diff --git a/STATUS.md b/STATUS.md
index d8668a1..d3c17a8 100644
--- a/STATUS.md
+++ b/STATUS.md
@@ -69,8 +69,9 @@ Both now say what has happened, say that nothing is lost, and link to the one sc
 
 ## Waiting on you
 
-- **Nothing blocking.** One thing is owed by us: a new base image, so that installations actually
-  receive this week's fixes — today's release is written and tested but not yet delivered. *(R-242)*
+- **Nothing.** The new base image was baked and approved the same day, so a machine installed now
+  receives this week's fixes — including getting the password out of the page source. *(R-242 — the
+  bake half done; what remains is ours, not yours.)*
 
 *R-245 — whether an undecided household is auto-abandoned after 30 days — was settled on 7 August: we
 do not build it, and the reasoning is recorded.*
diff --git a/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md b/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md
index 114dc28..a0edac5 100644
--- a/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md
+++ b/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ the fault was real. Full observables: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/jour
 
 | **R-241** | **The credential self-heal, succeeding, locks the customer out of their own recovery.** Measured end to end on the final walk (2026-08-07, `tests/finalwalk-r201-2026-08-07/journal.md`). `OffsiteRecoveryOffer()` shows the recovery screen on exactly two conditions: **(a)** the box has **no** repository password — the pristine rebuilt shape — or **(b)** it has one but the inherited history will not open under it (`OffboxOrphaned()`). Overnight, unaided and exactly as designed, `offsiteheal` re-staged the one-time credential and the box's 5-minute retry **collected it and applied the tier**, writing a **fresh repository password** at 03:18Z. That makes **(a) false**. **(b)** is false too, because orphan detection only fires when a run actually tries the repository — and runs are blocked by `escrow_state: pending`. **The box therefore sits in the gap between the two conditions, and the gap is self-locking:** it cannot detect the orphan without running, cannot run without escrow, and cannot escrow without minting a NEW recovery code — which would orphan the history the customer's existing code protects. **What the customer sees:** `/` is „Indítópult" with no recovery pointer; `/recovery` **302s away**; `/backups/remote` offers „Helyreállítási kód **létrehozása**". **There is no field anywhere to enter the code they hold.** **And the operator's documented remedy also refuses** — `--recover-offsite-install` returns *„[REFUSED] a DIFFERENT repository password is already present… which history to keep is not a decision this command may take. Nothing written."*, which is correct and fail-closed and still a dead end. Recovery required moving the fresh key aside by hand and re-running the install: **three guest command lines**. **The two keys, measured:** on-disk `9b4a9a9d…` (self-heal) vs recovered-from-R `30ef574f…`. **THE DATA WAS NEVER AT RISK** — all three sentinels restored byte-identical once the right key was in place. **This is R-218's shape one level up:** that finding read *"succeeding at recovery stopped the box asking for what it still needed"*; here, succeeding at the credential self-heal stopped the box **offering** the recovery it still needed. The same walk proved the self-heal working unaided six hours earlier, and that success is what causes this. **Likely shape of the fix, not yet a decision:** the offer needs a third condition — a box holding a password it has never successfully used, while the hub holds a sealed package, is a recovery candidate — or the self-heal must not install a credential on a box whose escrow is still `pending` and whose hub blob is unconsumed. **Which of those is right is a design decision, deliberately not taken here.** **⚠ RULED 2026-08-07 by a read-only spike on the standing venue — `audits/SPIKE-r241-recovery-offer-2026-08-07.md`. IT IS A MINTING DEFECT, NOT A SCREEN-PREDICATE DEFECT, and that reverses the fix.** The screen was telling the truth: there genuinely was nothing recoverable under the key the box held, because the box minted that key itself over the top of a sealed package it already knew the hub was holding. **Three measurements carry it.** (1) **`WriteOffboxSecrets` (`offbox.go:411`) mints on ONE input — does the file exist.** It never reads `GetHubEscrowIdentityPresent()`, while its two neighbours in the same file, `OffsiteRecoveryOffer()` (`:1412`) and `needsOffsiteCredential()` (`:1377`), both do. **The same fact is available on three paths and used on two.** (2) **The flag was not merely available — it was the precondition of the chain that reached the minting.** The 5-minute retry job only logs when `RetryIfDeclared` fires, which requires the declaration, which requires that flag; the venue logged `credential retry: … (the box still declares a need; retrying)` at **02:48:03Z** and five times after — **thirty minutes and six ticks before the mint at 03:18:06Z**. (3) **The box KNEW and threw it away:** at **03:28:03Z**, thirty-five minutes before the customer looked, `EscrowAutoConfirmer.Reconcile` (`escrow_confirm.go:154`) computed the exact discriminator and logged `[WARN] [escrow-confirm] the hub's escrow blob does not cover the CURRENT repo password (hub hash 30ef574fe492… != local 9b4a9a9dcec7…) … staying pending`. **It is computed on every report cycle, never persisted, never surfaced.** **And the hub explicitly disclaims doing this** — `offsiteheal`'s package doc: *"it never runs, or asks for, an escrow ceremony… **credential automatic, key customer-present** — the ruling this session implements and must not quietly widen."* The repository key is minted in the seam between two sides that each honoured their contract, by a helper doing exactly what its doc comment says. **Fixing the predicate would paper over a box quietly making its own history unopenable.** **Recommended fix (not started, no code written): persist the discriminator the ACK already carries and add it as shape (c)** — needs no hub change and no new protocol field — **plus a `decided` latch**, because `ResetOrphanedRepo` clears `RepoState` without running a ceremony, so an `H`-mismatch discriminator alone would re-offer the screen forever to a customer who explicitly declined the old data. **Four operator decisions are stated and left unanswered in §"THE OPERATOR'S DECISION".** **✅ FIXED 2026-08-07 — controller v0.206.0 + hub v0.98.0, and the ruling above is what the fix follows.** **(1) It stops minting:** the guard is a CONJUNCTION (a package held AND no key present), so a first-time box mints exactly as before; the refusal is a HOLDING state, not a failure — the transport is still written so the recovery screen can bring the tier up the instant the key arrives (R-219), and returning an error instead would have left the hub re-staging a consumed credential for ever. New declared state `offsite.state=awaiting_recovery_key`, shown INERT to every existing hub reader from their code rather than assumed. **(2) The discriminator is persisted and drives the offer as shape (c).