docs: R-181 closed, R-156 closed, R-110 + R-115 rulings recorded, R-182 filed

R-181 CLOSED (controller v0.193.0 + v0.193.1) and proven live on demo-hp for
BOTH reserve terms. The reserve is now a per-app, per-run ADMISSION decision
taken before the app's first write and covering all three write legs, and it
gained a size term. The refusal's wording was not weakened; the behaviour moved
so it became true, verified by sha256 tree fingerprint.

R-156 CLOSED — papra's template mounts the app's own data root. Precondition
re-measured rather than inherited (both boxes were wiped today).

Part 4, documentation only, nothing built:
- R-110 WAITING-ON-OPERATOR -> READY. Ruling: option (b), the installer's
  publish channel moves to a TAG. Recorded with the condition that decides
  whether it works at all — it must cover BOTH the /scripts/ git-sync and the
  nine files the installer fetches from raw/branch/main.
- R-115 WAITING-ON-OPERATOR -> READY. Ruling: mechanism (b), a build-side gate
  refusing to deploy or vouch an unpublished version. The third instance (agent
  v0.120.0) would have silently downgraded both demo boxes while succeeding.

R-182 NEW: the periodic status refresh has no admission scope, so a refused app
re-alerts on every poll (measured: a second alert pair 13s after the run's).
Pre-existing in v0.192.0; deliberately not fixed in the R-181 task.

capability map: the local-backup row moves to PROVEN-LIVE in BOTH halves.
ROADMAP: R-165 collapses to CLOSED; R-181 collapsed into it.
07-backup-architecture.md: the reserve's contract stated as what the code
provides (S-1 — an architectural contract changed in the same session).
STATUS.md trimmed 150 -> 111 lines, "What's broken" no longer holds shipped
work, and the stale "After:" line (pointing at work that shipped on 2 August)
is fixed.

documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 
 | ID | Item | Size | Status | Notes / map rows flipped |
 |----|------|------|--------|--------------------------|
-| R-115 | **Publishing is a remembered step — forgotten within eight hours of being documented as forgettable** | M | idea — **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR**, 2026-07-29 | A box installs the agent from a Gitea generic package the hub explicitly vouches, never from git. Nothing in the build, deploy or session-end path publishes or checks that a version was published, so **"deployed" and "installable" are independent states that drift silently**. **Instance 1 — R-111** (morning): 17 agent releases v0.97.0–v0.113.0 stranded; a new customer would have installed without the whole R-82 tiered-backup arc plus F-CRIT-2 and F-REBOOT. Found only because the E-2d Phase 0 gate happened to look. **Instance 2 — agent 0.114.0** (same afternoon): the R-113 fix, built and pushed at `b58d7bc`, deployed to felhom-pve, never published — which blocked Session C, since a fresh drill box would have installed 0.113.0 and proven the bug rather than the fix. **The finding is the RECURRENCE, not either instance** — both are fixed. R-111 named this leg in its own text (*"decide whether publishing joins the release train rather than staying a remembered step"*) and closed SHIPPED without it; it recurred the same day, which is the evidence that **a note is not a mechanism**. **Class: → R-29, one layer up** (a control that exists and is never walked) — deliberately NOT given a second ID. **Filed as its own item rather than reopening R-111** because R-111's finding (the channel *was* stale) is closed and verified end-to-end by the E-2d install, while the process defect that caused it is a distinct problem with a distinct fix and a distinct owner. **Operator's decision, mechanisms first:** (a) publish as a step in the build/release path so deployed and installable cannot diverge; (b) a gate that refuses to deploy an unpublished+unvouched version — strongest, fails closed; (c) a session-end checklist entry; (d) accept manual + a pre-Session-C verification. **(a)/(b) are mechanisms, (c)/(d) are reminders — and R-29's whole finding is that reminders do not hold.** No code written when filed, by design |
