- OPEN-ITEMS: R-185 closed with the measurement, the corrected root cause (the installer's Scenario-F reuse arm, not PVE_STORAGES), and the live sequence. Records that demo-hp carried the same drift and was fixed too. - capability map: the whole-guest row's HOST-tier half was OPTIMISTIC and now says so — that tier was not merely unproven, it was unprovable on both demo boxes, and every live proof cited was on the offsite tier. - vzdump-target-move runbook: its item 5 predicted this; annotated (not rewritten) with what actually happened — the create arm did grant, the reuse arm did not, and it surfaced as a silent unreadable tier rather than the 403 the item expected, because vzdump writes through a root path. - CONTEXT: S-21 (an empty listing cannot distinguish forbidden from newborn; the measured trap that an ungranted path answers with INHERITED privileges) and S-22 (the Scenario-F arm must finish the job). - STATUS: rewritten for the operator, back to one screen.
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ State: `BLOCKED` · `READY` · `WAITING-ON-OPERATOR` · `WATCHING`. Every row ha
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| **R-95** | restic offsite credential **can delete** (`readonly=False`, `forget --prune` runs from the box); SFTP cannot express append-only | **READY** | — | Root exposure still open. Mitigation now ARMED — split prune off-box or move to REST `--append-only` | CC |
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| **R-86** | Restore-tests are interval-scheduled, not backup-aligned | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE 2026-08-03** (agent **v0.121.0**, hub **v0.91.0**) | — | **The rule that shipped:** *let A be the newest archive on a tier that has settled ≥24 h; the tier is DUE when A exists and A has not already been proven.* Daily tier → proved daily on yesterday's archive; weekly tier → weekly on its own; newborn → UNKNOWN. The daemon-start ticker survives only as the **evaluation interval**. **THE TRAP, recorded because it is the version a reasonable person writes:** the row's own wording implemented literally — *"due when the newest archive is ≥24 h old"* — is NEVER true on a **daily** tier, because a new archive resets the newest-archive age to zero long before it reaches the lag; it would have silently switched restore-testing OFF for the tier that matters most. Red-proved at **0 runs over 5 simulated days**. **The state now records WHICH archive was proven**, not when a tier last passed — a time cannot answer *have we proven this archive*. A pre-R-86 state file keeps its time (rotation ordering survives) and yields no proven archive, so each tier is due exactly once after the upgrade: the safe direction. **Two knobs replace one and the old one is not silently repurposed:** `restore_test_eval_interval_seconds` (6 h) and `restore_test_settle_seconds` (24 h); the deprecated `restore_test_cadence_seconds` keeps its DISABLE meaning verbatim, now seeds the settle lag, and the daemon WARNs once at start-up naming both. **6 h is bounded from both ends, not picked:** MEASURED cost of one evaluation on demo-felhom — local dir storage **18 ms**, PBS tier over the WAN to ep0 **392 ms**, both **430 ms** — so cost is irrelevant; the CEILING is that a FAILING tier stays due, making the evaluation interval its retry interval for a multi-GB restore. **Part 2 shipped WITH it and was not optional** — see the hub half in this row's sibling text and `07-backup-architecture.md` §3: `restoreProvenStaleAfter` was a flat 7 days derived from the very cadence this removed, and a healthy weekly tier's proof age reaches **exactly** 168 h against a 168 h window — it sat ON the line, so any ordinary delay tipped it into a nightly alarm about a working system. The window is now per tier from that tier's observed archive interval, ×4 generations, floored at the old 7 days and capped at 12 days (strictly inside the two-week offsite retention), falling back to the tier's DECLARED rhythm (26 h host / 8 d offsite — the backup-freshness checker's own thresholds) when history is too short to observe one. **A hollow test caught by its own red-proof:** the first Scenario-G fixture had no jitter and PASSED under the flat-window mutation, because a perfectly regular weekly tier sits exactly ON the line rather than over it. The jitter is what makes it a test. **Also fixed in passing:** the candidate picker now skips archives failing `archivePlausiblyComplete` (under per-archive due-ness an incomplete phantom would be picked forever, fail forever, never earn proof and leave the tier due at EVERY evaluation), and the due-check runs BEFORE the heavy-operation gate is taken (a frequent poll must not be able to make a starting backup record a failure — F-A1). **Live proof:** see `felhom-agent/REPORT.md` | CC |
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| **R-87** | The restic tier is never restore-tested | **READY — RE-RANKED UP 2026-08-03 (R-86 closed)** | — | Design a controller-side test (no scratch-guest analogue transfers). **Most of what this row needed now exists.** R-86 built the piece that was missing: a tier is proved **per archive generation**, on its own rhythm, with the proof recorded as *which archive* — which is exactly the shape a weekly-ish restic tier needs, and the reason this row could not simply reuse the whole-guest scheduler before. What remains is genuinely restic-specific and is NOT a scheduling problem: there is no scratch-guest analogue, so the test has to be a controller-side restore of a bounded sample into a throwaway path, with its own definition of "proved". **Two things to carry over rather than re-derive:** the proof must record the SNAPSHOT it proved (not a timestamp), and the hub's staleness window must learn this tier's rhythm the way `restoreProvenWindow` now does — a restic tier on a weekly cadence lands on the same false-alarm line the flat 7 days did. **And R-95 still applies:** that credential can delete, so a restic restore-test must never be able to write to the repo | CC |