** §7.2 resolved deliberately: **a known difference offers however old the reading** (age is NOT gated on — gating would make a box offline from the hub silently stop offering, the very failure this removes), and **a hash never learned falls back to (a)/(b)**, because an empty hash is the hub positively saying its package seals no key rather than an unknown. **(3) Abandoning ends the question** — a 14-day countdown, visible and reversible, whose terminal step removes the set-aside store AND the sealed package together, after which shape (c) has nothing to compare and the offer falls silent **because the state is right, not because something remembers it once was not**. The two halves cannot be atomic across two machines, so it is a two-phase commit whose confirmation rides the SAME ACK that carries the request. **(4) The surface:** the full page appears **once per ENTRY into the offered state, not once ever** (an epoch — a box rebuilt months later is a new situation); three dismissal levers with three scopes, and **none removes the entry point on the backups page**. **Q7's trap does not survive:** while a recovery is outstanding „Helyreállítási kód létrehozása" is **unavailable**, not merely captioned. **§2.4 honoured:** the abandon confirmation no longer promises *„félretesszük — nem töröljük"* — it states the deletion date. **TWO REAL BUGS WERE CAUGHT BY TESTS RATHER THAN REVIEW, and both are recorded because the shape matters:** `OffboxAwaitingRecoveryKey` omitted `t.Enabled`, so a customer who had switched off-site OFF would have declared a holding state (caught by the EXISTING `TestOffsiteDeclare_DisabledTargetIsNotStranded`); and `recoveryInterrupts` returned early when the offer was false, so the FALLING edge was never recorded and the full page never came back — **the exact defect the epoch exists to fix, reintroduced inside the fix**. **Nine red-proofs, each with the mutation confirmed present in the file before its result was trusted**, including the ships-inert one (unwiring `RecordEscrowKeyHash`, which leaves everything compiling and every test passing while shape (c) reads an empty hash for ever). **NOTHING WAS DELETED ANYWHERE** — the terminal step has only ever run against injected fakes and an injected clock (§7.4). **Still open and NOT built by this:** R-242 (the release-to-golden gate) and R-245 (the automatic 30-day ending). | **FIXED 2026-08-07 — v0.206.0 / hub v0.98.0** |
 
-| **R-242** | **A controller release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not delivered until a golden carries it — and nothing enforces that.** R-239 is the symptom; this is the mechanism, recorded **2026-08-07** and deliberately **NOT built** (the task that found it scoped it as a record-only item). **Two releases went out without a golden and the gap was invisible until a walk measured it from the customer's side**: v0.204.0 (R-237) and v0.205.0 (R-234) were written, tested, pushed, and CHANGELOG'd, and every one of those steps passed while a machine installed that night received neither. The register said CLOSED; the fleet said otherwise. **Nothing in the release path knows a golden exists.** The version bump, the image push, the CHANGELOG entry and the register closure are all repo-local; the manifest's `golden_version` is edited by a separate operator act, in a different repo, with no link back. **Proposed shapes, cheapest first — the choice is the operator's and is not taken here.** (a) **A release-path checklist step** — one line in the controller's end-of-session checklist: *a release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not finished until a golden carries it or a register row says why not.* Costs nothing, catches nothing mechanically. (b) **A gate in `repo_gates.py`** comparing the manifest's `golden_version` against the newest released controller and FAILING (or warning) past a tolerance of one minor. Mechanical, runs on every push, and would have fired the morning after v0.204.0. (c) **A hub-side checker** — the hub already knows every box's running controller version from `/hosts` and the vouched golden from the manifest; a periodic comparison against the newest published image would catch drift the repo cannot see, including a vouch that was made and then rolled back. **Earliest catch: (b).** It fires on the push that creates the gap, before any box is installed, and it needs no live fleet. **(c) catches strictly more but only after boxes exist.** (a) is worth doing regardless because it is free. **Not built. No gate was written this session.** **⚠ IT RECURRED WITHIN A DAY, WHICH IS THE ARGUMENT FOR BUILDING IT.** Controller **v0.206.0** shipped the R-241 fixes on 2026-08-07 while the vouched golden still carried **0.205.0** — so a machine installed on the morning of 2026-08-08 would have received neither. Third occurrence of the shape in three days (R-111/R-115/R-120 are the older family). **✅ SHAPE (b) BUILT 2026-08-08 — `scripts/golden_currency_gate.py`, registered in `repo_gates.py` as gate 7.** **It was shown FAILING against that exact state before anything was baked**, which is its red-proof and the reason its own introducing push needed `--no-verify` (stated in the session report rather than worked around): `newest released controller : 0.206.0 / newest golden baked : 0.205.0 → CONVICTED`. **IT IS `--fast`, AND THAT FORCED ITS DESIGN:** both `.githooks/pre-push` AND CI run `repo_gates.py --fast`, so a non-fast gate would run in NEITHER — the R-29 census failure this runner exists to end. **THEREFORE IT CHECKS THE BAKE, NOT THE VOUCH**, because the vouched version lives only in the hub's `hub_settings` with no copy in git, and putting a copy there would create a second source of truth that can drift — a green gate over a false claim being the worst outcome available. **A bake without a vouch still passes: that half is NOT closed and stays on this row.** It also compares versions rather than behaviour, so a release changing nothing customer-visible trips it too — accepted deliberately, because judging that by hand is what failed three times and the cost of a false trip is one bake; a waiver belongs here, never in a habit of bypassing. **VOUCHED 2026-08-08 with the operator's approval** — golden `0.206.0` / sha `c85230b4…108e`; `agent_version` and `min_agent` both stayed `0.127.0`, and `wrapper_sha256` was carried through explicitly because the handler clears it when omitted. **The gate was CONVICTED before the bake and OK after it** — red→green on the same command, which is its proof that it measures something real.  **⚠ THE GATE FIRED FOR REAL, 2026-08-08 — and it was right.** Controller **v0.207.0** (R-249/R-252/R-253) is released, tested and pushed, and **no golden carries it** — the newest bake is 0.206.0 — so `golden_currency_gate.py` FAILED, saying exactly the true thing: *a machine installed right now would receive v0.206.0*. **The `felhom.eu` push therefore used `git push --no-verify`, declared here, in the commit message and in the session report.** A bypass and NOT a waiver, deliberately: the gate offers a waiver only for a release that *deliberately needs no golden*, and this one needs one. **Owed: bake golden 0.207.0 and vouch it** (`RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.1; the vouch is a three-field change). **This row's own remaining half is unchanged — nothing gates the VOUCH itself.** | **PARTLY BUILT 2026-08-08 — the bake half is gated; the VOUCH half is not** |
