package web

// Scenarios A–G (hub v0.84.0) — the break-glass Console access card + the operator-session reveal
// endpoint.
//
// SEAM DISCIPLINE: every test here drives RequireAuth(ServeHTTP), never a handler function
// directly. Scenario E (route ordering) is INVISIBLE to a handler-level test — the handler is
// correct and simply never runs — and that is the shape of the inert-seam defects on record.
//
// The load-bearing assertion is negative in the way that matters: the plaintext must not appear
// ANYWHERE in a rendered host page. revealCanary is deliberately distinctive so an accidental leak
// is greppable across the tree.

import (
	"bytes"
	"encoding/json"
	"io"
	"log"
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptest"
	"path/filepath"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"

	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
)

const revealCanary = "REVEAL-CANARY-9f2b7c"

// newRevealServer builds a hub with a live operator password (so RequireAuth + the ServeHTTP CSRF
// check are both armed) and a CAPTURED logger, so the "the secret never reaches the log" assertion
// has something to read.
func newRevealServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *store.Store, *bytes.Buffer) {
	t.Helper()
	var logBuf bytes.Buffer
	st, err := store.New(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "t.db"), log.New(io.Discard, "", 0))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("store.New: %v", err)
	}
	t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
	s := New(st, "", "", "test", 30*time.Minute, log.New(&logBuf, "", 0))
	h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("operator-pw"), bcrypt.MinCost)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	s.configPasswordHash = string(h)
	return s, st, &logBuf
}

// newRevealSession mints a live operator session and returns (cookie, csrfToken).
func newRevealSession(t *testing.T, s *Server) (*http.Cookie, string) {
	t.Helper()
	s.sessionsMu.Lock()
	s.sessions["sess-token-reveal"] = &hubSession{
		expiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
		csrfToken: "csrf-token-reveal",
	}
	s.sessionsMu.Unlock()
	return &http.Cookie{Name: "hub_session", Value: "sess-token-reveal"}, "csrf-token-reveal"
}

// seedRevealHost creates a host (optionally bound to a customer) with a vaulted credential.
func seedRevealHost(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, hostID, customerID, secret string) {
	t.Helper()
	if err := st.UpsertHost(&store.Host{HostID: hostID, CustomerID: customerID, APIKey: "k-" + hostID}); err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if secret != "" {
		if err := st.SaveHostRecoveryCredential(hostID, "root@pam", secret); err != nil {
			t.Fatal(err)
		}
	}
}

// serveReveal drives the REAL stack: RequireAuth → ServeHTTP → routing → handler.
func serveReveal(t *testing.T, s *Server, req *http.Request) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
	t.Helper()
	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
	s.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(s.ServeHTTP)).ServeHTTP(rr, req)
	return rr
}

func countEvents(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, customerID, eventType string) int {
	t.Helper()
	evs, err := st.GetRecentEvents(customerID, 100)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	n := 0
	for _, e := range evs {
		if e.EventType == eventType {
			n++
		}
	}
	return n
}

// --- Scenario A: the rendered host page carries presence + username + set_at, NEVER the secret ---
// RED-PROOF A: add `data-secret="{{.RecoverySecret}}"` to the card and a "RecoverySecret" key
// holding cred.Secret to hostDetailData → the canary assertion below goes RED.
func TestReveal_A_PageNeverCarriesTheSecret(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, _ := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, _ := newRevealSession(t, s)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "demo-felhom-8363b5", "demo-felhom", revealCanary)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/hosts/demo-felhom-8363b5", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	rr := serveReveal(t, s, req)
	if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
		t.Fatalf("host page = %d, want 200", rr.Code)
	}
	body := rr.Body.String()

	// THE load-bearing assertion — the whole response, attributes, comments, scripts and all.
	if strings.Contains(body, revealCanary) {
		t.Fatal("SECRET LEAK: the vaulted console password appears in the rendered host page")
	}
	for _, want := range []string{
		"Console access",
		"root@pam",
		"/hosts/demo-felhom-8363b5/reveal-recovery-credential",
		"Reveal",
	} {
		if !strings.Contains(body, want) {
			t.Errorf("host page is missing %q", want)
		}
	}
}

