docs: SPIKE — DooPlex build-cache containment; R-205..R-211 (2026-08-05)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 7s

Spike output only; no production Go code. The one shipped change rides in
homelab-manifests 6808a4b (R-205, the monitoring rule).

VERDICT: mechanism confirmed, with one correction and one refutation.

- CONFIRMED: builder.gc IS honoured under the containerd worker and DOES evict.
  Proven by naming a 440 MB `go mod download` record present at build N and
  absent by N+2 — not by absence of an error.
- CORRECTED: honoured ONLY in the `policy` array form. The flat form is
  SILENTLY ignored — daemon starts, logs nothing, keeps its defaults.
  `dockerd --validate` returned "configuration OK" for a bogus key AND for a
  config that then crashed the daemon. The oracle is `docker buildx inspect`.
- REFUTED: Docker's `data-root` would NOT move the cache — it moves 0.62 GB.
  The 181.4 GB belongs to the system containerd (`root` in
  /etc/containerd/config.toml).

P3 (operator-approved) executed: prune claimed 156.9 GB, the filesystem
returned 150.35 GB (the 6.5 GB gap is layers shared with images), SYNCHRONOUSLY
— / went 86% -> 53% used, and Longhorn's default disk went
Schedulable=False (DiskPressure) -> Schedulable=True (18.85% -> 50.32%).

P7 root-caused the largest item and it is NOT the cap: all 208 `go mod download`
records had Usage count 1. Isolated by controlled builds — same VERSION build-arg
-> CACHED, new VERSION -> executed, byte-identical tree. `ARG VERSION`/`ARG
GIT_COMMIT` sit ABOVE the module-download step, and a RUN's cache key includes
the stage environment. Both Dockerfiles have it. One line each to fix -> R-208.

P6 NOT EXECUTED — stops at the operator, as specified. Pre-analysis: the move is
safe as measured (+38.8 pp above the 25% floor) but SSD2 is the only Longhorn
disk with storageReserved=0 and is overcommitted 6.9x; at full inflation the move
lands 12 pp BELOW the floor. The prune removed the move's urgency, so CC
recommends against it unless ~80 GB is reserved on SSD2 -> R-209.

Register: R-205 (CLOSED, shipped), R-206 (Ansible: cap + prune + narrowed Docker
ban), R-207 (DRY_RUN guard), R-208 (ARG ordering), R-209/R-210 (operator),
R-211 (Prometheus has no config-reloader — rules changes have never applied
until something restarted the pod; found while verifying R-205).

Gates: repo_gates.py --fast — all OK, rc=0 (run separately from this commit).
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2026-08-05 10:02:46 +02:00
parent 0dbd954fec
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# SPIKE — DooPlex build-cache containment (cap at 30 GB, relocate to SSD2)
**Date:** 2026-08-05 · **Host:** DooPlex (192.168.0.180) — **Tier 2, protected**, not a drill target
**Class:** Spike. §1, §2, §3, §4, §13-verify, §15 apply; §5–§12 skipped (no production Go code written).
**Anchor:** `dooplex_report.md` (2026-08-05 read-only disk audit). Every number in it was treated as a
claim to re-measure, not a fact to carry forward.
> Unit convention: **GB = decimal (10⁹)**, because `df -B1`, `du -B1` and Prometheus emit raw bytes.
> `docker buildx inspect` renders **GiB** (2³⁰) — where that matters it is labelled.
---
## Verdict
**The mechanism is confirmed, with one correction and one refutation, and the follow-up is safe to spec.**
- **Confirmed:** a `builder.gc` policy in `/etc/docker/daemon.json` **is** honoured under the containerd
worker, and it **does** evict. Proven by naming a 440 MB cache record present at one build and absent
two builds later — not by the absence of an error.
- **Corrected:** it is honoured **only in the `policy` array form**. The flat form
(`{"gc": {"reservedSpace": …}}`) is **silently ignored** — the daemon starts, logs nothing, and keeps
its built-in defaults. `dockerd --validate` is worthless here: it returned `configuration OK` for a
bogus key **and** for a config that then crashed the daemon.
- **Refuted:** the audit's proposal to change Docker's `data-root` would **not** move the build cache. It
moves 0.62 GB. The 181.4 GB belongs to the **system containerd**, relocated via `root` in
`/etc/containerd/config.toml`.
- **The prune is done and it was the whole rescue.** `/` went **86% → 53% used**, and Longhorn's default
disk went **`Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)``Schedulable=True`**. The live consequence is cleared.
- **The largest single finding is not the cap.** 90.5 GB of the 157 GB was one layer re-downloading on
every build, and the root cause is a **one-line Dockerfile ordering defect**`ARG VERSION` declared
above the module-download step. Fixing it removes the source; the cap only bounds the symptom.
- **P6 (the SSD2 move) was NOT executed** — it stops at the operator, as specified. The pre-analysis
says the move is safe as measured but carries a real Longhorn risk, and the prune removed its urgency.
---
## 1. Confirmed baselines
| Repo | `main` @ commit at spike start | Drift vs the task's stated baseline |
|---|---|---|
| `homelab-manifests` | `5188058d0e43` | none — matched |
| `felhom.eu` | `0dbd954fec90` | none — matched |
Both trees clean (`git status --porcelain` empty) and `HEAD == origin/main` before any commit.
**Register:** highest allocated at baseline was **R-204**, re-confirmed in `OPEN-ITEMS.md`. **R-205**
onward were free and are allocated here (R-205 … R-211).
**One path correction:** `homelab-manifests` is **not** in `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/git/` with the other
repos — it lives at **`/home/kisfenyo/git/homelab-manifests`**.