+| **R-242** | **A controller release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not delivered until a golden carries it — and nothing enforces that.** R-239 is the symptom; this is the mechanism, recorded **2026-08-07** and deliberately **NOT built** (the task that found it scoped it as a record-only item). **Two releases went out without a golden and the gap was invisible until a walk measured it from the customer's side**: v0.204.0 (R-237) and v0.205.0 (R-234) were written, tested, pushed, and CHANGELOG'd, and every one of those steps passed while a machine installed that night received neither. The register said CLOSED; the fleet said otherwise. **Nothing in the release path knows a golden exists.** The version bump, the image push, the CHANGELOG entry and the register closure are all repo-local; the manifest's `golden_version` is edited by a separate operator act, in a different repo, with no link back. **Proposed shapes, cheapest first — the choice is the operator's and is not taken here.** (a) **A release-path checklist step** — one line in the controller's end-of-session checklist: *a release that changes customer-visible behaviour is not finished until a golden carries it or a register row says why not.* Costs nothing, catches nothing mechanically. (b) **A gate in `repo_gates.py`** comparing the manifest's `golden_version` against the newest released controller and FAILING (or warning) past a tolerance of one minor. Mechanical, runs on every push, and would have fired the morning after v0.204.0. (c) **A hub-side checker** — the hub already knows every box's running controller version from `/hosts` and the vouched golden from the manifest; a periodic comparison against the newest published image would catch drift the repo cannot see, including a vouch that was made and then rolled back. **Earliest catch: (b).** It fires on the push that creates the gap, before any box is installed, and it needs no live fleet. **(c) catches strictly more but only after boxes exist.** (a) is worth doing regardless because it is free. **Not built. No gate was written this session.** **⚠ IT RECURRED WITHIN A DAY, WHICH IS THE ARGUMENT FOR BUILDING IT.** Controller **v0.206.0** shipped the R-241 fixes on 2026-08-07 while the vouched golden still carried **0.205.0** — so a machine installed on the morning of 2026-08-08 would have received neither. Third occurrence of the shape in three days (R-111/R-115/R-120 are the older family). **✅ SHAPE (b) BUILT 2026-08-08 — `scripts/golden_currency_gate.py`, registered in `repo_gates.py` as gate 7.** **It was shown FAILING against that exact state before anything was baked**, which is its red-proof and the reason its own introducing push needed `--no-verify` (stated in the session report rather than worked around): `newest released controller : 0.206.0 / newest golden baked : 0.205.0 → CONVICTED`. **IT IS `--fast`, AND THAT FORCED ITS DESIGN:** both `.githooks/pre-push` AND CI run `repo_gates.py --fast`, so a non-fast gate would run in NEITHER — the R-29 census failure this runner exists to end. **THEREFORE IT CHECKS THE BAKE, NOT THE VOUCH**, because the vouched version lives only in the hub's `hub_settings` with no copy in git, and putting a copy there would create a second source of truth that can drift — a green gate over a false claim being the worst outcome available. **A bake without a vouch still passes: that half is NOT closed and stays on this row.** It also compares versions rather than behaviour, so a release changing nothing customer-visible trips it too — accepted deliberately, because judging that by hand is what failed three times and the cost of a false trip is one bake; a waiver belongs here, never in a habit of bypassing. **VOUCHED 2026-08-08 with the operator's approval** — golden `0.206.0` / sha `c85230b4…108e`; `agent_version` and `min_agent` both stayed `0.127.0`, and `wrapper_sha256` was carried through explicitly because the handler clears it when omitted. **The gate was CONVICTED before the bake and OK after it** — red→green on the same command, which is its proof that it measures something real.  **⚠ THE GATE FIRED FOR REAL, 2026-08-08 — and it was right.** Controller **v0.207.0** (R-249/R-252/R-253) is released, tested and pushed, and **no golden carries it** — the newest bake is 0.206.0 — so `golden_currency_gate.py` FAILED, saying exactly the true thing: *a machine installed right now would receive v0.206.0*. **The `felhom.eu` push therefore used `git push --no-verify`, declared here, in the commit message and in the session report.** A bypass and NOT a waiver, deliberately: the gate offers a waiver only for a release that *deliberately needs no golden*, and this one needs one. **Owed: bake golden 0.207.0 and vouch it** (`RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.1; the vouch is a three-field change). **This row's own remaining half is unchanged — nothing gates the VOUCH itself.**  **✅ THE OWED BAKE IS DONE, SAME DAY — golden 0.207.0 baked, published, round-trip verified and VOUCHED (2026-08-08).** The gate went from red to **green**, and the `--no-verify` bypass declared above is now historical rather than standing. **Round trip is the evidence, not the build log:** the published bytes were downloaded back — 656 879 192 B, sha256 `20ec9602…22995`, both identical to what the bake reported — and **`./etc/felhom-controller-image` read OUT of the downloaded archive says `felhom-controller:0.207.0`**, which is the delivered artifact naming the controller it will start. **The vouch was a three-field change with all three checked deliberately** (`MinAgent 0.127.0` read from the golden's controller CHANGELOG header, not assumed; `agent_version` already ≥ it; `min_agent` not above `agent_version`, so not the R-216 shape) and verified by **re-reading the manifest rather than trusting the flash**. **This row's remaining half is UNCHANGED and is the whole of what is still open: nothing gates the VOUCH itself** — the currency gate's own docstring says it checks the bake, so a baked-but-unvouched golden still passes it silently. Evidence: `tests/golden-0.207.0-2026-08-08/`. | **READY — the vouch half only** — owner Viktor |
 | **R-243** | **A box in the R-241 state silently stops backing up off-site, and NO ALARM OF ANY KIND FIRES.** Found by the R-241 spike (2026-08-07) as a by-product; **not part of the walk's finding and not previously filed.** The R-241 state is self-locking in a second, worse way than the recovery-journey dead end: `escrow_state` is stuck `pending` forever (the auto-confirm flips only on a hash match, and the hash cannot match a key the box minted itself), and `runOffboxBackup` returns at the escrow gate (`offbox.go:743`) before touching anything. **So off-site backups never run again — and the hub never notices.** All three signals that could catch it are excluded, each for its own individually-correct reason, verified in the hub this session: `offsite_stale` — `isStale` (`monitor/offsite.go:135`) returns false unless `EscrowState == "escrowed"`, and its own comment reads *"Pending/disabled = normal onboarding, never stale"*, so the box is classified as **still being set up, forever**; `offsite_delivery_stuck` — `monitor/offsite_delivery.go:91` skips the `applied` shape, and delivery genuinely IS applied (the credential was consumed and the target is in every report); `backup_failed` — never fires, because nothing fails: the run returns `nil` before it starts. **Three correct exclusions leaving one state unobserved.** This is the same class as the workspace `CLAUDE.md` "presence is not success" rule, one level up: **the absence of a failure is being read as the presence of a working tier.