docs(register): narrow R-332 — restart persistence is now proven live

The 0.215.0->0.216.0 redeploy replaced the container and the state file came
back with the previous version's changed_at, so the new container loaded the
pre-restart record rather than re-baselining. The verdict path itself, and the
already-alerted-disk restart case, remain unproven.

documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md

@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
 | **R-329** | **`app_start_failed` carries the IDENTICAL defect and was deliberately left alone.** `notifier.go` ~L546 emits severity `"warn"` for *„Telepített alkalmazás nem fut: %s"* — the same string that made R-328 undeliverable, so this event is also stored as `info` and emailed to nobody. It was NOT changed while fixing R-328 because it needs a decision first: **should a stopped app email the customer at all?** Flipping the string without answering that turns a silent event into a mail flood on a box where an app crash-loops. **Whoever changes it must check the hub side too** — a `customerMessages` entry and `DefaultEnabledEvents` membership decide who hears it, and the R-158/R-167 lesson is that routing a can't-act-on-it failure to a customer-enabled type is its own defect | **READY (XS code, the DECISION is the work) — NEW 2026-08-14** | a decision on whether `app_start_failed` should notify, and on which leg | Decide operator-only vs customer; then set the severity and the hub routing to match | Viktor |
 | **R-330** | **Disk health Phase 2 — the three SMART attributes the wire does not carry.** The failing drive's most telling counter was **187 `Reported_Uncorrect`**, sitting at normalized **1** against threshold **0** with a raw count of **1001** — one point from failing and structurally unable to get there. Also wanted: **199 `UDMA_CRC_Error_Count`** (cabling) and **188 `Command_Timeout`**. None are on the agent→controller wire today, so v0.215.0's ladder could not use them. Phase 2 also persists periodic SMART **samples** (the right home is `metrics.MetricsStore`, NOT the Phase-1 state file, which is one record per disk and must stay that way). **This is a declared WIRE change, so under the G-1 gate the hub must model the new fields in the SAME session** — that is precisely why it was kept out of Phase 1, where it would have turned a one-word severity fix into a three-repo change | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-14** | R-328 (closed) | Add 187/199/188 to the agent's `SmartSummary` + hub model in one session; then persist samples | CC |
 | **R-331** | **Disk health Phase 3 — growth-rate detection, and retiring the static 64.** The v0.215.0 count backstop (64 unreadable sectors → Hiba) is **a judgement from ONE drive**: the observed benign excursion peaked at 16 and cleared inside an hour, and the terminal run passed 64 at 13 Aug 11:28 and never came back. It is deliberately a backstop BEHIND the sustain rule, not the primary signal, but it is still a magic number tuned on a single sample and it will be wrong for some drive. With Phase 2's history the box can ask the question that actually matters — *is this count climbing, and how fast* — which distinguishes a drive with eight stable aging sectors from one adding forty a day, something no static threshold can do. Revisit 64 when that exists | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-14** | R-330 | Growth-rate rule over persisted samples; re-derive or delete the static 64 | CC |
-| **R-332** | **The new Hiba-from-counters path has never fired on real hardware.** v0.215.0's whole point is a verdict the product could not previously reach, and it is proven only against the committed fixture's values in unit tests (12 scenario groups, 11 of 12 red-proofs failing as required). The live validation on demo-hp proved the **negative** — three healthy disks still read Rendben across the deploy, no false alert — and the **severity wire** end to end, but no live disk has actually reached Hiba. **This is the honest gap and it must not be closed by pointing at the fixture tests**: the drive that produced the fixture is in DooPlex, which is Tier 2 and never a drill target, and the demo boxes are all-flash and healthy | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-14** | a real degrading disk, or an injection harness | **Closing condition:** a live disk reaching Hiba from counters, OR a deliberate injection through the REAL pipeline (agent `/disks` → controller check → hub event), not a hand-set verdict | CC |
+| **R-332** | **The new Hiba-from-counters path has never fired on real hardware.** v0.215.0's whole point is a verdict the product could not previously reach, and it is proven only against the committed fixture's values in unit tests (12 scenario groups, 11 of 12 red-proofs failing as required). The live validation on demo-hp proved the **negative** — three healthy disks still read Rendben across the deploy, no false alert — and the **severity wire** end to end, but no live disk has actually reached Hiba. **This is the honest gap and it must not be closed by pointing at the fixture tests**: the drive that produced the fixture is in DooPlex, which is Tier 2 and never a drill target, and the demo boxes are all-flash and healthy | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-14, NARROWED same day.** One item originally in this gap is now PROVEN LIVE: the **persisted state surviving a controller restart**. The v0.215.0→v0.216.0 redeploy destroyed and rebuilt the container, and the new one read back a `changed_at` written by the PREVIOUS version (`2026-08-14T07:23:14.640216851Z`, still intact at 09:31:35Z) instead of re-baselining — Scenario L on real hardware, not just the production-path unit test. **What remains unproven is the verdict itself, plus the stronger restart half: an already-ALERTED disk not re-alerting** | a real degrading disk, or an injection harness | **Closing condition:** a live disk reaching Hiba from counters, OR a deliberate injection through the REAL pipeline (agent `/disks` → controller check → hub event), not a hand-set verdict | CC |
