package api

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"database/sql"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"log"
	"net/http"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/assets"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/claim"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/configgen"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/mailrelay"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/notify"
	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
)

// ConfigTemplateProvider returns the controller.yaml template for config generation.
type ConfigTemplateProvider interface {
	Template() string
}

// LatestVersionProvider returns the latest controller image version known to the hub's registry
// checker (e.g. "0.86.0"), or "" if unknown. Satisfied by *web.VersionChecker; nil when the
// registry checker is disabled. Used to advertise latest on the controller report ACK.
type LatestVersionProvider interface {
	LatestVersion() string
}

// Handler handles API endpoints for report ingest and customer queries.
type Handler struct {
	store            *store.Store
	apiKey           string
	resendAPIKey     string
	fromEmail        string
	logger           *log.Logger
	httpClient       *http.Client
	templateProvider ConfigTemplateProvider
	dispatcher       *notify.Dispatcher
	assetsMgr        *assets.Manager
	latestVersion    LatestVersionProvider

	// App-email passthrough (POST /api/v1/mail). nil sender = endpoint returns 503.
	mailSender    mailrelay.Sender
	mailLimiter   *mailRateLimiter
	mailFromAllow map[string]bool

	// S1 offsite connectivity: the wgsync reconciler seam (internal/api/wg.go). nil = peer-sync
	// disabled — mutations still persist, responses carry sync:"disabled".
	wgSyncer WGSyncer

	// claimEngine is the customer-claim code engine (v0.50.0). nil = claim arc disabled: no codes
	// issued, no claim field in ACKs/configs — pre-arc behavior exactly.
	claimEngine *claim.Engine

	// wgRegisteredHook (v0.51.0, DR-tier-by-default scenario A) fires after a host's FIRST WG
	// peer registration — main.go wires it to the web server's PBSDRAutoProvision so a DR-ON
	// customer's pbs_dr descriptor lands hands-free (WG registers → provision → the agent's next
	// desired-state tick). nil = no cascade hook (pre-v0.51.0 behavior). Runs in a detached
	// goroutine; must never delay or fail the registration response.
	wgRegisteredHook func(ctx context.Context, customerID string)
}

// SetClaimEngine wires the customer-claim code engine (nil-safe everywhere it is used).
func (h *Handler) SetClaimEngine(e *claim.Engine) {
	h.claimEngine = e
}

// SetWGRegisteredHook wires the post-WG-registration cascade hook (v0.51.0; nil-safe).
func (h *Handler) SetWGRegisteredHook(f func(ctx context.Context, customerID string)) {
	h.wgRegisteredHook = f
}

// SetLatestVersionProvider wires the registry version checker so the controller report ACK can
// advertise the latest available version (Phase 2). nil-safe (no latest_version field emitted).
func (h *Handler) SetLatestVersionProvider(p LatestVersionProvider) {
	h.latestVersion = p
}

// New creates a new API handler.
func New(store *store.Store, apiKey, resendAPIKey, fromEmail string, templateProvider ConfigTemplateProvider, logger *log.Logger) *Handler {
	return &Handler{
		store:            store,
		apiKey:           apiKey,
		resendAPIKey:     resendAPIKey,
		fromEmail:        fromEmail,
		logger:           logger,
		httpClient:       &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second},
		templateProvider: templateProvider,
	}
}

// SetDispatcher sets the notification dispatcher for event-triggered emails.
func (h *Handler) SetDispatcher(d *notify.Dispatcher) {
	h.dispatcher = d
}

// SetAssetManager sets the asset manager for serving app assets to controllers.
func (h *Handler) SetAssetManager(am *assets.Manager) {
	h.assetsMgr = am
}

// checkAuth verifies the Bearer token against the global API key or a per-customer API key.
// Returns true if authorized.
func (h *Handler) checkAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	_, _, ok := h.checkAuthCustomer(r)
	return ok
}

// checkAuthCustomer verifies the Bearer token and returns the authenticated customer identity.
// For per-customer keys: returns (customerID, false, true).
// For global key: returns ("", true, true) — caller must allow any customer_id.
// On failure: returns ("", false, false).
func (h *Handler) checkAuthCustomer(r *http.Request) (customerID string, isGlobal bool, ok bool) {
	auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
	if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
		return "", false, false
	}
	token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")

	// Check global key first
	if h.apiKey != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(h.apiKey)) == 1 {
		return "", true, true
	}

	// Check per-customer key
	cfg, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfigByAPIKey(token)
	if err != nil || cfg == nil {
		return "", false, false
	}
	return cfg.CustomerID, false, true
}

// checkAuthHost resolves a Bearer token to a HOST identity (the agent's auth
// path). It is a sibling of checkAuthCustomer — the controller path is unchanged.
//   - global key  -> ("", "", true, true)    caller trusts body.host_id
//   - per-host key -> (hostID, customerID, false, true)
//   - failure      -> ("", "", false, false)
func (h *Handler) checkAuthHost(r *http.Request) (hostID, customerID string, isGlobal, ok bool) {
	auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
	if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
		return "", "", false, false
	}
	token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")

	// Global key first (same constant-time compare as checkAuthCustomer).
	if h.apiKey != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(h.apiKey)) == 1 {
		return "", "", true, true
	}

	host, err := h.store.GetHostByAPIKey(token)
	if err != nil || host == nil {
		return "", "", false, false
	}
	return host.HostID, host.CustomerID, false, true
}

// ServeHTTP routes API requests.
func (h *Handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1")

	switch {
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/report":
		h.handleReport(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/host-report":
		h.handleHostReport(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/host-enroll":
		h.handleHostEnroll(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/admin/hosts":
		h.handleAdminCreateHost(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPut && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/escrow"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/escrow")
		h.handleHostEscrowPut(w, r, hostID)
	// G1 break-glass: day-0 vaults the root@pam console credential (self-scoped host key); the
	// operator retrieves it via the /admin/ path (global key only).
	case r.Method == http.MethodPut && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/recovery-credential"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/recovery-credential")
		h.handleHostRecoveryCredentialPut(w, r, hostID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/recovery-credential"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/"), "/recovery-credential")
		h.handleAdminGetRecoveryCredential(w, r, hostID)
	// DR capstone (slice 10D). Recovery-mode toggle (global key); re-enroll + restore-directive
	// (gated on recovery mode — no old key needed, the box is lost).
	case r.Method == http.MethodPut && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/recovery-mode"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/"), "/recovery-mode")
		h.handleSetRecoveryMode(w, r, hostID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodDelete && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/recovery-mode"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/"), "/recovery-mode")
		h.handleClearRecoveryMode(w, r, hostID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/re-enroll"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/re-enroll")
		h.handleReEnroll(w, r, hostID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/restore-directive"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/restore-directive")
		h.handleGetRestoreDirective(w, r, hostID)
	// S2 offsite connectivity: box-facing WG pubkey registration (per-host key, self-scoped).
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/wg"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/wg")
		h.handleRegisterHostWG(w, r, hostID)
	// PBS DR tier (SLICE 1): the agent's consume-once fetch of its PBS token secret (api/pbsdr.go).
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/pbs/consume-token"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/pbs/consume-token")
		h.handleConsumePBSToken(w, r, hostID)
	// Desired-state serving (slice 10A) — per-host-key, self-scoped (a host reads only its own).
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/desired-state"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/desired-state")
		h.handleGetDesiredState(w, r, hostID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/jobs"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/"), "/jobs")
		h.handleGetJobs(w, r, hostID)
	// Job completion (slice 10B) — per-host-key, self-scoped: DELETE /hosts/{id}/jobs/{job_id}.
	case r.Method == http.MethodDelete && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/hosts/") && strings.Contains(path, "/jobs/"):
		rest := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/hosts/")
		if i := strings.Index(rest, "/jobs/"); i > 0 {
			h.handleDeleteJob(w, r, rest[:i], rest[i+len("/jobs/"):])
		} else {
			http.NotFound(w, r)
		}
	// Admin-set (slice 10A) — global/operator key only; bumps the generation.
	case r.Method == http.MethodPut && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/desired-state"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/"), "/desired-state")
		h.handleAdminSetDesiredState(w, r, hostID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/jobs"):
		hostID := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/admin/hosts/"), "/jobs")
		h.handleAdminEnqueueJob(w, r, hostID)
	// S1 offsite connectivity — WG endpoint record + peer registry (global key only, api/wg.go).
	// DELETE carries the pubkey in the body: base64 '/'+'+' keep pubkeys out of URL paths.
	case r.Method == http.MethodPut && path == "/admin/wg/endpoint":
		h.handleAdminSetWGEndpoint(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && path == "/admin/wg/endpoint":
		h.handleAdminGetWGEndpoint(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/admin/wg/peers":
		h.handleAdminAddWGPeer(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodDelete && path == "/admin/wg/peers":
		h.handleAdminDeleteWGPeer(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && path == "/admin/wg/peers":
		h.handleAdminListWGPeers(w, r)
	// H1: the fleet operator OOB peer (register/rotate at an explicit /32) + read-back.
	case r.Method == http.MethodPut && path == "/admin/wg/operator-peer":
		h.handleAdminSetOperatorPeer(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && path == "/admin/wg/operator-peer":
		h.handleAdminGetOperatorPeer(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/claim/reset-request":
		h.handleClaimResetRequest(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/event":
		h.handleEvent(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/mail":
		h.handleMail(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/notify":
		h.handleNotify(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && path == "/preferences":
		h.handleSavePreferences(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && path == "/customers":
		h.handleCustomers(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/"):
		parts := strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/"), "/")
		customerID := parts[0]
		if len(parts) > 1 && parts[1] == "history" {
			h.handleCustomerHistory(w, r, customerID)
		} else {
			h.handleCustomer(w, r, customerID)
		}
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/recovery/"):
		customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/recovery/")
		h.handleRecovery(w, r, customerID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/config/"):
		customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/config/")
		h.handleConfigRetrieve(w, r, customerID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/offsite/consume-password/"):
		customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/offsite/consume-password/")
		h.handleOffsiteConsumePassword(w, r, customerID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/artifacts/"):
		customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/artifacts/")
		h.handleArtifactManifest(w, r, customerID)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && path == "/assets/manifest":
		h.handleAssetsManifest(w, r)
	case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(path, "/assets/file/"):
		filename := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/assets/file/")
		h.handleAssetFile(w, r, filename)
	default:
		http.NotFound(w, r)
	}
}

