R-239 CLOSED (golden 0.205.0 vouched); R-241 ruling into the map and STATUS
gates / gates (push) Successful in 14s

R-239: the operator approved the vouch this session. golden_version
0.203.0 -> 0.205.0 (+ derived sha); agent_version and min_agent both stayed
0.127.0, because the new golden's MinAgent is also 0.127.0 - so in the event
it was a ONE-field change, not three. wrapper_sha256 was carried through
explicitly: the handler reads it from the form and CLEARS it when omitted.
Verified from the stored hub_settings (WAL-aware copy), not from the flash.
The R-120 gate passed exactly - the newest controller the fleet reports is
0.205.0, so a 0.204.0 golden would have been refused.

R-241: the capability map's recovery-journey row and STATUS carry the spike's
ruling - a MINTING defect, not a screen-predicate defect. The row stays FAIL:
delivery is not a journey, and R-241 is diagnosed, not fixed.

R-242 and R-243 surfaced in STATUS in plain language.
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@@ -28,9 +28,29 @@ beautifully, with nobody touching anything — hands the machine a fresh key. Ho
machine think it no longer needs rescuing. It is the same mistake the system already fixed once, one machine think it no longer needs rescuing. It is the same mistake the system already fixed once, one
level higher up. *(R-241)* level higher up. *(R-241)*
**And separately: today's machines do not yet have last week's fixes.** A machine installed tonight **7 August — we asked which of two things was actually wrong, and the answer changes the repair.** The
still gets the older in-house service, so two defects we fixed and closed are still live for a new obvious reading was that the screen's rule was too narrow. It was not. **The screen was telling the
customer. The code is right; it has not been packaged and approved yet. *(R-239)* truth**: there really was nothing openable with the key the machine was holding — because the machine
had *made that key itself*, on top of the sealed package we were already keeping for it. Three things
now measured rather than argued: the part that makes the key asks only *"is there a file here?"*,
while the two neighbouring pieces of code both check first whether we are holding a package; the
machine had that knowledge **half an hour before** it made the key, and it was the very reason the
repair ran at all; and **the machine worked out the problem itself**, wrote *"the sealed package does
not cover the current key"* into its own log thirty-five minutes before the household looked, and then
threw the answer away. **So mending the screen would have hidden a machine quietly making its own
backups unopenable.** No code was written — this was a question, and it is now answered. *(R-241)*
**Two things we did not go looking for.** A machine in this state also **stops making off-site backups
altogether, and nothing raises an alarm** — three separate safety nets each correctly decide it is not
their business *(R-243)*. And the obvious repair has a trap: a household that has already said *"I do
not want the old data"* would be asked again, forever, unless we record that they decided.
**And separately: today's machines now DO get last week's fixes — approved 7 August.** The newer
in-house service is packaged and approved, so a machine installed from now on gets both fixes a new
customer was still missing last night. Existing machines are untouched, and the approval can be undone
by re-selecting the previous one. *(R-239 — closed)* **The gap that let it happen is not closed**: a
release that changes what a customer sees is still not *delivered* until it is packaged, and nothing
checks that. *(R-242 — recorded, not built)*
## What's broken ## What's broken
@@ -44,11 +64,9 @@ customer. The code is right; it has not been packaged and approved yet. *(R-239)
their new app. It did not, and the restore refused minutes later. The button now says plainly that their new app. It did not, and the restore refused minutes later. The button now says plainly that
it did not start anything. it did not start anything.
- **A machine installed today still gets the older in-house service, so it cannot open a recovery - **~~A machine installed today still gets the older in-house service~~ — RESOLVED 7 August.** The
package until you approve the newer one.** It is no longer *lied to* — it says plainly that the newer service is packaged and approved, so a newly installed machine now gets it without anyone
machine cannot do this yet — but **approving the new service is one click from you**, and until then touching the machine. *(R-216, R-223, R-224, R-239)*
such a machine also gets the cautious "we do not know why" wording rather than the helpful one.
*(R-216, R-223, R-224)*
- **Three things a rebuilt machine still cannot do by itself.** Its owner cannot re-attach their own - **Three things a rebuilt machine still cannot do by itself.** Its owner cannot re-attach their own
drives, so no app can be put back on its data; it cannot create a new recovery code at all; and the drives, so no app can be put back on its data; it cannot create a new recovery code at all; and the
screen at the machine itself never stops showing a stale pairing code. Each is understood, measured screen at the machine itself never stops showing a stale pairing code. Each is understood, measured
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