package web
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"html/template"
"log"
"math"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/assets"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/claim"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/gitea"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/intent"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/monitor"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/poke"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/offsite"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/semver"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)
// Generic-package names + the artifact filename inside each version (used to resolve version lists +
// sha256 from Gitea for the Day-0 artifact manifest UI).
const (
pkgAgent = "felhom-agent"
fileAgent = "felhom-agent"
pkgGolden = "felhom-golden"
fileGolden = "golden.tar.zst"
)
// artifactChoice is one selectable artifact version + its Gitea-resolved sha256 (for the dropdown +
// the read-only sha display).
type artifactChoice struct {
Version string
SHA256 string
}
// hubSession holds per-session auth and CSRF data.
type hubSession struct {
expiresAt time.Time
csrfToken string
}
// Server handles the dashboard web UI.
type Server struct {
store *store.Store
// configPasswordHash is the operator login password bcrypt hash SEEDED from hub.yaml
// (auth.password_hash) at startup. It is the fallback only — a hub_settings DB override set via
// the Configuration UI wins. Never read this field directly for an auth decision; call
// effectivePasswordHash().
configPasswordHash string
apiKey string // report API key — used for controller callbacks
version string
logger *log.Logger
templates *template.Template
staleThreshold time.Duration
versionChecker *VersionChecker
templateFetcher *TemplateFetcher
assetsMgr *assets.Manager
gitea *gitea.Client // optional; enables the Day-0 artifact version dropdowns
offsite *offsite.Provisioner // optional; enables Hetzner offsite provisioning (SLICE 1)
offsiteBox func() (monitor.BoxSnapshot, bool) // optional (v0.64.0, R-5); the restic pool-box aggregate snapshot accessor
pbsdrBox func() (monitor.PBSBoxSnapshot, bool) // optional (v0.65.0, R-5); the PBS-DR datastore fill snapshot accessor
tenantsync tenancyProvisioner // optional; enables PBS DR tier provisioning (web/pbsdr.go)
claimEngine *claim.Engine // optional; enables the customer-claim resend button (v0.50.0)
selfBindMailer SelfBindMailer // optional; enables the customer self-bind link button (v0.66.0, R-27)
bindLimiter *bindRateLimiter // per-IP throttle for the PUBLIC /bind/ surface (v0.66.0, R-27)
// intentHub (v0.58.0, Direction-2 immediate-sync) is Bumped by every operator-intent handler
// (config save/delete, claim resend, offsite re-issue/freeze, floor, block/unblock, log pull)
// so a box long-polling GET /api/v1/wait wakes in seconds. Shared with the API handler. nil =
// no immediacy (bumps are no-ops; the 15-min cycle still reconciles).
intentHub *intent.Hub
// poke (v0.59.0, Direction-2a agent-plane immediate-sync) fires a fire-and-forget UDP nudge to
// a host's box (via the ep0 forced command) when an AGENT-plane desired-state change is saved
// (a pbsdr descriptor, the MinAgent floor) so the box ticks in seconds instead of ≤15 min. nil
// = no immediacy (a no-op; the report cycle still reconciles). Its sibling intentHub handles
// the CONTROLLER plane (customer/app config) via the long-poll wait channel.
poke *poke.Notifier
sessions map[string]*hubSession
sessionsMu sync.RWMutex
}
// New creates a new web server.