func (h *Handler) handleReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	authCustomerID, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthCustomer(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20)) // 1MB limit
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Extract customer_id from JSON
	var payload struct {
		CustomerID string `json:"customer_id"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil || payload.CustomerID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: customer_id required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Validate customer_id matches authenticated customer (unless global key)
	if !isGlobal && authCustomerID != payload.CustomerID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: customer_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	if err := h.store.SaveReport(payload.CustomerID, body); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to save report from %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Parse and save app telemetry (backward-compatible — old controllers won't have this field)
	var telemetryPayload struct {
		AppTelemetry []store.AppTelemetryRecord `json:"app_telemetry"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &telemetryPayload); err == nil && len(telemetryPayload.AppTelemetry) > 0 {
		if err := h.store.SaveAppTelemetry(payload.CustomerID, time.Now(), telemetryPayload.AppTelemetry); err != nil {
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to save app telemetry for %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, err)
		}
	}

	// On-demand log tails (v0.43.0) — the controller ships these on the cycle after the ACK
	// requested them. Storing one clears its pending request (consume-once, in SaveAppLogTail)
	// so the next ACK stops advertising it. Backward-compatible: old controllers never send this.
	var tailPayload struct {
		LogTails []struct {
			App         string    `json:"app"`
			CollectedAt time.Time `json:"collected_at"`
			Lines       []string  `json:"lines"`
		} `json:"log_tails"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &tailPayload); err == nil {
		for _, lt := range tailPayload.LogTails {
			if lt.App == "" {
				continue
			}
			if err := h.store.SaveAppLogTail(payload.CustomerID, lt.App, lt.CollectedAt, lt.Lines); err != nil {
				h.logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to save log tail %s/%s: %v", payload.CustomerID, lt.App, err)
			} else {
				h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Log tail received for %s/%s (%d lines)", payload.CustomerID, lt.App, len(lt.Lines))
			}
		}
	}

	// Controller self-log tail (v0.46.0) — the controller's OWN debug ring, shipped on the
	// cycle after the ACK's controller_log_requested. SaveLogBundle runs the secret gate
	// (a hit stores a BLOCKED flag row, nothing else) and clears the pending request
	// (consume-once). Backward-compatible: old controllers never send this.
	var selfTailPayload struct {
		ControllerLogTail *struct {
			CollectedAt time.Time `json:"collected_at"`
			Lines       []string  `json:"lines"`
		} `json:"controller_log_tail"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &selfTailPayload); err == nil && selfTailPayload.ControllerLogTail != nil {
		lt := selfTailPayload.ControllerLogTail
		blocked, berr := h.store.SaveLogBundle(payload.CustomerID, store.LogBundleComponentController, lt.CollectedAt, lt.Lines)
		switch {
		case berr != nil:
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to save controller log bundle for %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, berr)
		case blocked:
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] controller log bundle for %s BLOCKED: possible secret in log content — nothing stored", payload.CustomerID)
		default:
			h.logger.Printf("[INFO] controller log bundle received for %s (%d lines)", payload.CustomerID, len(lt.Lines))
		}
	}

	// DR recipe — persist the controller's secret-free customer/apps half (preserving any host half).
	// Backward-compatible (old controllers won't have this field); a failure must not drop the report.
	var drPayload struct {
		DRRecipe json.RawMessage `json:"dr_recipe"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &drPayload); err == nil && len(drPayload.DRRecipe) > 0 {
		var ver drRecipeVersionOnly
		_ = json.Unmarshal(drPayload.DRRecipe, &ver)
		if err := h.store.SaveDRRecipeAppHalf(payload.CustomerID, ver.RecipeVersion, drPayload.DRRecipe); err != nil {
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to save DR-recipe app-half for %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, err)
		} else {
			h.logger.Printf("[INFO] DR-recipe app-half stored for customer %s (v%d)", payload.CustomerID, ver.RecipeVersion)
		}
	}

	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Received report from %s (%d bytes)", payload.CustomerID, len(body))

	// Build response with optional customer_blocked flag
	resp := map[string]interface{}{"status": "ok"}
	if custCfg, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfig(payload.CustomerID); err == nil && custCfg != nil {
		if custCfg.Status == "blocked" {
			resp["customer_blocked"] = true
		}
		// Config-refresh (v0.26.0): advertise the per-customer config_version. The controller compares
		// it against its last-applied version and, on a change, re-pulls controller.yaml + self-restarts
		// (pull-based config delivery — the hub never connects into the box). Only emitted for
		// config-managed customers (a report-only box without a config row gets no field and is unaffected).
		resp["config_version"] = custCfg.ConfigVersion

		// Customer-claim arc (v0.50.0, F-4): ensure a claim code exists for every reporting managed
		// customer (idempotent — the live-box entry point; Day-0 boxes get theirs at config retrieve),
		// ingest the controller's reported claimed flag (set-only — a wiped settings.json can never
		// un-claim), and serve the ACTIVE code hash + generation in the ACK. The hash is bcrypt (non-
		// reversible) — safe to serve on the authenticated report channel; the plaintext code exists
		// only in the customer's mailbox.
		if h.claimEngine != nil {
			cs, cerr := h.claimEngine.EnsureIssued(custCfg)
			if cerr != nil {
				h.logger.Printf("[WARN] claim issue for %s on report: %v", payload.CustomerID, cerr)
			}
			var claimedPayload struct {
				Claimed *bool `json:"claimed"`
			}
			if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &claimedPayload); err == nil &&
				claimedPayload.Claimed != nil && *claimedPayload.Claimed {
				if err := h.claimEngine.MarkClaimed(custCfg); err != nil {
					h.logger.Printf("[WARN] claim mark-claimed for %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, err)
				} else if cs != nil && cs.ClaimedAt == nil {
					cs, _ = h.store.GetClaim(payload.CustomerID) // refresh for the ACK below
				}
			}
			if cs != nil {
				resp["claim"] = map[string]interface{}{
					"code_hash":  cs.CodeHash,
					"generation": cs.Generation,
					"issued_at":  cs.IssuedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
				}
			}
		}
	}

	// SLICE 3 — escrow status for the hub-verified auto-confirm: the controller flips its offbox
	// EscrowState pending→escrowed ONLY when sha256(its local repo password) matches restic_pw_sha256
	// (blob-presence alone must never confirm — a stale blob may not cover the current key). The hash is
	// non-reversible (256-bit random secret) — safe to serve; omitted entirely when no escrow row exists.
	if es, err := h.store.GetEscrowStatusForCustomer(payload.CustomerID); err == nil && es != nil {
		resp["escrow"] = es
	}

	// v0.43.0 — pending log-tail requests (same additive ACK-flag pattern as escrow): the
	// controller collects the named apps' tails and ships them on its NEXT report; the field
	// is omitted when nothing is pending. The hub never connects into the box.
	if apps, err := h.store.GetPendingLogTailRequests(payload.CustomerID); err == nil && len(apps) > 0 {
		resp["log_tail_requests"] = apps
	}