// --- Copy must work WITHOUT a reveal (regression, 2026-07-31) ---
//
// THE INCIDENT: Copy shipped `disabled` until a Reveal. Clicking it did nothing, silently, so the
// operator's clipboard kept its previous contents — ANOTHER HOST'S console password — which was then
// pasted into a PVE login that failed with no explanation. The box logged a plain
// `password check failed for user (root)` and the credential was never at fault.
//
// Copying without revealing is also the SAFER path: the secret never renders on screen, so it cannot
// be shoulder-surfed or captured in a screenshot.
//
// RED-PROOF: restore `disabled` on the Copy button → this test goes red.
func TestReveal_CopyIsNotGatedOnReveal(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, _ := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, _ := newRevealSession(t, s)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "demo-hp-bb76ea", "demo-hp", revealCanary)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/hosts/demo-hp-bb76ea", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	body := serveReveal(t, s, req).Body.String()

	// Locate the Copy button and assert it ships ENABLED.
	i := strings.Index(body, `id="console-copy-demo-hp-bb76ea"`)
	if i < 0 {
		t.Fatal("no Copy button on the card")
	}
	end := strings.Index(body[i:], ">")
	if end < 0 {
		t.Fatal("malformed Copy button tag")
	}
	tag := body[i : i+end]
	if strings.Contains(tag, "disabled") {
		t.Fatalf("the Copy button ships DISABLED — clicking it is a silent no-op that leaves a stale "+
			"secret in the clipboard: %s", tag)
	}

	// It must still be the case that no secret is in the document.
	if strings.Contains(body, revealCanary) {
		t.Fatal("SECRET LEAK: enabling Copy put the password in the page")
	}

	// And the copy path must be wired to the SAME audited endpoint, not a second one.
	if !strings.Contains(body, "copyConsolePassword('demo-hp-bb76ea')") {
		t.Error("the Copy button is not wired to a handler")
	}
	// The endpoint URL must be DEFINED exactly once (the data-reveal-url attribute); the script
	// reads it back with getAttribute rather than rebuilding it, so Copy cannot drift onto a
	// different — unaudited — path than Reveal.
	if n := strings.Count(body, "/hosts/demo-hp-bb76ea/reveal-recovery-credential"); n != 1 {
		t.Errorf("the retrieval URL is written %d times; it must be defined once and read back", n)
	}
}

// Every failure branch of the copy path must report itself. A disabled button, a missing clipboard
// API and a refused clipboard write all previously ended in silence.
func TestReveal_CopyPathHasNoSilentFailureBranch(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, _ := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, _ := newRevealSession(t, s)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "demo-hp-bb76ea", "demo-hp", revealCanary)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/hosts/demo-hp-bb76ea", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	body := serveReveal(t, s, req).Body.String()

	for _, want := range []struct{ frag, why string }{
		{"will not give the page clipboard access", "no clipboard API → must say so, not no-op"},
		{"clipboard write was refused", "a rejected writeText → must never claim success"},
		{"Could not copy the credential", "a failed fetch → must surface the status"},
		{"Copied ", "a SUCCESSFUL copy must confirm, or the operator cannot tell it worked"},
	} {
		if !strings.Contains(body, want.frag) {
			t.Errorf("missing outcome message %q (%s)", want.frag, want.why)
		}
	}

	// The confirmation must NAME the host: the clipboard is fleet-wide and every box has a different
	// console password, so "copied" alone cannot say copied for WHICH box — the exact confusion that
	// produced the incident.
	if !strings.Contains(body, "' + hostID + '") {
		t.Error("the copy confirmation does not name the host it copied for")
	}
}