func New(store *store.Store, passwordHash, apiKey, version string, staleThreshold time.Duration, logger *log.Logger) *Server {
funcMap := template.FuncMap{
"timeAgo": timeAgo,
"timeAgoPtr": func(t *time.Time) string {
if t == nil {
return "—"
}
return timeAgo(*t)
},
"statusColor": statusColor,
"formatFloat": func(f float64) string { return fmt.Sprintf("%.0f", f) },
"joinStrings": func(s []string, sep string) string { return strings.Join(s, sep) },
"json": func(v interface{}) template.JS {
b, _ := json.Marshal(v)
return template.JS(b)
},
"hubVersion": func() string { return version },
"add": func(a, b int) int { return a + b },
"mapGet": func(m map[string]int, key string) int {
if m == nil {
return 0
}
return m[key]
},
"memoryColor": memoryColor,
"accuracyClass": accuracyClass,
"gt": func(a, b int) bool { return a > b },
}
tmpl := template.Must(template.New("").Funcs(funcMap).ParseFS(templateFS, "templates/*.html"))
return &Server{
store: store,
configPasswordHash: passwordHash,
apiKey: apiKey,
version: version,
logger: logger,
templates: tmpl,
staleThreshold: staleThreshold,
sessions: make(map[string]*hubSession),
bindLimiter: newBindRateLimiter(30), // public /bind/ surface: 30 req/min/IP burst (R-27)
}
}
// effectivePasswordHash returns the operator login password bcrypt hash in force: the UI-set DB
// override (hub_settings, via the Configuration page) when present, otherwise the config/env seed
// (auth.password_hash from hub.yaml). This is the SINGLE source of truth for every auth check — the
// DB override wins and the ConfigMap value is the break-glass fallback, mirroring the
// controller-version floor's precedence. Empty return = auth disabled (dev/test only).
func (s *Server) effectivePasswordHash() string {
if h := s.store.GetOperatorPasswordHash(); h != "" {
return h
}
return s.configPasswordHash
}
// CleanupSessions removes expired sessions. Call with: go s.CleanupSessions(ctx).
func (s *Server) CleanupSessions(ctx context.Context) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(15 * time.Minute)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
s.sessionsMu.Lock()
now := time.Now()
for t, sess := range s.sessions {
if now.After(sess.expiresAt) {
delete(s.sessions, t)
}
}
s.sessionsMu.Unlock()
}
}
}
// SetVersionChecker sets the version checker (optional, may be nil if no registry credentials).
func (s *Server) SetVersionChecker(vc *VersionChecker) {
s.versionChecker = vc
}
// SetTemplateFetcher sets the template fetcher for config generation (optional).
func (s *Server) SetTemplateFetcher(tf *TemplateFetcher) {
s.templateFetcher = tf
}
// SetAssetManager sets the asset manager for the Configuration page (optional).
func (s *Server) SetAssetManager(am *assets.Manager) {
s.assetsMgr = am
}
// SetOffsiteProvisioner enables Hetzner offsite provisioning (optional). Without it, saving a config with
// offsite enabled returns an error (offsite not configured on this hub).
func (s *Server) SetOffsiteProvisioner(p *offsite.Provisioner) { s.offsite = p }
// SetOffsiteBox wires the pool-box aggregate snapshot accessor (v0.64.0, R-5): the checker's cached
// snapshot, read on the Offsite tab + the Dashboard tile. nil (no HETZNER_TOKEN/box id) → both render an
// honest "not configured". The web layer NEVER fetches from Hetzner — it only reads this cache.
func (s *Server) SetOffsiteBox(fn func() (monitor.BoxSnapshot, bool)) { s.offsiteBox = fn }
// SetPBSDRBox wires the PBS-DR datastore fill snapshot accessor (v0.65.0, R-5): read on the Offsite
// "PBS DR" tab + the Dashboard PBS gauge. nil (no tenantsync client) → "not configured". The snapshot
// carries its own state (ok/unavailable/degraded); the web layer never polls ep0.
func (s *Server) SetPBSDRBox(fn func() (monitor.PBSBoxSnapshot, bool)) { s.pbsdrBox = fn }
// SetClaimEngine wires the customer-claim code engine for the Setup-tab resend button (v0.50.0).
func (s *Server) SetClaimEngine(e *claim.Engine) { s.claimEngine = e }
// SetIntentHub wires the operator-intent notifier (v0.58.0). Every intent handler bumps it via
// s.bumpIntent; nil-safe (bumps become no-ops).
func (s *Server) SetIntentHub(hub *intent.Hub) { s.intentHub = hub }
// bumpIntent advances the customer's wait generation so a box long-polling GET /api/v1/wait wakes
// immediately. nil-safe. Call AFTER the successful store write (mirror the report.Trigger
// fire-after-commit rule — never on an error path).