	// v0.46.0 — pending CONTROLLER self-log pull (same additive ACK-flag pattern): the
	// controller ships controller_log_tail on its NEXT report; omitted when nothing pending.
	if pending, err := h.store.PendingLogBundleRequest(payload.CustomerID, store.LogBundleComponentController); err == nil && pending {
		resp["controller_log_requested"] = true
	}

	// Phase 2 managed updates: advertise the effective controller-version FLOOR (per-customer override
	// else global default) and the latest available version. The controller compares its current
	// version against the floor and auto-updates when below it (latest stays the customer's opt-in
	// "update to latest" button — NOT the auto-target). Both fields are omitted when empty, so an old
	// controller that ignores them, or a hub with no floor configured, behaves exactly as before.
	// Part D: the per-box MinAgent conditional floor — HOLD the controller-version floor for a box
	// whose host agent is below the current golden's required MinAgent (never push a controller past
	// the agent it depends on). A held box gets NO directive (behaves as if no floor) but is flagged
	// on the dashboard, never silently stale.
	if fd := h.store.ResolveManagedFloor(payload.CustomerID); fd.Floor != "" {
		resp["min_controller_version"] = fd.Floor
	} else if fd.Held {
		h.logger.Printf("[INFO] managed floor HELD for %s: agent %q < MinAgent %s (controller floor withheld)",
			payload.CustomerID, fd.AgentVersion, fd.MinAgent)
	}
	if h.latestVersion != nil {
		if latest := h.latestVersion.LatestVersion(); latest != "" {
			resp["latest_version"] = latest
		}
	}

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}

// defaultHostPollSeconds is the cadence the hub hands every agent this slice (no
// per-host override UI yet — that is a later slice).
const defaultHostPollSeconds = 900

// maxHostReportBytes bounds a host-report body. Larger than the controller path's
// 1 MiB because host reports carry the full guest list + (later) storage/backup
// arrays. We read one byte past it and reject explicitly (413) rather than letting
// LimitReader silently truncate — a truncated-but-valid JSON would otherwise be
// accepted as a partial report, dropping guests from the mirror.
const maxHostReportBytes = 4 << 20 // 4 MiB

// hostReportPayload is the subset of the agent host-report (slice-3 contract,
// §3 / agent spec §4) the hub needs for denorm + guest reality. The remaining fields
// (backups/restore_tests/pbs_snapshots/audit_tail) are ignored, so an empty or absent
// collection is accepted without error.
//
// storage_targets (slice 5) is now parsed: the agent populates it, and the hub accepts
// + persists it. Persistence is the full report_json row (which carries the targets
// verbatim) plus the denorm counts below — the RICH manifest schema (desired class/role/
// policy/creds) is hub-owned and lands in slice 10; this slice only mirrors what the agent
// observes.
type hostReportPayload struct {
	HostID       string `json:"host_id"`
	AgentVersion string `json:"agent_version"`
	Host         struct {
		CPUPercent    float64 `json:"cpu_percent"`
		MemoryPercent float64 `json:"memory_percent"`
		DiskPercent   float64 `json:"disk_percent"`
	} `json:"host"`
	Guests []struct {
		VMID              int    `json:"vmid"`
		Name              string `json:"name"`
		Status            string `json:"status"`
		ControllerVersion string `json:"controller_version"`
	} `json:"guests"`
	StorageTargets []hostStorageTarget `json:"storage_targets"`
	Backups        []hostBackup        `json:"backups"`       // slice 6
	RestoreTests   []hostRestoreTest   `json:"restore_tests"` // slice 6
	PBSSnapshots   []hostPBSSnapshot   `json:"pbs_snapshots"` // slice 6 Phase B
	Cloudflared    struct {
		Status string `json:"status"`
	} `json:"cloudflared"`
	// DR recipe — the agent's storage/guest/PBS half (secret-free). RawMessage = stored verbatim,
	// ignore-unknown (forward-compat). Persisted to dr_recipe, assembled with the controller half.
	DRRecipe json.RawMessage `json:"dr_recipe"`
	// LogTail (v0.46.0) — the agent's on-demand debug-ring tail, present only on the
	// heartbeat right after the envelope's log_tail_requested (agent ≥ 0.83.0).
	LogTail *struct {
		CollectedAt time.Time `json:"collected_at"`
		Lines       []string  `json:"lines"`
	} `json:"log_tail"`
}

// drRecipeVersionOnly extracts just recipe_version from a half's JSON (ignore-unknown). 0 if absent.
type drRecipeVersionOnly struct {
	RecipeVersion int `json:"recipe_version"`
}

// hostPBSSnapshot mirrors the agent's hub.PBSSnapshot wire contract (slice 6 Phase B). The
// hub persists it via report_json and surfaces a FAILED verify prominently (the loudest
// offsite-DR signal — same treatment as a failed restore-test).
type hostPBSSnapshot struct {
	Namespace   string `json:"namespace"`
	BackupType  string `json:"backup_type"`
	BackupID    string `json:"backup_id"`
	BackupTime  string `json:"backup_time"`
	SizeBytes   int64  `json:"size_bytes"`
	Owner       string `json:"owner"`
	Protected   bool   `json:"protected"`
	Encrypted   bool   `json:"encrypted"`
	VerifyState string `json:"verify_state"`
	VerifyUPID  string `json:"verify_upid,omitempty"`
}

// hostBackup / hostRestoreTest mirror the agent's hub.Backup / hub.RestoreTest wire
// contract field-for-field (slice 6, doc 03 §8). DUPLICATED contract — the golden stays
// byte-identical with felhom-agent's copy and the key-set tests guard drift. The hub
// persists these via report_json (no new columns this slice) and surfaces a FAILED
// restore-test prominently (the loudest DR signal). The rich backup policy is slice 10.
type hostBackup struct {
	TargetID         string   `json:"target_id"`
	VMID             int      `json:"vmid"`
	Archive          string   `json:"archive"`
	Mode             string   `json:"mode"`
	CrashConsistent  bool     `json:"crash_consistent"`
	SizeBytes        int64    `json:"size_bytes"`
	Success          bool     `json:"success"`
	Error            string   `json:"error,omitempty"`
	StartedAt        string   `json:"started_at"`
	DurationSeconds  float64  `json:"duration_seconds"`
	UncoveredVolumes []string `json:"uncovered_volumes"`
}

type hostRestoreTest struct {
	SourceArchive   string  `json:"source_archive"`
	SourceTier      string  `json:"source_tier"`
	ScratchVMID     int     `json:"scratch_vmid"`
	Pass            bool    `json:"pass"`
	Verified        string  `json:"verified"`
	Error           string  `json:"error,omitempty"`
	TestedAt        string  `json:"tested_at"`
	DurationSeconds float64 `json:"duration_seconds"`
	// Warnings are the guest-start task's warning line(s) on a PASS (e.g. the systemd-nesting
	// advisory). The verdict is liveness-only, so a passed restore-test can carry warnings.
	Warnings []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
	// WarningsRecognized is true iff every warning is the known-benign anchor. Absent ⇒ false,
	// which is the SAFE default: the hub then treats it as an unrecognized warning (the louder
	// path), so a missing flag can only over-notice, never hide a real warning.
	WarningsRecognized bool `json:"warnings_recognized,omitempty"`
}

// hostStorageTarget mirrors the agent's hub.StorageTarget wire contract field-for-field.
// It is a DUPLICATED contract (no shared types module yet); testdata/host-report.golden.json
// must stay byte-identical with felhom-agent's copy and the key-set test guards drift.
// The hub does not act on these yet beyond persisting + counting them (slice 10 adds the
// authoritative manifest), but mirroring the full shape keeps the cross-repo contract honest.
type hostStorageTarget struct {
	Name          string  `json:"name"`
	Type          string  `json:"type"`
	DurableID     string  `json:"durable_id"`
	State         string  `json:"state"`
	Reachable     bool    `json:"reachable"`
	TotalBytes    int64   `json:"total_bytes"`
	UsedBytes     int64   `json:"used_bytes"`
	AvailBytes    int64   `json:"avail_bytes"`
	UsedFraction  float64 `json:"used_fraction"`
	Content       string  `json:"content"`
	MountPath     string  `json:"mount_path"`
	BackingDevice string  `json:"backing_device"`
	ClassHint     string  `json:"class_hint"`
	Role          string  `json:"role"`
	ThinPool      *struct {
		DataUsedFraction     float64  `json:"data_used_fraction"`
		MetadataUsedFraction *float64 `json:"metadata_used_fraction"`
	} `json:"thin_pool,omitempty"`
	Smart struct {
		Health               string `json:"health"`
		TemperatureC         *int   `json:"temperature_c"`
		PowerOnHours         *int   `json:"power_on_hours"`
		ReallocatedSectors   *int   `json:"reallocated_sectors"`
		PendingSectors       *int   `json:"pending_sectors"`
		OfflineUncorrectable *int   `json:"offline_uncorrectable"`
		CriticalWarning      *int   `json:"critical_warning"`
		MediaErrors          *int   `json:"media_errors"`
		PercentageUsed       *int   `json:"percentage_used"`
	} `json:"smart"`
}

