# Felhom bare-metal ISO pipeline (R-21 slice A) Turns the official Proxmox VE ISO into a **Felhom auto-install ISO** whose first-boot chain, unattended, fetches and runs `felhom-host-install.sh` until the host is enrolled and a guest is provisioned. Boot the ISO on blank hardware → walk away → managed Felhom host. Grounding: every install/first-boot/webhook mechanism used here is proven in `documentation/audits/SPIKE-baremetal-iso-2026-07-16.md` (S1–S8). This pipeline **composes** them; it does **not** modify `felhom-host-install.sh` (which it only invokes over the public distribution channel). > **Scope:** slice A = the pipeline + the in-ISO bootstrap, validated on nested VM 310. The physical > N100 run is **RUNBOOK B** (separate, supervised). The customer-facing claim/pairing that removes the > secret from the ISO is **slice C** (not built here). ## Files | File | Role | |---|---| | `Dockerfile.assistant` | build host: Debian trixie + `proxmox-auto-install-assistant` (paired to the ISO's PVE generation by Debian codename) + `xorriso` + `shellcheck` | | `build-felhom-iso.sh` | the pipeline: render answer, mint throwaway root hash, **validate-answer output-parse gate**, render stub, `prepare-iso`, emit ISO + sha256 + manifest | | `answer.toml.tmpl` | Proxmox answer template (`__FQDN__` / `__ROOT_HASH__` / `__ROOT_SSH_KEYS__` / `__DISK_SETUP__` placeholders; `[first-boot]` from-iso/fully-up) | | `profiles/*.profile` | disk-selection + fqdn fragments (sourceable, no secret) | | `stub-first-boot.sh` | the ONE first-boot executable (skeleton; build injects the bootstrap script/unit/env as base64) | | `felhom-bootstrap.sh` | per-attempt: fetch host-install from the public channel → run it with the retrieval passphrase → on rc 0 write done-flag + disable | | `felhom-bootstrap.service` | retry-forever unit (`Type=oneshot`, `Restart=on-failure`, `RestartSec=30`, `StartLimitIntervalSec=0`) | ## Build ```bash # 1. build the assistant image once (rebuild when the target PVE generation changes) docker build -f scripts/iso/Dockerfile.assistant -t felhom-iso-assistant:trixie scripts/iso # 2. build an ISO (on the build host; PVE ISO pre-downloaded + its official sha256) scripts/iso/build-felhom-iso.sh \ --pve-iso /path/proxmox-ve_9.2-1.iso \ --iso-sha256 4e88fe416df9b527624a175f24c9aa07c714d3332afb1ee3dbf3879573ef2c6c \ --profile scripts/iso/profiles/nested-vm.profile \ --bootstrap-env /secure/bootstrap.env \ --out ~/felhom-iso/out ``` Output: `felhom-pve--v-.iso` + `.sha256` + `.manifest.txt`. The build **gates the answer on validate-answer's OUTPUT TEXT, never `$?`** — `validate-answer` returns exit 0 even on a broken file (spike S1 trap; also `prepare-iso` was observed to exit 0 on a bad answer). A broken answer aborts the build with the validator's message and produces **no ISO**. Note `validate-answer` is *syntactic only*: disk existence is a runtime property (a non-existent disk passes the build and fails-safe at install — spike S5c/S8b). ## Profile format A sourceable shell fragment: ```sh FELHOM_FQDN="felhom-host.local" FELHOM_DISK_SETUP='[disk-setup] filesystem = "ext4" disk-list = ["sda"]' # optional emergency/validation key baked into root's authorized_keys (blank -> not baked): # FELHOM_ROOT_SSH_KEY="ssh-ed25519 AAAA... ops@felhom" ``` `FELHOM_DISK_SETUP` is any valid Proxmox `[disk-setup]` block — a `disk-list` OR a udev `filter.