func (s *Server) bumpIntent(customerID string) {
if s.intentHub != nil {
s.intentHub.Bump(customerID)
}
}
// SetGiteaClient enables the Day-0 artifact version dropdowns (optional). Without it the artifact form
// degrades to manual text entry.
func (s *Server) SetGiteaClient(c *gitea.Client) {
s.gitea = c
}
// artifactChoices resolves the currently-available versions of a generic package + each one's sha256
// from Gitea, newest first, for the Day-0 artifact dropdown. Returns nil (→ manual text-entry
// fallback) when no Gitea client is configured or Gitea is unreachable. A failed sha lookup for a
// single version drops just that version, not the whole list.
func (s *Server) artifactChoices(ctx context.Context, pkg, file string) []artifactChoice {
if s.gitea == nil {
return nil
}
vers, err := s.gitea.ListVersions(ctx, pkg)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[WARN] artifact versions (%s): %v", pkg, err)
return nil
}
const maxChoices = 20
if len(vers) > maxChoices {
s.logger.Printf("[INFO] artifact versions (%s): showing newest %d of %d", pkg, maxChoices, len(vers))
vers = vers[:maxChoices]
}
out := make([]artifactChoice, 0, len(vers))
for _, v := range vers {
sha, err := s.gitea.FileSHA256(ctx, pkg, v, file)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[WARN] artifact sha (%s/%s): %v", pkg, v, err)
continue
}
out = append(out, artifactChoice{Version: v, SHA256: sha})
}
return out
}
// ServeHTTP routes web requests.
func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
path := r.URL.Path
// CSRF protection for all state-changing requests (web routes only).
// API routes (/api/v1/) are Bearer-token authenticated and exempt.
if r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Method != http.MethodHead && r.Method != http.MethodOptions {
// /bind/ is the public customer self-bind surface (THE TRAP §9.2): no operator session to
// ride, so CSRF is exempt here exactly as it is for /login. The URL capability token is the
// authorization boundary; a cross-site POST without both secrets only burns attempts.
if path != "/login" && !isPublicBindPath(path) && s.effectivePasswordHash() != "" {
if !s.validateCSRF(r) {
s.logger.Printf("[WARN] CSRF rejected: %s %s from %s", r.Method, path, r.RemoteAddr)
http.Error(w, "CSRF token missing or invalid. Please reload the page.", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
}
}
switch {
case path == "/":
s.handleDashboard(w, r)
case path == "/style.css":
s.handleCSS(w, r)
case path == "/static/chart.min.js":
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/javascript")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=86400")
w.Write(chartJS)
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/static/fonts/"):
// Vendored brand fonts (design system v2) — embedded, no CDN.
name := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/static/fonts/")
data, err := fontFS.ReadFile("static/fonts/" + name)
if err != nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "font/woff2")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
w.Write(data)
case path == "/configuration":
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleConfigurationAction(w, r)
} else {
s.handleConfiguration(w, r)
}
case path == "/apps" || path == "/apps/":
s.handleApps(w, r)
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/apps/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/reset-telemetry"):
appName := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/apps/")
appName = strings.TrimSuffix(appName, "/reset-telemetry")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleResetAppTelemetry(w, r, appName)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/apps/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/dismiss-issues"):
appName := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/apps/")
appName = strings.TrimSuffix(appName, "/dismiss-issues")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleDismissAppIssues(w, r, appName)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/apps/"):
appName := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/apps/")
s.handleAppDetail(w, r, appName)
// Offsite — WG endpoint + peer registry (S2), plus endpoint management forms
// (v0.47.0; peer mutations stay on the admin API, allocation stays lowest-endpoint-id).
case path == "/offsite":
s.handleOffsite(w, r)
case path == "/offsite/endpoints":
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleOffsiteEndpointSave(w, r)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/offsite/endpoints/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/delete"):
endpointID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/offsite/endpoints/"), "/delete")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleOffsiteEndpointDelete(w, r, endpointID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
// Hosts — read-only fleet view (audit F-M1) + the v0.46.0 log-bundle actions.
case path == "/hosts" || path == "/hosts/":
s.handleHostsList(w, r)
// R-21 slice C — unclaimed-appliance operator actions (bind/discard). POST only.