// handleHostReport ingests the agent's host-report (the heartbeat) and returns the
// control envelope (agent spec §5).
func (h *Handler) handleHostReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	hostID, custID, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, maxHostReportBytes+1))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if len(body) > maxHostReportBytes {
		http.Error(w, "Payload too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
		return
	}
	var rep hostReportPayload
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &rep); err != nil || rep.HostID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: host_id required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if isGlobal {
		// Global-key bootstrap: trust body.host_id but require the host to exist
		// (it must be minted first) and resolve its customer from the row.
		host, err := h.store.GetHost(rep.HostID)
		if err != nil {
			h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] host lookup failed for %s: %v", rep.HostID, err)
			http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if host == nil {
			http.Error(w, "Unknown host_id (mint via /admin/hosts first)", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
		hostID, custID = rep.HostID, host.CustomerID
	} else if rep.HostID != hostID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: host_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	running := 0
	for _, g := range rep.Guests {
		if g.Status == "running" {
			running++
		}
	}
	denorm := store.HostReportDenorm{
		AgentVersion:      rep.AgentVersion,
		CPUPercent:        rep.Host.CPUPercent,
		MemoryPercent:     rep.Host.MemoryPercent,
		DiskPercent:       rep.Host.DiskPercent,
		GuestTotal:        len(rep.Guests),
		GuestRunning:      running,
		CloudflaredStatus: rep.Cloudflared.Status,
	}
	if err := h.store.SaveHostReport(hostID, custID, body, denorm); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to save host-report from %s: %v", hostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	for _, g := range rep.Guests {
		status := g.Status
		if status == "" {
			status = "unknown"
		}
		guest := &store.Guest{
			GuestID:           store.GuestID(hostID, g.VMID),
			CustomerID:        custID,
			HostID:            hostID,
			VMID:              g.VMID,
			DisplayName:       g.Name,
			Status:            status,
			ControllerVersion: g.ControllerVersion,
		}
		if err := h.store.UpsertGuestFromReport(guest); err != nil {
			// A guest upsert failure must not drop the whole report (liveness).
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to upsert guest %s: %v", guest.GuestID, err)
		}
	}

	// storage_targets (slice 5): persisted as part of report_json above. Count + surface
	// disconnected ones in the log (the slice-10 manifest will reconcile them; for now the
	// signal is the visibility — a disconnected target is the storage analog of host-down).
	disconnected := 0
	for _, st := range rep.StorageTargets {
		if st.State == "disconnected" {
			disconnected++
		}
	}
	if disconnected > 0 {
		h.logger.Printf("[WARN] host %s reports %d disconnected storage target(s) of %d",
			hostID, disconnected, len(rep.StorageTargets))
	}

	// restore_tests (slice 6): a FAILED self-restore-test is the loudest DR signal there is
	// — surface it prominently. A PASS that carried start warnings (e.g. the systemd-nesting
	// advisory) is surfaced too: INFO when every warning is recognized-benign, escalated to
	// WARN when an UNRECOGNIZED warning stood out (as loud as a failed PBS verify is for
	// backups), so a real restore warning can't hide behind a green pass. A backup whose
	// vzdump failed is also worth a warning.
	for _, rt := range rep.RestoreTests {
		switch {
		case !rt.Pass:
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] host %s restore-test FAILED: archive=%s tier=%s scratch=%d err=%q",
				hostID, rt.SourceArchive, rt.SourceTier, rt.ScratchVMID, rt.Error)
		case len(rt.Warnings) == 0:
			// clean pass — nothing to surface here (counted in the summary line below).
		case rt.WarningsRecognized:
			h.logger.Printf("[INFO] host %s restore-test passed WITH WARNINGS (recognized): archive=%s tier=%s warnings=%v",
				hostID, rt.SourceArchive, rt.SourceTier, rt.Warnings)
		default:
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] host %s restore-test passed WITH UNRECOGNIZED WARNINGS: archive=%s tier=%s warnings=%v",
				hostID, rt.SourceArchive, rt.SourceTier, rt.Warnings)
		}
	}
	for _, bk := range rep.Backups {
		if !bk.Success {
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] host %s backup FAILED: target=%s vmid=%d err=%q",
				hostID, bk.TargetID, bk.VMID, bk.Error)
		}
	}
	// pbs_snapshots (slice 6 Phase B): a FAILED PBS verify is the loudest offsite-DR signal.
	for _, ps := range rep.PBSSnapshots {
		if ps.VerifyState == "failed" {
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] host %s PBS verify FAILED: %s/%s ns=%s owner=%s",
				hostID, ps.BackupType, ps.BackupID, ps.Namespace, ps.Owner)
		}
	}

	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] host-report from %s (%d guests, %d storage targets, %d backups, %d restore-tests, %d pbs-snapshots, %d bytes)",
		hostID, len(rep.Guests), len(rep.StorageTargets), len(rep.Backups), len(rep.RestoreTests), len(rep.PBSSnapshots), len(body))

	// Agent log tail (v0.46.0) — the debug-ring bundle a prior envelope requested.
	// SaveLogBundle runs the secret gate + clears the pending request (consume-once).
	// A failure must NOT drop the heartbeat; just warn.
	if rep.LogTail != nil {
		blocked, berr := h.store.SaveLogBundle(hostID, store.LogBundleComponentAgent, rep.LogTail.CollectedAt, rep.LogTail.Lines)
		switch {
		case berr != nil:
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to save agent log bundle for %s: %v", hostID, berr)
		case blocked:
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent log bundle for %s BLOCKED: possible secret in log content — nothing stored", hostID)
		default:
			h.logger.Printf("[INFO] agent log bundle received for %s (%d lines)", hostID, len(rep.LogTail.Lines))
		}
	}

	// DR recipe — persist the agent's secret-free storage/guest/PBS half (preserving any app half).
	// A failure here must NOT drop the heartbeat (the report already saved); just warn.
	if len(rep.DRRecipe) > 0 && custID != "" {
		var ver drRecipeVersionOnly
		_ = json.Unmarshal(rep.DRRecipe, &ver)
		if err := h.store.SaveDRRecipeHostHalf(custID, hostID, ver.RecipeVersion, rep.DRRecipe); err != nil {
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] Failed to save DR-recipe host-half for customer %s (host %s): %v", custID, hostID, err)
		} else {
			h.logger.Printf("[INFO] DR-recipe host-half stored for customer %s (host %s, v%d)", custID, hostID, ver.RecipeVersion)
		}
	}

	blocked := false
	if cc, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfig(custID); err == nil && cc != nil && cc.Status == "blocked" {
		blocked = true
	}

	// Control envelope (slice 10A): the cheap change-notification. desired_generation is the
	// host's current generation (the agent re-fetches the full desired-state only when it
	// advances past its cached one); has_signed_ops flags a non-empty signed-jobs queue (the
	// agent fetches/executes them in 10B). Both degrade safely to their slice-4 defaults on a
	// store error — a heartbeat must never fail on the control channel.
	var desiredGen int64
	if host, err := h.store.GetHost(hostID); err == nil && host != nil {
		desiredGen = host.DesiredGeneration
	}
	hasSignedOps := false
	if n, err := h.store.CountSignedJobs(hostID); err == nil && n > 0 {
		hasSignedOps = true
	}
	resp := map[string]interface{}{
		"status":                "ok",
		"poll_interval_seconds": defaultHostPollSeconds,
		"blocked":               blocked,
		"desired_generation":    desiredGen,
		"has_signed_ops":        hasSignedOps,
	}
	// v0.46.0 — pending agent log pull: the NEXT heartbeat carries log_tail (agent ≥
	// 0.83.0; older agents ignore the flag and the request stays visibly pending).
	if pending, err := h.store.PendingLogBundleRequest(hostID, store.LogBundleComponentAgent); err == nil && pending {
		resp["log_tail_requested"] = true
	}
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}