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| **R-185** | **The agent cannot see the host backup tier's archives on demo-felhom — the PVE token has no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, so the content listing returns EMPTY where root sees three archives.** Found 2026-08-03 while live-validating R-86. `pveum acl list` grants `FelhomAgentStore` on `/storage/{local,local-lvm,felhom-pbs}` and **not** on `felhom-backup`, which is the box's actual `local_backup_target`. Verified three ways: `pvesh` as root lists 3 archives (6.1–6.3 GB, 08-01/02/03); the same endpoint with the agent's token returns `{"data":[]}`; and `local` — which HAS a grant — returns its archives through the same token | **OPEN — filed, not fixed** | — | **Pre-existing and independent of R-86** (it is a property of the ACL, and the R-85 rotation had the same blindness). **Consequences:** the host tier has never been restore-testable on that box, and R-85's *"an empty tier is skipped, not failed"* rule made that silent. **The part worth fixing is the silence, not only the grant:** a permission-blinded tier is today INDISTINGUISHABLE from a newborn one — both report *"no settled archive yet"* — which is this project's own absence-is-not-evidence rule failing in a new place. The agent already knows better: it RECORDS successful backups to that target, so *"I wrote archives here and the tier lists none"* is a contradiction it can detect and should say loudly. **Do not fix by widening the token blind:** decide whether the host-install ACL set should follow `local_backup_target` (it currently hardcodes `local`), which is where the drift began | CC |
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| **R-185** | **The agent cannot see the host backup tier's archives on demo-felhom — the PVE token has no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, so the content listing returns EMPTY where root sees three archives.** Found 2026-08-03 while live-validating R-86. `pveum acl list` grants `FelhomAgentStore` on `/storage/{local,local-lvm,felhom-pbs}` and **not** on `felhom-backup`, which is the box's actual `local_backup_target`. Verified three ways: `pvesh` as root lists 3 archives (6.1–6.3 GB, 08-01/02/03); the same endpoint with the agent's token returns `{"data":[]}`; and `local` — which HAS a grant — returns its archives through the same token | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE 2026-08-03** (agent **v0.123.0**, installer **1.24.0**) | — | **Pre-existing and independent of R-86** (it is a property of the ACL, and the R-85 rotation had the same blindness). **Consequences:** the host tier has never been restore-testable on that box, and R-85's *"an empty tier is skipped, not failed"* rule made that silent. **The part worth fixing is the silence, not only the grant:** a permission-blinded tier is today INDISTINGUISHABLE from a newborn one — both report *"no settled archive yet"* — which is this project's own absence-is-not-evidence rule failing in a new place. The agent already knows better: it RECORDS successful backups to that target, so *"I wrote archives here and the tier lists none"* is a contradiction it can detect and should say loudly. **Do not fix by widening the token blind:** decide whether the host-install ACL set should follow `local_backup_target` (it currently hardcodes `local`), which is where the drift began **BOTH HALVES FIXED, AND THE ROOT CAUSE WAS NOT WHERE IT LOOKED.** **(1) The silence.** `Client.Permissions` asks `GET /access/permissions?path=/storage/<target>` **as the agent's own token**, and one `capability.Status` per configured tier reports it — composed around the sudo prober the way the pool-read check already is, with the `Status` wire shape untouched so the hub's existing critical-degraded alert applies with **no hub change**. **MEASURED BEFORE IT WAS DESIGNED AGAINST, and the obvious reading is wrong:** an ungranted path answers neither empty nor 403 but with the privileges INHERITED from the box-wide `/` grant — `felhom-pbs` → `{Datastore.Allocate:1, Datastore.AllocateSpace:1}` vs `felhom-backup` → `{Sys.Audit:1, SDN.Use:1, Datastore.Audit:1}`. A probe asking *"is the path present?"* or *"does it have Datastore.Audit?"* would report the blinded storage HEALTHY; the probe tests `Datastore.AllocateSpace` and a red-proof pins that. The probed set comes from the box's own `BackupTiers()`, never a fixed list — a hardcoded probe list is the defect reproduced inside the fix. Critical (the hub alerts only on critical), **except** the `local` fallback target, which is reported but does not page: turning host-install's own documented DEGRADED configuration into an alert is how a signal becomes something an operator archives unread. It never looks at content, so it cannot alarm on a newborn tier by construction; it never reports ok when it could not ask. **(2) The installer.