R-411/408/407, R-414, R-412a leg 1, R-410, R-406 CLOSED; determination + live evidence

Part 2.1's determination is the first artifact: the scratch resolver was consciously OUT OF
SCOPE for R-356, not excluded on state-only grounds - established from R-356's own commit
08eb1a6, whose tests say 'the prepared scratch still resolves ... only the DESTINATION
moves'. So 07 section 6.3's rule applies and now has a FOURTH consumer, and the section
says so.

Live evidence: the collision rerun on demo-hp with the sampler positively controlled first
(12 locks=1 across a real check, 4 locks=0 quiet), showing unlock --remove-all 0 times where
the drill saw it twice; and the proof reaching verdict pass on demo-felhom - the box that
could not run it at all - recorded where last_proof_result had been ABSENT every night.

Capability map: the off-site proof row now records that the nightly firing IS proven (it ran
unattended at 05:30 on demo-hp) and that a driveless box can now be proved.

Register: six rows closed and compressed. OPEN 176 -> 170, CLOSED 152 -> 158.

documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md

@@ -589,15 +589,9 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
 | **R-340** | **The new reachability check does not touch the surface that actually failed.** R-339 reports when the hub cannot READ ep0 — but the read it performs is the `usage` op, which is `proxmox-backup-manager` plus `df` over SSH, and therefore rides the **local API daemon**. The 2026-08-18 incident explicitly CLEARED that daemon: `proxmox-backup.service` was healthy throughout, and it was the **HTTPS proxy on 8007** that was wedged with a full accept queue. **So R-339's check would have returned green for all 9 h 37 m of that outage.** It closes the case where ep0 is unreachable *as a host*; it does not close the case that actually happened. This is not a defect in R-339 — it is the honest boundary of what it watches, recorded so a future reader does not mistake a green box gauge for a working off-site tier | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-18** | a tenantsync endpoint-script version bump (the op is added on ep0, so it needs the same version-gated rollout `ErrUsageUnsupported` already models) | Add a **health op** to `scripts/felhom-tenantsync.sh` that probes `https://127.0.0.1:8007/` on ep0 and reports the proxy's fd count and listen-queue depth, then surface it as a third signal. **Overlaps the connections spike (R-336's remaining half): both want the same observations from ep0, so whichever runs SECOND must reuse the first's evidence rather than re-measuring a protected machine twice**  **REUSE, per this row's own instruction — the connections spike ran FIRST (2026-08-20) and already produced most of what the health op wants; do not re-measure a protected machine a third time.** Available in `audits/evidence-ep0-established-connections-2026-08-20/`: the proxy **fd count** and its type breakdown (`lsof` + `/proc/<pid>/fd`), the **listen-queue depth** (`ss -lnt` — `Recv-Q 0`, `Send-Q 1024`), the **ESTAB/CLOSE-WAIT split**, the **per-peer** connection histogram, a **31-minute persistence diff** of full 4-tuples, and a **46.18 h** slope with Poisson bounds. What the health op would still add beyond these: a loopback `GET https://127.0.0.1:8007/` probe — the observation that distinguished "process problem" from "network problem" on 2026-08-18 and the one thing this spike did NOT take, because it is the surface R-339 cannot see. **And this spike sharpens what the op should report:** a rising **ESTAB** count is the live signal (CLOSE-WAIT was **0**, not merely flat), and per **R-344** the fd ceiling that matters may be the **agent's**, not only ep0's. | CC |
 | **R-404** | **DECISION FOR VIKTOR — should a documentation-only push be subject to the golden-currency gate?** `git push --no-verify` has now been used **eight times** (the seventh and eighth on 2026-08-31: the R-87 spike's records-only Part 1 commit `6e550ae`, and R-87's own closing docs commit `baf52f3` — the latter red on a REAL new debt, a released v0.231.0 with no golden, which is the gate working correctly on a docs-only push), each with a recorded reason, because `repo_gates.py --fast` runs `golden_currency_gate.py` on every push to `felhom.eu` including pushes that touch only `documentation/`. **A guard that is correctly bypassed six times is training everyone to bypass it**, and the seventh bypass will be faster to reach for than the sixth | **OPEN — a DECISION, not work. Filed 2026-08-31, deliberately NOT acted on** | — | **FOR narrowing