// handleAdminCreateHost mints a host identity (host_id + per-host api_key).
//
// PROVISIONAL (slice-3 bootstrap): global-key only, so the demo agent can
// authenticate before enrollment (slices 7–8) exists. Enrollment will mint host
// identity + pin signing keys; this endpoint should be removed/locked down then
// (tracked under doc 05 §11 auth-tightening at cutover).
func (h *Handler) handleAdminCreateHost(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	_, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok || !isGlobal {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: global key required", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	var req struct {
		CustomerID  string `json:"customer_id"`
		HostID      string `json:"host_id"`
		DisplayName string `json:"display_name"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &req); err != nil || req.CustomerID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: customer_id required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	cc, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfig(req.CustomerID)
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if cc == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Unknown customer_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	hostID := req.HostID
	if hostID == "" {
		sfx, err := configgen.RandomHex(3) // 6 hex chars — human-legible for the demo
		if err != nil {
			http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		hostID = req.CustomerID + "-" + sfx
	}
	apiKey, err := configgen.RandomHex(32)
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if err := h.store.UpsertHost(&store.Host{HostID: hostID, CustomerID: req.CustomerID, APIKey: apiKey}); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to mint host for %s: %v", req.CustomerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] provisional host mint: %s (customer %s)", hostID, req.CustomerID)
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"host_id": hostID, "api_key": apiKey})
}

// handleHostEnroll is the passphrase-authed, mint-once-reuse host enrollment for Day-0
// (option C, SPIKE-day0-firstboot-handshake-2026-06-26). It is the sibling of the
// global-key handleAdminCreateHost: the operator/host-bootstrap script carries ONLY the
// customer's retrieval passphrase (no global key in the field deploy path), POSTs the
// customer_id, and gets back the host credential — minted on first call, REUSED byte-for-
// byte on every subsequent call (so re-running the bootstrap never orphans a live agent's
// key). Auth (passphrase) is checked BEFORE any mint — a bad-auth call never writes a row.
// The proven GET /config/{id} controller pull and POST /admin/hosts escape hatch are
// untouched.
func (h *Handler) handleHostEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	var req struct {
		CustomerID string `json:"customer_id"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &req); err != nil || req.CustomerID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: customer_id required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Passphrase auth — mirrors handleConfigRetrieve exactly (header, 404-then-401 order,
	// constant-time compare). Happens BEFORE any mint.
	password := r.Header.Get("X-Retrieval-Password")
	if password == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: X-Retrieval-Password header required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	cc, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfig(req.CustomerID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] host-enroll: customer lookup failed for %s: %v", req.CustomerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if cc == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(cc.RetrievalPassword)) != 1 {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: invalid password", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	// Mint-once-reuse: an existing host for this customer is returned as-is (idempotent).
	existing, err := h.store.GetHostByCustomer(req.CustomerID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] host-enroll: host lookup failed for %s: %v", req.CustomerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if existing != nil {
		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"host_id": existing.HostID, "api_key": existing.APIKey})
		return
	}

	// First enroll: mint (mirrors handleAdminCreateHost's mint block).
	sfx, err := configgen.RandomHex(3) // 6 hex chars — host_id suffix
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	hostID := req.CustomerID + "-" + sfx
	apiKey, err := configgen.RandomHex(32)
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if err := h.store.UpsertHost(&store.Host{HostID: hostID, CustomerID: req.CustomerID, APIKey: apiKey}); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] host-enroll: failed to mint host for %s: %v", req.CustomerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] host enrolled: %s (customer %s)", hostID, req.CustomerID)
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"host_id": hostID, "api_key": apiKey})
}

// escrowUploadRequest is the agent→hub wire shape for the OPAQUE PBS recovery-code escrow blob
// (slice 7, doc 03 §8a). It MUST stay in lockstep with the agent's emit struct
// (felhom-agent cmd/felhom-agent escrowUploadRequest). The hub stores the bytes and NEVER decrypts
// them (it has no recovery code).
type escrowUploadRequest struct {
	BlobB64        string `json:"blob_b64"`        // base64 of the opaque R-wrapped blob (ciphertext)
	KeyFingerprint string `json:"key_fingerprint"` // for operator display only
	Posture        string `json:"posture"`         // e.g. "zero_knowledge"
	CreatedAt      string `json:"created_at"`      // RFC3339
	// Slice 10D.1 — optional DR bundle, stored alongside the K-escrow (both opaque/non-secret).
	IdentityBlobB64 string          `json:"identity_blob_b64,omitempty"` // age-wrapped {tunnel_token, pbs_token}
	DirectiveJSON   json.RawMessage `json:"directive,omitempty"`         // non-secret directive (pbs repo/ns, expected fp, tunnel id)
	// SLICE 3 — sha256 hex of the restic repo password sealed in the identity blob (non-reversible hash
	// of a 256-bit random secret — safe to store/serve; present only when a staged password was folded in).
	ResticPwSHA256 string `json:"restic_pw_sha256,omitempty"`
}

// handleHostEscrowPut stores a host's opaque escrow blob (doc 03 §8a). Authed with the PER-HOST key
// (a host may only write its own escrow; the global operator key is also accepted). The hub keeps
// the ciphertext and never opens it. Last-write-wins (rotation). No serving this slice (slice 10).
func (h *Handler) handleHostEscrowPut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pathHostID string) {
	authHostID, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	if pathHostID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing host_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	// A per-host key may only write ITS OWN escrow; the global key may write any.
	if !isGlobal && authHostID != pathHostID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: host_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20)) // 1 MB cap; the blob is ~hundreds of bytes
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	var req escrowUploadRequest
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &req); err != nil || req.BlobB64 == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: blob_b64 required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	blob, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(req.BlobB64)
	if err != nil || len(blob) == 0 {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: blob_b64 not valid base64", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	createdAt := req.CreatedAt
	if createdAt == "" {
		createdAt = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
	}
	// Store the OPAQUE bytes. No decrypt path exists — the hub cannot open this.
	if err := h.store.SaveHostEscrow(pathHostID, blob, req.KeyFingerprint, req.Posture, createdAt, req.ResticPwSHA256); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to store escrow for host %s: %v", pathHostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	// Slice 10D.1: optionally store the IDENTITY escrow blob + the non-secret DR directive alongside
	// the K-escrow (both opaque / non-secret — no usable secret hub-side). Additive: a slice-7
	// upload without these is unchanged.
	if req.IdentityBlobB64 != "" {
		idBlob, derr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(req.IdentityBlobB64)
		if derr != nil || len(idBlob) == 0 {
			http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: identity_blob_b64 not valid base64", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
		directive := req.DirectiveJSON
		if len(directive) == 0 || !json.Valid(directive) {
			directive = json.RawMessage("{}")
		}
		if err := h.store.SaveHostDRBundle(pathHostID, idBlob, string(directive)); err != nil {
			h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to store DR bundle for host %s: %v", pathHostID, err)
			http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		h.logger.Printf("[INFO] stored DR bundle for host %s (identity %d bytes + directive)", pathHostID, len(idBlob))
	}
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] stored opaque escrow blob for host %s (%d bytes, posture=%s, fp=%s)",
		pathHostID, len(blob), req.Posture, req.KeyFingerprint)
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}

// handleHostRecoveryCredentialPut vaults a host's break-glass root@pam console credential (TASK G1).
// SELF-SCOPED (a host key writes only its own; global may write any) — day-0 posts it with the
// host api_key. The secret is stored at rest and NEVER logged (only the username + a length are
// logged). This is the human fallback for when both the sshd path AND the agent-independent
// auto-heal have failed: the operator retrieves it to reach the PVE web console (pveproxy — a
// failure domain distinct from sshd).
func (h *Handler) handleHostRecoveryCredentialPut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pathHostID string) {
	authHostID, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	if pathHostID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing host_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if !isGlobal && authHostID != pathHostID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: host_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<16)) // 64 KiB cap; a username+password is tiny
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	var req struct {
		Username string `json:"username"`
		Password string `json:"password"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &req); err != nil || req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: username + password required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	// The host must exist (mint-first) — a per-host key already proves it; the global path re-checks.
	if isGlobal {
		host, herr := h.store.GetHost(pathHostID)
		if herr != nil || host == nil {
			http.Error(w, "Unknown host_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
	}
	if err := h.store.SaveHostRecoveryCredential(pathHostID, req.Username, req.Password); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to vault recovery credential for host %s: %v", pathHostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	// SECRET DISCIPLINE: log the username + a length only — NEVER the password.
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] vaulted break-glass recovery credential for host %s (user=%s, secret %d chars)",
		pathHostID, req.Username, len(req.Password))
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}