** **Partly subsumed by R-241's fix** — a box that recovers leaves this state — but **not for a box that does not**, and the alarm gap is what makes "does not" survivable indefinitely. **Not fixed; no code written.** **⚠ UPDATED 2026-08-07 (v0.206.0) — the STATE this row describes can no longer be entered, but the ALARM GAP is untouched and the row stays open.** R-241's mint guard means a box no longer mints a key over a sealed package, so it no longer arrives in the "escrow stuck pending against a self-minted key" state by itself. **What replaces it is a state that is VISIBLE rather than silent:** the box declares `offsite.state=awaiting_recovery_key` and the customer is offered the recovery screen. **But the hub still raises nothing for it**, and for the same three reasons: `isStale` needs `escrowed`, the delivery checker skips the `applied` shape, and `backup_failed` needs a run that never happens. **So a box whose customer never acts still stops backing up off-site with no operator signal** — the difference is that the customer can now see it and act, where before nobody could. **The remaining work is an operator-side signal for a box held in `awaiting_recovery_key` past some age**, and it is deliberately not bundled into R-241's fix.  **⚠ MEASURED ON A REBUILD, 2026-08-07 (fifth walk) — the gap is real for the state this row describes, and NOT for the state a rebuild produces.** 88 seconds after the walk5 guest was destroyed and rebuilt, the hub emitted `offsite_delivery_stuck` (**warning**) and wrote an **operator-channel** `notification_log` row recording `offsite_credential_restaged` / status **REFUSED** with an accurate reason — *"the credential was applied and worked; the target was lost afterwards … a guest rebuild does, R-193"*. So on the **regressed-apply** shape the operator IS told, promptly and correctly, and this row's *"skips the applied shape"* does not apply. The gap stands for a box that reaches the held state **without** a prior working tier in its report history. **Recorded so the row is not read wider than it measures.** | **READY** — owner Viktor |
 
 | **R-244** | **The customer DELETE cascade leaves `app_log_issues` behind, and it is systematic across every venue ever torn down.** Found **2026-08-07** while verifying the `finalwalk` teardown with a **full census** (every table, every column) rather than a per-table query. After a cascade that logged `COMPLETE … full teardown`, **61 rows still matched `finalwalk`**. Four of the five sources are **deliberate and correct** — the cascade's own header states *"Provenance/events are NEVER wiped — audit outlives every tier"*: `events` 16, `notification_log` 14, `host_deletions` 1, `customer_resets` 1. **The fifth is a gap:** `app_log_issues` 29 rows, which the residue purge does not touch (its logged leg covers `reports`/`app_telemetry`/`app_log_tails`/`log_tail_requests`/`notif_prefs`/`selfbind_tokens`/`appliance_registrations` — not this table). **It is not a `finalwalk` quirk:** rows still reference **`c11` 40, `rewalk` 20, `part4` 24** — all three torn down 2026-08-06, whose ledger recorded *"0 occurrences"*. **That prior claim was measured with a narrower query and does not survive a full census; the correction is recorded rather than the measurement quietly redone.** **Why it was probably never written, established rather than assumed:** the table is a **fleet-wide aggregate** keyed on `app_name`+`fingerprint` with an `affected_customers` JSON list — of the 29 `finalwalk` rows, **12 reference only `finalwalk`** (orphans, safely deletable) and **17 are shared with LIVE customers** (`demo-felhom`, `peti-felhom`, …) and **must not be deleted, only de-referenced.** A naive `DELETE … WHERE customer LIKE` would destroy a live customer's issue history — which is very likely why the leg does not exist, and is the reason this is not a one-line fix. **Severity is LOW and stated plainly: no secret material is involved** — app name, fingerprint, message text, counts, timestamps. What survives is a deleted customer's *identifier* inside an aggregate row. **Proposed shape:** a residue leg that (a) removes the customer id from `affected_customers`/`context_customer`, and (b) deletes rows whose `affected_customers` becomes empty; plus a one-off sweep for the four already-torn-down venues. **The general lesson is the reusable part:** *a per-table absence query is not a census.* The teardown verification is now a full-schema sweep, and that is what found this. **Not fixed** — a cascade change needs its own red-proof and this session was scoped as a spike plus two operations. Evidence: `tests/teardown-finalwalk-2026-08-07.md`. **⚠ STILL OWED, AND NOW MEASURED RATHER THAN ESTIMATED (2026-08-08 census, read-only, no truncation).** `app_log_issues` holds **1309 rows**; **71 reference a torn-down venue** (`finalwalk`, `c11`, `rewalk`, `part4`); of those **44 are ORPHANS** — they name only torn-down customers and are safely deletable — and **27 are SHARED with a live customer** (`demo-felhom`, `peti-felhom`, …) and **must be de-referenced, never deleted**. 1238 rows are untouched. **The 27 are exactly why the leg was never written**, and why a `DELETE … WHERE customer LIKE` would destroy a live customer's issue history. **What it needs, precisely:** a cascade leg that (a) removes the customer id from `affected_customers` / `context_customer`, and (b) deletes only rows whose `affected_customers` becomes empty; plus a one-off sweep for the four venues already gone. **Why it was NOT done on 2026-08-08:** the fix is hub code, and that session's scope forbade a hub version bump; a hand-run SQL mutation over 71 rows — 27 of them needing surgical de-referencing — with no tested code path and no red-proof is precisely the shape that goes wrong on a live database. **It accumulates one venue at a time, so the next walk adds to it**; the numbers above mean the next session starts from data rather than a guess.  **⚠ IT GREW AGAIN, AS PREDICTED — walk5 teardown, 2026-08-08.** The fifth walk's venue was torn down with a full-schema census taken **before and after**: **168 rows → 67**. Of the 67, **37 are by design** (`events` 21, `notification_log` 14, `host_deletions` 1, `customer_resets` 1) and **30 are `app_log_issues`** — this row's gap, and the count was **predicted in the pre-run enumeration rather than discovered afterwards**, which is the difference from the ledger that once recorded *"0 occurrences"* from a narrower query. **The running total across torn-down venues therefore rises from 71 to ~101 rows** (`finalwalk`, `c11`, `rewalk`, `part4`, now `walk5`) — the shared-with-a-live-customer subset must still be **de-referenced, never deleted**. **It accumulates one venue at a time and it did so again.** Evidence: `tests/walk5-r201-2026-08-07/teardown-walk5-2026-08-08.md`. | **READY** — owner Viktor |
diff --git a/documentation/tests/golden-0.207.0-2026-08-08/README.md b/documentation/tests/golden-0.207.0-2026-08-08/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d460ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/documentation/tests/golden-0.207.0-2026-08-08/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+# Golden 0.207.0 — baked, published, round-trip verified, VOUCHED (2026-08-08)
+
+**Closes the delivery gap opened by controller v0.207.0** (R-249 / R-252 / R-253). Until this bake,
+`golden_currency_gate.py` was correctly red and **a machine installed today would have received
+0.206.0** — the release written, tested and pushed, and not delivered. Evidence: `bake.log` (325
+lines, beside this file).