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/appliances/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/bind"):
if id, ok := parseApplianceID(path, "bind"); ok && r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleApplianceBind(w, r, id)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/appliances/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/discard"):
if id, ok := parseApplianceID(path, "discard"); ok && r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleApplianceDiscard(w, r, id)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
// v0.47.0 stale host removal — suffix routes BEFORE the bare /hosts/ catch-all
// (mirroring the request-logs placement).
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/delete-impact"):
hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/delete-impact")
if r.Method == http.MethodGet {
s.handleHostDeleteImpact(w, r, hostID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/delete"):
hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/delete")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleHostDelete(w, r, hostID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
// v0.84.0 break-glass console credential — suffix route BEFORE the bare /hosts/ catch-all
// (registered after it, the POST would 404 and the GET would silently render the host page).
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/reveal-recovery-credential"):
hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/reveal-recovery-credential")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleHostRevealRecoveryCredential(w, r, hostID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/request-logs"):
hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/request-logs")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleRequestLogBundle(w, r, hostID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.Contains(path, "/log-bundles/"):
rest := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/")
if i := strings.Index(rest, "/log-bundles/"); i > 0 {
s.handleLogBundleView(w, r, rest[:i], rest[i+len("/log-bundles/"):])
} else {
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/"):
hostID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/")
s.handleHostDetail(w, r, hostID)
case path == "/login":
s.handleLogin(w, r)
case isPublicBindPath(path):
// PUBLIC customer self-bind (R-27 slice 1) — GET renders the form/state, POST validates the
// two factors. Auth + CSRF exempt above via the SAME isPublicBindPath predicate.
s.handleBind(w, r)
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/block"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/block")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleBlockCustomer(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/selfbind-link"):
// R-27 slice 1: mint + email a customer self-bind capability link. POST only.
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/selfbind-link")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleSelfBindLinkSend(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/unblock"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/unblock")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleUnblockCustomer(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/geo/disable"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/geo/disable")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleGeoDisable(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/floor"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/floor")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleSetCustomerFloor(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/create-config"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/create-config")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleCreateConfigFromReport(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/dr-recipe.json"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/dr-recipe.json")
s.handleDRRecipeDownload(w, r, customerID)
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/request-log-tail"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/request-log-tail")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleRequestLogTail(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.Contains(path, "/log-tail/"):
rest := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
parts := strings.SplitN(rest, "/log-tail/", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
s.handleLogTailView(w, r, parts[0], parts[1])
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
s.handleCustomerUnified(w, r, customerID)
// Config management routes — exact matches first, then prefix matches
case path == "/configs":
s.handleConfigList(w, r)
case path == "/configs/new":
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleConfigCreate(w, r)
} else {
s.handleConfigNewForm(w, r)
}
// Global settings live under the Configuration tab (moved from Customers).
case path == "/configuration/global-floor/impact":
if r.Method == http.MethodGet {
s.handleGlobalFloorImpact(w, r)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case path == "/configuration/global-floor":
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleSetGlobalFloor(w, r)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case path == "/configuration/artifacts":
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleSetArtifacts(w, r)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case path == "/configuration/password":
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleChangePassword(w, r)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/delete"):
// Customer DELETE cascade (v0.69.0, R-25b): GET returns the guided dialog's live inventory
// (hosts + offsite + PBS + custody + any incomplete journal), POST runs the full teardown.
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/delete")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleCustomerDelete(w, r, customerID)
} else {
s.handleCustomerDeletePreview(w, r, customerID)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/edit"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/edit")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleConfigUpdate(w, r, customerID)
} else {
s.handleConfigEditForm(w, r, customerID)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/offsite-reissue"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/offsite-reissue")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleOffsiteReissue(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/claim-resend"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/claim-resend")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleClaimResend(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/pbsdr-reissue"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/pbsdr-reissue")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handlePBSDRReissue(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/offsite-freeze"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/offsite-freeze")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleOffsiteFreeze(w, r, customerID, r.FormValue("unfreeze") != "1")
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/preview"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/preview")
s.handleConfigPreview(w, r, customerID)
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/regen-password"):
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/regen-password")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleConfigRegenPassword(w, r, customerID)
} else {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/reset"):
// Customer RESET (v0.61.0): GET renders the confirm surface (live inventory), POST executes.