// handleAdminGetRecoveryCredential returns a host's vaulted break-glass credential to the OPERATOR
// (global key only — a per-host key must NOT read its own console password back out). This is the
// authenticated retrieval path the break-glass runbook uses. The response body carries the secret by
// necessity; it is never written to the hub log.
func (h *Handler) handleAdminGetRecoveryCredential(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pathHostID string) {
	_, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok || !isGlobal {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized) // operator/global key ONLY
		return
	}
	if pathHostID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing host_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	cred, err := h.store.GetHostRecoveryCredential(pathHostID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to read recovery credential for host %s: %v", pathHostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if cred == nil {
		http.Error(w, "No recovery credential vaulted for this host", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] operator retrieved break-glass recovery credential for host %s (user=%s)", pathHostID, cred.Username)
	resp, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
		"host_id":  cred.HostID,
		"username": cred.Username,
		"password": cred.Secret,
		"set_at":   cred.SetAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
	})
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write(resp)
}

// handleGetDesiredState serves a host its authoritative desired-state (slice 10A). Per-host key,
// SELF-SCOPED: a host reads ONLY its own (the global operator key may read any). The agent fetches
// this when the heartbeat envelope's desired_generation has advanced past its cached one. The
// response carries the generation the state corresponds to, so the agent caches it atomically.
func (h *Handler) handleGetDesiredState(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pathHostID string) {
	authHostID, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	if pathHostID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing host_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if !isGlobal && authHostID != pathHostID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: host_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	host, err := h.store.GetHost(pathHostID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] desired-state lookup for %s: %v", pathHostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if host == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Unknown host_id", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	desired := host.DesiredJSON
	if strings.TrimSpace(desired) == "" {
		desired = "{}"
	}
	// S2: merge the hub-OWNED wireguard block at read time (no peer → pass-through unchanged;
	// the stored operator blob is never modified). See api/wg.go mergeWireguard.
	desired = h.mergeWireguard(pathHostID, desired)
	resp := map[string]interface{}{
		"generation":    host.DesiredGeneration,
		"desired_state": json.RawMessage(desired), // opaque to the hub — agent owns the schema
	}
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}

// handleGetJobs serves a host its pending signed-op blobs (slice 10A). Per-host key, SELF-SCOPED.
// The blobs are OPAQUE (the hub never forged or opened them); the agent verifies + executes them
// in 10B. 10A only serves the queue.
func (h *Handler) handleGetJobs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pathHostID string) {
	authHostID, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	if pathHostID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing host_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if !isGlobal && authHostID != pathHostID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: host_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	jobs, err := h.store.GetSignedJobs(pathHostID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] jobs lookup for %s: %v", pathHostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	out := make([]map[string]string, 0, len(jobs))
	for _, j := range jobs {
		out = append(out, map[string]string{
			"job_id":     j.JobID,
			"blob_b64":   base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(j.Blob),
			"created_at": j.CreatedAt,
		})
	}
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{"jobs": out})
}

// handleDeleteJob clears a processed job from a host's queue (slice 10B). Per-host key,
// SELF-SCOPED (a host clears only its own jobs; the global key may clear any). Idempotent.
func (h *Handler) handleDeleteJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pathHostID, jobID string) {
	authHostID, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	if pathHostID == "" || jobID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing host_id or job_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if !isGlobal && authHostID != pathHostID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: host_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	if err := h.store.DeleteSignedJob(pathHostID, jobID); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] delete job %s for %s: %v", jobID, pathHostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] host %s cleared signed-op job %s (executed or rejected)", pathHostID, jobID)
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}

// handleAdminSetDesiredState sets a host's desired-state (slice 10A). GLOBAL/operator key ONLY —
// a per-host key cannot author its own intent. The body is the desired-state JSON (opaque to the
// hub: it stores + serves bytes, never validates/interprets the schema — the agent/CLI owns it).
// Writing BUMPS desired_generation so the next heartbeat signals the agent to re-fetch.
func (h *Handler) handleAdminSetDesiredState(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pathHostID string) {
	_, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok || !isGlobal {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: global key required", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	if pathHostID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing host_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	// Validate it is well-formed JSON (the hub does not interpret the schema, but a malformed
	// blob would break the agent's parse — reject it at the door).
	if !json.Valid(body) {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: body must be JSON", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	// S2: the wireguard block is HUB-owned, merged at read time — an operator copy-paste of a
	// served desired-state must never write it back into the stored blob (it would go stale and
	// shadow the live assignment). Reject at the door.
	var topKeys map[string]json.RawMessage
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &topKeys); err == nil {
		if _, has := topKeys["wireguard"]; has {
			http.Error(w, "wireguard is hub-owned; register via POST /hosts/{id}/wg", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
	}
	gen, err := h.store.SetHostDesired(pathHostID, body)
	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
		http.Error(w, "Unknown host_id", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] set desired-state for %s: %v", pathHostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] admin-set desired-state for host %s (generation now %d, %d bytes)", pathHostID, gen, len(body))
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{"status": "ok", "generation": gen})
}

// handleAdminEnqueueJob appends an opaque signed-op blob to a host's queue (slice 10A). GLOBAL key
// ONLY. The blob is pre-signed off-hub (the hub holds no signing key); the hub stores it verbatim.
// This is the minimal operator path to seed the queue so HasSignedOps/serving are exercisable; the
// rich operator/signing UX is later. Execution is 10B.
func (h *Handler) handleAdminEnqueueJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, pathHostID string) {
	_, _, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthHost(r)
	if !ok || !isGlobal {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: global key required", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	if pathHostID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing host_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	host, err := h.store.GetHost(pathHostID)
	if err != nil || host == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Unknown host_id", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	var req struct {
		JobID   string `json:"job_id"`
		BlobB64 string `json:"blob_b64"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &req); err != nil || req.BlobB64 == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: blob_b64 required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	blob, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(req.BlobB64)
	if err != nil || len(blob) == 0 {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: blob_b64 not valid base64", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if req.JobID == "" {
		req.JobID, _ = configgen.RandomHex(8)
	}
	if err := h.store.EnqueueSignedJob(pathHostID, req.JobID, blob); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] enqueue job for %s: %v", pathHostID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] enqueued signed-op job %s for host %s (%d bytes)", req.JobID, pathHostID, len(blob))
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{"status": "ok", "job_id": req.JobID})
}

// handleClaimResetRequest is the controller-forwarded "Elfelejtett jelszó" (v0.50.0): the box
// asks the hub to email a fresh reset code to the REGISTERED customer address — the requester
// never chooses the destination. Auth: the customer's own report Bearer key (self-scoped).
// The response is deliberately neutral 200 on every authorized outcome (cap reached, email
// failure) — the customer-facing message is always "ha az e-mail cím regisztrálva van…"; the
// real outcome goes to the operator log + notification_log.
func (h *Handler) handleClaimResetRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	authCustomerID, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthCustomer(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 4096))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	var payload struct {
		CustomerID string `json:"customer_id"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil || payload.CustomerID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: customer_id required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if !isGlobal && authCustomerID != payload.CustomerID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: customer_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	if h.claimEngine == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Claim engine not available", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
		return
	}
	cfg, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfig(payload.CustomerID)
	if err != nil || cfg == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	if err := h.claimEngine.RequestReset(cfg); err != nil {
		// Neutral to the box; loud to the operator (cap reached / send failure / no email).
		h.logger.Printf("[WARN] claim reset-request for %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, err)
	} else {
		h.logger.Printf("[INFO] claim reset-request for %s: reset code emailed to the registered address", payload.CustomerID)
	}
	// v0.52.0 (take-two F-15): serve the ACTIVE code state in the response — same shape and same
	// bcrypt-only guarantee as the report ACK — so the box accepts the emailed code the moment it
	// lands instead of waiting for the next ACK (~15 min). Served on every authorized outcome: on
	// a cap-reached refusal it is the unrotated row (a controller-side no-op by generation).
	resp := map[string]interface{}{"status": "ok"}
	if cs, err := h.store.GetClaim(payload.CustomerID); err == nil && cs != nil {
		resp["claim"] = map[string]interface{}{
			"code_hash":  cs.CodeHash,
			"generation": cs.Generation,
			"issued_at":  cs.IssuedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
		}
	}
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}