+| R-115 | **Publishing is a remembered step — forgotten within eight hours of being documented as forgettable** | M | **READY** — operator ruling 2026-08-03: **mechanism (b), a build-side gate that REFUSES to deploy or vouch an unpublished version.** THIRD instance the same day (agent v0.120.0 deployed to both boxes while unpublished; a documented-path reinstall would have silently downgraded them and *succeeded*). CC's to build | A box installs the agent from a Gitea generic package the hub explicitly vouches, never from git. Nothing in the build, deploy or session-end path publishes or checks that a version was published, so **"deployed" and "installable" are independent states that drift silently**. **Instance 1 — R-111** (morning): 17 agent releases v0.97.0–v0.113.0 stranded; a new customer would have installed without the whole R-82 tiered-backup arc plus F-CRIT-2 and F-REBOOT. Found only because the E-2d Phase 0 gate happened to look. **Instance 2 — agent 0.114.0** (same afternoon): the R-113 fix, built and pushed at `b58d7bc`, deployed to felhom-pve, never published — which blocked Session C, since a fresh drill box would have installed 0.113.0 and proven the bug rather than the fix. **The finding is the RECURRENCE, not either instance** — both are fixed. R-111 named this leg in its own text (*"decide whether publishing joins the release train rather than staying a remembered step"*) and closed SHIPPED without it; it recurred the same day, which is the evidence that **a note is not a mechanism**. **Class: → R-29, one layer up** (a control that exists and is never walked) — deliberately NOT given a second ID. **Filed as its own item rather than reopening R-111** because R-111's finding (the channel *was* stale) is closed and verified end-to-end by the E-2d install, while the process defect that caused it is a distinct problem with a distinct fix and a distinct owner. **Operator's decision, mechanisms first:** (a) publish as a step in the build/release path so deployed and installable cannot diverge; (b) a gate that refuses to deploy an unpublished+unvouched version — strongest, fails closed; (c) a session-end checklist entry; (d) accept manual + a pre-Session-C verification. **(a)/(b) are mechanisms, (c)/(d) are reminders — and R-29's whole finding is that reminders do not hold.** No code written when filed, by design |
 | R-116 | **The drive-absent alarm and its recovery are a mismatched pair — generic on the way out, specific on the way back** | S | idea — **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-29** | Absent fires `storage_disconnected`; return fires `backup_target_restored`. `backup_target_absent` never fires at all (count 0 across a full Session-C run), so an operator gets an alarm they cannot match to its recovery — exactly what `notifyDriveReturned`'s own comment forbids. Root cause: `notifyDriveAbsent` (`intermediary.go:635-646`) branches on `isTarget[a.Path]` with `a.Path` the GUEST path, and `driveTargetByPath` (`:602-616`) builds it as `out[GuestPath] = d.BackupTarget` — but **the drive is TWO `/disks` rows and the flag and the guest path sit on different ones**: the `felhom-backup` storage row has `BackupTarget: true` (`felhom-agent/internal/localapi/disks.go:211`) and gets a guest path only while classified user-data, while the registry union row has the guest path and **never assigns `BackupTarget`** (`disks.go:265-267`). Absent ⇒ the flagged row loses its guest path ⇒ the union row writes `false` ⇒ generic. On return the rows rejoin ⇒ specific. v0.184.1 fixed the KEYING, not this. **Only reachable because R-113 made the gate fire at all.** Fix likely agent-side; decide the repo first. Blocks E-2's C5. Evidence: `audits/SESSION-C-2026-07-29.md` §5 |
