Part A proof (R-1045 narrowed): Plex setup gate on demo-hp 9201 — expired code, stranger gets only the gate (public + LAN), household passes, gate file removed with the app

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS

documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md

@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
 | **R-779** | Security & access | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Part A's "two outside addresses seen as two" is proven through the simulated tunnel only; on the REAL tunnel the second outside address (ep0, one request allowed) was refused by Cloudflare's edge with 403 and never reached the box.** Measured 2026-10-01 19:51 UTC (`audits/visitors-2026-10-01/A/L2-demo-hp-real-tunnel.txt`): no log line on demo-hp; demo-hp's box has no geo restriction in its settings, so a Cloudflare ZONE rule (country or bot, not read) refused a German datacenter address. DooPlex's own address on the real tunnel was seen as itself. **Needs:** one sign-in from a second Hungarian address (the operator's phone off wifi) while DooPlex is locked out — 2 minutes; and say which Cloudflare rule refused ep0. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (a phone), CC reads the logs** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a proof gap on the real tunnel; operator-only follow-up.** | — | — | CC + operator |
 | **R-904** | Security & access | P4 | **Cloudflare can read every household's app traffic; replacing it with our own relay is a later item.** Facts (reviewer discussion 2026-10-08; `01`): app traffic and the dashboard reach the box through the Cloudflare Tunnel (`01` §5 trust table, rows end-user ↔ apps and customer ↔ controller UI; §7), and the tunnel's public end is Cloudflare's edge, where TLS ends — so Cloudflare can technically read that traffic (the FAQ says so since 2026-10-08, R-900; „TLS ends at the edge" is not written in `01` — add it there). What Cloudflare gives today, free: inbound reach with no router setup, the CGNAT answer (`01` §4, §7); certificates (`01` §7, the free tier covers one level below a zone); the geo-WAF the hub enforces (`01` §5 last row, §7); flood protection (not in `01`). The alternative named: our own EU relay over WireGuard with TLS passthrough by SNI, certificates on the box, the geo-block on the relay. Its costs: one more machine the operator keeps up, and a single point of reach for every box; weaker flood protection; about a week of work after a spike. Operator ruling 2026-10-08 09:07 (`09` §3 decision 184): a later item. | **DEFERRED** — **2026-10-10: the asked sentence is in `01` §7** („TLS ends at Cloudflare's edge …”); the spike stays deferred. **DEFERRED — after the first customers (operator ruling 2026-10-08 09:07)** | — | A spike after the first customers (the relay's reach, cost and flood behaviour, measured) | operator |
 | **R-1040** | Security & access | P4 | **Until the household makes Sonarr's or Radarr's first admin, any container on the box can read the app's API key.** Measured on the bench 2026-10-14 with the R-1030 seed in place: `AuthenticationRequired=Enabled`, `AuthenticationMethod=None` — `/initialize.json` from another container answers 200 with `apiKey`. Outsiders are blocked by the box's setup gate in that window; a compromised other app is not. | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-14 | — | Seed the API key at install (`SONARR__AUTH__APIKEY`, measured to work) so the box knows it, and close the window by telling the household in the first steps; or seed a Forms user | CC |
-| **R-1045** | Security & access | P2 | **An unclaimed Plex answers everything without a token to a private address — and through the tunnel every request comes from one.** MEASURED 2026-10-14 night on a throwaway `plex-k6` on Tester 1 (`audits/media-drive-events-2026-10-14/``K6-1-unclaimed-plex.txt`): with no claim, `/library/sections`, `/:/prefs` and `/myplex/account` answer 200 with NO token from the Docker network. Through cloudflared, Plex sees cloudflared's private address, so a publicly routed unclaimed Plex would be open to anyone — server settings and every library. R-1028's late code leaves exactly such a server. NOT measured over the public path (the throwaway had no route). Harm if true: a household's media and Plex settings open to the internet. | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-14 night | — | Measure on a throwaway with a public route on a Tier-0 box (P1 if it holds); the build: no public route until `PlexOnlineToken` is set | CC |
+| **R-1045** | Security & access | P2 | **An unclaimed Plex answers everything without a token to a private address — and through the tunnel every request comes from one.** MEASURED 2026-10-14 night on a throwaway `plex-k6` on Tester 1 (`audits/media-drive-events-2026-10-14/``K6-1-unclaimed-plex.txt`): with no claim, `/library/sections`, `/:/prefs` and `/myplex/account` answer 200 with NO token from the Docker network. Through cloudflared, Plex sees cloudflared's private address, so a publicly routed unclaimed Plex would be open to anyone — server settings and every library. R-1028's late code leaves exactly such a server. NOT measured over the public path (the throwaway had no route). Harm if true: a household's media and Plex settings open to the internet. **NARROWED 2026-10-15 (Part A, `audits/media-build-2026-10-15/A-plex-gate/`):** the live catalog's Plex has `setup_gate: true` (app-catalog `9a23ee5`). Proven on demo-hp 9201 with an EXPIRED claim code: the server came up unclaimed and open on the docker network (`/library/sections`, `/:/prefs` 200 with no token), while a stranger over the public path got only the gate (HTML → 302 to the dashboard's `/__gate/start`; `/identity`, `/library/sections`, `/:/prefs` → 401 „waiting for its first setup”), the same on the LAN path; the household passed with its dashboard session and reached Plex. Removing the app removed the gate file 9 s later (the tick). **Left open:** the gate opens on the household's „Kész, beállítottam” even while Plex is still unclaimed (no probe: Plex answers XML to the probe's request) — closed by R-1028's build (the controller claims and opens on a real claim). | **NARROWED** — the public path is closed by the gate; the „Kész” button on an unclaimed server is the rest | R-1028 | With R-1028: the gate opens only when Plex reports `claimed` (the controller asks with `Accept: application/json`) | CC |
 | **R-1050** | Security & access | P4 | **Raise HSTS to one year on or after 2026-11-15, if no https trouble was reported.** `09` §3 decision 249 (D2 = A, operator 2026-10-15): HSTS stays `max-age=86400` now; after a month with no https trouble it becomes one year (`31536000`); never preload, never `includeSubDomains`. The value is `HSTSMaxAgeSeconds` in `felhom-controller/controller/internal/infra/infra.go`, pinned by `TestRenderForwardedHeaders_HTTPSOnly`. „Trouble” = any report of a name that will not open, or a box answering http after the floor. | **WATCHING** — filed 2026-10-15 | the date | On or after 2026-11-15: read the register and the operator's mail for https trouble since 2026-10-15; none → a controller release with one year (test updated), bake → vouch → floor | CC |
 
 ## Box system & updates — 11 rows (P2 1, P3 7, P4 3)