# REPORT — SMART-coverage capability upgrade + R-50 island-bridge SPIKE (2026-07-25)

**Overwritten** per the standing rule. felhom.eu's share of the SMART-coverage task (docs) + the R-50
spike. (Code for the SMART fix is in felhom-agent v0.95.0 + felhom-controller v0.171.0.)

## Baseline → commits
felhom.eu `770ee5a` → `be2d90f` (capability-map) → **`1d65f44`** (island-bridge spike + ROADMAP).

## Capability map — disk-health row upgraded (evidence)
`documentation/architecture/00-capability-map.md`: the "Lemez-egészség felügyelet" row moved
**IMPLEMENTED → PROVEN-LIVE (healthy path + delivery)**. With agent v0.95.0 + controller v0.171.0 the
card on 9201 shows both real disks with real verdicts + model labels ("AirDisk 512GB SSD" → Rendben,
"TOSHIBA MQ04ABF100" → Rendben) — reversing the 2026-07-24 "Nincs adat on a raw UUID" state. Corrected
the earlier "virtualized demo hardware" note (it is a real N100).

## R-50 island-bridge SPIKE — BLOCKED empirically; design half source-grounded
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-island-bridge-2026-07-25.md` (+ ROADMAP R-50 → "SPIKED (partial)").
- **Probe 1 (drill env health): ABSENT.** `qm list` on felhom-pve is EMPTY (no nested drill PVE VM
  qm300); `pct list` shows only guest 9201; no `2f4b00`/drill config. The throwaway drill appliance was
  torn down. **Per the hard drill-only rule, probes 3–8 (bridge / NIC hot-add / island bind / F1 replay
  / survival) were NOT run — felhom-pve networking, guest 9201, and the live agent's `listen_addr` were
  left UNTOUCHED.** No live GO/NO-GO.
- **Source-grounded findings delivered (read-only):**
  - **Address plan:** recommend **link-local `169.254.253.1/30`↔`.2/30`** — structurally uncollidable
    with any customer LAN (RFC-3927 is neither routed nor DHCP'd), vs an obscure RFC-1918 /30's small
    residual risk.
  - **F1 root cause:** the LAN literal is baked in TWO places to move atomically — agent bind
    (`config.go:229` ← `felhom-host-install.sh:2226/2162`) + guest dial (`provision/backhalf.go:129` →
    `bootstrap.json` endpoint).
  - **NEW finding — the dnsmasq trap (CONFIRMED in source):** `LANResolverConfig.WithDefaults`
    (`config.go:208–210`) derives the DNS listen-address from `listen_addr`, so moving the bind to the
    island silently kills LAN DNS → the spec MUST set `lan_resolver.host_ip = LAN IP` explicitly.
  - **Pin:** leaf-DER-SHA256 based (address-independent) → no cert re-issue expected (source-asserted;
    empirically unproven without the drill env).
  - Provisioning inventory (file:line), cluster-parity (SDN on Peti's 2 nodes), and an implementation
    skeleton recorded.
- **Remaining:** a rebuilt drill VM to validate probes 3–8 before any production spec. **STOP —
  implementation is a future task.**

## Observations
- The island-bridge spike could not fulfill its empirical half; the honest outcome (env gone → STOP, no
  production improvisation) is recorded, and the source analysis gives the future task a real head start.