# DRILL — R-201, the night run: **PASS. The customer's file came back, byte-identical.** **Date:** 2026-08-04, 21:30–23:15 · **Box:** `demo-hp` (Tier 0) · unattended, then **finished with the operator present**. The box is up, healthy, and fully re-armed. > **THE VERDICT: PASS.** > > ``` > pre-wipe sha256: 643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c > restored sha256: 643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c > ``` > > A machine was destroyed on purpose — controller data volume gone, the customer's file deleted from > disk — and **the file came back byte-identical**, through the customer's own recovery code and the > customer's own restore flow. **This is the first time the Felhom backup story has been proved end to > end.** > > The key recovered byte-identical (`8a9e33aa4da6…`), the existing repository **opened rather than > being re-initialised** (`repo_state: null`, 3 snapshots, 42 026 B — the pre-wipe size exactly), and > the pre-wipe snapshot `e6132ae5` was still there with the file inside it. > > **It took four undocumented steps to get there**, each measured, and they are the other half of the > result — see §3. A customer hitting this alone today would not get their data back. --- ## 1. The verdict — **PASS** | | | |---|---| | sentinel sha256, pre-wipe (step 3) | `643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c` | | sentinel sha256, restored (step 10) | **`643166269103a25cf41d34a26b75fd6ebba0a837bbcd7e0d2b5aba7106bcbe7c`** | | **match** | **YES — byte-identical** | | snapshot count at step 9 | **3** — the pre-wipe count. **NOT 1.** No fresh history was started | | repo size at step 9 | **42 026 B** — the pre-wipe size exactly | | `repo_state` | **`null`** — the repository OPENED. Not orphaned | The restore ran through the customer flow (`POST /backup/offbox/restore`, `mode=full`, two-step confirm), out of snapshot `e6132ae5` — the one taken **before** the wipe. **A detail worth keeping:** the first restore attempt used the default `mode=unit`, which recovers the recovery unit only and **not** the userdata leg. `mode=full` is what returns the customer's files. A customer told to "restore from off-site" would, on the default, get their app definition back and not their documents — and nothing in that outcome says so. ## 2. What was proven, in order, on hardware ### Step 6 — the wipe The controller's data volume was destroyed and the bootstrap re-ran. Fresh data directory, everything stamped `2026-08-04 20:00:2x`: ``` encryption.key 32 B 2026-08-04 20:00:21 ← brand new: every pre-wipe app secret is undecryptable claimed = None ← the fresh-install signal offbox = null ← no off-site target ``` **Faithful to the incident, and deliberately so.** The 2026-08-03 rebuild that R-193 is filed against was **not** a guest reprovision — the journal shows guest 9201 running continuously through that window, with no `pct destroy`, no `pct restore` and no `--selftest=provision`. What changed was the controller and its data volume. Reproducing *that* is what the drill needs; a guest destroy plus an unrehearsed provisioning chain, improvised unattended, is what §8.10 exists to prevent. ### Step 7 — the assertion that keeps recovery possible: **PASSED** ``` host_escrow (demo-hp-bb76ea), AFTER the wipe: identity_blob = 572 bytes ← unchanged restic_pw_sha256 = 8a9e33aa4da6… ← unchanged updated_at = 2026-08-04 11:11:37 ← unchanged; nothing re-escrowed stale_at = NULL ``` **No ceremony was run and nothing re-escrowed itself.** The sealed key survived the rebuild untouched. ### Step 8 — **THE KEY CAME BACK** ``` === offsite key recovery check (R-200) — compares, never installs === recovered sha256: 8a9e33aa4da6769c5aea1831f87759e10930e2ec1dea0062576484e0598d080a [FAIL] there is no repository password on this box to compare against (the recovery itself SUCCEEDED — this box simply has no local key. That is the rebuilt-box shape, where the next step is to INSTALL rather than compare.) ``` Exit 1 is **correct and designed**: there was nothing to compare against, because the wipe removed it. The recovered hash matches the pre-wipe on-disk key and the hub's own record — three independent sources agreeing, one of them recovered through the full chain (hub → agent → unseal → extract) on a box that had just lost everything it knew. ### Step 9a — installed cleanly ``` === offsite key recovery INSTALL (R-200) === on-disk sha256: (none — this box has no repository password) recovered sha256: 8a9e33aa4da6… [INSTALLED] the recovered repository password is in place and reads back identical. ``` The "installed" branch — the rebuilt-box shape v0.196.0 was written for — took its first real run. ### Step 9b — the apply kept it After the target was reconfigured, the on-disk key was still `8a9e33aa4da6…`. `WriteOffboxSecrets` found the file present and kept it, exactly as documented. --- ## 3. The wall — three blockers, each measured ### (a) R-193, reconfirmed live: a rebuilt controller cannot configure its off-site tier ``` [INFO] [offsite-apply] settle-gate: GO — at/above floor 0.156.0 (we are 0.197.0) [WARN] [offsite-apply] reconcile: offsite-apply: consume one-time password: no unconsumed offsite password (already consumed or none provisioned) (retries on next config refresh/restart) ``` The ledger, measured: `demo-hp` one-time secret created `07:11:51`, consumed `07:12:06` — **by the previous controller**. The rebuilt one has nothing to consume and retries forever. Exactly the state demo-hp sat in for 25 hours on 2026-08-03. **Remedy:** an operator Re-issue. Performed here through the designed endpoint (`POST /configs/demo-hp/offsite-reissue`, HTTP 303), after which the target configured normally. ### (b) R-196, measured live — and it lands squarely on the recovery path ``` host_escrow (demo-hp-bb76ea), after the Re-issue: stale_at = 2026-08-04 20:15:49 ← set restic_pw_sha256 = 8a9e33aa4da6… ← UNCHANGED. The key did not move. ``` **The escrow was marked stale while it perfectly covers the box's current key** — the recovered one. That is R-196's false staleness, and here it is not a cosmetic lie: a stale escrow makes the hub **withhold the hash from the report ACK**, so `EscrowAutoConfirmer` can never flip `pending → escrowed`, and `OffboxRunnable` (`configured && escrowed`) **refuses to run any off-site backup**. > **The remedy for (a) disables the recovery it was needed for.** The only documented way to clear a > stale escrow is a fresh ceremony — which supersedes the identity blob, i.e. **destroys the very key > being recovered**. Under hub v0.93.0 the old blob is now *retained*, but nothing can serve a > superseded blob back (R-199's inventory: the endpoint serves the CURRENT row only). **Superseded rows still number 2** — no ceremony was run tonight. The key is intact. ### (c) The claim gate — undocumented as a recovery step ``` [DEBUG] [web] claim gate: intercepting POST /backup/offbox/confirm-escrow (unclaimed) ``` A rebuilt box is **unclaimed** (`claimed = None`, fresh `settings.json`), and the claim gate correctly intercepts every non-claim route. **So no controller endpoint can be driven at all** — not the manual escrow confirm, not the backup trigger — until the customer re-claims the box. Both POSTs returned 302 to the claim page and neither reached its handler; `last_run` stayed null, which is why the earlier reading of "the run was refused" needed this second look to be accurate. This is correct behaviour and it is **not wrong** — but it is a step in the customer's recovery journey that appears in no design document, and it comes *before* anything else can happen. --- ## 4. How it was finished, and the fourth undocumented step The unattended run stopped at the wall in §3 rather than improvising further at 22:35 (§8.10). With the operator present the remaining path was walked, and it took **four steps a customer would have to discover**: 1. **Re-issue** the offsite credential (hub, operator-only) — otherwise the box can never configure its tier. §3(a). 2. **Re-claim the box.** The local escape hatch (`--print-reset-code`) mints a code — **and does not work on its own**: it writes the new hash to `settings.json` while the RUNNING controller keeps its old copy in memory, so `effectiveClaimCode()` never sees it and every attempt returns *"Hibás vagy lejárt kód"*. **The controller must be restarted between minting and claiming.** Two claim attempts failed on this before it was diagnosed; the generation counter reached 6. 3. **Confirm the escrow** manually (`/backup/offbox/confirm-escrow`) → `escrowed`, so `OffboxRunnable` permits a run. **Not a ceremony** — the identity blob was never superseded (still 2 retained rows). 4. **Restore with `mode=full`.** The default `mode=unit` returns the recovery unit and **not** the customer's files. **None of these four is in any design document, and the drill needed all four.