package monitor import ( "io" "log" "path/filepath" "strings" "testing" "gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store" _ "modernc.org/sqlite" ) // reportWith builds a host-report body carrying the given capability snapshot (the only field the // capability checker reads). One critical-degraded entry makes the host "degraded". func reportWith(caps string) []byte { return []byte(`{"host_id":"h1","capabilities":` + caps + `}`) } const capAllOK = `[{"name":"guest-init-pid","feature":"drive-gate","critical":true,"status":"ok"}]` const capCritDegraded = `[{"name":"guest-init-pid","feature":"drive-gate guest-sees","critical":true,"status":"degraded","reason":"sudo policy denied"}]` const capNonCritDegraded = `[{"name":"disk-smart","feature":"SMART","critical":false,"status":"degraded","reason":"binary not found"}]` func newCapStore(t *testing.T) *store.Store { t.Helper() st, err := store.New(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"), log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() }) st.SaveCustomerConfig(&store.CustomerConfig{CustomerID: "c1", APIKey: "ck", RetrievalPassword: "p"}) st.UpsertHost(&store.Host{HostID: "h1", CustomerID: "c1", APIKey: "k1"}) return st } // TestHostCapabilityChecker covers the full transition contract (§10): seed (no event), ok→degraded // (one event), steady degraded (none), degraded→ok (recovered), and that a non-critical degradation // never trips the host state. func TestHostCapabilityChecker(t *testing.T) { st := newCapStore(t) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capAllOK), store.HostReportDenorm{}) var events []string onEvent := func(_, eventType, _, _, _, _ string) { events = append(events, eventType) } // Seed ok → no event on init. cc := NewHostCapabilityChecker(st, onEvent, log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)) if cc.GetState("h1") != "ok" { t.Fatalf("seed state = %s, want ok", cc.GetState("h1")) } if len(events) != 0 { t.Fatalf("seed must not emit, got %v", events) } // ok → degraded: exactly ONE operator event. st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCritDegraded), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if cc.GetState("h1") != "degraded" { t.Fatalf("state = %s, want degraded", cc.GetState("h1")) } if len(events) != 1 || events[0] != "agent_capability_degraded" { t.Fatalf("want one agent_capability_degraded, got %v", events) } // Steady degraded: NO duplicate event. st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCritDegraded), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if len(events) != 1 { t.Fatalf("steady degraded must not re-emit, got %v", events) } // degraded → ok: recovered event. st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capAllOK), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if cc.GetState("h1") != "ok" { t.Fatalf("state = %s, want ok", cc.GetState("h1")) } if len(events) != 2 || events[1] != "agent_capability_recovered" { t.Fatalf("want recovered event, got %v", events) } } // A NON-critical degradation must NOT flip the host to degraded (no operator noise). func TestHostCapabilityChecker_NonCriticalIgnored(t *testing.T) { st := newCapStore(t) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capAllOK), store.HostReportDenorm{}) var events []string cc := NewHostCapabilityChecker(st, func(_, et, _, _, _, _ string) { events = append(events, et) }, log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capNonCritDegraded), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if cc.GetState("h1") != "ok" { t.Fatalf("non-critical degradation flipped state to %s, want ok", cc.GetState("h1")) } if len(events) != 0 { t.Fatalf("non-critical degradation must not alert, got %v", events) } } // A pre-v0.44.0 agent (no capabilities array) is "ok" — an old agent can't trip a false alert. func TestHostCapabilityChecker_OldAgentNoCaps(t *testing.T) { st := newCapStore(t) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", []byte(`{"host_id":"h1"}`), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc := NewHostCapabilityChecker(st, func(_, _, _, _, _, _ string) {}, log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)) if cc.GetState("h1") != "ok" { t.Fatalf("old agent (no caps) state = %s, want ok", cc.GetState("h1")) } } // F2 RED-PROOF: a host already DEGRADED at hub (re)start is left UNSEEDED by the constructor and the // FIRST Check emits once — so a box that was already broken when the hub restarted alerts (vs the // pre-fix path which seeded it silently and never alerted). Companion: pre-fix the constructor seeded // "degraded" and Check saw oldState==newState → no event. func TestHostCapabilityChecker_F2_BornDegradedAlerts(t *testing.T) { st := newCapStore(t) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCritDegraded), store.HostReportDenorm{}) var events []string cc := NewHostCapabilityChecker(st, func(_, et, _, _, _, _ string) { events = append(events, et) }, log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)) if len(events) != 0 { t.Fatalf("construction must not emit, got %v", events) } if cc.GetState("h1") != "unknown" { t.Fatalf("born-degraded must be left unseeded, GetState = %s want unknown", cc.GetState("h1")) } cc.Check() if len(events) != 1 || events[0] != "agent_capability_degraded" { t.Fatalf("born-degraded first Check → one agent_capability_degraded, got %v", events) } cc.Check() // steady degraded → no duplicate if len(events) != 1 { t.Fatalf("steady degraded must not re-emit, got %v", events) } } // ── R-1150: a refused whole-guest backup has its own alarm ─────────────────────────────────────── const capCadenceRefused = `[{"name":"guest-init-pid","feature":"drive-gate","critical":true,"status":"ok"},` + `{"name":"localapi:backup-cadence-cap","feature":"whole-guest restore points","critical":true,"status":"degraded",` + `"reason":"refused a whole-guest backup of guest 9202 on target \"local\" at 2026-10-19T03:15:00Z — more than the schedule allows; the guest's controller may be misbehaving or compromised: check the guest"}]` const capCadenceOK = `[{"name":"guest-init-pid","feature":"drive-gate","critical":true,"status":"ok"},` + `{"name":"localapi:backup-cadence-cap","feature":"whole-guest restore points","critical":true,"status":"ok"}]` const capGrantAndCadenceDegraded = `[{"name":"guest-init-pid","feature":"drive-gate guest-sees","critical":true,"status":"degraded","reason":"sudo policy denied"},` + `{"name":"localapi:backup-cadence-cap","feature":"whole-guest restore points","critical":true,"status":"degraded","reason":"refused a whole-guest backup of guest 9202"}]` const capGrantDegradedCadenceOK = `[{"name":"guest-init-pid","feature":"drive-gate guest-sees","critical":true,"status":"degraded","reason":"sudo policy denied"},` + `{"name":"localapi:backup-cadence-cap","feature":"whole-guest restore points","critical":true,"status":"ok"}]` type capEvent struct{ eventType, severity, message, details string } func recordCapEvents(evs *[]capEvent) EventNotifyFunc { return func(_, eventType, severity, message, details, _ string) { *evs = append(*evs, capEvent{eventType, severity, message, details}) } } func capTypes(evs []capEvent) []string { out := make([]string, len(evs)) for i, e := range evs { out[i] = e.eventType } return out } // The cadence cap ALONE degraded → exactly one whole_guest_backup_refused (warning, plain text, the agent's // reason in the details) and NOT agent_capability_degraded; steady → nothing; the window ending → one // whole_guest_backup_refusal_cleared (info) and NOT agent_capability_recovered. // // COMPANION RED-PROOF (observed 2026-10-19): with the pre-fix shape restored (capabilityState counting the // cadence cap like any grant, no separate refusal state) this test fails with // // host_capability_test.go: cadence cap alone → want [whole_guest_backup_refused], got [agent_capability_degraded] // // Restored. func TestR1150_CadenceCapAloneRaisesWholeGuestBackupRefused(t *testing.T) { st := newCapStore(t) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCadenceOK), store.HostReportDenorm{}) var evs []capEvent cc := NewHostCapabilityChecker(st, recordCapEvents(&evs), log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCadenceRefused), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if got := capTypes(evs); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "whole_guest_backup_refused" { t.Fatalf("cadence cap alone → want [whole_guest_backup_refused], got %v", got) } e := evs[0] if e.severity != "warning" { t.Errorf("severity = %q, want warning", e.severity) } if !strings.Contains(e.message, "a whole-guest backup was refused") || !strings.Contains(e.message, "check the guest") { t.Errorf("message does not say what happened in plain words: %q", e.message) } if strings.Contains(e.message, "privileged capability") { t.Errorf("message still reads as a broken grant: %q", e.message) } if !strings.Contains(e.details, "guest 9202") || !strings.Contains(e.details, "localapi:backup-cadence-cap") { t.Errorf("details must carry the agent's reason and the capability name: %s", e.details) } if cc.GetState("h1") != "ok" { t.Errorf("the grants state = %s, want ok (the cadence cap is not a grant)", cc.GetState("h1")) } if cc.GetBackupRefusalState("h1") != "degraded" { t.Errorf("refusal state = %s, want degraded", cc.GetBackupRefusalState("h1")) } // The event is STORED too (the operator's event list), under the new type. if at, err := st.LastEventAt("c1", "whole_guest_backup_refused"); err != nil || at.IsZero() { t.Errorf("whole_guest_backup_refused not stored: at=%v err=%v", at, err) } st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCadenceRefused), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if len(evs) != 1 { t.Fatalf("steady refusal must not re-emit, got %v", capTypes(evs)) } st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCadenceOK), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if got := capTypes(evs); len(got) != 2 || got[1] != "whole_guest_backup_refusal_cleared" { t.Fatalf("refusal window ended → want [.. whole_guest_backup_refusal_cleared], got %v", got) } if evs[1].severity != "info" { t.Errorf("cleared severity = %q, want info (recorded, never mailed)", evs[1].severity) } } // Another critical cap degraded → agent_capability_degraded unchanged (the cadence cap never named in it); // both degraded on ONE report → exactly one event per state; the grant restored while the refusal stands → // agent_capability_recovered alone; nothing for a steady state. // // COMPANION RED-PROOF (observed 2026-10-19): with the pre-fix shape restored the both-degraded report emits a // single event naming both caps and the test fails with // // host_capability_test.go: grant + cadence on one report → want [agent_capability_degraded whole_guest_backup_refused], got [agent_capability_degraded] // // Restored. func TestR1150_OtherCapStillRaisesCapabilityDegraded(t *testing.T) { st := newCapStore(t) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCadenceOK), store.HostReportDenorm{}) var evs []capEvent cc := NewHostCapabilityChecker(st, recordCapEvents(&evs), log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)) // A grant alone: the old event, unchanged text. st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capGrantDegradedCadenceOK), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if got := capTypes(evs); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "agent_capability_degraded" { t.Fatalf("grant alone → want [agent_capability_degraded], got %v", got) } if !strings.Contains(evs[0].message, "agent privileged capability degraded — guest-init-pid") { t.Errorf("agent_capability_degraded text changed: %q", evs[0].message) } // Back to clean, then both on one report. st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCadenceOK), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() evs = nil st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capGrantAndCadenceDegraded), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() got := capTypes(evs) if len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "agent_capability_degraded" || got[1] != "whole_guest_backup_refused" { t.Fatalf("grant + cadence on one report → want [agent_capability_degraded whole_guest_backup_refused], got %v", got) } if strings.Contains(evs[0].message, "backup-cadence-cap") || strings.Contains(evs[0].details, "backup-cadence-cap") { t.Errorf("agent_capability_degraded must not name the cadence cap: %q / %s", evs[0].message, evs[0].details) } // Steady: nothing. st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capGrantAndCadenceDegraded), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if len(evs) != 2 { t.Fatalf("steady both-degraded must not re-emit, got %v", capTypes(evs)) } // The grant restored, the refusal still standing: only the grants recover. st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCadenceRefused), store.HostReportDenorm{}) cc.Check() if got := capTypes(evs); len(got) != 3 || got[2] != "agent_capability_recovered" { t.Fatalf("grant restored, refusal standing → want [.. agent_capability_recovered], got %v", got) } if cc.GetBackupRefusalState("h1") != "degraded" { t.Errorf("refusal state = %s, want still degraded", cc.GetBackupRefusalState("h1")) } } // F2 for the refusal: a host already reporting a refused backup when the hub (re)starts alerts ONCE on the // first Check (not at construction), and never again while steady. // // COMPANION RED-PROOF (observed 2026-10-19): with the pre-fix shape restored it fails with // // host_capability_test.go: born-refused → want exactly [whole_guest_backup_refused], got [agent_capability_degraded] // // Restored. func TestR1150_BornRefusedAlertsOnce(t *testing.T) { st := newCapStore(t) st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", reportWith(capCadenceRefused), store.HostReportDenorm{}) var evs []capEvent cc := NewHostCapabilityChecker(st, recordCapEvents(&evs), log.New(io.Discard, "", 0)) if len(evs) != 0 { t.Fatalf("construction must not emit, got %v", capTypes(evs)) } cc.Check() cc.Check() if got := capTypes(evs); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "whole_guest_backup_refused" { t.Fatalf("born-refused → want exactly [whole_guest_backup_refused], got %v", got) } }