*` glob. **A filter matching nothing, or a non-existent disk, fails-safe**: the installer aborts (exit 1, no disk touched) rather than installing on the wrong disk (spike S5c). Never commit a real key in `FELHOM_ROOT_SSH_KEY` unless it is meant to ship in every ISO built from that profile. ## bootstrap-env (SECRET-BEARING) The `--bootstrap-env` file becomes the in-ISO `/etc/felhom/bootstrap.env`: ```sh FELHOM_CUSTOMER_ID= # required FELHOM_MODE=appliance # required (appliance|byo) FELHOM_RETRIEVAL_PASSPHRASE= # required — SECRET # optional: # FELHOM_HUB_URL=https://hub.felhom.eu # FELHOM_INSTALL_URL=https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh # FELHOM_EXTRA_ARGS="--cores 4 --memory 8192" # profile-only flags, never secrets ``` **Why the ISO is secret-bearing (§4.4 finding):** the hub install-command's *distribution channel* is the public `https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` — no token, no secret in the command. But `felhom-host-install.sh` requires the customer **retrieval passphrase** (normally a no-echo prompt) to fetch the config and enroll the host. An *unattended* install must supply it via `--passphrase-file`, so the ISO embeds it. **Rules for a secret-bearing ISO:** - supervised / single-use only; **never distributed**; **delete after the run**. - issue the passphrase with the shortest usable lifetime; rotate/retire after the install. - the bootstrap `shred`s `bootstrap.env` on the box once host-install succeeds (reduces secret-at-rest). - **slice C** removes this: the claim/pairing flow delivers the passphrase (or config) to the box *after* the customer claims it, so the *distributed* ISO carries no secret. ## The first-boot chain `stub-first-boot.sh` (exactly-once, `[first-boot]` from-iso/fully-up) is **dumb**: it lays down `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-bootstrap.sh`, the systemd unit, and `/etc/felhom/bootstrap.env` (0600), then enables + starts the unit. All fallible/network work lives in `felhom-bootstrap.service`, which retries forever until `felhom-host-install.sh` exits 0, then writes `/etc/felhom/.bootstrap-done`, disables itself, and scrubs the env. Retry-vs-resume: the first attempt is plain; any later attempt that finds `/var/lib/felhom-install/state.json` adds `--resume` (safe per host-install v1.11.3 — its producer steps re-run each pass). ## N100 profile (for RUNBOOK B) The nested profile uses `disk-list=["sda"]`. **A real single-disk mini-PC should use a unique-serial udev filter, not `disk-list`:** 1. Boot once (or use a live env), harvest the target disk's udev id: `udevadm info --query=property --name=/dev/sda | grep -E 'ID_SERIAL_SHORT|ID_MODEL|ID_WWN'`. 2. Write a profile: `filter.ID_SERIAL_SHORT = ""` + `filter-match = "all"`. A match-nothing filter fails-safe (won't wipe the wrong disk). 3. **Prior-LVM prerequisite:** the auto-installer does **not** force-clear a pre-existing LVM PV signature — a disk with a previous Linux/Proxmox install aborts at "cannot init physical volume" (spike S2b). Wipe first: `blkdiscard -f /dev/` (or `wipefs -a` + zero the PV region). 4. UEFI + Secure Boot: no caveat — installs and boots under SB enforcing, no MOK/keypress (spike S2b). ## Validation status (nested VM 310, 2026-07-16) PASS: build gate + red-proof (C); disk-filter fail-safe through the pipeline (D); stub→unit→**real public-channel fetch**→correct host-install invocation→retry; 2.3 resume decision; exactly-once stub; no-network retry + auto-recovery (B). **Operator-gated (not live-proven here):** host-install rc-0 terminal success → hub-enrolled + guest-provisioned + done-flag + unit-disable — needs a properly created drill customer (the hub create-UI is password-gated and a live-DB insert is unsafe). Also out of scope: the physical N100 run (RUNBOOK B).