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/reset")
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
s.handleCustomerReset(w, r, customerID)
} else {
s.handleCustomerResetPreview(w, r, customerID)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/configs/"):
// Redirect old config detail URL to unified customer page
customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/configs/")
http.Redirect(w, r, "/customers/"+customerID, http.StatusSeeOther)
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}
// RequireAuth wraps a handler with session or basic authentication.
func (s *Server) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Skip auth if no password configured
if s.effectivePasswordHash() == "" {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Always allow the login page through (GET and POST), and the PUBLIC customer self-bind
// surface (THE TRAP §9.2): /bind/ is exempt from operator auth exactly as /login is — the
// emailed URL capability token IS the auth model there. isPublicBindPath is the SINGLE
// definition of the prefix (matched tightly: trailing slash, path already .. -cleaned by the
// ServeMux) so this exemption cannot reach any operator-gated route.
if r.URL.Path == "/login" || isPublicBindPath(r.URL.Path) {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Check session cookie (random token stored server-side)
if cookie, err := r.Cookie("hub_session"); err == nil {
s.sessionsMu.RLock()
sess, ok := s.sessions[cookie.Value]
s.sessionsMu.RUnlock()
if ok && time.Now().Before(sess.expiresAt) {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
}
// Check basic auth (for programmatic/CLI access)
_, password, ok := r.BasicAuth()
if ok && bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(s.effectivePasswordHash()), []byte(password)) == nil {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Redirect browsers to login page; send 401 for API-like requests
if r.Header.Get("Accept") == "application/json" || r.Header.Get("X-Requested-With") != "" {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="Felhom Hub"`)
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusFound)
})
}
func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
password := r.FormValue("password")
effHash := s.effectivePasswordHash()
if effHash != "" && bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(effHash), []byte(password)) == nil {
// Generate random session token
b := make([]byte, 32)
_, _ = rand.Read(b)
sessionToken := hex.EncodeToString(b)
// Generate CSRF token
cb := make([]byte, 32)
_, _ = rand.Read(cb)
csrfToken := hex.EncodeToString(cb)
s.sessionsMu.Lock()
s.sessions[sessionToken] = &hubSession{
expiresAt: time.Now().Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
csrfToken: csrfToken,
}
s.sessionsMu.Unlock()
isSecure := r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: "hub_session",
Value: sessionToken,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
Secure: isSecure,
MaxAge: 86400 * 7,
})
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
// Render login with error
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
w.Write([]byte(`Felhom Hub — Bejelentkezés`))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`Felhom Hub — Bejelentkezés`))
}
// validateCSRF checks the CSRF token for a session-based request.
// Returns true if CSRF is valid or if no session cookie is present (Basic Auth path).
func (s *Server) validateCSRF(r *http.Request) bool {
cookie, err := r.Cookie("hub_session")
if err != nil {
// No session cookie — likely Basic Auth or programmatic access; skip CSRF
return true
}
s.sessionsMu.RLock()
sess, ok := s.sessions[cookie.Value]
s.sessionsMu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return false
}
submitted := r.FormValue("_csrf")
if submitted == "" {
submitted = r.Header.Get("X-CSRF-Token")
}
return submitted != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(submitted), []byte(sess.csrfToken)) == 1
}
// csrfToken returns the CSRF token for the current session.
func (s *Server) csrfToken(r *http.Request) string {
cookie, err := r.Cookie("hub_session")
if err != nil {
return ""
}
s.sessionsMu.RLock()
sess, ok := s.sessions[cookie.Value]
s.sessionsMu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return ""
}
return sess.csrfToken
}
// csrfField returns an HTML hidden input for embedding in forms.