** The row and the task both assumed `PVE_STORAGES` was the culprit. It is not: `configure_backup_target`'s **Case A** arm creates the storage and grants in the same breath, so a box that builds its own target was always fine. The **Scenario-F** arm — *"the target already exists, leave it exactly as it is"* — returned **without granting**, which is why a box whose `felhom-backup` pre-dated the install (the vzdump-target-move runbook, or a reinstall) pointed `local_backup_target` at a storage its token could not read. That arm now ensures the ACL through the same guarded wrapper; the storage DEFINITION is still untouched, so Scenario F is unviolated, and `pveum acl modify` is idempotent. `$BACKUP_TARGET_ID` is deliberately still NOT in `PVE_STORAGES` — that list is granted in step 4/5, before the target is resolved in step 6, and `--acl-storages` entries are preflight-checked for existence. A **gate** now asserts every arm that resolves the target also grants on it (red-proved: *resolves in 2 place(s) but grants in only 1*). **LIVE, in order:** the three-way observation reproduced unchanged (root 3 archives / token `{"data":[]}` / `local` lists through the same token) → agent v0.123.0 deployed → **`capability DEGRADED … pve:store-grant:felhom-backup … lacks Datastore.AllocateSpace … INVISIBLE to the agent and it is never restore-tested`, critical=true**, and the hub raised `agent_capability_degraded` **and emailed the operator** → grant applied (user AND token) → the token lists **3 archives** → `ok=70 total=70 degraded=0` and the hub logged `degraded → ok (agent_capability_recovered)` → **the host tier is a due-check candidate for the first time on that box**, correctly picking the 08-02 archive because the 08-03 one has not settled 24 h. **demo-hp CARRIES THE SAME DRIFT Line truncated
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| **R-186** | **A released agent binary's sha256 cannot be reproduced from its tag.** `release-agent.sh` builds at step 3 and tags at step 4, so Go's VCS stamp records a PSEUDO-version (`v0.120.1-0.20260803130452-4d825910…`) in the published bytes, while any rebuild after the tag exists stamps `v0.121.0` — a different binary. Measured 2026-08-03 on v0.121.0: published `b2128f3c…` (14 081 336 B) vs rebuild-at-tag `8302e396…` (14 077 240 B), identical source, identical toolchain, 4 096 bytes apart | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + MEASURED 2026-08-03** (agent **v0.122.0**) | — | **Why it matters:** the sha the operator vouches is the one thing tying a machine to a binary, and today nobody can independently rebuild it to check. **The build order is deliberate** (the script's own comment: a tag with no package is caught by `check-published-versions.py`, a package with no tag is invisible to it), so the fix is not to swap the steps blind. Candidates: `-buildvcs=false` or `-trimpath` for a version-stable stamp, or tag-then-build with the tag deleted on a failed publish. **Mitigation used this session:** the DEPLOYED binary is the PUBLISHED artifact, downloaded from Gitea — not a local rebuild — so the running bytes are the vouchable ones **FIXED by removing the cause, not by sequencing around it.** `-buildvcs=false` drops the VCS stamp (nothing in the repo reads it — no `ReadBuildInfo` caller) and `-trimpath` removes absolute build paths, so the same source produces the same bytes whether or not the tag exists yet and regardless of checkout directory. **Measured before the change**, same source, same toolchain, one commit: default flags with no tag `18f4a495…` 14 085 464 B (mod `v0.121.2-0.2026…`) vs default flags tagged `4a38f394…` 14 085 440 B (mod `v0.121.99`) — different bytes; with the new flags, `7ffcdf1d…` 14 064 574 B **identical both ways**. **Measured after the change on the real release:** published `d5f294e5…` 14 076 649 B = rebuild-at-tag #1 = rebuild-at-tag #2, **all three identical**. **A second discrepancy fell out of it:** `publish-agent.sh`'s fallback build forced `CGO_ENABLED=0` and therefore produced a binary **74 KB smaller** (13 990 236 B vs 14 064 574 B) than the release path built for the same version — one version name, two binaries, decided by which entry point ran. Both paths now build identically, with a comment in each naming the other. **The operator can now check a published sha without being there:** the exact command is in `felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md`. | CC |
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| **R-187** | **R-115's one-command release had never actually run its publish leg — the first real use died there.** `scripts/publish-agent.sh` has been mode `0644` since it was created (2026-06-28), because every earlier caller invoked it as `bash scripts/publish-agent.sh`; `release-agent.sh` (written 2026-08-03) called it directly and got `Permission denied` on v0.121.0's release | **CLOSED — SHIPPED 2026-08-03** (`felhom-agent`) | — | **Fixed both ways in one commit:** the executable bit restored, and the caller changed to `bash "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/publish-agent.sh"` so the release no longer depends on a file mode — the kind of thing a checkout, an archive or a copy silently loses again. **The lesson is R-115's own, one level up:** the mechanism written to make a step unforgettable was itself never exercised end-to-end, so it failed the first time it mattered. A mechanism that has not been RUN is a note with better formatting | CC |