 | R-113 | **The drive-absent gate cannot fire on device loss — E-2b's alarm is wired to an unreachable condition** | M | idea — **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-29** | `planDriveGates` (`felhom-controller/internal/web/intermediary.go:216-262`) treats a path as present by OR-ing in `d.BoundUnderParent`, which the agent derives from `GuestSeesMount()` — *"is this path a mount target in the guest's `/proc/<pid>/mountinfo`"* (`internal/localapi/disks.go:210`). The raw drive mount is a **device-bound systemd unit** and dies with the device; **the agent's own bind under the shared parent is not device-bound and its mountinfo entry outlives the device**, so the gate reads it as present and `notifyDriveAbsent` is never called. Live on a fresh box: target drive hot-detached, agent said `enrolled drive absent by UUID` every 20 s for 4½ min, controller logged **0** `[gate]` lines, hub received **zero** events — neither `backup_target_absent` nor the generic `storage_disconnected`. Not a virtualisation artefact (device-bound-mount vs manual-bind is the same on metal); caveat: SCSI hot-detach, physical unplug not staged. **Sixth instance of seam-built-but-never-wired — E-2b wired the seam to a condition that cannot occur.** Evidence: `audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md` §5.2 |
 | R-112 | **E-2's degraded banner and offer have no UI consumer — correct endpoint, invisible to the customer** | S | idea — **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-29** | `GET /api/storage/backup-target` returns byte-exact Hungarian copy (verified on a live box), and nothing in the product asks for it: `grep 'backup-target'` across every `*.html`/`*.js`/`*.css` → **0 hits**; no template references `OfferPath`/`Degraded`/the copy; `resolveBackupTargetState` and `degradedMessageFor` are consumed **only** by the JSON handler, with **no page handler injecting the state**. Decisive contrast: the templates fetch **18 distinct `/api/storage/*` endpoints** — `backup-target` and `backup-target/assign` are the only two with zero references. The handler's own comment calls itself *"the dashboard's source for the degraded banner and the offer"*. v0.185.1 shipped as *"the offer endpoints were mounted where nothing routed to them"* and fixed the **mount**, stopping one layer short of the **render**; its test pins dispatch, not reachability. **Fifth instance of the class. Fix R-114 first** — wiring this alone starts showing customers a wrong message. Evidence: `audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md` §5.1 |
@@ -157,18 +157,18 @@ Self-resolves the moment the target answers (the storage read succeeds, sees the
 | R-97 | **The whole-guest backup tier has NO failure signal to the hub — `internal/quiesce` never notifies** | S | **SHIPPED (controller v0.177.0 + hub v0.78.0, 2026-07-27)** — **R-97a:** `quiesce.TierNotifier`, a seam (not an import) wired by an init-only setter, edge-triggered on the R-88 breaker ARMING so a failing tier is reported once per run rather than once per retry; recovery rides `recordSuccess`'s existing bool. **NEW operator-only event types** `whole_guest_backup_failed`/`_recovered` — deliberately NOT `backup_failed`, which carries a customer Hungarian template AND sits in demo-felhom's live `enabled_events`, so reusing it would have emailed the CUSTOMER about a backup they cannot act on while it was still retrying. The recovery joins `recoveredPairedDownTypes` because its `info` severity would otherwise be dropped by `severityNotifies` — the operator would hear it break and never hear it heal. **The hub's operator cooldown was keyed `customerID:eventType` alone**, so one tier would have masked the other for an hour; now narrowly extended with a `tier` suffix taken from the event details, leaving every other event type unchanged. **R-97b:** a suppression window keyed to the quiesce CYCLE (not a state test — v0.164.0's `!= StateStopped` filter cannot see an app caught MID-RESTART, which is exactly how BookStack alarmed), consumed at the same single derivation point `classifyRunStates`. Grace = **180 s**, derived from the deploy flow's 120 s health timeout and Mealie's 60 s `start_period`; it **expires**, so an app that genuinely fails to come back still alarms. **PROVEN LIVE end-to-end with a control:** the new type POSTs 200 from inside guest 9201 while a bogus type 400s, and `notification_log` shows **1 operator row, 0 customer rows**. The quiesce→notify link itself is unit-proven only. | On 2026-07-27 three whole-guest backups failed and three quiesce cycles stopped and restarted every customer app stack, and **not one `backup_failed` event reached the hub.