// --- Scenario B: reveal delivers the secret, records exactly one event, and never logs it ---
// RED-PROOF B: delete the SaveEvent call in handleHostRevealRecoveryCredential → the event
// assertion goes RED.
func TestReveal_B_RevealDeliversAndAudits(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, logBuf := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, csrf := newRevealSession(t, s)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "demo-felhom-8363b5", "demo-felhom", revealCanary)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/hosts/demo-felhom-8363b5/reveal-recovery-credential", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf)
	rr := serveReveal(t, s, req)

	if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
		t.Fatalf("reveal = %d, want 200 (body %q)", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
	}
	if got := rr.Header().Get("Cache-Control"); got != "no-store" {
		t.Errorf("Cache-Control = %q, want no-store", got)
	}
	if ct := rr.Header().Get("Content-Type"); !strings.HasPrefix(ct, "application/json") {
		t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
	}
	var got struct {
		HostID   string `json:"host_id"`
		Username string `json:"username"`
		Password string `json:"password"`
		SetAt    string `json:"set_at"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("decode: %v (body %q)", err, rr.Body.String())
	}
	if got.Password != revealCanary {
		t.Errorf("password = %q, want the vaulted secret", got.Password)
	}
	if got.Username != "root@pam" || got.HostID != "demo-felhom-8363b5" {
		t.Errorf("unexpected payload: %+v", got)
	}
	if got.SetAt == "" {
		t.Error("set_at missing — the operator cannot judge staleness without it")
	}

	// Exactly ONE timeline row, on the bound customer, info severity, source "hub", Hungarian.
	evs, err := st.GetRecentEvents("demo-felhom", 100)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	n := 0
	for _, e := range evs {
		if e.EventType != "recovery_credential_revealed" {
			continue
		}
		n++
		if e.Severity != "info" {
			t.Errorf("severity = %q, want info", e.Severity)
		}
		if e.Source != "hub" {
			t.Errorf("source = %q, want hub", e.Source)
		}
		if !strings.Contains(e.Message, "konzolos hozzáférési jelszavát") {
			t.Errorf("message is not the Hungarian customer-facing line: %q", e.Message)
		}
		if strings.Contains(e.Message, revealCanary) || strings.Contains(e.DetailsJSON, revealCanary) {
			t.Fatal("SECRET LEAK: the password is in the event row")
		}
	}
	if n != 1 {
		t.Errorf("recovery_credential_revealed rows = %d, want exactly 1", n)
	}

	// The hub log records the access — username + length only.
	if strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), revealCanary) {
		t.Fatal("SECRET LEAK: the password reached the hub log")
	}
	if !strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), "operator revealed break-glass console credential") {
		t.Errorf("the access is not recorded in the hub log: %q", logBuf.String())
	}

	// No dispatcher call exists on this path — nothing was emailed.
	notifs, err := st.GetRecentNotifications("demo-felhom", 100)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if len(notifs) != 0 {
		t.Errorf("reveal produced %d notification_log row(s); it must email nobody", len(notifs))
	}
}

// --- Scenario C: nothing vaulted → the explanatory card, no control, 404 on POST, zero events ---
func TestReveal_C_NotVaulted(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, _ := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, csrf := newRevealSession(t, s)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "sess-f-2670b5", "sess-f", "") // no credential row

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/hosts/sess-f-2670b5", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	body := serveReveal(t, s, req).Body.String()
	if !strings.Contains(body, "not vaulted") {
		t.Error("the not-vaulted state does not render its badge")
	}
	if !strings.Contains(body, "byo host") {
		t.Error("the not-vaulted state does not explain WHY (byo / step 4b)")
	}
	if strings.Contains(body, "/hosts/sess-f-2670b5/reveal-recovery-credential") {
		t.Error("a Reveal control is offered for a host with nothing vaulted")
	}

	req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/hosts/sess-f-2670b5/reveal-recovery-credential", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf)
	rr := serveReveal(t, s, req)
	if rr.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
		t.Fatalf("reveal on an unvaulted host = %d, want 404", rr.Code)
	}
	// A 404 is not an access: only a DELIVERED secret is recorded.
	if n := countEvents(t, st, "sess-f", "recovery_credential_revealed"); n != 0 {
		t.Errorf("a 404 wrote %d event row(s); it must write none", n)
	}
}