---
## 2. P0 — arrival state, expected vs measured
Measured live before anything was changed. **Values that matched are recorded, not omitted.**
| Fact | Expected (audit) | **Measured** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Root fs size | 477,393,182,720 B | **477,393,182,720 B** | match |
| Root fs used | 387.3 GB | **387,332,755,456 B** | match (+10.8 MB in 2 h) |
| Root fs avail | 65.7 GB | **65,734,934,528 B** | match |
| Root fs percent | 86% | **86%** | match |
| Docker server version | 29.6.2 | **29.6.2** (build `3d80467`) | match |
| Storage driver | overlayfs, containerd snapshotter | **`overlayfs`, `driver-type: io.containerd.snapshotter.v1`** | match |
| Docker Root Dir | `/var/lib/docker`, ~0.6 GB | **`/var/lib/docker`, 618,541,056 B** | match |
| containerd root | `/var/lib/containerd`, ~181.4 GB | **181,394,223,104 B** | match |
| Build cache total / reclaimable | 157 GB / 147.8 GB | **157 GB / 147.8 GB**, 1446 records | match |
| Images / containers | 345 images, 2 running | **345 unique** (350 tag lines), **2 running** | match |
| `/etc/docker/daemon.json` | does not exist | **does not exist** (`/etc/docker/` exists, empty) | match |
| `/etc/buildkit/` | does not exist | **does not exist** | match |
| SSD2 device / mount / fs / free | ~240 GB, ~203 GB free | **`/dev/sde2`, `/mnt/ssd_2`, ext4, 235,148,750,848 B fs, 203,034,353,664 B free** | match |
| SSD1 Longhorn | `Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)` | **`Schedulable=False`, `DiskPressure`, 18.85% avail** | match |
| HDD2 Longhorn | also False | **`Schedulable=False`, `DiskPressure`, 24.91% avail** | match |
| Housekeeping timer | active, last Sun 2026-08-02 | **active**, last **2026-08-02 05:35:10 CEST**, next 08-09, `ExecMainStatus=0` | match |
**Prohibition honoured:** `node-housekeeping.sh` was **not run**, in any mode. Its state was read from
systemd, from the textfile on disk, and from Prometheus. The textfile's mtime is still
`2026-08-02 05:35:11` — the 8-week reclaim history is intact.
**What the audit did not measure — the SSD2 Longhorn record** (`Crucial-SSD-240G`,
`/mnt/ssd_2/data/longhorn`):
| field | value |
|---|---:|
| `storageMaximum` | 235,148,750,848 |
| `storageAvailable` | 214,958,080,000 (**91.41%**) |
| `storageScheduled` | 139,586,437,120 |
| `storageReserved` | **0** |
| condition | **`Schedulable=True`** |
| replicas | **12** |
**Two things stand out and both matter for P6.** SSD2 is the **only** Longhorn disk reserving **zero**
(HDD2 and HDD4 each reserve 500 GB). And `storageScheduled` (139.6 GB) exceeds actual usage
(`df`: 20,094,939,136 B) by **6.9×** — Longhorn is heavily overcommitted on this disk.
---
## 3. P1 — which daemon owns the bytes
> **The single configuration change that relocates the build cache is `root = "<path>"` in
> `/etc/containerd/config.toml`, owned by `containerd.service` — the SYSTEM containerd
> (PID 2698677, socket `/run/containerd/containerd.sock`).**
**The audit's `data-root` proposal is refuted, and the split is measured:**
| tree | size | moved by `data-root`? |
|---|---:|---|
| `/var/lib/docker` | **618,541,056 B** (volumes 321 MB, **buildkit metadata 282 MB**, containers 14 MB) | yes |
| `/var/lib/containerd` | **181,394,223,104 B** (overlayfs snapshots **170,357,870,592 B**, content 10.98 GB) | **no** |
`dockerd` runs as `/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd:// --containerd=/run/containerd/containerd.sock` with **no
systemd drop-ins**. BuildKit keeps its *record database* under Docker Root Dir (0.28 GB) but its *layer
bytes* in containerd's snapshotter — which is why `data-root` looks plausible and is wrong.
In `/etc/containerd/config.toml` the `root` key is **present but commented out**, so it defaults to
`/var/lib/containerd`. Uncommenting it is the whole change.
**k3s is unaffected — confirmed, not assumed.** k3s runs a **separate** containerd instance with its own
socket (`/run/k3s/containerd/containerd.sock`) and its own root
(`/var/lib/rancher/k3s/agent/containerd`, **79,669,473,280 B**). Nothing in this spike touches it.
---
## 4. P2 — which GC key schema this release accepts
**`dockerd --validate` exists on 29.6.2 and is not an oracle for this subtree.** Measured:
| candidate | `--validate` | reality |
|---|---|---|
| `defaultKeepStorage` (old flat form) | `configuration OK` | — |
| `policy` array | `configuration OK` | **honoured** |
| `reservedSpace` / `maxUsedSpace` / `minFreeSpace` flat | `configuration OK` | **silently ignored** |
| **`totallyBogusKey`** | **`configuration OK`** | proves the validator does no field checking |
| `policy` with `"filter": [three values]` | **`configuration OK`** | **crashed the daemon on restart** |
> **The real oracle is `docker buildx inspect`, which renders the *effective* policy.** That is an
> assertion of effect; `--validate` and "no error in the log" are both assertions of absence, and both
> were measured to lie here.
**The flat form is silently ignored.** With `{"gc":{"enabled":true,"reservedSpace":"1GB","maxUsedSpace":"2GB","minFreeSpace":"10GB"}}`
applied and the daemon restarted, `buildx inspect` still reported the built-in defaults, and
`journalctl -u docker.service` carried **no warning, no deprecation notice and no error**.
**The `filter` key takes ONE value per policy entry, not an array.** An array is fatal at startup:
```
error initializing buildkit: error creating buildkit instance: filters expect only one value
```
The daemon then entered a systemd restart loop. **This is also how the two `unless-stopped` dev
containers ended up stopped** — and they did **not** come back when the daemon later started cleanly;
they needed a manual `docker start`. A follow-up that templates this file must **restart and verify**,
never validate-and-assume.
**Documented statement on containerd-worker applicability:** none found in `dockerd --help` or the
installed docs. Recorded as **unknown from documentation**, and settled empirically by P5.
**The default policy is not "no policy".** Before any change, `buildx inspect` reported built-in rules
with **Reserved 41.91 GiB / Max Used 331.6 GiB / Min Free 82.89 GiB**. The audit's "there is no BuildKit
GC policy on this host" is *almost* right — there was one, sized so large it could never bind: the cache
at 157 GB was less than half the 331.6 GiB ceiling.
### The validated `daemon.json`, verbatim (final state, left in place deliberately)
```json
{
"builder": {
"gc": {
"enabled": true,
"policy": [
{ "reservedSpace": "10GB", "maxUsedSpace": "30GB", "minFreeSpace": "20GB" },
{ "all": true, "reservedSpace": "10GB", "maxUsedSpace": "30GB", "minFreeSpace": "20GB" }
]
}
}
}
```
Effective policy confirmed live (note the **GiB** rendering — `30GB` in JSON becomes a 30 GiB rule):
```
GC Policy rule#0: All: false Reserved Space: 10GiB Max Used Space: 30GiB Min Free Space: 20GiB
GC Policy rule#1: All: true Reserved Space: 10GiB Max Used Space: 30GiB Min Free Space: 20GiB
```
**No deprecation warning was emitted** for any accepted form.
---
## 5. P3 — the prune: claimed, actual, settle
Pre-checked: no build in progress, P0 and P7 captured first.