** It is not the allowlist — the hub already carries `backup_failed` and `backup_completed` (they are emitted by the controller's *app-data* backup path). The cause is that **`internal/quiesce` does not import `internal/notify` at all**: the tier R-82 built has no route to the hub, so a whole-guest backup can fail indefinitely in silence. The loop's only trace was `app_start_failed` — **info** severity, **Hungarian**, on the **customer** channel — telling the customer BookStack was down (it had been caught mid-restart by the third cycle) without saying why, during an outage the system itself caused. So the one signal that did fire was both the wrong tier and the wrong story. **Shape:** emit `backup_failed`/`backup_completed` from `quiesceAndPollTiers` naming the TIER, operator-tier; and decide whether a quiesce-induced restart should suppress `app_start_failed` the way controller **v0.164.0**'s deliberate-stop filter does — an app the backup stopped on purpose is not a fault. R-88's breaker bounds the repetition but changes nothing about the silence |
 | R-95 | **The restic offsite tier's credential CAN DELETE — R-89's "parallel question", now ANSWERED** | M | idea — established read-only 2026-07-27 | **The exposure closed on the weekly PBS tier is fully open on the daily restic tier**, which holds the customer's actual documents and photos and is the only tier that survives losing the box. Established without mutating anything: **(1) Identity** — a per-customer *subaccount* on `storage-box-pool-1` (box 611714, bx11, `u629488`): `u629488-sub1` home `felhom-demo-felhom`, `sub2` peti-felhom, `sub3` demo-hp, each labelled `felhom-customer`. Auth is an **SSH key stored ON THE BOX** (`…/felhom-controller-data/_data/data/offbox/ssh_key`, 0600, beside `repo_password` + a pinned `known_hosts`) — customer-side, not hub-side, so a compromised guest holds it. **(2) Read-write: YES** — the API reports **`readonly=False` on all three subaccounts**, and it is not merely latent: the controller runs `restic forget --group-by host,tags --keep-daily 7 --keep-weekly … --prune` **from the box** (`backup/offbox.go:984`, also `:1070`). Delete rights are exercised on every run. **(3) Append-only: NO, and not expressible** — the repo is built as `sftp:` (`offbox.go:482`); restic's append-only mode requires the **REST server** backend, which plain SFTP cannot provide. **(4) A zero-code mitigation exists and is unused:** the box type carries `snapshot_limit=10` and the API reports `snapshot_plan=null` with **0 snapshots** and `size_snapshots=0`. Hetzner Storage Box snapshots are taken **server-side, outside the SFTP namespace** — an SFTP subaccount cannot delete them — so they are a genuine immutability layer at no extra cost and with no code change. **Rule once for both tiers, per R-89.** Options, cheapest first: enable a snapshot plan (operator click, immediate); split backup-write from prune so pruning runs somewhere the box cannot reach; or move the repo to restic's REST server with `--append-only`. Flips the capability-map row for offsite immutability |
 | R-94 | ~~A hand-synced version constant drifts, and the gate that would catch it is never run~~ | XS | **CLOSED — SHIPPED hub v0.87.0, 2026-08-02** | Closed by **deleting** the label rather than deriving it: the Setup command fetches the installer at run time from a 30 s-git-synced website (R-110), so no build-time value in the hub can be true. `hostinstall_gates.py` gate 1 inverted to pin the ABSENCE of a version literal; the tautological `render_test.go` assertion deleted (demonstrated passing at `9.9.9`). Detail: `OPEN-ITEMS.md` R-94 |
-| R-110 | **`main` is the installer's publish channel — there is no staging** | S | idea — found 2026-07-29, **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR (a ruling, not a defect)** | `manifests/webpage.yaml` git-syncs `/scripts/` from `--branch=main` on a `--period=30s`, and nginx serves that working tree directly (`location /scripts/`, `root /usr/share/nginx/html/current`). So pushing `scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` **is** publishing it: within thirty seconds it is what every subsequent `felhom-bootstrap.sh` fetch (`scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh:96`) and every operator-run day-0 command (`customer_unified.html:563`, `:1262`; `runbooks/day0-install.md` C.1) receives. **There is no tag, no pinned-version path, no staging copy and no rollback other than another push** — for the one artifact that runs as **root on a virgin box**, the most privileged thing Felhom ships. **Two consequences worth stating plainly:** E-2d is not a gate *before* exposure — 1.22.0 has been the live installer since it hit `main` on 2026-07-29, so the proof run confirms what customers already receive rather than clearing it for release; and the precaution the old R-94 row recorded ("do not point every new box at an installer that has never run") **was never available to take**, because nothing points boxes at a version. **Open question for the operator, not a defect to fix blind:** should `/scripts/` serve a pinned release — a tag-tracked git-sync ref, or a versioned directory (`/scripts/1.22.0/…`) with the hub's generated command naming a version — or is `main`-tracking the accepted shape for a one-operator product where the alternative is a release ritual nobody performs? **Exposure today is zero** (no boxes are installing), which is exactly why it is cheap to decide now. Whichever way it goes, it decides whether R-94 leg (a) makes the label a *fact* (derived from the served script) or keeps it a *claim*. Flips no capability-map row — the map states what the platform does, and this changes nothing about that |
+| R-110 | **`main` is the installer's publish channel — there is no staging** | S | **READY** — operator ruling 2026-08-03: **option (b), the channel moves to a TAG**, so publishing is moving the tag and rollback is moving it back. **Must cover BOTH channels** — the nginx `/scripts/` git-sync AND the nine files the installer fetches from `raw/branch/main` — or it only half-works. CC's to build | `manifests/webpage.yaml` git-syncs `/scripts/` from `--branch=main` on a `--period=30s`, and nginx serves that working tree directly (`location /scripts/`, `root /usr/share/nginx/html/current`). So pushing `scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` **is** publishing it: within thirty seconds it is what every subsequent `felhom-bootstrap.sh` fetch (`scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh:96`) and every operator-run day-0 command (`customer_unified.html:563`, `:1262`; `runbooks/day0-install.md` C.1) receives. **There is no tag, no pinned-version path, no staging copy and no rollback other than another push** — for the one artifact that runs as **root on a virgin box**, the most privileged thing Felhom ships. **Two consequences worth stating plainly:** E-2d is not a gate *before* exposure — 1.22.0 has been the live installer since it hit `main` on 2026-07-29, so the proof run confirms what customers already receive rather than clearing it for release; and the precaution the old R-94 row recorded ("do not point every new box at an installer that has never run") **was never available to take**, because nothing points boxes at a version. **Open question for the operator, not a defect to fix blind:** should `/scripts/` serve a pinned release — a tag-tracked git-sync ref, or a versioned directory (`/scripts/1.22.0/…`) with the hub's generated command naming a version — or is `main`-tracking the accepted shape for a one-operator product where the alternative is a release ritual nobody performs? **Exposure today is zero** (no boxes are installing), which is exactly why it is cheap to decide now. Whichever way it goes, it decides whether R-94 leg (a) makes the label a *fact* (derived from the served script) or keeps it a *claim*. Flips no capability-map row — the map states what the platform does, and this changes nothing about that |
 | R-128 | **`ISO_VERSION` "aligns with SCRIPT_VERSION" was a comment nothing evaluated** | XS | **CLOSED — iso v1.26.0, 2026-07-31** | Closed by **correcting the claim, not asserting it**: the ISO is frozen while `felhom-host-install.sh` is fetched at run time from `main` (R-94/R-110), so an assertion would invent a constraint. `build-felhom-iso.sh:45-52`. Full reasoning in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` |