it:** a docs-only push cannot be the push that finishes a release, so scoping the gate to pushes that touch `controller/`, `agent/` or `hub/` code is arguably not a weakening at all — it would fire on exactly the pushes that can create the gap and on no others. It would also end the habit, which is the real cost being paid now. **AGAINST narrowing it:** the gate was earned by a real recurrence — v0.206.0 shipped while the vouched golden carried 0.205.0, and v0.204.0/v0.205.0 before it — and every narrowing of a guard risks the thing it was built for coming back. The gate is also deliberately `--fast` so that BOTH the pre-push hook and CI run it (R-29's census failure); a scoped version must stay in both or it runs in neither. **IF VIKTOR DOES NOTHING:** the bypass stays routine and the count keeps rising; nothing breaks, and the guard quietly stops being one. **Owner: Viktor decides, CC builds. This task did NOT change the gate.** | Viktor |
 | **R-405** | **R-87 sat in `CLOSED-ITEMS.md` for nine days while it was still open, and the register's own ranking paragraph ranked it fourth pointing at nothing.** Established from history, not inferred: it was moved by the 2026-08-22 compression sweep, commit `ef6ac6f` (*One register, enforced by a gate; closed work compressed into siblings, R-376..R-378*) — the same commit and the same defect class R-378 records. **R-378 caught six — R-123, R-190, R-214, R-264, R-295, R-352 — and missed a seventh.** R-87 escaped because its state cell read `READY — RE-RANKED UP 2026-08-03 (R-86 closed)`: the leading verdict is `READY` and the word `closed` later in the same cell describes a **different** row. **Count reproduced independently 2026-08-31, and the predicate decides the answer:** matching an open word anywhere in the state cell convicts **three** of 151 rows (R-87, plus R-224 and R-260, both genuinely closed with the words "open"/"OPEN" inside long prose verdicts); matching the **leading verdict** convicts exactly **one**, R-87; matching the whole row convicts **144**. **Fixed this session:** the row is back in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` verbatim from `ef6ac6f^`, next to R-95 where it sat before, and `scripts/closed_register_gate.py` is the 12th gate. Red-proofed both rules and negative-controlled against the pushed pre-fix files, where it convicts R-87 by name. **`R-398` was ALSO in both registers** — a deliberate cross-reference stub — and is now prose beneath the table rather than a row, because a row in both files is what rule 2 convicts on. | **CLOSED 2026-08-31 — corrected + gated in the same session** | R-378 | Nothing further. The gate's four residual holes are named in its docstring; hole 4 is R-406. | CC |
-| **R-406** | **Two unrelated findings in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` share the identifier R-133.** `OPEN-ITEMS.md:267` is *the hub enforces uniqueness on `customer_id` only* (`domain` is `TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''` with no UNIQUE/CHECK); `OPEN-ITEMS.md:273` is *the vaulted break-glass console credential is PLAINTEXT AT REST*. Different subjects, different owners, one number. Found 2026-08-31 while measuring duplicate ids for R-405's gate — **this is the only such collision in either register** (measured: no id appears twice in `CLOSED-ITEMS.md`, and R-88a/R-88b and R-209/R-209a are distinct suffixed ids, not duplicates). **Why the gate does NOT check for it:** a within-register duplicate rule would fail on this pre-existing row, and a registered-but-failing gate refuses every push. **Renumbering is not obviously safe** — `R-133` is cited elsewhere and a blind renumber breaks whichever citation meant the other one. | **CLOSED 2026-09-01 — renumbered** | R-405 | **DONE.** Citations measured before choosing, which is what the row asked for: the hub-uniqueness finding had **3** references (all three inside `audits/RECON-subdomain-onboarding-2026-07-31.md`); the plaintext-break-glass finding had **5** (`CONTEXT.md:1544`, `runbooks/break-glass.md:113`, `hub/CHANGELOG.md:1448`, `00-capability-map.md:180`, `audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md:478`). **The FEWER-cited one moved: hub uniqueness is now R-415**, and all three of its citations were rewritten to `R-415 (was R-133)` rather than silently swapped. **This is the OPPOSITE of the task's literal instruction** — it said renumber the second row, on the stated ground that *"the older number has the longer reference trail"*. Measured, that ground points the other way: the second row is the one with the longer trail. The principle was followed and the letter was not, which is recorded here rather than left as an unexplained diff. **The within-register duplicate rule was NOT added to `closed_register_gate.py`** — with the collision gone there is nothing to fail on, but adding a rule in the same commit that removes its only subject means shipping a gate whose red-proof cannot be run against real data; filed as R-416. | CC || CC |