| | value |
|---|---:|
| **Claimed by `docker builder prune -af`** | **156.9 GB** (1444 records deleted, 86 s wall-clock) |
| **Actual filesystem reclaim** | **150,353,829,888 B (150.35 GB)** |
| **Time to settle** | **synchronous — full reclaim visible at t+0** |
Settle poll (t+0 already showed +150,354,477,056 B; two consecutive readings <50 MB apart at t+60s;
the residual 0.4 MB and 0.3 MB steps are ordinary background writes, not lagging reclaim):
| t | avail | step delta |
|---|---:|---:|
| 0 s | 215,947,522,048 | — |
| 30 s | 215,947,141,120 | 380,928 |
| 60 s | 215,946,874,880 | 266,240 |
**The 6.5 GB gap between claimed and actual is not an error** — it is the layers still shared with
retained images (`Shared: 8.6 GB` before the prune). **A weekly job must measure the filesystem, not
trust the command's `Total:`.**
**Unlike containerd's image GC, this returns bytes synchronously**, so the follow-up needs no
`settle_imagefs` equivalent — but the settle poll is what *established* that, and it cost 60 seconds.
| | before | after |
|---|---:|---:|
| `/` used | 387,474,644,992 B (**86%**) | 240,301,133,824 B (**53%**) |
| `/` avail | 65,593,044,992 B | 215,946,874,880 B |
| `/var/lib/containerd` | 181,537,714,176 B | 31,160,053,760 B |
| build cache | 156.9 GB / 1443 records | **0 B / 0 records** |
| images | 345 | **345** (untouched) |
| dev containers | 2 healthy | **2 healthy** |
### The live consequence, cleared
Longhorn re-evaluated within 60 s:
| disk | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| `default-disk-…` (SSD1, `/var/lib/longhorn/`) | `Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)`, 89,967,820,800 B, **18.85%** | **`Schedulable=True`**, 240,228,761,600 B, **50.32%** |
| `HDD2` | `Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)`, 24.91% | **unchanged — still False, 24.91%** |
**HDD2 is untouched by this work and remains unschedulable.** It is a separate item, stated here so it
is not read as fixed by association.
---
## 6. P5 — proving the ceiling is enforced
**Rollback stated before the first mutation** and never needed beyond the recovery below:
`sudo rm /etc/docker/daemon.json && sudo systemctl restart docker` — the file did not exist, so removal
is a complete revert.
Test ceiling **2 GB** (below one build's working set, deliberately, so eviction is reachable).
### Build-by-build totals
| step | build cache total | reclaimable | records |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| baseline (post-prune) | 0 B | 0 B | 0 |
| controller 1 | 2.583 GB | 2.583 GB | 22 |
| hub 1 | **3.703 GB** ← peak | 3.703 GB | 37 |
| controller 2 | 3.525 GB | 3.525 GB | 37 |
| hub 2 | 3.051 GB | 3.051 GB | 38 |
| controller 3 | 2.817 GB | 2.817 GB | 36 |
| hub 3 | **2.782 GB** | 2.782 GB | 38 |
**The total stops rising and trends down** — the cap binds. Records plateau at 3638.
### The named eviction — the assertion that matters
Set-differencing the record IDs, **4 records present at controller-build-1 were absent by
controller-build-3**, including the exact class that accumulated 208 copies:
| ID | size | created | description |
|---|---:|---|---|
| **`9ak8egnxrg6rkibic2zo44u1`** | **440 MB** | 07:28:34 | **`mount / from exec /bin/sh -c go mod download \|\| true`** |
| `kkic530irq4em04kywzwrsjp` | 214.6 MB | 07:28:37 | `… go build -ldflags …` |
| `yvityhta4wppwa8cxs525c3g` | 58.83 MB | 07:28:36 | `… go mod tidy` |
| `mvttjfrimnt1ttt0ogry75ue` | 49.8 MB | 07:28:35 | `[builder 5/7] COPY . .` |
Across the whole sequence: `h1→h3` evicted **17** records, `c2→c3` evicted **10**.
### Tolerance, stated honestly
Steady state settled at **2.782.82 GB against a 2 GiB (2.147 GB) rule — about 30% over**, with a peak
of **3.70 GB (~72% over)** mid-sequence.
**This overshoot is an artefact of the test, not a property of the cap, and should not be extrapolated to
30 GB.** A single controller build produces ~2.6 GB of cache in one shot, so a 2 GB ceiling was set
*below one build's working set* — GC cannot get under it without deleting the cache it just created. At
30 GB the same working set is ~9% of the ceiling and GC has ample room.
### GC is build-triggered, not timer-driven
Six minutes idle, polled each minute: **total unchanged at 2.782 GB, records unchanged at 38.** The
cache does not shrink on its own. A burst of builds can overshoot and *stay* overshot until the next
build — which is the argument for keeping a weekly `docker builder prune` as a backstop (R-206), rather
than relying on the cap alone.
### Then the ruled 30 GB
Applied, restarted, and confirmed by the effective policy (§4). Both dev containers came back healthy
and **their data is intact — asserted positively, not by absence of complaint**:
| observable | before | after |
|---|---:|---:|
| postgres `count(*) from pg_database` | 4 | **4** |
| postgres `pg_database_size('jarr_dev')` | 175,135,767 | **175,135,767** |
| postgres public tables | 31 | **31** |
| redis `DBSIZE` | 2437 | **2437** |
| docker volumes | 8 | **8, identical names** |
---
## 7. P7 — why the module-download layer re-runs
**Root cause found and proven: `ARG VERSION` / `ARG GIT_COMMIT` are declared in the builder stage
*above* the module-download step, so a new version value invalidates every `RUN` beneath them.**
### The evidence chain
**1. Every record was used exactly once.** All **208** `go mod download` records (206 at audit time, +2
from this spike's builds) carried **`Usage count: 1`**, spanning 2026-07-06 → 2026-08-05, totalling
91.36 GB at 438440 MB each. Not one was ever reused.
**2. Two builds through `build.sh`, byte-identical tree, both missed.**
| step | build 1 | build 2 |
|---|---|---|
| `#8 WORKDIR /build` | CACHED | CACHED |
| `#9 COPY go.mod ./` | **CACHED** | **CACHED** |
| **`#10 RUN go mod download \|\| true`** | **executed** | **executed** |
| `#11 COPY . .` | executed | executed |
| `#12 RUN go mod tidy` | executed | executed |
| `#13 RUN … go build …` | executed | executed |
| `#14/#15/#16` (stage-1 `RUN`s) | CACHED | CACHED |
`go.mod` was **byte-identical** (`d8ded3f0798c…`) in the repo and in the workspace, mtime unchanged
(`2026-07-24 11:54:08`).