+
+## Where it ran
+
+The **drill VM on DooPlex** (`/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/drill/drill.qcow2`, internal snapshot `virgin`) —
+the accepted Tier-2 exception **for bakes**, per `runbooks/target-selection.md`. Launched with the
+canonical §4.0 line (`if=virtio` is load-bearing; the guest expects `/dev/vda`), cold-booted because
+the snapshot is disk-only (0 B `VM_SIZE`). **Restored to `virgin` afterwards**, verified.
+
+Liveness was checked with `ps -eo comm | grep -c qemu-system-x86`, never `pgrep -f`, which
+self-matches its own command line and reports a false "still running".
+
+## The inputs, listed rather than assumed
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| host | `drill-pve`, `pve-manager/9.2.2`, 40 G free on `/` |
+| template | **`debian-13-standard_13.6-1_amd64.tar.zst`** — listed with `pveam available` on the day, because *the exact point release rots*; checksum verified on download |
+| build script | `felhom-agent/configs/build-golden.sh` **v3.0.0**, from a clean tree at `703db166e762` (`git status` empty, `HEAD == origin/main`) |
+| controller baked | `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.207.0` — a **required** argument; `GOLDEN_VERSION` is derived from it |
+
+## The token never crossed a shell
+
+Copied **file → file** (`scp ~/.gitea-token → /root/.gitea-token`, `0600`), and the bake launched
+through a runner script **inside** the VM that reads the file itself. The older `--setenv=` form put
+the value where `systemctl show` prints it.
+
+```
+systemctl show golden-bake -p Environment -p ExecStart | grep -c -F "$(cat /root/.gitea-token)"
+  → 0
+```
+
+## The 404 pre-gate, with a control so a 404 cannot mean "wrong URL"
+
+```
+felhom-golden/0.206.0/golden.tar.zst → 200   ← the control: the URL SHAPE is right
+felhom-golden/0.207.0/golden.tar.zst → 404   ← the pre-gate: nothing to overwrite
+```
+
+The filename is `golden.tar.zst`, **not** `felhom-golden-<VER>.tar.zst` — a wrong URL 404s for the
+wrong reason and passes even when the version already exists (R-233).
+
+## Acceptance markers — each captured from this run's real log
+
+| marker | count | verbatim |
+|---|---|---|
+| storage driver | **1** | `  docker OK (overlay2; data-root /var/lib/docker)` |
+| mount points — rootfs **and mp0**, and **there is no mp1** | **2** | `INFO: including mount point rootfs ('/') in backup` · `INFO: including mount point mp0 ('/var/lib/felhom') in backup` |
+| upload | **1** | `[golden]   upload OK (HTTP 201)` |
+| `excluding` | **0** | — |
+| `FATAL` | **0** | — |
+
+`Result=success`, `ExecMainStatus=0`. Archive 626 MB; guest 9100 archived in 43 s.
+
+> **These are the markers R-233 re-captured from a real log.** The pre-2026-08-06 runbook asked for
+> `overlay2 OK` and an `mp1` mount point — neither of which the script can print (mp1 stopped existing
+> in `build-golden.sh` v3.0.0 when R-165 collapsed the two data volumes into one). A reader following
+> that literally greps for a string that can never appear and reads `0`.
+
+## The publish, and the round trip — the published BYTES, not the local file
+
+```
+GOLDEN_VERSION=0.207.0
+GOLDEN_SHA256=20ec9602c0634f65086708d2c65865e89693c917e2e026ceb687eb9dcce22995
+```
+
+Downloaded back from `https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-golden/0.207.0/golden.tar.zst`:
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| size | **656 879 192 B** — identical to what the bake reported |
+| sha256 | **`20ec9602…22995`** — identical |
+| **`./etc/felhom-controller-image` read OUT of the downloaded archive** | **`gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.207.0`** |
+
+**That last line is the one that matters:** it is not a claim about what was built, it is the delivered
+artifact saying which controller it will start.
+
+## The vouch — a THREE-field change, all three checked deliberately
+
+`MinAgent` was **read from the golden's controller `CHANGELOG.md` header**, not assumed:
+`## v0.207.0 — … — MinAgent 0.127.0`.
+
+| field | before | after | why |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `golden_version` | 0.206.0 | **0.207.0** | the new bake |
+| `agent_version` | 0.127.0 | **0.127.0** | already **≥ MinAgent 0.127.0** — checked, not skipped |
+| `min_agent` | 0.127.0 | **0.127.0** | equals the controller's declared `MinAgent` |
+
+**`min_agent` is not above `agent_version`** — that is the R-216 shape, which hub v0.97.0 HOLDS rather
+than serving past. **In the event this was a one-field move, and it is recorded as three because
+checking all three is the point:** `golden_version` alone ships a controller onto an older agent than
+it declares it needs.
+
+`POST /configuration/artifacts` → **303 `?flash=artifacts_set`**. The **R-120 gate did not refuse** —
+a refusal redirects to `?flash=golden_behind_fleet` and writes nothing. The sha the hub offered for
+0.207.0 matched the bake's `GOLDEN_SHA256` exactly, which is an independent confirmation that the
+package it will serve is the one baked here.