 | R-154 | **`[first-boot]` is automated-install-only, and nothing in the tree said so** | XS | **CLOSED — iso v1.26.0, 2026-07-31** | A PVE property, measured with a same-image control (`audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-3-2026-07-31.md` §2); recorded at `scripts/iso/pkg/build-deb.sh:6-11`. Superseded in practice by the `.deb` delivery route |
 | R-155 | **`iso-repack.sh` refused any ISO without `auto-installer-mode.toml`** | XS | **CLOSED — iso v1.26.0, 2026-07-31** | **Narrowed, not deleted** — unchanged for `FELHOM_MENU=single` (`iso-repack.sh:121-128`), does not apply to `release` where the file's absence *is* gate G1. Do not remove it wholesale |
-| R-156 | **An app's data is neither persisted nor backed up, and it reports healthy** — a template mounts a volume at a path the app never writes, so data sits in the container's writable layer: lost on redeploy, tarred nightly as an empty dir, healthcheck green | S | **DETECTED + GATE SHIPPED; papra REFERRED** (catalog sweep, 2026-08-02) | Found by Campaign 10 on **papra**; the 53-template sweep convicted **gramps-web** and **wishlist** too and **fixed both**. The gate is `app-catalog-felhom.eu/scripts/check-volume-persistence.py` — a runtime probe (`docker diff` + mount occupancy + writability, canary self-test, fails closed); the detector and the gate are one program. **papra is NOT fixed**: the fix needs the app to use `/app/data` or the template to mount `/app/app-data`, so it is referred. Sweep evidence: `app-catalog-felhom.eu/audits/persistence-sweep-2026-08-02/` (53 probe.json). Ranking in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` |
+| R-156 | ~~**An app's data is neither persisted nor backed up, and it reports healthy**~~ | S | **CLOSED — all three apps fixed, 2026-08-03.** papra's template now mounts `papra_data:/app/app-data` (the app's own data ROOT, chosen over reconfiguring three env vars so a future upstream path cannot escape). Deployed nowhere — re-checked on both demo guests and the hub fleet view, not inherited. Gate run in BOTH directions: CLEAN fixed, BROKEN reverted | Found by Campaign 10 on **papra**; the 53-template sweep convicted **gramps-web** and **wishlist** too and **fixed both**. The gate is `app-catalog-felhom.eu/scripts/check-volume-persistence.py` — a runtime probe (`docker diff` + mount occupancy + writability, canary self-test, fails closed); the detector and the gate are one program. **papra is NOT fixed**: the fix needs the app to use `/app/data` or the template to mount `/app/app-data`, so it is referred. Sweep evidence: `app-catalog-felhom.eu/audits/persistence-sweep-2026-08-02/` (53 probe.json). Ranking in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` |
 | R-157 | **`bootrecon`'s start-ONCE sweep misses the boot orphan it exists to recover** | S | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE (v0.189.0 + v0.190.0, 2026-08-02)** | Both mechanisms closed. **B:** the container count → recorded intent (R-166). **A:** the single T+5 s observation → a settle-then-sweep window (sample every 5 s, settled after 3 identical samples, one sweep at the end, ends on settled OR a 50 s budget). Budget is 50 s because settle+budget+one retry must fit the 90 s `deadAppBootGrace`; a test rejected 60 s at 95 s. Late recoveries are REPORTED, not hidden by widening the grace. **The fix had its own defect, found live:** sampling the Manager's 10 s-refreshed cache let "settled" mean "the cache did not update" — `sampleBootFleet` now refreshes first. **6/6 hard resets clean on the shipped build**, plus a same-app before/after (missed 18:08:35, recovered 18:18:50) |
 | R-170 | **The drive-backed boot gate infers a Stop from a container count** | S | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE (v0.190.0, 2026-08-02)** | `shouldRecreateOnBoot` reads `desired_state` with the same three-way table as `isBootOrphan`; absent keeps the old `hasContainers` behaviour exactly; `presentStable` untouched. Agreement pinned from both sides against one fixture table. Live: calibre-web (`running`, zero containers) recreated and immich (`stopped`) left alone in the same reboot |