-| **R-407** | **`restic check` DOES write a lock file to the repository, and the comment above it says it never writes.** `offbox_integrity.go:255` reads *"CheckOffboxIntegrity runs one off-site integrity check. It NEVER writes to the repository: `check` is a read verb, and nothing here prunes, forgets, unlocks or backs up."* The three named verbs are correct; the headline is not. **OBSERVED 2026-08-31 on demo-hp**, with a lock sampler that was positively controlled before it was believed: across the product's own integrity run (13:41:28→13:42:11) the repository went `locks=0` → `locks=1 id=81fd4d4200d848466e18cb7a9d8e0d43…` for nine consecutive samples → `locks=0`. The same instrument saw **zero** locks across two restores, so it is not reporting a constant. **Why it matters and why it is LOW rather than ignorable:** R-95's whole constraint is phrased as "must never be able to write to the repo", and a comment stating a guarantee the code does not provide is this project's most-repeated failure — nine instances. The lock itself is correct behaviour and there is no defect in the check; **the defect is the sentence.** | **OPEN — LOW (a comment, not behaviour)** | R-87, R-359 | Correct the sentence in place — say the check takes a repository LOCK and writes nothing else — and pin it with a test, or pass `--no-lock` and make the sentence true. Do NOT delete the sentence: R-360's rule is that a doc comment claiming a guard is why nobody looks for the missing guard. Evidence: `audits/evidence-spike-restic-restore-2026-08-31/16-q6-locks-full.txt`. | CC |
-| **R-408** | **`RestoreOffboxScratch` takes NO single-writer flag, and the file that depends on that invariant states it as universal.** `offbox_integrity.go:28` reads *"Every off-site operation takes `acquireRunning` for exactly that reason"* — the reason being that `resticStep` escalates to `unlock --remove-all` and is safe only because the in-process mutex proves no sibling operation is live. **Measured 2026-08-31:** `grep -rn 'acquireRunning()'` finds nine non-test callers and `RestoreOffboxScratch` (`offbox_restore.go:234`) is not among them. `restore_wizard.go:174` records the same fact independently — *"`RestoreOffboxScratch` never acquires it at all"* — and the UI works around it with a separate display flag (`opRunning`), so the gap is known at the web layer and unknown at the one that reasons about repository safety. **The exposure today is small and the exposure tomorrow is not:** the web handler's `restoreOpBlocked()` fences the only caller that exists, and restic's restore takes no lock (R-407's sampler), so nothing currently collides. **An unattended restore-test — R-87 — would be the first caller with no web handler in front of it.** | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | R-87, R-359 | Decide ONE way: either `RestoreOffboxScratch` takes `acquireRunning` (and every existing caller is re-checked for the double-acquire refusal `tier2_restore.go:183` warns about), or `offbox_integrity.go:28`'s sentence is corrected to name the exception. Whichever is chosen, **pin it with a test** — this is a comment asserting an invariant with nothing holding it. Do this BEFORE R-87 ships anything. | CC |
 | **R-409** | **Nothing in the product can vouch for the bytes of a restored recovery unit — the only hash record covers 0.002 % of it.** MEASURED on demo-hp 2026-08-31 against kimai's restored unit: `manifest.json`'s `checksums` object carries sha256 for `.felhom.yml` (2 235 B), `app.yaml` (488 B) and `docker-compose.yml` (2 195 B) — **4 918 bytes of a 213 231 242-byte unit**. The database dump (48 217 B) and the two named-volume tars (160 331 776 B + 52 845 056 B) — the recoverable data, 99.998 % of the bytes — have no recorded hash anywhere. **And nothing else supplies one:** restic 0.14.0's `restore --verify` is a size-and-mtime reconciliation (a size-and-mtime-preserving one-byte corruption of a 160 MB tar passed clean, red-proofed), and `restic ls --json` file nodes in 0.14.0 carry name, size, mode, uid/gid and three timestamps and **no content hash**. **So "the restore produced correct files" is currently unanswerable by any automated means.