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| **R-188** | **Every agent release has a ~50 % chance of emailing the operator a CI failure for a release that is correct.** `on: [push]` fires the gates workflow on the **tag** push too, and `release-agent.sh` pushes the tag BEFORE publishing the package (deliberately — a tag with no package is caught by `check-published-versions.py`, a package with no tag is invisible to it). So CI can run the published-versions gate inside the seconds-long window where `v<ver>` exists and the package does not, and it correctly reports *"every released agent version must be INSTALLABLE"* — for a release that completes normally a moment later | **CLOSED — SHIPPED 2026-08-03** (agent **v0.122.0**) | — | **MEASURED, 2026-08-03, across two releases in one session:** v0.121.0 → runs #12 (id 79) **success** and #13 (id 81) **failure** on the same sha `4618169`; v0.121.1 → #17 (id 88) **failure** and #18 (id 89) **success** on the same sha `cd1b087`; and v0.121.0's second pair (#14/#15, `4d82591`) both **success** — i.e. it is a race, not a rule. Local gate afterwards: all three versions verify. **Why it matters more than it looks:** R-168 made CI email the operator on failure precisely so a red gate cannot be missed. A signal that cries wolf on every second correct release is how that mail becomes something you archive unread — the R-29 failure mode one layer up, and R-100's corollary in a new place (an alarm whose text is true but whose trigger is not the thing you would act on). **Fix shapes, cheapest first:** have the workflow skip tag refs (`if: !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')` — the commit push already covers the content, and the tag adds no new code); or make `check-published-versions.py` tolerate a tag younger than ~2 minutes; or publish before tagging, which the release script's own comment argues against. **Do not "fix" it by quieting the alarm** **FIXED by moving ONLY the tag push** (build → tag locally → publish → push tag). The tag is still created before anything is published, so the build and the tag still describe the same commit; it becomes VISIBLE — to CI, and to any `raw/tag/…` fetch — only once the package is downloadable. **The invariant the old order protected was not traded away:** `check-published-versions.py` now asserts the converse directly — *no published version may be missing its tag* — as a BOUNDED probe of the frontier (where a failed tag push leaves an orphan) and of patch gaps, printing its probe set on every run because a check whose coverage is invisible reads as a guarantee it is not making. The package listing api still answers **401** without a token (re-measured 2026-08-03), so absence still cannot be enumerated and the script says so. **Both directions demonstrated:** a real published-but-untagged fixture (0.121.2, published then deleted — HTTP 201 then 204, absence re-verified by a 404) made the gate FAIL and print the one-line recovery; removing the converse block made it pass over that same orphan. A tag with no package still fails, shown against a local stand-in rather than by pushing a probe tag — pushing one would have emailed the operator a TRUE alarm about a fixture, which is the same attention cost this row removes. **A half-done release is now loud:** publish-succeeded-then-push-failed dies naming the exact recovery command, and a FAILED publish removes the local-only tag so the release can simply be retried instead of colliding with step 2's re-release guard. **Scenario E, live:** v0.122.0's own release produced CI runs **21 (task id 96)** and **22 (task id 97)** on the same sha — **both green**, where the same shape produced one red run on each of the two previous releases. | CC |
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@@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ there is one ranking to maintain rather than two.
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proof that names its archive, and a staleness window that learns a tier's rhythm). What is left is
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restic-specific — there is no scratch-guest analogue — so it still needs its own design, but it is
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no longer waiting on a scheduling model that did not exist.
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5. **R-185** — the agent is blind to demo-felhom's host backup tier (a missing storage ACL), and the
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blindness reads exactly like a newborn tier. Small to fix, and the *silence* is the part worth
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fixing, not just the grant.
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5. ~~**R-185**~~ — **CLOSED 2026-08-03**, agent v0.123.0 + installer 1.24.0, proven live on both demo
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boxes. The silence was fixed as well as the grant: the box now asks whether it may READ each tier
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it depends on, because an empty listing cannot distinguish forbidden from newborn.
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6. ~~**R-189**~~ — **CLOSED 2026-08-03** with **R-188** and **R-186**, agent v0.122.0. The three
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reporting/release signals that misreported their own work are fixed; **R-185 is the one that
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remains open from that group** and is untouched by this — it is a missing storage ACL on
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