**3. `build.sh`'s churn was ruled out by fingerprinting.** Content-hashing all 737 files across
`rm -rf` + `cp -a` + host-side `go mod tidy`: **`tidy` changes nothing**, and the reproduced tree is
**content-identical** to the live workspace. `go.mod`'s inode number was even identical across the churn.
**4. A direct `docker build` on the untouched workspace cached *everything*** — including
`RUN go mod download` — proving BuildKit's cache is healthy and the Dockerfile is cacheable.
**5. The decisive isolation.** Same workspace, same command, only the build-arg value varied:
| run | `--build-arg VERSION` | `COPY go.mod ./` | **`RUN go mod download`** |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | **new** (`spike-p7e`) | CACHED | **executed** |
| E2 | **same** (`spike-p7e`) | CACHED | **CACHED** |
**The mechanism, and it explains the `#9 CACHED / #10 executed` signature exactly:** a `COPY`'s cache key
is content-based and carries no environment, so it hits; a `RUN`'s key includes the stage **environment**,
which contains every `ARG` declared above it. Since every real build passes a fresh `VERSION` (and often
a fresh `GIT_COMMIT`), the module-download layer is invalidated **on every build, without exception**
206 builds, 206 retained 440 MB snapshots, 90.5 GB.
**Both Dockerfiles have it.** `felhom.eu/hub/Dockerfile` declares `ARG VERSION` / `ARG BUILD_TIME` above
`COPY go.mod go.sum*``RUN go mod download`. **And because both produce byte-identical `buildx du`
description strings, the 208 records are a COMBINED count** and must not be attributed to one project.
**Fix shape — not applied here, filed as R-208:** move the `ARG` declarations down to just above the
final `go build`. One line per Dockerfile. **This is worth more than the cap and the move combined:** the
cap bounds the symptom at 30 GB; this removes the source.
---
## 8. P4 — the image store, enumerated (nothing deleted)
345 unique images across 350 tag lines (5 double-tagged), **0 dangling**. Only two are held by running
containers: `redis:7-alpine` and `postgres:16-alpine`. `docker image prune -a` would remove **343**.
**Size the prize before spending a decision on it.** Per-tag sizes sum to 139.29 GB, but that
double-counts shared layers. `docker system df` puts the **real dedup'd footprint at 31.02 GB, of which
27.02 GB is reclaimable** — roughly a fifth of what the build-cache prune already returned.
| GB (per-tag sum) | tags | repository |
|---:|---:|---|
| 118.44 | **207** | `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller` |
| 7.25 | **107** | `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub` |
| 4.34 | 5 | `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/jarr` |
| 1.69 | 1 | `ghcr.io/seanmorley15/adventurelog-backend` |
| 0.94 | 1 | `ghcr.io/papra-hq/papra` |
| 0.72 | 1 | `codewithcj/sparkyfitness_server` |
| 0.72 | 1 | `postgis/postgis` |
| 0.59 | 3 | `gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/sparkyfitness-export` |
| (23 more, each ≤0.53 GB) | | |
### Registry presence — which are recoverable
Queried against the live Gitea registry v2 API:
| repo | tags in registry | tags local | **local-only (NOT re-pullable)** |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| `felhom-controller` | 76 | 207 | **131** |
| `felhom-hub` | 45 | 107 | **62** |
**The local-only tags are all old.** Controller `0.39.0``0.135.0` plus `v0.35.0``v0.39.0`; hub
`0.9.0``0.57.0` plus `v0.7.2``v0.13.0`. **Everything from controller `0.136.0` and hub `0.58.0`
upward is in the registry** and therefore recoverable by `docker pull`.
**This is the list the operator still owes a ruling on (R-210).** CC's view: not worth doing for the
space — ~27 GB against 199 GB now free. The only real benefit is dropping unrecoverable clutter.
---
## 9. P8 — what else writes to Docker
**The bounded list of build triggers on the host Docker daemon is: interactive/manual runs only.**
- **18 systemd timers** enumerated — none invokes docker. (`node-housekeeping`, `dooplex-backup`,
`apt-daily*`, `sysstat*`, `logrotate`, `fstrim`, `e2scrub_all`, `smart-fancontrol`, …)
- **Root crontab: empty** (comments only). **User crontab: one entry**, `sync-hetzner-backups.sh`,
writes under `/mnt/5_hdd`.
- **`/etc/cron.d`: 4 real files** — anacron, e2scrub_all, sysstat, zfsutils. None touches docker.
**The hole the audit left open is now closed with positive evidence.** The audit concluded "no CI runner
exists on this host" from systemd/process/crontab alone — but a Gitea Actions runner **does** exist as a
**cluster pod** (R-168, 2026-08-02). It cannot reach the host daemon:
- **162 pods swept across all namespaces: `0` mount any `docker`/`containerd` hostPath.**
- `act-runner` (`gitea-system`, image `felhom-act-runner:0.1.0`) has one volume — a PVC at `/data`.
`privileged: false`, `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`, **all capabilities dropped**, no docker socket.
- Its Dockerfile states the absence is deliberate: *"DELIBERATELY NOT INSTALLED: a Go toolchain, Node, or
Docker … There is no container runtime in here on purpose."*
- `gates.yml` runs exactly one command — `python3 scripts/<repo>_gates.py --fast` — plus a git fetch and
a failure-only Resend alarm. **No `docker build` anywhere.**
**So the audit's ~7 builds/day attribution to interactive use is confirmed**, and now on a complete
enumeration rather than a partial one.
---
## 10. P9 — the monitoring rule fix (shipped)
**File:** `homelab-manifests/mon-system/prometheus-rules.yaml`, alert
`RootFsPressureDespiteHousekeeping`. **Commit `6808a4b`.**
**Change:** `and`**`and on(instance)`**. A bare `and` requires identical label sets; the left vector
carries `{device,fstype,instance,job,mountpoint}` and the right — a node_exporter *textfile* metric —
carries only `{instance,job}`. Nothing ever matched.
### Red-proof (required, and both numbers recorded)
**Threshold substituted `0.25` → `0.5`, and the reason is stated rather than hidden:** P3's prune had
already taken `/` to 44.6% available, so the shipped threshold's left side is now legitimately false. The
defect is in **label matching**, not in the threshold, so the proof is run at a threshold where both
sides are individually true — which is exactly the condition the original rule was meant to catch.
| expression | `result_count` |
|---|---:|
| left side alone (`avail/size < 0.5`) | **1** |
| right side alone (`time() last_success < 1209600`) | **1** |
| **as shipped — bare `and`** | **0** |
| **fixed — `and on(instance)`** | **1** |
For completeness, at the shipped 0.25 threshold **both** forms return 0 today — because the left side is
false now, not because the fix failed.