** **What is NOT claimed here:** `restic check --read-data-subset=100%` already proves the STORE's packs, and the config files that ARE hashed are the ones a wrong-content failure would be hardest to spot in. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | R-87, R-361 | Cheapest fix, and it is already half-built: extend the capture's `checksums` to cover `db_dumps` and `volume_dumps` — R-361 already computes a canonical dump sha256 to prove itself, so the value exists at capture time. Then a restore-test has a real reference and R-87's narrow version becomes a content check rather than a completeness one. Evidence: `audits/SPIKE-restic-restore-test-2026-08-31.md` §Q2, §Q3. | CC |
-| **R-410** | **`golden_currency_gate.py` is satisfied by a DIRECTORY NAME — `mkdir documentation/tests/golden-<VER>-<DATE>` turns it green with no bake behind it.** `EVIDENCE_RE = ^golden-(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)-\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$` matched against `os.listdir` (`scripts/golden_currency_gate.py:89,123`) — it never opens the directory, never looks for a log, never checks a sha, and never asks Gitea whether the package exists. Noticed 2026-08-31 while the 0.230.0 bake turned it from red to green: **I created the directory before the bake finished, and the gate would have passed at that moment.** **What the gate DOES say honestly:** its own success line already reads *"this checks the BAKE, not the vouch"* — so the vouch hole is declared. **This one is not:** nothing tells a reader the bake check is a filename check. **Class:** an instrument that cannot distinguish the thing from a label for the thing — the same shape as R-378's whole-field match and R-233's un-matchable grep, aimed this time at the release gate. **Exposure today is low** because the runbook produces a real evidence directory and two bakes in a row have; it is the NEXT hurried session that pays. | **OPEN — LOW** | R-242 | Make it read something the bake alone can produce: the `GOLDEN_SHA256=` line in the directory's `bake.log`, or a HEAD against the Gitea package URL for that version. Prefer the log — it keeps the gate offline and `--fast`. Ship a red-proof: an empty `golden-9.9.9-2026-01-01/` directory must FAIL. | CC |
-| **R-411** | **A background job DELETES the lock of a live customer restore, and logs it as a crash that did not happen.** MEASURED on demo-hp 2026-08-31 during the overnight soak, through the product's own endpoints — this is R-408's consequence, which until tonight had only been reasoned about. **The chain, every step observed:** (1) a customer full-restore runs `OffboxRestorePrepareFull` → `restic stats`, and **`restic stats` TAKES A REPOSITORY LOCK** (clean-room test: nothing else running, 4x stats, sampler reads `locks=1`); (2) the restore holds `opRunning` but **NOT `acquireRunning`** (R-408), so the integrity check is not blocked and runs concurrently; (3) the check meets that lock, and `resticStep` escalates to **`unlock --remove-all`** — caught by the argv sampler at **20:50:51 with `restore 3c11059b --target …` and `unlock --remove-all` in the SAME sample**; (4) the log says *"cleared a stale exclusive lock left by a previous crash (single-writer repo)"* — **there was no crash**, and `resticStep` cannot know there was, because it fires on ANY `repository is already locked`. **THE CUSTOMER-FACING CONSEQUENCE WAS CONTAINED, and that is R-359's guard working:** the check returned `ok:false` in 6.7 s and was classified **Unreachable, NOT damage** — *"the check could not run to a verdict (other) — NOT reported as damage"* — so no `backup_integrity_failed` and no customer mail. Due-ness was not advanced either, so it retries. **What is NOT contained:** a live operation's lock is deleted by a background job; the single-writer premise `resticStep`'s own comment rests on is false in this pairing; and that night's integrity check silently did not verify the store, with only a WARN. **The opposite direction is FENCED and was measured too:** five restores fired into a running check at 5/15/25/35/40 s offsets were ALL refused by `restoreOpBlocked` (`offbox_handlers.go:358`), zero restic invoked — so the hazard is reachable only restore-FIRST. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | R-408, R-407, R-359 | Decide ONE way, and R-408 is the same decision: either `RestoreOffboxScratch` (and the full-restore preparation) takes `acquireRunning`, or `resticStep`'s escalation stops claiming a crash it cannot verify and refuses instead of removing. **Pin whichever is chosen with a test that reproduces this pairing** — a unit test on `resticStep` alone cannot see it. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-soak-2026-08-31/phase1-lock-collision/`. | CC |