 | **R-333** | **Two disk-health questions the deploy raised and did NOT act on.** **(a) The 55/60 °C bands are SPINNING-DISK bands applied to NVMe.** They were adopted unchanged from the operator's Prometheus config so the two systems cannot disagree — a deliberate, stated decision — but **measured on demo-hp 2026-08-14 the healthy Toshiba KXG50PNV1T02 NVMe idles at 53 °C, two degrees below Figyelmeztetés and seven below Hiba**, and NVMe routinely exceeds 60 °C under load with no fault whatever. As it stands a healthy customer NVMe under sustained write can be reported as **Hiba** — the single worst outcome this feature can produce. **(b) The agent runs bare `smartctl -a -j` with no `-n standby`** (`felhom-agent/internal/storage/hostops.go:368`), so every poll WAKES a spun-down drive; going 6h → hourly multiplies that by six. demo-hp is all-flash so the cadence measurement could not reveal it, and it was recorded rather than acted on per the task's own instruction. Mitigating datum from the fixture: the failing drive logged only **3375 load cycles in 60505 hours** (~one per 18h), i.e. that duty cycle barely spins down at all | **READY (S each) — NEW 2026-08-14** | — | (a) split the temperature bands by device class, or drop them for NVMe and rely on `critical_warning`; (b) add `-n standby` to the agent's smartctl invocation (an agent change, so fold it into R-330's session) | Viktor decides (a); CC does (b) |
 | **R-334** | **WAIVER + open item: controller v0.215.0 is released and deployed, and NO golden carries it.** Convicted by `golden_currency_gate.py` on the 2026-08-14 push: newest released controller **0.215.0**, newest golden bake **0.214.0** (`documentation/tests/golden-0.214.0-2026-08-12`). **A machine installed right now receives 0.214.0** — i.e. a brand-new box would ship WITHOUT the R-328 severity fix and would keep emailing nobody about a failing disk. The running fleet is unaffected (demo-hp guest 9201 is on 0.215.0 and healthy); this is purely the day-0 install path. **Not baked in this session deliberately:** the task scoped deployment to demo-hp only, and the second half of the fix — vouching the bake in the hub's day-0 artifact manifest — is **operator-password-gated, so CC cannot complete it**; a baked-but-unvouched golden is worse than none. **The push was made with `git push --no-verify` and it is stated here and in the session report**, per `.claude/rules/gates.md` — the gate has no waiver parser, so recording a waiver does not clear it | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-14** | operator availability for the vouch step | Bake a golden on 0.215.0 per `runbooks/RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.1, then vouch it — a THREE-field change (`golden_version` + `agent_version` + `min_agent`). Until then every NEW install lacks the severity fix | CC bakes; **Viktor vouches** |
 | **R-335** | **One physical disk was walked TWICE per run, and the second walk sustained it against itself.** Found on live hardware ~2h after the v0.215.0 deploy, **by noticing the release's own positive observable disagreed with its own persisted artefact**: the hourly check logged *"3 disk(s) evaluated"* while `disk-health-state.json` held **two** records. Cause: demo-hp's `c11-scratch` and `felhom-backup` are the same physical NVMe (`/dev/nvme0n1`) and resolve to the same `diskKey`. **Not cosmetic** — `RunDiskHealthCheck` writes a disk's new record before the next entry reads it, so the SECOND copy consumed the FIRST copy's write as its prior: the disk **sustained against itself and reached Hiba on a FIRST sighting**, defeating truth-table row 6 — the exact rule separating a one-hour benign excursion from a false critical — and would have emitted **two identical events** for one drive. **Latent, not active, on demo-hp** (all three entries healthy, zero counters), but any aliased disk developing a single pending sector would have gone straight to Hiba. **This is the shape standing rule 3 warns about: an absent alarm was not evidence — the two artefacts had to be read AGAINST each other** | **CLOSED — controller v0.216.0, 2026-08-14.** Each `diskKey` is evaluated once per run; both entries stay marked `seen` so neither looks like a disappeared disk, and the card still renders both storage rows (the dedup is about state and alerts, not display). Pinned by `TestDiskCheck_SameDiskTwiceIsEvaluatedOnce`; companion red-proof run and reverted — deleting the guard makes the first sighting emit `Kind:2` (Hiba-from-sectors) at 8 sectors | — | — | CC |