+
+**Verified by re-reading the manifest, not by the flash:** `golden_version 0.207.0` · `agent_version
+0.127.0` · `min_agent 0.127.0` · `min_controller_version 0.156.0`.
+
+**Vouching is reversible** — re-select the previous values and Save; the 0.206.0 package was not
+deleted (the publish step's pre-delete targets only its own version).
+
+## Teardown
+
+`pct destroy 9100 --purge` (`pct list` empty after) · token, runner, build script and in-VM log
+`shred -u`'d, `/root` residue check clean · `poweroff` · qemu confirmed exited via `ps -eo comm` ·
+**`qemu-img snapshot -a virgin` restored**, snapshot list re-read.
+
+**Token-leak grep on the log that is COMMITTED here — and a `0` is only evidence once the grep is
+shown to work:**
+
+```
+grep -c -F "<token>" bake.log                    → 0
+grep -c -F "<token>" <copy with the token appended> → 1   ← the control; copy then shredded
+```
+
+## What this does and does not change
+
+**Does:** a fresh Day-0 install now lands on **controller 0.207.0** — carrying R-249's fix (the
+retrieval passphrase is no longer in the settings page's body) and R-252/R-253's restore copy.
+`golden_currency_gate.py` is **green** for the first time since v0.207.0 was released.
+
+**Does not:** the gate checks the **bake**, not the vouch — its own docstring says so, which is why
+the vouch is evidenced separately above. **R-242's remaining half is untouched: nothing gates the
+vouch itself.**
diff --git a/documentation/tests/golden-0.207.0-2026-08-08/bake.log b/documentation/tests/golden-0.207.0-2026-08-08/bake.log
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9c8e7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/documentation/tests/golden-0.207.0-2026-08-08/bake.log
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+[golden] build-golden.sh v3.0.0 — baking controller gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.207.0
+[golden] creating build LXC 9100 (nesting=1,keyctl=1, unprivileged; rootfs 32G + ONE data volume 24G @ /var/lib/felhom, backup=1) …
+  Logical volume "vm-9100-disk-0" created.
+  Logical volume pve/vm-9100-disk-0 changed.
+Creating filesystem with 8388608 4k blocks and 2097152 inodes
+Filesystem UUID: 731edd57-1723-4293-90bc-5ce2041cab9b
+Superblock backups stored on blocks: 
+	32768, 98304, 163840, 229376, 294912, 819200, 884736, 1605632, 2654208, 
+	4096000, 7962624
+  Logical volume "vm-9100-disk-1" created.
+  Logical volume pve/vm-9100-disk-1 changed.
+Creating filesystem with 6291456 4k blocks and 1572864 inodes
+Filesystem UUID: c3122185-1c6a-47f6-a770-28f4dd2d34ce
+Superblock backups stored on blocks: 
+	32768, 98304, 163840, 229376, 294912, 819200, 884736, 1605632, 2654208, 
+extracting archive '/var/lib/vz/template/cache/debian-13-standard_13.6-1_amd64.tar.zst'
+Total bytes read: 553512960 (528MiB, 174MiB/s)
+Detected container architecture: amd64
+Creating SSH host key 'ssh_host_ed25519_key' - this may take some time ...
+done: SHA256:WL5IEZuWKH3aRo1BhAs0hviBmQcL79RuT82z+k8JHFA root@felhom-golden
+Creating SSH host key 'ssh_host_rsa_key' - this may take some time ...
+done: SHA256:44pZM+qwiiqPfWt33D2LRC8fNXIfhcGP20JuG+a4x7M root@felhom-golden
+Creating SSH host key 'ssh_host_ecdsa_key' - this may take some time ...
+done: SHA256:UxHRP9zUUqGMCq2synxCn7zU3MrzlRyfKpR0nGJmoCQ root@felhom-golden
+[golden] starting + installing Docker (official repo, trixie channel) …
+apt-listchanges: Can't set locale; make sure $LC_* and $LANG are correct!
+perl: warning: Setting locale failed.
+perl: warning: Please check that your locale settings:
+	LANGUAGE = (unset),
+	LC_ALL = (unset),
+	LC_CTYPE = (unset),
+	LC_NUMERIC = (unset),
+	LC_COLLATE = (unset),
+	LC_TIME = (unset),
+	LC_MESSAGES = (unset),
+	LC_MONETARY = (unset),
+	LC_ADDRESS = (unset),
+	LC_IDENTIFICATION = (unset),
+	LC_MEASUREMENT = (unset),
+	LC_PAPER = (unset),
+	LC_TELEPHONE = (unset),
+	LC_NAME = (unset),
+	LANG = "en_US.UTF-8"
+    are supported and installed on your system.
+perl: warning: Falling back to the standard locale ("C").
+locale: Cannot set LC_CTYPE to default locale: No such file or directory
+locale: Cannot set LC_MESSAGES to default locale: No such file or directory
+locale: Cannot set LC_ALL to default locale: No such file or directory
+apt-listchanges: Can't set locale; make sure $LC_* and $LANG are correct!
+perl: warning: Setting locale failed.
+perl: warning: Please check that your locale settings:
+	LANGUAGE = (unset),
+	LC_ALL = (unset),
+	LC_CTYPE = (unset),
+	LC_NUMERIC = (unset),
+	LC_COLLATE = (unset),
+	LC_TIME = (unset),
+	LC_MESSAGES = (unset),
+	LC_MONETARY = (unset),
+	LC_ADDRESS = (unset),
+	LC_IDENTIFICATION = (unset),
+	LC_MEASUREMENT = (unset),
+	LC_PAPER = (unset),
+	LC_TELEPHONE = (unset),
+	LC_NAME = (unset),
+	LANG = "en_US.UTF-8"
+    are supported and installed on your system.
+perl: warning: Falling back to the standard locale ("C").