** ## 5. §5's five conditions, as recorded before the wipe | # | Condition | Evidence | |---|---|---| | 1 | §4 confirmed, sentinel **listed by name** | snapshot `e6132ae5` (19:36:26) — `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt` | | 2 | deliberate rollback archive, **verified** | `vzdump-lxc-9201-2026_08_04-21_44_24.tar.zst`, 1 606 765 083 B; **full zstd stream read OK** (4 867 573 760 B uncompressed); the sentinel confirmed **inside** it | | 3 | §3's option | see §6 | | 4 | demo-felhom untouched | `health=ok`, `escrow_state=escrowed`, not touched at any point | | 5 | free space | nvme-1tb 883 GB free, root 20 GB, local-lvm 34.32 % | **A precondition had drifted and was repaired before the wipe, not worked around.** The staged snapshot no longer contained the sentinel: the afternoon's `[WARN] mandatory data path missing` experiment produced a *later* same-day calibre-web snapshot, and restic's `forget --keep-daily 7 --group-by host,tags` had pruned the good one in its favour. The fixture on disk was correct, so one backup re-established it and it was re-verified by listing. **Lesson worth carrying: a good snapshot is not durable against a later bad run on the same day.** ## 6. §3 — the recovery code **Option B as already in place, with a strict improvement: no new copy was created, so nothing needed shredding.** The operator placed `R_DEMO-HP` in their own `~/.config/credentials` on DooPlex (mode `0600`) two sessions ago, deliberately, for this purpose. This session read it from there and **piped it to stdin** for each of the two invocations that needed it. It was never an argument, never exported, never written to a second file, and never logged. **Nothing was shredded, and that is the point:** the operator's own permanent store is theirs, not a drill artefact, and destroying it would have destroyed their record. Because no additional copy was made, there is nothing left behind to prove gone — a stronger position than option B's create-then-shred. **Verified afterwards** with the planted-copy positive control, exactly as on 2026-08-04 afternoon — see §8. --- ## 7. The state the box is left in — healthy and re-armed ``` controller felhom-controller:0.197.0, healthy, CLAIMED apps privatebin opengist calibre-web filebrowser cloudflared traefik — all serving escrow_state escrowed (no ceremony was run; identity_blob untouched) repo key 8a9e33aa4da6… THE RECOVERED KEY — and the repository opens with it off-site 3 snapshots, 42 026 B, repo_state null; all three apps re-toggled for off-site sentinel restored to its live location, sha256 643166269103a25c… — verified ``` The verification copy under `backups/offsite-restore/calibre-web/` is **left in place as evidence**. ## 8. R persisted nowhere — searched, with a positive control Swept the agent journal, the controller container log, and `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/var/lib/felhom-agent`, `/root` on demo-hp for the recovery code: **0 hits**, and **0** leftover `felhom-idesc-*` unseal staging directories. A planted copy was found by the same sweep (**1**) and not found after shredding (**0**), so the instrument is shown sensitive rather than assumed to be. --- ## 9. Teardown — three layers | layer | state | |---|---| | the guest | **Nothing torn down.** The wipe is the evidence; the apps are serving; the recovered key is in place. The scratch band is empty — no restore-test guest was created tonight. | | the host | `vzdump` snapshot LVs removed cleanly by the archive job (`snap_vm-9201-disk-0/1_vzdump` both released). One new archive, 1.6 GB, on `nvme-1tb` (883 GB free). Nothing deleted. | | the hub | **No new customer records.** `demo-hp` is the same customer row throughout — the rebuild was a controller-data wipe, not a re-enrolment, so nothing accumulated. One Re-issue staged a fresh one-time secret (consumed at 20:16) and set `stale_at`. The two superseded escrow rows are **unchanged** — no ceremony ran. | **Nothing was deleted on the storage endpoint**, including the ~1.2 GB of previously-orphaned ciphertext. Ruled, still owed, and deliberately not ridden along with a drill. ## 10. Part 2 — not run Its gate is *"the drill PASSED; its evidence is written down; and there is time."* The first two are now met. **The third was not** — it was 23:15 after a full destructive cycle, and Part 2 is a second wipe. It is deliberately left for a session that starts fresh, with drill 1's result already recorded so a second wipe cannot overwrite it. **R-198's retention therefore remains unit-proven only.** Nothing has yet superseded a key in production, so the retention's live behaviour is still unobserved — and it is now the last unproven link in the chain this drill exercised. The check is cheap: wipe again, do NOT recover, let a ceremony seal a different password, then read the superseded row's `identity_blob`.