package api import ( "bytes" "context" "encoding/json" "fmt" "sync" "testing" "time" "gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store" ) // fakeSender records every Send so tests can assert call count + byte fidelity. type fakeSender struct { mu sync.Mutex calls int lastRaw []byte from string to []string err error } func (f *fakeSender) Send(_ context.Context, raw []byte, mailFrom string, rcptTo []string) error { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() f.calls++ f.lastRaw = append([]byte(nil), raw...) f.from = mailFrom f.to = append([]string(nil), rcptTo...) return f.err } func (f *fakeSender) callCount() int { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() return f.calls } func rawFrom(from string) []byte { return []byte("From: " + from + "\r\nTo: recipient@example.com\r\nSubject: test\r\n\r\nbody\r\n") } func mailBody(t *testing.T, fromAddr string) string { t.Helper() b, err := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{ "raw_mime": rawFrom(fromAddr), "mail_from": fromAddr, "rcpt_to": []string{"recipient@example.com"}, }) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } return string(b) } func withCustomer(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, id, key string) { t.Helper() if err := st.SaveCustomerConfig(&store.CustomerConfig{CustomerID: id, APIKey: key, RetrievalPassword: "p"}); err != nil { t.Fatalf("SaveCustomerConfig: %v", err) } } // §7 A / §10: happy path — the hub passes the RAW bytes through unchanged to the sender, // NOT a parsed/structured payload. func TestMail_HappyPath_PassthroughRawBytes(t *testing.T) { h, st, _ := newTestHandler(t) withCustomer(t, st, "c1", "ckey") fake := &fakeSender{} h.SetMailRelay(fake, 30, []string{"felhom.eu"}) rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", mailBody(t, "vaultwarden@felhom.eu")) if rr.Code != 200 { t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d (%s)", rr.Code, rr.Body.String()) } if fake.callCount() != 1 { t.Fatalf("expected 1 send, got %d", fake.callCount()) } // Byte-equality: the sender must receive exactly what the box sent — no parse/re-encode // (the parse-then-API path drops inline CID images; §10). if !bytes.Equal(fake.lastRaw, rawFrom("vaultwarden@felhom.eu")) { t.Fatalf("sender got mutated bytes:\n got=%q", fake.lastRaw) } } func TestMail_Unauthorized(t *testing.T) { h, _, _ := newTestHandler(t) h.SetMailRelay(&fakeSender{}, 30, []string{"felhom.eu"}) if rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "wrongkey", mailBody(t, "x@felhom.eu")); rr.Code != 401 { t.Fatalf("expected 401, got %d", rr.Code) } } func TestMail_NotConfigured_503(t *testing.T) { h, st, _ := newTestHandler(t) withCustomer(t, st, "c1", "ckey") // No SetMailRelay → sender nil. if rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", mailBody(t, "x@felhom.eu")); rr.Code != 503 { t.Fatalf("expected 503, got %d", rr.Code) } } // §7 B: From outside the allowlist is refused and the sender is NEVER called. func TestMail_FromOutsideAllowlist_Rejected_NoSend(t *testing.T) { h, st, _ := newTestHandler(t) withCustomer(t, st, "c1", "ckey") fake := &fakeSender{} h.SetMailRelay(fake, 30, []string{"felhom.eu"}) rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", mailBody(t, "evil@notfelhom.example")) if rr.Code != 403 { t.Fatalf("expected 403, got %d", rr.Code) } if fake.callCount() != 0 { t.Fatalf("sender must not be called on From-reject, got %d", fake.callCount()) } } // Companion red-proof for §7 B: allow the bad domain → the same message reaches the sender. func TestMail_FromReject_CompanionProof(t *testing.T) { h, st, _ := newTestHandler(t) withCustomer(t, st, "c1", "ckey") fake := &fakeSender{} h.SetMailRelay(fake, 30, []string{"notfelhom.example"}) // gate removed rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", mailBody(t, "evil@notfelhom.example")) if rr.Code != 200 { t.Fatalf("with the domain allowed, expected 200, got %d", rr.Code) } if fake.callCount() != 1 { t.Fatalf("companion: wrong-From should reach the sender once, got %d", fake.callCount()) } } // §7 C: per-box rate limit — over the limit returns 429; a different customer is unaffected. func TestMail_RateLimit_PerCustomer(t *testing.T) { h, st, _ := newTestHandler(t) withCustomer(t, st, "c1", "ckey") withCustomer(t, st, "c2", "ckey2") h.SetMailRelay(&fakeSender{}, 1, []string{"felhom.eu"}) // 1/min if rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", mailBody(t, "a@felhom.eu")); rr.Code != 200 { t.Fatalf("first send should pass, got %d", rr.Code) } if rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", mailBody(t, "a@felhom.eu")); rr.Code != 429 { t.Fatalf("second send (over limit) should be 429, got %d", rr.Code) } // Different customer's quota is independent — one box can't starve the fleet. if rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey2", mailBody(t, "b@felhom.eu")); rr.Code != 200 { t.Fatalf("other customer should be unaffected, got %d", rr.Code) } } // Companion red-proof for §7 C: a generous limit lets the N+1th through (proves the limiter bites). func TestMail_RateLimit_CompanionProof(t *testing.T) { h, st, _ := newTestHandler(t) withCustomer(t, st, "c1", "ckey") h.SetMailRelay(&fakeSender{}, 1000, []string{"felhom.eu"}) for i := 0; i < 5; i++ { if rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", mailBody(t, "a@felhom.eu")); rr.Code != 200 { t.Fatalf("call %d should pass under a generous limit, got %d", i, rr.Code) } } } // §7 A failure surface: a Resend send failure becomes 502 (the box's shim maps that to a // permanent SMTP error to the app). func TestMail_SendFailure_502(t *testing.T) { h, st, _ := newTestHandler(t) withCustomer(t, st, "c1", "ckey") h.SetMailRelay(&fakeSender{err: fmt.Errorf("resend refused")}, 30, []string{"felhom.eu"}) if rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", mailBody(t, "vaultwarden@felhom.eu")); rr.Code != 502 { t.Fatalf("expected 502 on send failure, got %d", rr.Code) } } func TestMail_BadBody_400(t *testing.T) { h, st, _ := newTestHandler(t) withCustomer(t, st, "c1", "ckey") h.SetMailRelay(&fakeSender{}, 30, []string{"felhom.eu"}) if rr := do(h, "POST", "/mail", "ckey", "{not json"); rr.Code != 400 { t.Fatalf("expected 400 for bad body, got %d", rr.Code) } } // --- rate limiter unit (deterministic clock) --- func TestMailRateLimiter_ThresholdRefillIsolation(t *testing.T) { rl := newMailRateLimiter(2) now := time.Unix(1000, 0) rl.now = func() time.Time { return now } if !rl.allow("a") || !rl.allow("a") { t.Fatal("first two for key a should pass (burst=2)") } if rl.allow("a") { t.Fatal("third for key a should be denied") } // Different key is independent. if !rl.allow("b") { t.Fatal("key b should be unaffected") } // Advance 30s → 2/min refills 1 token. now = now.Add(30 * time.Second) if !rl.allow("a") { t.Fatal("after 30s, key a should have refilled one token") } if rl.allow("a") { t.Fatal("only one token should have refilled") } }