**Annotation rewritten.** It pointed at Longhorn replicas/snapshots (~10% of the growth). It now names
`docker buildx du` first, records the 30 GB cap in `/etc/docker/daemon.json`, and notes that a reverted
or unapplied cap looks exactly like this alert firing — so the alert text carries its own diagnosis.
### Deployment — GitOps, no `kubectl set image`, no live ConfigMap edit
ArgoCD app `monitoring` (auto-sync **off**): hard-refresh → `OutOfSync` at `6808a4be54a7` → deliberate
sync → **`Synced` / `Healthy`**, operation phase **`Succeeded`**.
**Verified in Prometheus, not assumed from ArgoCD:**
```
query : … < 0.25 and on (instance) time() - node_housekeeping_last_success_timestamp_seconds < 1209600
state : inactive health : ok lastError : (none)
```
`inactive` is now the **correct** answer — `/` really is fine at 44.6% available.
> **A near-miss worth recording: I invented a full commit SHA from ArgoCD's truncated display and the
> sync failed with `upload-pack: not our ref`.** It failed loudly and cost one retry. It would not have
> failed loudly had the fabricated SHA happened to exist.
### The finding P9 turned up on the way — R-211
**There is no config-reloader.** The `mon-system/prometheus` Deployment runs **one** container
(`prom/prometheus:v3.12.0`) with no reloader sidecar. After the sync the updated rules file was present
**inside the pod** (`grep -c "and on(instance)"` → 3 on the mounted symlink) while the Prometheus rules
API **still served the old expression for 4+ minutes**, with no error anywhere. It took effect only after
an explicit `POST /-/reload` (HTTP 200; `--web.enable-lifecycle` was already set).
**The consequence is general:** every rule edit in this repo has silently not applied until something
happened to restart the pod. `Synced/Healthy` was true and beside the point. Filed as **R-211**.
---
## 11. P6 — the SSD2 move: pre-analysis only. **NOT EXECUTED.**
**Stopped here as specified. Nothing was moved, no daemon was reconfigured for SSD2, no mount unit was
written.** The operator must be present.
**First, the framing changed underneath this probe.** P3's prune took `/` to 53% used and un-stuck
SSD1's Longhorn disk. **The move is no longer a rescue; it is a deliberate choice.** Per standing rule 4,
CC's disagreement is stated rather than absorbed: **the cap alone resolved the problem the move was meant
to solve, and the move carries a Longhorn risk the cap does not.**
### Mechanism — three candidates
| | mechanism | survives package upgrade | expressible in Ansible | visible reading the host cold |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(a)** | **`root = "/mnt/ssd_2/…"` in `/etc/containerd/config.toml`** | **yes** — dpkg conffile, local edits preserved | **yes** — a template, the file is already managed-shaped | **yes** — one line in the daemon's own config |
| (b) | systemd mount unit / fstab bind onto `/var/lib/containerd` | yes | yes | **weak** — invisible unless you check `findmnt` |
| (c) | symlink | fragile | yes | **weak**, and overlayfs mount semantics through a symlink are unproven here |
**Recommendation: (a).** It is the only one that a person reading the host cold can *see*, and the key
already exists in the file (commented out).
### The boot-order trap, and its guard
If containerd or Docker starts before `/mnt/ssd_2` is mounted, the daemon **creates an empty store on the
root disk** and 345 images appear to have vanished.
**Guard:** `RequiresMountsFor=/mnt/ssd_2` on **`containerd.service`** and **`docker.service`**. Neither
has it today — `containerd.service` carries only `After=network.target dbus.service`.
> **`RequiresMountsFor` RE-MOUNTS; it does not refuse.** systemd pulls the mount unit in and *starts* it,
> so an unmounted-but-available device is silently re-mounted and everything looks fine. It refuses only
> when the device is genuinely **unavailable**. **Testing it by unmounting proves nothing** — it must be
> tested by pointing at an absent device. This is the ep0 datastore lesson
> (`RUNBOOK-ep0-datastore-volume-2026-07-27.md`), earned on this project.
**And a move that has not survived a reboot has not been validated.** Mount-ordering reasoning is exactly
the class this project has been burned by.
### The Longhorn consequence — the part that decides it
`Crucial-SSD-240G`, `storageMaximum` 235,148,750,848, **25% floor = 58,787,187,712**:
| scenario | resulting `storageAvailable` | as % | vs the 25% floor |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| today, untouched | 214,958,080,000 | 91.41% | +66.4 pp |
| move cache only (30 GB) | 184,958,080,000 | 78.66% | **+53.7 pp** |
| move whole containerd tree today (34.3 GB) | 180,658,569,216 | 76.83% | +51.8 pp |
| **move at steady state (~31.5 GB images + 30 GB cache ≈ 65 GB)** | 149,958,080,000 | **63.77%** | **+38.8 pp** |
**As measured, the move is safe by a wide margin — nowhere near the 10-pp caution band.**
**But the worst case is not comfortable, and it is not hypothetical enough to omit.** `storageScheduled`
on SSD2 is **139,586,437,120** while actual usage is **20,094,939,136** — a 6.9× overcommit. If those 12
volumes ever inflate to their scheduled size:
| scenario | available | as % | vs floor |
|---|---:|---:|---|
| + cache only (30 GB) | 65,562,313,728 | 27.88% | +2.9 pp — inside the caution band |
| **+ steady state (65 GB)** | 30,562,313,728 | **13.00%** | **12.0 pp → `Schedulable=False`** |
That is precisely the failure that just took SSD1 out of service.
> **Recommendation: proceed only together with setting Longhorn's `storageReserved` on SSD2 to cover the
> containerd tree (~80 GB).** SSD2 reserving **zero** while HDD2 and HDD4 each reserve 500 GB is an
> anomaly in its own right, and it is what lets Longhorn oversubscribe into the space the cache needs.
> Without that, CC recommends **not moving** — the cap has already done the job.
### The sequence, prepared and not executed
Each step with its rollback. **Do not run without the operator.**
| # | step | rollback |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | `systemctl stop docker docker.socket containerd` | `systemctl start containerd docker` |
| 2 | `mkdir -p /mnt/ssd_2/containerd` | `rmdir` |
| 3 | `rsync -aHAX --numeric-ids /var/lib/containerd/ /mnt/ssd_2/containerd/` (small now — ~34 GB, and ~2.8 GB of it is cache) | delete the copy; the original is untouched |
| 4 | `mv /var/lib/containerd /var/lib/containerd.pre-move` (**move aside, never delete**) | `mv` back |
| 5 | set `root = '/mnt/ssd_2/containerd'` in `/etc/containerd/config.toml` | restore the commented line |
| 6 | drop-in `RequiresMountsFor=/mnt/ssd_2` on `containerd.service` **and** `docker.service`; `systemctl daemon-reload` | delete the drop-ins |
| 7 | `systemctl start containerd docker`; **verify `docker images` = 345, both dev containers up, `du` confirms the store's real path** | steps 5→4→1 in reverse |
| 8 | set SSD2 `storageReserved` ≈ 80 GB in the Longhorn node CR | set back to 0 |
| 9 | **`reboot`, then re-verify everything in step 7** | as above |
| 10 | test the guard by pointing at an **absent** device — an unmount alone proves nothing | restore fstab |
| 11 | only after a clean reboot + a full build: `rm -rf /var/lib/containerd.pre-move` | — none; do this last |
---
## 12. Teardown
**Nothing was provisioned.** No machine, no VM, no LXC guest, no hub record, no customer, no Longhorn
volume, no PVC. There is nothing to decommission.