func (s *Server) csrfField(r *http.Request) template.HTML {
tok := s.csrfToken(r)
return template.HTML(``)
}
func (s *Server) handleDashboard(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
customers, err := s.store.GetCustomers()
if err != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Dashboard: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
configs, _ := s.store.ListCustomerConfigs()
type dashboardCustomer struct {
store.CustomerSummary
OverallStatus string // "ok", "warn", "down", "pending"
HostCause string // v0.53.0 roll-up: "" or "host down|stale|pending: "
BackupAge string
EventCriticals int
EventErrors int
EventWarnings int
}
// Build map of report customers keyed by ID
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var data []dashboardCustomer
for _, c := range customers {
// Skip blocked customers
if s.store.IsCustomerBlocked(c.CustomerID) {
continue
}
seen[c.CustomerID] = true
dc := dashboardCustomer{CustomerSummary: c}
// Controller-derived status + the v0.53.0 dead-host roll-up (rollup.go): a customer
// may never look better than its worst expected host.
dc.OverallStatus, dc.HostCause = s.foldHostStatus(c.CustomerID, controllerStatus(&c), true)
// Backup age
if c.BackupLastSnapshot != nil {
dc.BackupAge = timeAgo(*c.BackupLastSnapshot)
} else {
dc.BackupAge = "–"
}
// Event counts (last 24h)
if counts, err := s.store.CountEventsBySeverity(c.CustomerID, time.Now().Add(-24*time.Hour)); err == nil {
dc.EventCriticals = counts["critical"]
dc.EventErrors = counts["error"]
dc.EventWarnings = counts["warning"]
}
data = append(data, dc)
}
// Add config-only customers (no reports yet) as "pending"
for _, cfg := range configs {
if seen[cfg.CustomerID] || cfg.Status == "blocked" {
continue
}
dc := dashboardCustomer{
CustomerSummary: store.CustomerSummary{
CustomerID: cfg.CustomerID,
CustomerName: cfg.CustomerName,
},
OverallStatus: "pending",
BackupAge: "–",
}
// Roll-up for the never-reported customer too: a down/stale host worsens even during
// onboarding — only never-reported ("pending") hosts are excluded here.
dc.OverallStatus, dc.HostCause = s.foldHostStatus(cfg.CustomerID, dc.OverallStatus, false)
data = append(data, dc)
}
payload := struct {
Customers []dashboardCustomer
OffsiteTile *offsiteTile // R-5: restic pool box; nil → no gauge
PBSTile *pbsdrTile // R-5 v0.65.0: PBS DR datastore; nil → no gauge
}{Customers: data, OffsiteTile: s.offsiteBoxTile(), PBSTile: s.pbsdrBoxTile()}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
if err := s.templates.ExecuteTemplate(w, "dashboard.html", payload); err != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Template render: %v", err)
}
}
// compareVersions delegates to THE hub comparator (internal/semver). Kept as a thin wrapper so the
// web package's many call sites are unchanged.
func compareVersions(a, b string) int { return semver.Compare(a, b) }
func (s *Server) handleCSS(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
data, err := templateFS.ReadFile("templates/style.css")
if err != nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/css")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=3600")
w.Write(data)
}
func timeAgo(t time.Time) string {
d := time.Since(t)
if d < time.Minute {
return "just now"
}
if d < time.Hour {
m := int(math.Round(d.Minutes()))
return fmt.Sprintf("%d min ago", m)
}
if d < 24*time.Hour {
h := int(math.Round(d.Hours()))
return fmt.Sprintf("%dh ago", h)
}
days := int(d.Hours() / 24)
return fmt.Sprintf("%dd ago", days)
}
// statusColor maps a status value to a design-system-v2 semantic token, consumed as a
// class suffix (status-dot-nominal, tag-nominal, …) — never as an inline color (D4).
// Exception-color principle: a healthy fleet is blue/neutral; amber/red only on deviation.