 | R-171 | **The boot sweep started apps whose data drive was ABSENT** — a regression from v0.189.0 | S | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE (v0.190.0, 2026-08-02)** | Reasoned from the diff, CONFIRMED on hardware first (`audits/DIAG-bootrecon-drive-absent-2026-08-02.md`). The write hazard was blocked only by an ACCIDENTAL filesystem permission (host-root-owned mountpoint + unprivileged guest); the false dead-app alarm was real on every box. New fail-safe `bootrecon.StartGate` seam, also covering quiesce and in-flight app-data operations (§8.2). The rule already existed on the API path (`startGatedByMissingDrive`); the sweep bypassed it |
 | R-166 | **App state gets a desired/observed model with its own store** (operator decision D-b) | M | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE — controller v0.189.0, 2026-08-02** | Tri-state `desired_state` in `app.yaml`, written ONLY by the customer's action; `bootrecon` reads intent instead of `len(Containers) > 0`; **absent means UNKNOWN** so legacy boxes keep byte-identical behaviour; running-only backfill; `backup.AppStopGuard` covers every stop→work→start window in its own marker file. **The durable fix for R-157 mechanism B.** Both blocking facts answered at source first: the crash-safe journal pattern DID already exist (quiesce, migrate) but covered **none** of the app-data path, and the SQLite store was rejected as a home because `metrics.db` is optional by design. `07`/`02` architecture docs carry the desired/in-flight/observed split. **Left for R-170:** the drive-backed boot gate still uses the container-count inference |
 | R-158 | ~~A local Tier-1 backup failure reaches no hub channel~~ | S | **SHIPPED — controller v0.191.0 + hub v0.89.0, 2026-08-02** | Collapsed per the lifecycle rule. Closed by **R-167** (D-c's operator half) — no second row was filed for the same wire. New `unitNotify` seam fired per app from `captureAllRecoveryUnits` with the loop continuing, carrying the target filesystem's used/free bytes. **Routed to a new OPERATOR-ONLY type `recovery_unit_capture_failed`, NOT the `backup_failed` this row proposed** — that type is customer-enabled by default and would email the customer about a failure they cannot act on; decision D-c overrides the proposal. **Flips:** the new capability-map row *"A failed per-app Tier-1 backup reaches the OPERATOR"* → **PROVEN-LIVE** (`customer | … | skipped | operator_only` observed in the hub's `notification_log`, 9201, 2026-08-02) |
 | R-167 | ~~Storage monitoring and backup alerts (decision D-c)~~ | M | **SHIPPED — controller v0.191.0/.1/.2 + hub v0.89.0, 2026-08-02** | Collapsed per the lifecycle rule. **Landed BEFORE the R-165 merge rather than with it** — D-a's condition (2) requires the same step and never after, and first is strictly better: the warnings were proven on hardware while the wall is still standing. Customer half = `internal/fillwatch`, per filesystem, two threshold terms (85% / 5 GiB; critical 95% / 2 GiB), edge-triggered with persisted state and a 75% / 7 GiB hysteresis return. **It emits the pre-existing `disk_warning`/`disk_critical` pair, which had NO producer in any repo — the sixth *built-but-never-wired* instance**; the hub's two generic `customerMessages` entries were deleted so the dynamic Hungarian survives. Operator half = R-158. **Flips:** two new capability-map rows → **PROVEN-LIVE**. **Follow-ups:** R-177 (no run-now path), R-175 (§7.5's bound is one box's) |
-| R-165 | Merge `mp1` into `mp0` — the dedicated backup partition stops existing (decision D-a) | M | **SPIKED 2026-08-02 — WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** | `audits/SPIKE-r165-mp1-merge-2026-08-02.md`, M1-M5, **no layout touched**. Prerequisite R-167 is now SHIPPED. **Three findings the merge session must not re-derive:** (1) *"the layout" is not one thing* — demo-felhom `200G/50G`, demo-hp `50G/20G`, golden `16G/8G`, so any fixed pair is already wrong for one box (→ R-175); (2) **`mp1` is a BULKHEAD, not only a ceiling** — an overflow today cannot reach `/var/lib/docker`, and after the merge it can, which is the one place "the merge is cheap" stops being true; (3) the golden fails closed on the split in **four** places, not one. **M5: D-a's condition (1) is currently SATISFIED** — no external box is in the hub's host register, and both demo boxes are Tier 0 and reinstallable, so migration cost for the measurable population is zero. **Recommendation: S1 (one volume, two directories) + B2 (a refusal threshold in the capture path), fresh-install shape.** **Two prerequisites unmeasured → R-176.** Does NOT close R-163 until it lands |