**Cleaned up:**
- The six candidate `daemon.json` files written for P2 (in the session scratch dir, never in
`/etc/docker/`) — **removed**.
- The scratch workspace fingerprint tree (`ws_sim`) — **removed**.
- **Nine scratch image tags** created by the probe builds — `felhom-spike:{p7c,e1,e2}`,
`felhom-controller:{spike-p7a,spike-p7b,spike-p7d,evict-c1,evict-c2,evict-c3}`,
`felhom-hub:{evict-h1,evict-h2,evict-h3}`**all removed**.
- `felhom-controller:latest` **restored** to `sha256:bdcd4a4ae8e006f1…` (0.198.0), byte-matching the
anchor captured before the first build. Image count back to **345**, the P0 baseline.
**Intentional state left in place, recorded here so it does not read as a leftover:**
**`/etc/docker/daemon.json` exists**, with the content in §4. It did not exist before this session.
Removing it plus a daemon restart is a complete revert.
**Not cleaned up, deliberately:** the ~2.78 GB of build cache from the eviction sequence. It is the
working cache under a live 30 GB policy, not scratch.
---
## 13. Final state
| | at arrival | **now** |
|---|---:|---:|
| `/` used | 387,332,755,456 B (**86%**) | **240,301,133,824 B (54%)** |
| `/` available | 65,734,934,528 B | **212,766,556,160 B** |
| `/var/lib/containerd` | 181,394,223,104 B | **34,299,510,784 B** |
| build cache | 157 GB / 1446 records | **2.782 GB / 38 records, capped at 30 GiB** |
| images | 345 | **345** |
| dev containers | 2 healthy | **2 healthy, data verified intact** |
| SSD1 Longhorn | **`Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)`** | **`Schedulable=True`, 50.32%** |
| `RootFsPressureDespiteHousekeeping` | **dead — could never fire** | **live, `health=ok`, red-proven** |
| growth driver | unbounded, ~5.25 GB/day | **capped; source diagnosed (R-208)** |
---
## 14. Observations — noticed, deliberately not acted on
1. **`build.sh` exists in two copies** — `felhom-controller/controller/build.sh` (in git) and
`/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/build/felhom-controller/build.sh` (the operative one). They differ by **one
comment line**. The hub solved this with a symlink into the repo; the controller has not. Not fixed —
out of scope, but it is a drift channel.
2. **`build.sh` tags `:latest` on every build**, including throwaway version tags. A spike build silently
moved `latest` off 0.198.0; it was restored from an anchor captured beforehand. A `--no-latest` flag,
or tagging `latest` only on `--push`, would remove the trap.
3. **The default BuildKit GC policy is derived from disk size**, so a bigger root disk would have raised
the 331.6 GiB ceiling too. The cap needs to be explicit no matter how much disk is added.
4. **`node-housekeeping.sh`'s own `avail_bytes()` uses `df … | tail -1`** — the truncating-instrument
shape this project has been bitten by twice. It is *correct* here (`df` on one path emits exactly one
data row), so it was left alone, but it is worth knowing it is there.
5. **HDD2 remains `Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)`** at 24.91%, a hair under the 25% floor with 2.47 TB
free and its 500 GB reserve satisfied. Untouched by this work, and not fixed by it.
6. **The `mon-system` Prometheus has `--web.enable-admin-api`** as well as `--web.enable-lifecycle`. The
admin API permits series deletion. Noted, not acted on.
7. **Longhorn on SSD2 is overcommitted 6.9×** (139.6 GB scheduled vs 20.1 GB used). That is normal for
thin provisioning, but combined with `storageReserved = 0` it is what makes the P6 worst case reach
the floor.
---
## 15. Register
Allocated this session: **R-205** (CLOSED — the monitoring rule, shipped), **R-206** (Ansible: cap +
prune + narrowed Docker ban), **R-207** (the `DRY_RUN` guard), **R-208** (the `ARG`-ordering cache miss —
the largest remaining win), **R-209** (WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — whether to move to SSD2 at all),
**R-210** (WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — the image list), **R-211** (no Prometheus config-reloader).