// allowedEventTypes lists all valid event_type values the Hub accepts.
var allowedEventTypes = map[string]bool{
	// Controller-pushed events
	"controller_started":      true,
	"claim_lockout":           true, // v0.50.0 — claim/reset code brute-force lockout tripped
	"controller_updated":      true,
	"backup_completed":        true,
	"backup_failed":           true,
	"db_dump_completed":       true,
	"db_dump_failed":          true,
	"backup_integrity_ok":     true,
	"backup_integrity_failed": true,
	"crossdrive_completed":    true,
	"crossdrive_failed":       true,
	// controller v0.134.1 — enlarged offsite push refused by the quota gate (warning; the controller's
	// dynamic Hungarian message is customer-grade — deliberately NO customerMessages entry, which would
	// discard the numbers (templates.go:129 priority)).
	"offbox_enlarge_blocked":      true,
	"storage_disconnected":        true,
	"storage_reconnected":         true,
	"disk_warning":                true,
	"disk_critical":               true,
	"health_degraded":             true,
	"health_critical":             true,
	"health_recovered":            true,
	"app_deployed":                true,
	"app_removed":                 true,
	"app_start_failed":            true, // controller fix-3 (CAMPAIGN-3): a deployed app is not running
	"disaster_recovery_started":   true,
	"disaster_recovery_completed": true,
	// Controller→agent channel health (controller v0.90.0) — operator-only (not customer toggles)
	"agent_channel_pin_mismatch":       true,
	"agent_channel_unauthorized":       true,
	"agent_channel_unreachable":        true,
	"agent_channel_timeout":            true,
	"agent_channel_misconfigured":      true,
	"agent_channel_construction_error": true,
	"agent_channel_unknown":            true,
	"agent_channel_recovered":          true,
	// Hub-generated events
	"node_stale":     true,
	"node_down":      true,
	"node_recovered": true,
	// Hub-generated host-domain events (v0.7.0, slice 3)
	"host_stale":     true,
	"host_down":      true,
	"host_recovered": true,
	// Hub-generated host root-fs disk-pressure (v0.23.0) — distinct from the controller's GUEST disk_*
	"host_disk_warning":      true,
	"host_disk_critical":     true,
	"storage_fill_warning":   true,
	"storage_fill_critical":  true,
	"expected_backup_missed": true,
	"expected_dbdump_missed": true,
	// Special
	"test": true,
}

// handleEvent processes structured events from controllers (new endpoint, replaces /notify for updated controllers).
func (h *Handler) handleEvent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	authCustomerID, isGlobal, ok := h.checkAuthCustomer(r)
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	var payload struct {
		CustomerID string          `json:"customer_id"`
		EventType  string          `json:"event_type"`
		Severity   string          `json:"severity"`
		Message    string          `json:"message"`
		Details    json.RawMessage `json:"details"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid JSON", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if payload.CustomerID == "" || payload.EventType == "" {
		http.Error(w, "customer_id and event_type are required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Validate customer_id matches authenticated customer (unless global key)
	if !isGlobal && authCustomerID != payload.CustomerID {
		http.Error(w, "Forbidden: customer_id mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	// Validate event_type
	if !allowedEventTypes[payload.EventType] {
		http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Invalid event_type: %s", payload.EventType), http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Validate/default severity (exact-match lowercase; unknown values coerce to info)
	switch payload.Severity {
	case "info", "warning", "error", "critical":
	default:
		payload.Severity = "info"
	}

	// Store details as JSON string
	detailsStr := "{}"
	if len(payload.Details) > 0 && string(payload.Details) != "null" {
		detailsStr = string(payload.Details)
	}

	_, err = h.store.SaveEvent(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, detailsStr, "controller")
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to save event from %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Event from %s: %s (%s) — %s", payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message)

	// Dispatch notifications (non-blocking)
	if h.dispatcher != nil {
		go h.dispatcher.ProcessEvent(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, detailsStr, "controller")
	}

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write([]byte(`{"ok":true}`))
}

func (h *Handler) handleCustomers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	customers, err := h.store.GetCustomers()
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to get customers: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	type customerJSON struct {
		ID                 string     `json:"id"`
		Name               string     `json:"name"`
		ControllerVersion  string     `json:"controller_version"`
		ControllerURL      string     `json:"controller_url,omitempty"`
		HealthStatus       string     `json:"health_status"`
		LastSeen           time.Time  `json:"last_seen"`
		CPUPercent         float64    `json:"cpu_percent"`
		MemoryPercent      float64    `json:"memory_percent"`
		ContainerTotal     int        `json:"container_total"`
		ContainerRunning   int        `json:"container_running"`
		BackupLastSnapshot *time.Time `json:"backup_last_snapshot"`
	}

	result := make([]customerJSON, 0, len(customers))
	for _, c := range customers {
		result = append(result, customerJSON{
			ID:                 c.CustomerID,
			Name:               c.CustomerName,
			ControllerVersion:  c.ControllerVersion,
			ControllerURL:      c.ControllerURL,
			HealthStatus:       c.HealthStatus,
			LastSeen:           c.ReceivedAt,
			CPUPercent:         c.CPUPercent,
			MemoryPercent:      c.MemoryPercent,
			ContainerTotal:     c.ContainerTotal,
			ContainerRunning:   c.ContainerRunning,
			BackupLastSnapshot: c.BackupLastSnapshot,
		})
	}

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(result)
}

func (h *Handler) handleCustomer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, customerID string) {
	customer, err := h.store.GetCustomer(customerID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to get customer %s: %v", customerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if customer == nil {
		http.NotFound(w, r)
		return
	}

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	// Return the full report JSON directly
	w.Write([]byte(customer.ReportJSON))
}

func (h *Handler) handleCustomerHistory(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, customerID string) {
	period := r.URL.Query().Get("period")
	var since time.Duration
	switch period {
	case "7d":
		since = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
	case "30d":
		since = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
	default:
		since = 24 * time.Hour
	}

	history, err := h.store.GetCustomerHistory(customerID, since)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to get history for %s: %v", customerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	type historyEntry struct {
		ReceivedAt    time.Time `json:"received_at"`
		HealthStatus  string    `json:"health_status"`
		CPUPercent    float64   `json:"cpu_percent"`
		MemoryPercent float64   `json:"memory_percent"`
	}

	result := make([]historyEntry, 0, len(history))
	for _, h := range history {
		result = append(result, historyEntry{
			ReceivedAt:    h.ReceivedAt,
			HealthStatus:  h.HealthStatus,
			CPUPercent:    h.CPUPercent,
			MemoryPercent: h.MemoryPercent,
		})
	}

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(result)
}

// handleNotify processes notification events from customer controllers.
func (h *Handler) handleNotify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if !h.checkAuth(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	var payload struct {
		CustomerID string `json:"customer_id"`
		EventType  string `json:"event_type"`
		Severity   string `json:"severity"`
		Message    string `json:"message"`
		Details    string `json:"details"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil || payload.CustomerID == "" || payload.EventType == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: customer_id and event_type required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Notification from %s: %s (%s) — %s", payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message)

	// Check if customer is blocked
	if h.store.IsCustomerBlocked(payload.CustomerID) {
		h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Notification suppressed for blocked customer %s", payload.CustomerID)
		h.store.LogNotification(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, "skipped", "customer blocked", "customer")
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok","sent":false,"reason":"blocked"}`))
		return
	}

	// Look up customer notification preferences
	prefs, err := h.store.GetNotificationPrefs(payload.CustomerID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to get notification prefs for %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Check if customer has email configured and event type is enabled
	if prefs == nil || prefs.Email == "" {
		h.logger.Printf("[INFO] No email configured for %s, skipping notification", payload.CustomerID)
		h.store.LogNotification(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, "skipped", "no email configured", "customer")
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok","sent":false,"reason":"no_email"}`))
		return
	}

	// Check if event type is in the enabled list (test events always pass)
	eventEnabled := payload.EventType == "test"
	for _, e := range prefs.EnabledEvents {
		if e == payload.EventType {
			eventEnabled = true
			break
		}
	}
	if !eventEnabled {
		h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Event %s not enabled for %s, skipping", payload.EventType, payload.CustomerID)
		h.store.LogNotification(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, "skipped", "event not enabled", "customer")
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok","sent":false,"reason":"event_disabled"}`))
		return
	}

	// Send email via Resend API
	if h.resendAPIKey == "" {
		h.logger.Printf("[WARN] Resend API key not configured, cannot send notification email")
		h.store.LogNotification(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, "skipped", "resend api key not configured", "customer")
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok","sent":false,"reason":"no_api_key"}`))
		return
	}

	subject, emailBody := formatNotificationEmail(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, payload.Details)
	sendErr := h.sendResendEmail(prefs.Email, subject, emailBody)
	if sendErr != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to send notification email to %s: %v", prefs.Email, sendErr)
		h.store.LogNotification(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, "failed", sendErr.Error(), "customer")
		http.Error(w, "Failed to send email", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Notification email sent to %s for %s/%s", prefs.Email, payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType)
	h.store.LogNotification(payload.CustomerID, payload.EventType, payload.Severity, payload.Message, "sent", "", "customer")