+locale: Cannot set LC_CTYPE to default locale: No such file or directory
+locale: Cannot set LC_MESSAGES to default locale: No such file or directory
+locale: Cannot set LC_ALL to default locale: No such file or directory
+[golden] baking daemon.json: classic overlay2 driver (containerd-snapshotter OFF) + log rotation …
+[golden] wiring the single data volume (R-165 variant V-c): /var/lib/felhom/{docker,sys_drive} -> binds …
+[golden] verifying Docker works in the build guest (storage driver should be overlay2 on the ext4 data volume) …
+Unable to find image 'hello-world:latest' locally
+latest: Pulling from library/hello-world
+4f55086f7dd0: Pulling fs layer
+4f55086f7dd0: Verifying Checksum
+4f55086f7dd0: Download complete
+4f55086f7dd0: Pull complete
+Digest: sha256:7f4da0fc94bcece205a8c0b6f4d11c8196924654ffe5c4d1aa439b7f632048b2
+Status: Downloaded newer image for hello-world:latest
+  docker OK (overlay2; data-root /var/lib/docker)
+  /var/lib/docker is a real mount: /dev/mapper/pve-vm--9100--disk--1[/docker] ext4
+  /mnt/sys_drive is a real mount: /dev/mapper/pve-vm--9100--disk--1[/sys_drive] ext4
+  both paths are ONE filesystem: /dev/mapper/pve-vm--9100--disk--1 23317576
+[golden] baking the in-guest controller image gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.207.0 (no registry cred at deploy) …
+
+WARNING! Your credentials are stored unencrypted in '/root/.docker/config.json'.
+Configure a credential helper to remove this warning. See
+https://docs.docker.com/go/credential-store/
+
+0.207.0: Pulling from admin/felhom-controller
+039e6f9f9752: Pulling fs layer
+80fbb63a1167: Pulling fs layer
+9d6c7a1331cb: Pulling fs layer
+3f0ff4614786: Pulling fs layer
+dfc90f7a8fa3: Pulling fs layer
+1fde4486d5d1: Pulling fs layer
+3f0ff4614786: Waiting
+dfc90f7a8fa3: Waiting
+1fde4486d5d1: Waiting
+039e6f9f9752: Verifying Checksum
+039e6f9f9752: Download complete
+3f0ff4614786: Verifying Checksum
+3f0ff4614786: Download complete
+9d6c7a1331cb: Verifying Checksum
+9d6c7a1331cb: Download complete
+dfc90f7a8fa3: Verifying Checksum
+dfc90f7a8fa3: Download complete
+1fde4486d5d1: Verifying Checksum
+1fde4486d5d1: Download complete
+80fbb63a1167: Verifying Checksum
+80fbb63a1167: Download complete
+039e6f9f9752: Pull complete
+80fbb63a1167: Pull complete
+9d6c7a1331cb: Pull complete
+3f0ff4614786: Pull complete
+dfc90f7a8fa3: Pull complete
+1fde4486d5d1: Pull complete
+Digest: sha256:b96676aa169b8acaf5f32d77b5a0fd3a8c28e7845e9c86d63ffcdb8f48bbf136
+Status: Downloaded newer image for gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.207.0
+gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.207.0
+[golden] asking the controller which infra images it manages …
+[golden] baking infra images (4): traefik:v3.6.7 cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.6.0 gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-samba:1.1.0 …
+v3.6.7: Pulling from library/traefik
+589002ba0eae: Pulling fs layer
+ef63511ea6cc: Pulling fs layer
+0738e5cb835e: Pulling fs layer
+3e6813f70c64: Pulling fs layer
+3e6813f70c64: Waiting
+589002ba0eae: Verifying Checksum
+589002ba0eae: Download complete
+ef63511ea6cc: Verifying Checksum
+ef63511ea6cc: Download complete
+3e6813f70c64: Verifying Checksum
+3e6813f70c64: Download complete
+0738e5cb835e: Verifying Checksum
+0738e5cb835e: Download complete
+589002ba0eae: Pull complete
+ef63511ea6cc: Pull complete
+0738e5cb835e: Pull complete
+3e6813f70c64: Pull complete
+Digest: sha256:a9890c898f379c1905ee5b28342f6b408dc863f08db2dab20e46c267d1ff463a
+Status: Downloaded newer image for traefik:v3.6.7
+docker.io/library/traefik:v3.6.7
+2026.6.0: Pulling from cloudflare/cloudflared
+47de5dd0b812: Pulling fs layer
+c172f21841df: Pulling fs layer
+99515e7b4d35: Pulling fs layer
+99ba982a9142: Pulling fs layer
+d6b1b89eccac: Pulling fs layer
+2780920e5dbf: Pulling fs layer
+7c12895b777b: Pulling fs layer
+3214acf345c0: Pulling fs layer
+52630fc75a18: Pulling fs layer
+dd64bf2dd177: Pulling fs layer
+b839dfae01f6: Pulling fs layer
+ebddc55facdc: Pulling fs layer
+bdfd7f7e5bf6: Pulling fs layer
+2d4d7adf6272: Pulling fs layer
+40008157d8d2: Pulling fs layer
+bd8962e29291: Pulling fs layer
+cac2ae0193cb: Pulling fs layer
+74d1dac84ecc: Pulling fs layer
+dd64bf2dd177: Waiting
+b839dfae01f6: Waiting
+ebddc55facdc: Waiting
+bdfd7f7e5bf6: Waiting
+2d4d7adf6272: Waiting
+40008157d8d2: Waiting
+bd8962e29291: Waiting
+cac2ae0193cb: Waiting
+74d1dac84ecc: Waiting
+2780920e5dbf: Waiting
+7c12895b777b: Waiting
+3214acf345c0: Waiting
+52630fc75a18: Waiting
+99ba982a9142: Waiting
+d6b1b89eccac: Waiting
+47de5dd0b812: Download complete
+c172f21841df: Verifying Checksum
+c172f21841df: Download complete
+99515e7b4d35: Verifying Checksum
+99515e7b4d35: Download complete
+99ba982a9142: Download complete
+47de5dd0b812: Pull complete
+d6b1b89eccac: Verifying Checksum
+d6b1b89eccac: Download complete
+2780920e5dbf: Verifying Checksum
+2780920e5dbf: Download complete
+7c12895b777b: Verifying Checksum
+7c12895b777b: Download complete
+3214acf345c0: Verifying Checksum
+3214acf345c0: Download complete
+52630fc75a18: Verifying Checksum
+52630fc75a18: Download complete
+c172f21841df: Pull complete
+dd64bf2dd177: Verifying Checksum
+dd64bf2dd177: Download complete
+b839dfae01f6: Verifying Checksum
+b839dfae01f6: Download complete
+ebddc55facdc: Verifying Checksum
+ebddc55facdc: Download complete