+7
View File
@@ -181,6 +181,13 @@ drill needed — the fourth is R-193, and until it goes the recovery is still op
| **R-167** | ~~**Storage monitoring and backup alerts.**~~ | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (controller v0.191.0/.1/.2 + hub v0.89.0, 2026-08-02) | — | **Operator decision D-c. It shipped BEFORE the R-165 merge, not with it** — D-a's condition (2) says the monitoring lands in the same step and never after, and landing it first is strictly better and costs nothing. **Customer half:** new `internal/fillwatch`, per FILESYSTEM (never per app — one full disk holding ten apps would fire ten times). **It emits the PRE-EXISTING `disk_warning`/`disk_critical` pair, which was allowlisted, copy'd, in `DefaultEnabledEvents` and checkbox'd with NO PRODUCER IN ANY REPO** — a complete customer pipeline with no producer, the **sixth** *built-but-never-wired* instance here; minting a new near-duplicate type would have left it inert forever. **Two threshold terms, whichever trips first** (85% / 5 GiB; critical 95% / 2 GiB) because a percentage alone lies at both ends of this fleet's size range — **proven live: the critical crossing fired on the FREE-BYTE term (1.7 GB) at only 91% used.** Edge-triggered on escalation, state persisted, hysteresis dead zone at 75% / 7 GiB pinned by a test; a nil usage read never warns and never clears one (§8.4). The hub's two generic `customerMessages` entries were **removed**`FormatCustomerEmail` prefers the entry over the message, so keeping them would discard the drive label and the byte figures. **Operator half: see R-158.** **Live on 9201, all three flows:** `disk_warning` then `disk_critical` both `customer | sent` with the Hungarian rendered, exactly two events across three boots (the edge trigger held on the one between), then a silent clear that re-armed. **v0.191.1** added the once-at-startup run (Daily/Every both wait for their first tick, so a box BOOTING over the line would have stayed silent up to 24 h — the R-100 shape); **v0.191.2** added a per-run positive observable, earned when a quiet run during this session's own validation proved unreadable as evidence. Follow-ups: **R-177** (no run-now path) | — |
| **R-168** | ~~CI: no runner exists, and with trunk-based pushes CI can DETECT but not BLOCK~~ | **SHIPPED — and the alarm is DEMONSTRATED** (2026-08-02) | — | **Runner live**: `homelab-manifests/gitea-system/act-runner.yaml`, an unprivileged host-mode `act_runner` in `gitea-system`, one owner-scoped registration serving all four repos (measured: tasks 7-10 all claimed by `felhom-gates-runner`). `.gitea/workflows/gates.yml` in each repo runs that repo's entry point with `--fast` and nothing else; no `uses:` step anywhere. **Six probes, all answered, none STOPped**`audits/SPIKE-ci-runner-2026-08-02.md`. The two that changed the design: **P2** (stock image has git but NO python3 → custom image `felhom-act-runner:0.1.0`, base pinned, python3 and nothing else) and **P6** (a runner that loses `/data/.runner` re-registers and leaves a dead record behind → the PVC is load-bearing, measured both ways). **P5 is the one that mattered**: a failed run produced NO mail, NO notification row and NO log line from Gitea, so the run now sends its own alarm via Resend and prints the provider's accepted id. **Proven end to end, not asserted**: a deliberately broken commit pushed with `--no-verify` → run #6 `failure``RESEND-ACCEPTED id=5ff34766-c5f8-4588-8104-08296aeb45ab`. Posture shown from the live pod spec: `privileged: false`, all caps dropped, no docker socket, no hostPath, `automountServiceAccountToken: false`, sized at half Gitea's limits so it cannot crowd out the service holding every repository on the same node. **The standing limit stays true and is written into the manifest and every workflow: it DETECTS, it does not BLOCK** — making it block is → R-169 | — |
| **R-169** | **CI can only report, because there is no gate in the road.** Every felhom repo pushes straight to `main` with no pull request, so there is no merge for a status check to stand at. R-168's runner therefore notices a broken push *after* it has landed | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** (a working-style decision, not a defect) | an operator ruling | Making CI *blocking* requires two things this task deliberately did NOT do, because both change how the operator works and that is not a task's call: **(a)** branch protection on `main`, and **(b)** a pull-request workflow instead of direct-to-`main` pushes. The cost is real — every change would need a PR, which for a single-operator project may be worse than the disease. **The current arrangement is two nets, and it is not nothing**: `.githooks/pre-push` REFUSES locally, and R-168's runner NOTICES when that hook was skipped or was never armed in a clone, and emails. The honest gap is the window between a `--no-verify` push landing and the operator reading the alarm. Decide only if that window ever actually costs something | operator |
| **R-205** | ~~**`RootFsPressureDespiteHousekeeping` can never fire** — a bare PromQL `and` across mismatched label sets~~ | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + RED-PROVEN LIVE** (`homelab-manifests` `6808a4b`, 2026-08-05) | — | **`and``and on(instance)`.** Left vector carries `{device,fstype,instance,job,mountpoint}`; the right is a node_exporter *textfile* metric carrying `{instance,job}`. Nothing ever matched, so the alert returned the empty vector unconditionally — `health=ok`, `inactive`, no error, **dead from the day it was written**. It stayed silent through the entire 2026-07 build-cache incident that took `/` to 86% used and put Longhorn's default disk into `Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)`. **Red-proof against the live Prometheus API, both sides individually true** (threshold substituted `0.25``0.5` because P3's prune had already cleared the incident; the defect is in label matching, not the threshold): bare `and`**`result_count 0`**, `and on(instance)`**`result_count 1`**. **The annotation was also wrong and is rewritten** — it sent the reader to Longhorn replicas/snapshots (~10% of the growth) instead of the unbounded build cache (157 GB, ~95%); it now names `docker buildx du` first and records the 30 GB cap so a reverted cap is diagnosable from the alert text. ArgoCD `monitoring` Synced/Healthy at `6808a4b`; rule live and `health=ok`. Evidence: `audits/SPIKE-dooplex-buildcache-2026-08-05.md` | — |
| **R-206** | **The build-cache cap and the weekly prune exist only as a hand-edited `/etc/docker/daemon.json` on DooPlex — not in Ansible, so a rebuild loses them.** The `node_housekeeping` role must also carry the prune, which today it is forbidden to run | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-05** | — | **The spike validated the recipe; this row builds it.** Three parts. **(a) Template `/etc/docker/daemon.json`** with the **`policy` array** form — **the flat form (`{"gc":{"reservedSpace":…}}`) is SILENTLY IGNORED**, measured: the daemon starts, logs nothing, and `docker buildx inspect` still reports the built-in defaults. **The oracle is `docker buildx inspect`, never `dockerd --validate`** — the validator returned `configuration OK` for a bogus key AND for the config that then **crashed the daemon** (`filter` takes one value per policy entry, not an array; `error initializing buildkit: filters expect only one value`). **(b) Narrow the role's Docker ban** (`node-housekeeping.sh.j2:10-14`) to permit exactly `docker builder prune -af` and nothing else — the ban's stated premise ("Docker here runs only unrelated jarr-* dev containers") is obsolete: the growth is Felhom Go build cache. **The measured prune is SYNCHRONOUS** (150.35 GB back at t+0, two consecutive polls <1 MB apart within 60 s) — **unlike containerd's image GC, so it needs no `settle_imagefs` equivalent**, but it MUST measure the filesystem rather than trust the command: `prune` claimed **156.9 GB** and the filesystem returned **150.35 GB**, the 6.5 GB gap being layers still shared with images. **(c) A restart-safety note in the role:** a bad `daemon.json` takes the daemon down AND leaves the `unless-stopped` dev containers stopped — they needed a manual `docker start` — so the role must restart-and-verify, not validate-and-assume. Recipe + every measurement: `audits/SPIKE-dooplex-buildcache-2026-08-05.md` | CC |