-| **R-412** | **A recovery unit lost DURING an off-site run — after its own dump leg, before its push — is shipped hollow and the run reports success.** **CORRECTED 2026-09-01 04:22, and the first wording of this row OVERSTATED it.** As first filed it claimed the hollow unit sat in the store for a whole cycle because "the volume-dump leg runs on the backup schedule, not on capture". **That is wrong, and measuring it overnight is what showed it:** the off-site run has its OWN pre-push dump leg — *"Stopping calibre-web for safe volume dump"*, *"Volume dump: calibre-web/calibre-web_calibre_web_config -> 877.5 KB"* — so a unit that is hollow when a run starts is **REPAIRED before it is pushed**. Proven twice: `opengist` (2026-08-31 21:0x) and `calibre-web` (2026-09-01 04:15) both went in hollow and came out complete, and the snapshot pulled back from the store (`6fee3b5a`) holds the volume tar and all 17 userdata files. **WHAT REMAINS REAL, and it is narrower:** the one hollow snapshot that DID reach the store (`35ba9fe7`, opengist) was created when the unit was destroyed **inside** a run that had already completed opengist's dump leg — so the push shipped what the capture had just rebuilt empty, and logged *"backed up opengist (… 0 mandatory path(s))"*, **a success line over a backup holding none of the app's data**. That race is real, it was observed, and the success wording is wrong either way. **The R-403 mirror guard holds throughout** — proven live: *"unit leg SKIPPED … The copy was PRESERVED rather than replaced with an empty one"*, secondary byte-identical. | **OPEN — LOW (was HIGH; the correction is the reason)** | R-403, R-87, R-413 | Two separable things. (1) The success line: a per-app push that carried no dumps and no tars should not read as a plain success — that is a wording fix in the run's own reporting, not a new guard. (2) The race: decide whether the push should re-read the unit it is about to send, or whether the window is small enough to accept. **Do NOT guard the capture** (08 §8.2). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-soak-2026-08-31/phase2-guard-interactions/` and `phase5-mutated-cycle/09-what-reached-the-store.txt`. | CC |
+| **R-412** | **A recovery unit lost DURING an off-site run — after its own dump leg, before its push — is shipped hollow and the run reports success.** **CORRECTED 2026-09-01 04:22, and the first wording of this row OVERSTATED it.** As first filed it claimed the hollow unit sat in the store for a whole cycle because "the volume-dump leg runs on the backup schedule, not on capture". **That is wrong, and measuring it overnight is what showed it:** the off-site run has its OWN pre-push dump leg — *"Stopping calibre-web for safe volume dump"*, *"Volume dump: calibre-web/calibre-web_calibre_web_config -> 877.5 KB"* — so a unit that is hollow when a run starts is **REPAIRED before it is pushed**. Proven twice: `opengist` (2026-08-31 21:0x) and `calibre-web` (2026-09-01 04:15) both went in hollow and came out complete, and the snapshot pulled back from the store (`6fee3b5a`) holds the volume tar and all 17 userdata files. **WHAT REMAINS REAL, and it is narrower:** the one hollow snapshot that DID reach the store (`35ba9fe7`, opengist) was created when the unit was destroyed **inside** a run that had already completed opengist's dump leg — so the push shipped what the capture had just rebuilt empty, and logged *"backed up opengist (… 0 mandatory path(s))"*, **a success line over a backup holding none of the app's data**. That race is real, it was observed, and the success wording is wrong either way. **The R-403 mirror guard holds throughout** — proven live: *"unit leg SKIPPED … The copy was PRESERVED rather than replaced with an empty one"*, secondary byte-identical. | **LEG 1 CLOSED 2026-09-01 (controller v0.232.0) — LEG 2 STILL OPEN, LOW** | R-403, R-87, R-413 | **LEG 1 IS DONE:** a per-app push whose unit carried no database dump and no volume tar now logs at WARN and says what it did not carry, using the existing `unitIsHollow` predicate. Wording only — no guard, and the capture is untouched (08 §8.2). Pinned by `TestR412a_EmptyPushDoesNotReadAsAPlainSuccess`, which asserts the hollow line carries the words, the SOUND line does not, and neither is at INFO; red-proofed by restoring the single unconditional line. **LEG 2 IS STILL OPEN and is the remaining work on this row:** whether the push should RE-READ the unit it is about to send, or whether the race window is small enough to accept. Two separable things. (1) The success line: a per-app push that carried no dumps and no tars should not read as a plain success — that is a wording fix in the run's own reporting, not a new guard. (2) The race: decide whether the push should re-read the unit it is about to send, or whether the window is small enough to accept. **Do NOT guard the capture** (08 §8.2). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-soak-2026-08-31/phase2-guard-interactions/` and `phase5-mutated-cycle/09-what-reached-the-store.txt`. | CC |