+| R-165 | ~~Merge `mp1` into `mp0` — the dedicated backup partition stops existing (decision D-a)~~ | M | **CLOSED — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-08-03.** Variant V-c shipped (golden v3.0.0 + agent v0.120.0 + controller v0.192.0); both demo boxes reinstalled and proven end to end (R-178). **Its stated replacement for the bulkhead — B2 — was completed by R-181 the same day** (controller v0.193.0/.1): the reserve became a per-app, per-run admission covering all three write legs and gained a size term, and both terms were re-proven by filling demo-hp. R-181 is collapsed into this row rather than carried separately | `audits/SPIKE-r165-mp1-merge-2026-08-02.md`, M1-M5, **no layout touched**. Prerequisite R-167 is now SHIPPED. **Three findings the merge session must not re-derive:** (1) *"the layout" is not one thing* — demo-felhom `200G/50G`, demo-hp `50G/20G`, golden `16G/8G`, so any fixed pair is already wrong for one box (→ R-175); (2) **`mp1` is a BULKHEAD, not only a ceiling** — an overflow today cannot reach `/var/lib/docker`, and after the merge it can, which is the one place "the merge is cheap" stops being true; (3) the golden fails closed on the split in **four** places, not one. **M5: D-a's condition (1) is currently SATISFIED** — no external box is in the hub's host register, and both demo boxes are Tier 0 and reinstallable, so migration cost for the measurable population is zero. **Recommendation: S1 (one volume, two directories) + B2 (a refusal threshold in the capture path), fresh-install shape.** **Two prerequisites unmeasured → R-176.** Does NOT close R-163 until it lands |
 | R-159 | **wishlist's data landed in an ANONYMOUS volume — never backed up, orphaned by a redeploy** | XS | **SHIPPED** (`templates/wishlist/`, 2026-08-02) — filed for the CLASS | Image declares `VOLUME /usr/src/app/data`; template mounted `wishlist_data:/data`, a path the app never writes. `ResolveDockerVolumeNames` returns names only for compose-declared volumes, so `DumpAppVolumes` never sees an anonymous one. **The class is open:** any image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path is silent unbacked-up storage — **`immich-server` has one today** at `/data`, empty when measured. Proposed `REUSE.md` rule: a template mounts every path in `Config.Volumes`, or says why not |
 | R-160 | **gramps-web persisted three paths and wrote to none of them** | XS | **SHIPPED** (`templates/gramps-web/`, 2026-08-02) | `/app/data` appears nowhere in the image's env; the accounts DB and **the family tree** (`GRAMPS_DATABASE_PATH=/root/.gramps/grampsdb`) both landed in the writable layer. Upstream persists **eight** paths, the template three, one a phantom. **Severity above papra's:** papra loses documents the customer may hold elsewhere; gramps-web loses the artefact built inside the app, of which no other copy exists by construction |
 | R-161 | **The volume-persistence gate is enforced by convention, not automatically** | M | **RULED + SHIPPED at reduced scope** (operator, 2026-08-02; `app-catalog` `fd7747d`) | Enforcement is **convention**: the catalog repo has no CI at all (`.gitea/workflows`, `.github`, drone/woodpecker — searched, none). **R-29's record: three orphaned gates, one enforced, and only the enforced one ever stopped anything — so the ruling copied the shape that works.** **Controller-side REJECTED with a measured reason:** a check at template load can only read the file, and a static audit of all 53 templates reports the catalog clean **including papra** — it would pass on the very defect it exists to catch (the property is runtime-only; see `check-volume-persistence.py`'s header). **CI REJECTED for now** — neither repo has any, no users yet. **Shipped:** `scripts/catalog_gates.py`, one entry point over all three gates, non-zero on any failure, mandated in the catalog's `CLAUDE.md` as `site_gates.py` is. **Open residue is only the automatic half**, sufficient while one person touches templates |