| **R-207** | **`DRY_RUN=1` on `node-housekeeping.sh` is NOT non-mutating — it destroys the metric history it is supposed to let you inspect** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-05** | — | `write_metrics()` (`node-housekeeping.sh.j2:119-150`) has **no `DRY_RUN` guard at all**`DRY_RUN` appears in it only inside a log line — and it is called from an **unconditional `EXIT` trap** (`:150`). A dry run therefore atomically renames over the live node_exporter textfile, overwriting `node_housekeeping_last_success_timestamp_seconds` with *now* and `reclaimed_bytes` with ~0 — **resetting the staleness clock `HousekeepingStale` watches and erasing the 8-week reclaim history**. Confirmed by reading the source in both the 2026-08-05 audit and this spike; **neither run executed it**, so the history survives. Fix: guard `write_metrics` on `DRY_RUN`, or have the trap skip it. Pairs naturally with R-206 (same file, same role) | CC |
| **R-208** | **Every Felhom Go build re-downloads its modules because `ARG VERSION` sits ABOVE the module-download layer — ~440 MB of dead cache per build, 90.5 GB of the 157 GB** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-05, ROOT CAUSE PROVEN** | — | **Measured, not inferred.** All **208** retained `go mod download` records carried **`Usage count: 1`** — not one was ever reused in ~a month of builds. The mechanism was isolated by four controlled builds: an unchanged tree rebuilt with the **same** `--build-arg VERSION``RUN go mod download` **CACHED**; the **same** tree with a **new** `VERSION`**executed**. `COPY go.mod ./` stays CACHED either way, which is the tell: a `COPY`'s key is content-based, while a `RUN`'s key includes the stage **environment**, and `ARG VERSION`/`ARG GIT_COMMIT` are declared *before* the download in `felhom-controller/controller/Dockerfile`. Since every real build passes a fresh version, the layer is invalidated **every single time**. **`felhom.eu/hub/Dockerfile` has the identical defect** (`ARG VERSION`/`ARG BUILD_TIME` above `COPY go.mod go.sum*``RUN go mod download`) — and because both Dockerfiles produce byte-identical `buildx du` description strings, the 208 records are a COMBINED count and must not be attributed to one project. **Fix shape (one line each, not applied here):** move the `ARG VERSION`/`ARG GIT_COMMIT`/`ARG BUILD_TIME` declarations down to just above the final `go build`. **Worth more than the cap and the move combined** — the cap bounds the symptom, this removes the source. `build.sh`'s `rm -rf` + `cp -a` and its host-side `go mod tidy` were **ruled out by fingerprinting**: the tree is byte-identical across runs and `tidy` is a no-op | CC |
| **R-209** | **Should the containerd store move to SSD2 at all? — SSD2 is the ONLY Longhorn disk with `storageReserved = 0`, and the move is safe today but breaches the 25% floor if its volumes ever inflate** | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** — NEW 2026-08-05 | an operator ruling | **P3's prune already removed the urgency: `/` went 86% → 53% used and SSD1's Longhorn disk went `Schedulable=False (DiskPressure)` → `Schedulable=True` (18.85% → 50.32% available).** The move was ruled "cap then move"; the cap is in and the pressure is gone, so this is now a deliberate choice rather than a rescue. **The numbers, measured (`Crucial-SSD-240G`, `/mnt/ssd_2/data/longhorn`, `storageMaximum` 235,148,750,848):** available today **214,958,080,000 (91.41%)**; 25% floor **58,787,187,712**. Moving the whole containerd tree at steady state (~31.5 GB images + ≤30 GB cache ≈ 65 GB) leaves **63.77%, i.e. +38.8 pp above the floor — comfortably safe as measured.** **But `storageScheduled` on SSD2 is 139,586,437,120 while `df` says only 20,094,939,136 is actually used** — Longhorn has overcommitted 6.9× — and if those volumes ever inflate to their scheduled size, the same disk lands at **13.00%, i.e. 12 pp BELOW the floor → `Schedulable=False`**, which is exactly the failure that just took SSD1 out. **Recommendation: do the move only together with setting `storageReserved` on SSD2 to cover the containerd tree (~80 GB); SSD2 reserving zero while HDD2 and HDD4 each reserve 500 GB is an anomaly in its own right.** Mechanism, if it goes ahead: **containerd's `root` in `/etc/containerd/config.toml`** (the key is present but commented out) — **not** Docker's `data-root`, which would move only 0.62 GB. Guard: `RequiresMountsFor=/mnt/ssd_2` on `containerd.service` **and** `docker.service`, remembering that **`RequiresMountsFor` RE-MOUNTS rather than refusing** ([[ep0-datastore-volume-move-2026-07-27]]) — so it must be tested with a genuinely absent device, and the move is not validated until it has survived a **reboot**. Full pre-analysis: `audits/SPIKE-dooplex-buildcache-2026-08-05.md` §P6 | operator |
| **R-210** | **Which of the 345 local images may be deleted — 131 controller tags and 62 hub tags exist ONLY on this box and are not recoverable by `docker pull`** | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** — NEW 2026-08-05 | an operator ruling | **Nothing was deleted; this is a list, not an action.** The registry was queried directly: `felhom-controller` has **76** tags in Gitea vs **207** locally, `felhom-hub` **45** vs **107**. The **131 + 62 local-only tags are all OLD** — controller `0.39.0``0.135.0` plus `v0.35.0``v0.39.0`, hub `0.9.0``0.57.0` plus `v0.7.2``v0.13.0` — while everything from controller `0.136.0` and hub `0.58.0` upward IS in the registry and therefore re-pullable. **Size the prize honestly before spending a decision on it:** per-tag sizes sum to 139.29 GB, but that double-counts shared layers — `docker system df` puts the **real** dedup'd image footprint at **31.02 GB with 27.02 GB reclaimable**, i.e. an order of magnitude less than the build cache P3 already returned. `docker image prune -a` would remove 343 of 345 (only `redis:7-alpine` and `postgres:16-alpine` are held by running containers). **CC's view: not worth doing for the space** — it buys ~27 GB against 199 GB now free, and its only real benefit is dropping unrecoverable clutter | operator |
| **R-211** | **Prometheus has no config-reloader — a rules change reaches the pod and is never read** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-05** | — | Found while verifying R-205 rather than by looking for it. The `mon-system/prometheus` Deployment runs **one** container (`prom/prometheus:v3.12.0`) with **no `configmap-reload`/`prometheus-config-reloader` sidecar**. After the ArgoCD sync the updated `node-housekeeping-alerts.yml` was present **inside the pod** (`grep -c "and on(instance)"` → 3 on the mounted symlink) while the Prometheus **rules API still served the old expression** — for **4+ minutes**, with no error anywhere. It only took effect after an explicit `POST /-/reload`. **The consequence is general, not specific to R-205: every rule edit in this repo since the stack was built has silently not applied until something happened to restart the pod** — so "committed and synced" has never meant "in force", and ArgoCD reporting `Synced/Healthy` is true and beside the point. `--web.enable-lifecycle` IS already set, so the fix is small: add a reloader sidecar watching the ConfigMap, or a `checksum/config` pod annotation so a rules change rolls the pod. **Same class as the four *built-but-never-wired* seams** — the control exists, nothing walks it | CC |
## Why the TOP READY rows rank this way