	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok","sent":true}`))
}

// handleSavePreferences stores notification preferences pushed from a customer controller.
func (h *Handler) handleSavePreferences(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if !h.checkAuth(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	var payload struct {
		CustomerID    string   `json:"customer_id"`
		Email         string   `json:"email"`
		EnabledEvents []string `json:"enabled_events"`
		CooldownHours int      `json:"cooldown_hours"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil || payload.CustomerID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid payload: customer_id required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := h.store.SaveNotificationPrefs(payload.CustomerID, payload.Email, payload.EnabledEvents, payload.CooldownHours); err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to save notification prefs for %s: %v", payload.CustomerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Notification preferences updated for %s: email=%s, events=%v", payload.CustomerID, payload.Email, payload.EnabledEvents)
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}

// handleRecovery returns the generated controller.yaml for disaster recovery.
// Auth: X-Retrieval-Password header (same as config retrieval).
//
// The infra-backup payload was retired (Phase-1, 2026-06-16): it pushed plaintext
// customer secrets to the hub (a zero-knowledge violation) and had been dead since
// slice 8C. DR config now comes from the generated controller.yaml here; the data
// bytes come from the agent's PBS whole-CT snapshot. A secret-free DR recipe is the
// later DR slice's job.
func (h *Handler) handleRecovery(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, customerID string) {
	if customerID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing customer_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	password := r.Header.Get("X-Retrieval-Password")
	if password == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: X-Retrieval-Password header required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	cfg, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfig(customerID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Recovery: failed to get customer config for %s: %v", customerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if cfg == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(cfg.RetrievalPassword)) != 1 {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: invalid password", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	// Generate controller.yaml. The claim state is baked read-only (no issue on the DR path — a
	// recovered box whose settings.json is gone re-gates on the EXISTING hash; the reset flow
	// covers a customer who lost the password with the box).
	var configYAML string
	if h.templateProvider != nil {
		var claimState *store.ClaimState
		if h.claimEngine != nil {
			claimState, _ = h.store.GetClaim(customerID)
		}
		yamlOutput, err := configgen.Generate(h.templateProvider.Template(), cfg, claimState)
		if err != nil {
			h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Recovery: failed to generate config for %s: %v", customerID, err)
			http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		configYAML = yamlOutput
	}

	// infra_backup retired: the response keeps has_infra_backup=false so any old client
	// degrades gracefully to the config_yaml-only path.
	resp := struct {
		CustomerID     string `json:"customer_id"`
		ConfigYAML     string `json:"config_yaml"`
		HasInfraBackup bool   `json:"has_infra_backup"`
	}{
		CustomerID:     customerID,
		ConfigYAML:     configYAML,
		HasInfraBackup: false,
	}

	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Recovery data downloaded for customer %s (config only; infra-backup retired)", customerID)
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}

// handleConfigRetrieve returns a generated controller.yaml for a customer.
// Auth: X-Retrieval-Password header (not Bearer token).
func (h *Handler) handleConfigRetrieve(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, customerID string) {
	if customerID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing customer_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	password := r.Header.Get("X-Retrieval-Password")
	if password == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: X-Retrieval-Password header required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	cfg, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfig(customerID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to get customer config for %s: %v", customerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if cfg == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	// Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(cfg.RetrievalPassword)) != 1 {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: invalid password", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	if h.templateProvider == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Config generation not available", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
		return
	}

	// Customer-claim arc (v0.50.0): the REAL config pull (Day-0 installer / controller refresh) is
	// the Day-0 claim entry point — issue + email the first code here (idempotent), and bake the
	// active hash into the generated web.claim_code_hash so the box is gated from FIRST boot.
	// (The operator-UI preview deliberately does NOT issue — it only bakes an existing hash.)
	var claimState *store.ClaimState
	if h.claimEngine != nil {
		var cerr error
		claimState, cerr = h.claimEngine.EnsureIssued(cfg)
		if cerr != nil {
			// Loud but non-fatal: the config is still served; if a hash was stored the gate is armed
			// and the operator resends the email from the customer page.
			h.logger.Printf("[WARN] claim issue for %s on config retrieve: %v", customerID, cerr)
		}
	}

	yamlOutput, err := configgen.Generate(h.templateProvider.Template(), cfg, claimState)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to generate config for %s: %v", customerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Config downloaded for customer %s", customerID)
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/yaml; charset=utf-8")
	w.Write([]byte(yamlOutput))
}

// artifactManifestResponse is the wire shape the host-bootstrap script consumes: the operator-vouched
// current agent binary + golden archive (version + sha256 each). The script fetches each artifact from
// Gitea with the config-retrieve git token and verifies its sha256 against THESE values before install
// — so the hub is the checksum trust root, a different root than Gitea (which only stores the bytes).
type artifactManifestResponse struct {
	Agent  artifactEntry `json:"agent"`
	Golden artifactEntry `json:"golden"`
}

type artifactEntry struct {
	Version string `json:"version"`
	SHA256  string `json:"sha256"`
}

// handleArtifactManifest serves the current artifact set for a customer. Auth mirrors
// handleConfigRetrieve EXACTLY (X-Retrieval-Password header, 404-then-401 order, constant-time
// compare) so a script that can pull the controller.yaml can pull the manifest with the same secret.
// v0.16.0 returns the GLOBAL current set for every customer (per-customer pinning is a future hook).
// An unset manifest returns empty fields (not an error) — the script falls back to the local golden
// and fails clearly on a missing binary.
func (h *Handler) handleArtifactManifest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, customerID string) {
	if customerID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Missing customer_id", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	password := r.Header.Get("X-Retrieval-Password")
	if password == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: X-Retrieval-Password header required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	cfg, err := h.store.GetCustomerConfig(customerID)
	if err != nil {
		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] artifacts: customer lookup failed for %s: %v", customerID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if cfg == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(password), []byte(cfg.RetrievalPassword)) != 1 {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized: invalid password", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	m := h.store.GetArtifactManifest()
	resp := artifactManifestResponse{
		Agent:  artifactEntry{Version: m.AgentVersion, SHA256: m.AgentSHA256},
		Golden: artifactEntry{Version: m.GoldenVersion, SHA256: m.GoldenSHA256},
	}
	h.logger.Printf("[INFO] Artifact manifest served for customer %s (agent=%s golden=%s)", customerID, m.AgentVersion, m.GoldenVersion)
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
}

// sendResendEmail sends an email via the Resend HTTP API.
func (h *Handler) sendResendEmail(to, subject, textBody string) error {
	payload := map[string]interface{}{
		"from":    h.fromEmail,
		"to":      []string{to},
		"subject": subject,
		"text":    textBody,
	}

	jsonData, err := json.Marshal(payload)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("marshaling email payload: %w", err)
	}

	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", "https://api.resend.com/emails", bytes.NewReader(jsonData))
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("creating request: %w", err)
	}
	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+h.resendAPIKey)
	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

	resp, err := h.httpClient.Do(req)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("sending request: %w", err)
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()

	if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
		respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024))
		return fmt.Errorf("resend API returned %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(respBody))
	}

	return nil
}

// formatNotificationEmail creates a Hungarian email subject and body.
func formatNotificationEmail(customerID, eventType, severity, message, details string) (string, string) {
	severityLabel := map[string]string{
		"info":     "Információ",
		"warning":  "Figyelmeztetés",
		"error":    "Hiba",
		"critical": "Kritikus",
	}
	label := severityLabel[severity]
	if label == "" {
		label = severity
	}

	subject := fmt.Sprintf("[Felhom] %s: %s", label, message)

	now := time.Now().Format("2006-01-02 15:04")
	emailText := fmt.Sprintf(`Kedves Ügyfél!

A Felhom rendszered a következő figyelmeztetést jelezte:

%s

Részletek:
- Szerver: %s
- Időpont: %s
- Szint: %s
- Típus: %s`, message, customerID, now, label, eventType)

	if details != "" {
		emailText += fmt.Sprintf("\n- Megjegyzés: %s", details)
	}

	emailText += `

Ha kérdésed van, vedd fel a kapcsolatot az üzemeltetővel.

Üdvözlettel,
Felhom.eu monitoring`

	return subject, emailText
}

// --- Asset endpoints ---

func (h *Handler) handleAssetsManifest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if !h.checkAuth(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	if h.assetsMgr == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Assets not configured", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
		return
	}

	data, err := h.assetsMgr.MarshalManifestJSON()
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.Write(data)
}

func (h *Handler) handleAssetFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, filename string) {
	if !h.checkAuth(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	if h.assetsMgr == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Assets not configured", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
		return
	}

	h.assetsMgr.ServeFile(w, r, filename)
}