// ok -> nominal (blue — operating normally)
// warn, stale -> warn (amber — degraded / stale report)
// down, fail -> crit (red — outage)
// pending -> neutral (a not-yet-provisioned customer is a normal fleet state)
// disabled -> neutral (deliberately paused — not a deviation)
// blocked -> warn (an operator cut a customer off: intentional but attention-worthy)
func statusColor(status string) string {
switch status {
case "ok":
return "nominal"
case "warn", "stale":
return "warn"
case "down", "fail":
return "crit"
case "blocked":
return "warn"
case "disabled", "pending":
return "neutral"
default:
return "neutral"
}
}
// handleConfiguration renders the Configuration page.
func (s *Server) handleConfiguration(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
csrfToken := s.getCSRFToken(r)
assetCount := 0
assetLastSync := ""
if s.assetsMgr != nil {
assetCount = s.assetsMgr.FileCount()
if m := s.assetsMgr.GetManifest(); m != nil {
assetLastSync = m.Generated
}
}
ctx := r.Context()
data := map[string]interface{}{
"CSRFToken": csrfToken,
"CSRFField": s.csrfField(r),
"AssetCount": assetCount,
"AssetLastSync": assetLastSync,
"GlobalFloor": s.store.GetGlobalMinControllerVersion(),
"FloorRes": s.store.ResolveGlobalFloor(),
"Artifacts": s.store.GetArtifactManifest(),
"AgentChoices": s.artifactChoices(ctx, pkgAgent, fileAgent),
"GoldenChoices": s.artifactChoices(ctx, pkgGolden, fileGolden),
"Flash": r.URL.Query().Get("flash"),
}
if err := s.templates.ExecuteTemplate(w, "configuration.html", data); err != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] configuration.html template: %v", err)
}
}
// handleConfigurationAction handles POST actions on the Configuration page.
func (s *Server) handleConfigurationAction(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
action := r.FormValue("action")
switch action {
case "refresh_assets":
if s.assetsMgr == nil {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=assets_not_configured", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
if err := s.assetsMgr.ReSeed(); err != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Asset re-seed failed: %v", err)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=assets_error", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
s.logger.Printf("[INFO] Manual asset re-seed completed")
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=assets_refreshed", http.StatusSeeOther)
default:
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
}
// minOperatorPasswordLen is the minimum accepted new operator login password length (bytes). A low
// floor by design — this is the single operator's own login, not a customer-facing credential — but
// it stops fat-finger empties/typos from silently becoming the password. bcrypt caps input at 72
// bytes, so that is the hard upper bound.
const minOperatorPasswordLen = 8
// handleChangePassword updates the operator login password from the Configuration page (v0.54.0).
// It requires the CURRENT password (verified against the effective hash — DB override → config seed),
// a new password of at least minOperatorPasswordLen bytes, and a matching confirmation. On success it
// bcrypts the new password (cost 10, matching the ConfigMap seed) and persists it to hub_settings, the
// DB override that wins over the hub.yaml seed. The ConfigMap value stays the break-glass fallback:
// blank the DB row (or edit the manifest + redeploy) to reset a lost password. Existing sessions are
// intentionally left valid — only the /login and Basic-Auth checks consult the new hash. CSRF is
// already enforced by ServeHTTP for this POST.
func (s *Server) handleChangePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
current := r.FormValue("current_password")
next := r.FormValue("new_password")
confirm := r.FormValue("confirm_password")
// Verify the current password against the effective hash. Empty effective hash (auth disabled)
// also blocks the change — there is nothing to authenticate against.
if eff := s.effectivePasswordHash(); eff == "" || bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(eff), []byte(current)) != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[WARN] Change-password rejected: current password mismatch from %s", r.RemoteAddr)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=pw_current_wrong", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
if len(next) < minOperatorPasswordLen {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=pw_too_short", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
if len(next) > 72 { // bcrypt hard limit — reject up front for a friendly message
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=pw_too_long", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
if next != confirm {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=pw_mismatch", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
if next == current { // no-op change — keep the flash honest
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=pw_unchanged", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(next), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Change-password: bcrypt generate failed: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if err := s.store.SetOperatorPasswordHash(string(hash)); err != nil {
s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Change-password: persist failed: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
s.logger.Printf("[INFO] Operator login password changed via Configuration UI from %s", r.RemoteAddr)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/configuration?flash=pw_changed", http.StatusSeeOther)
}