// --- Scenario D: the CSRF gate (security) ---
// RED-PROOF D: the companion below sends the token and asserts 200, proving this test
// discriminates on CSRF rather than passing because the request was malformed some other way.
func TestReveal_D_CSRFRequired(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, _ := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, csrf := newRevealSession(t, s)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "demo-felhom-8363b5", "demo-felhom", revealCanary)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/hosts/demo-felhom-8363b5/reveal-recovery-credential", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie) // session, but NO CSRF token
	rr := serveReveal(t, s, req)
	if rr.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
		t.Fatalf("reveal without CSRF = %d, want 403", rr.Code)
	}
	if strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), revealCanary) {
		t.Fatal("SECRET LEAK: the 403 body carries the password")
	}
	if n := countEvents(t, st, "demo-felhom", "recovery_credential_revealed"); n != 0 {
		t.Errorf("a CSRF refusal wrote %d event row(s); it must write none", n)
	}

	// The discriminator: the SAME request WITH the token succeeds.
	req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/hosts/demo-felhom-8363b5/reveal-recovery-credential", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf)
	if rr := serveReveal(t, s, req); rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
		t.Fatalf("the same request WITH a CSRF token = %d, want 200 — the 403 above proves nothing", rr.Code)
	}
}

// --- Scenario E: the method gate — and, through it, the ROUTE ORDER (seam test) ---
// RED-PROOF E: move the new case BELOW `case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/")` → the GET falls
// through to the catch-all, renders the host detail page 200, and this test goes RED.
func TestReveal_E_MethodGateAndRouteOrder(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, _ := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, _ := newRevealSession(t, s)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "demo-felhom-8363b5", "demo-felhom", revealCanary)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/hosts/demo-felhom-8363b5/reveal-recovery-credential", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	rr := serveReveal(t, s, req)
	if rr.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
		t.Fatalf("GET on the reveal route = %d, want 405", rr.Code)
	}
	// The route-order half: a fall-through to /hosts/ would render the host page instead.
	if strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), "Console access") {
		t.Fatal("the reveal route fell through to the /hosts/ catch-all — the case is registered AFTER it")
	}
	if strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), revealCanary) {
		t.Fatal("SECRET LEAK: the 405 body carries the password")
	}
}

// --- Scenario F: unknown host ---
func TestReveal_F_UnknownHost(t *testing.T) {
	s, _, _ := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, csrf := newRevealSession(t, s)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/hosts/does-not-exist/reveal-recovery-credential", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf)
	if rr := serveReveal(t, s, req); rr.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
		t.Fatalf("reveal on an unknown host = %d, want 404", rr.Code)
	}
}

// --- Scenario G: unauthenticated ---
func TestReveal_G_Unauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, _ := newRevealServer(t)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "demo-felhom-8363b5", "demo-felhom", revealCanary)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/hosts/demo-felhom-8363b5/reveal-recovery-credential", nil)
	req.Header.Set("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest") // API-like → 401 rather than a login redirect
	rr := serveReveal(t, s, req)
	if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
		t.Fatalf("unauthenticated reveal = %d, want 401", rr.Code)
	}
	if strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), revealCanary) {
		t.Fatal("SECRET LEAK: the 401 body carries the password")
	}
	if n := countEvents(t, st, "demo-felhom", "recovery_credential_revealed"); n != 0 {
		t.Errorf("an unauthenticated call wrote %d event row(s); it must write none", n)
	}
}

// --- Edge case (§8): an UNBOUND host reveals fine and writes no event (SaveEvent needs a customer) ---
func TestReveal_UnboundHostRevealsWithoutAnEvent(t *testing.T) {
	s, st, logBuf := newRevealServer(t)
	cookie, csrf := newRevealSession(t, s)
	seedRevealHost(t, st, "unbound-01", "", revealCanary)

	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/hosts/unbound-01/reveal-recovery-credential", nil)
	req.AddCookie(cookie)
	req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf)
	rr := serveReveal(t, s, req)
	if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
		t.Fatalf("reveal on an unbound host = %d, want 200", rr.Code)
	}
	if !strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), revealCanary) {
		t.Error("the unbound host's secret was not delivered")
	}
	// No placeholder customer id is invented — the hub log is the only record.
	if n := countEvents(t, st, "", "recovery_credential_revealed"); n != 0 {
		t.Errorf("an unbound host wrote %d event row(s) against an empty customer id", n)
	}
	if !strings.Contains(logBuf.String(), "unbound-01") {
		t.Error("the unbound host's reveal is recorded nowhere at all")
	}
}