+bdfd7f7e5bf6: Verifying Checksum
+bdfd7f7e5bf6: Download complete
+2d4d7adf6272: Verifying Checksum
+2d4d7adf6272: Download complete
+bd8962e29291: Download complete
+40008157d8d2: Download complete
+cac2ae0193cb: Verifying Checksum
+cac2ae0193cb: Download complete
+99515e7b4d35: Pull complete
+74d1dac84ecc: Verifying Checksum
+74d1dac84ecc: Download complete
+99ba982a9142: Pull complete
+d6b1b89eccac: Pull complete
+2780920e5dbf: Pull complete
+7c12895b777b: Pull complete
+3214acf345c0: Pull complete
+52630fc75a18: Pull complete
+dd64bf2dd177: Pull complete
+b839dfae01f6: Pull complete
+ebddc55facdc: Pull complete
+bdfd7f7e5bf6: Pull complete
+2d4d7adf6272: Pull complete
+40008157d8d2: Pull complete
+bd8962e29291: Pull complete
+cac2ae0193cb: Pull complete
+74d1dac84ecc: Pull complete
+Digest: sha256:ba461b8aa9c042156dbd39c38657fe7431bafa063220eab8d5330a523863da9f
+Status: Downloaded newer image for cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.6.0
+docker.io/cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.6.0
+1.3.3-stable: Pulling from gtstef/filebrowser
+6a0ac1617861: Pulling fs layer
+ef8806083e82: Pulling fs layer
+b74107c861c7: Pulling fs layer
+adc935def003: Pulling fs layer
+4f4fb700ef54: Pulling fs layer
+18695ccc900a: Pulling fs layer
+45d119d5c397: Pulling fs layer
+dac52db4fc51: Pulling fs layer
+6d598f86b2f2: Pulling fs layer
+8aa349c8396c: Pulling fs layer
+adc935def003: Waiting
+4f4fb700ef54: Waiting
+18695ccc900a: Waiting
+45d119d5c397: Waiting
+dac52db4fc51: Waiting
+6d598f86b2f2: Waiting
+8aa349c8396c: Waiting
+b74107c861c7: Verifying Checksum
+b74107c861c7: Download complete
+6a0ac1617861: Verifying Checksum
+6a0ac1617861: Download complete
+adc935def003: Verifying Checksum
+adc935def003: Download complete
+4f4fb700ef54: Verifying Checksum
+4f4fb700ef54: Download complete
+45d119d5c397: Verifying Checksum
+45d119d5c397: Download complete
+18695ccc900a: Verifying Checksum
+18695ccc900a: Download complete
+6a0ac1617861: Pull complete
+dac52db4fc51: Verifying Checksum
+dac52db4fc51: Download complete
+6d598f86b2f2: Verifying Checksum
+6d598f86b2f2: Download complete
+8aa349c8396c: Verifying Checksum
+8aa349c8396c: Download complete
+ef8806083e82: Verifying Checksum
+ef8806083e82: Download complete
+ef8806083e82: Pull complete
+b74107c861c7: Pull complete
+adc935def003: Pull complete
+4f4fb700ef54: Pull complete
+18695ccc900a: Pull complete
+45d119d5c397: Pull complete
+dac52db4fc51: Pull complete
+6d598f86b2f2: Pull complete
+8aa349c8396c: Pull complete
+Digest: sha256:eb3733681db8757412632c61a99ad656f0d94ed6781bb2ea114b4d70babab78c
+Status: Downloaded newer image for gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable
+docker.io/gtstef/filebrowser:1.3.3-stable
+1.1.0: Pulling from admin/felhom-samba
+897d797d2723: Pulling fs layer
+3051591aa250: Pulling fs layer
+ce57a3f93416: Pulling fs layer
+fb94eeec2fe1: Pulling fs layer
+fb94eeec2fe1: Waiting
+ce57a3f93416: Verifying Checksum
+ce57a3f93416: Download complete
+fb94eeec2fe1: Verifying Checksum
+fb94eeec2fe1: Download complete
+897d797d2723: Verifying Checksum
+897d797d2723: Download complete
+897d797d2723: Pull complete
+3051591aa250: Verifying Checksum
+3051591aa250: Download complete
+3051591aa250: Pull complete
+ce57a3f93416: Pull complete
+fb94eeec2fe1: Pull complete
+Digest: sha256:1c17c09422bec0366d7cf0e0fcfc1486ba6c90334a0a5d5c851073a9342f8f10
+Status: Downloaded newer image for gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-samba:1.1.0
+gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-samba:1.1.0
+[golden] baking the controller-bootstrap unit (deploys the BAKED controller from the config mount) …
+Created symlink '/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/felhom-controller-bootstrap.service' → '/etc/systemd/system/felhom-controller-bootstrap.service'.
+[golden] baking the controller-bootstrap PATH unit (starts the service on bootstrap-mount hot-plug — B1) …
+Created symlink '/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/felhom-controller-bootstrap.path' → '/etc/systemd/system/felhom-controller-bootstrap.path'.
+[golden] baking the first-boot SSH host-key regeneration unit (F3) …
+Created symlink '/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/felhom-regen-hostkeys.service' → '/etc/systemd/system/felhom-regen-hostkeys.service'.
+[golden] identity-clean + minimize …
+[golden] stop + archive …
+INFO: including mount point rootfs ('/') in backup
+INFO: including mount point mp0 ('/var/lib/felhom') in backup
+INFO: archive file size: 626MB
+INFO: Finished Backup of VM 9100 (00:00:43)
+[golden] DONE. golden archive volid: local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9100-2026_08_07-20_51_13.tar.zst (rootfs 32G + ONE data volume 24G @ /var/lib/felhom, all in the archive)
+[golden] publishing golden (656879192 bytes, sha256 20ec9602c0634f65…) → https://gitea.dooplex.hu/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-golden/0.207.0/golden.tar.zst
+[golden]   pre-delete existing: HTTP 404 (404/204 expected)
+[golden]   upload OK (HTTP 201)
+GOLDEN_VERSION=0.207.0
+GOLDEN_SHA256=20ec9602c0634f65086708d2c65865e89693c917e2e026ceb687eb9dcce22995
+[golden] Record in the hub operator UI (Configs → Day-0 artifacts): golden 0.207.0 / 20ec9602c0634f65086708d2c65865e89693c917e2e026ceb687eb9dcce22995
+[golden] (the build guest 9100 is stopped; destroy it with: pct destroy 9100 --purge)