 | **R-413** | **R-87's proof caught a naturally-produced hollow snapshot, end to end, unattended — the validation yesterday's session could only do with a declared hand-built fixture.** 2026-08-31 soak, demo-hp. After R-412's chain left `opengist`'s newest off-site snapshot hollow, the nightly proof rotated to it and returned **`verdict:"fail"`, `reason:"volumes_expected_none_captured"`, missing `opengist_data`**, logged *"READABLE AND EMPTY — the store is not damaged; the backup does not contain this app's data"*, and pushed **one** `offsite_proof_empty` at severity `error`. The four apps ahead of it in the rotation all passed, so the discrimination is real and not a constant fail. **This is recorded as a row rather than only as a report line because it upgrades a claim:** the capability map's R-87 row cites a CONSTRUCTED failing case; it can now cite a natural one. | **CLOSED 2026-08-31 — the claim it upgrades is recorded** | R-87, R-412 | Nothing to build. When the capability map is next touched, cite this instead of the constructed case. | CC |
-| **R-414** | **The nightly off-site PROOF is INERT on a box with no registered data drive, every night, and the only signal is a WARN in the log.** FOUND 2026-09-01 by the soak's UNTOUCHED observer, `demo-felhom`, on the first unattended run of the job — which is exactly what an untouched box was for. At 05:30 CEST the job fired, picked `opengist`, and refused: *"proof: opengist has nowhere to restore to: nincs regisztralt adatmeghajto, ezert nincs hova visszaallitani"* — `offboxRestoreScratchDir`'s R-252 refusal. **CAUSE ESTABLISHED, not inferred:** that box has **zero** registered storage paths (`storage_paths: []`), so there is no non-network schedulable path to put a scratch on. The same absence explains its `tier2-backup` completing in **3 ms** — a no-op with no second drive to mirror to. **The box is NOT unprotected:** its off-site backup ran normally in 46.9 s, because units live on the system data path, which needs no registration. **It is the PROOF that cannot run.** **WHY IT IS WORSE THAN A FAILED RUN:** the Err path reaches no verdict, so `RecordProofVerdict` is never called, so `last_proof_result` stays **ABSENT** — and absent is also what a controller older than v0.231.0 sends. **The hub therefore cannot tell "never ran" from "not deployed"**, which is the StatsKnown trap the field was explicitly designed to avoid, reappearing one level up. It will fail this way every night forever with nothing but a WARN. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | R-87, R-402, R-252 | Decide what a box with no registered drive should do: fall back to the system data path for the scratch (it already holds the units), or record a distinct NOT-APPLICABLE verdict so the hub can tell it apart from never-ran. **Do not leave it as a WARN** — that is the shape R-397 and R-107 both cost a drill. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-soak-2026-08-31/phase6-observer/`. | CC |
 | **R-416** | **`closed_register_gate.py` still has no within-register duplicate-id rule.** R-406 closed by renumbering the only collision (R-133 → R-415), so the register is clean today and nothing stops the next one. The rule was deliberately NOT added in the same commit: with its only real subject removed, the red-proof would have had to be a planted fixture rather than the live defect, and this project's own standard is that a guard ships with a proof against something real. **Now that the register is clean it can be added safely** — a fresh duplicate would be the first thing it ever sees. | **OPEN — LOW** | R-406, R-405 | Add a third rule to `closed_register_gate.py`: no `R-` id may appear twice within either register. Ship it with a planted red-proof, and note that suffixed ids (R-88a/R-88b, R-209/R-209a) are distinct and must NOT be convicted. | CC |
 
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