hub v0.111.1: the alarm stops promising a rescue that does not exist, and the arc is closed for beta
gates / gates (push) Successful in 17s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 17s
R-434 CLOSED — and the row's own "blocked on R-433" verdict was wrong, which is the point.
The fix is a DELETION, not a replacement: withdraw the promise instead of swapping it for a
new one, and the sentence is true under every possible answer to the provider questions, so
it never needs a second rewrite. A replacement would have been blocked; a withdrawal is not.
was: "...still hold the older copy, so this is recoverable file-by-file; it is NOT
confirmed data loss. Check whether a deletion ran on the box before restoring."
now: "...still hold the older copy. The route back out of them is not yet established,
so treat this as neither confirmed data loss nor confirmed recovery. Get in touch
before restoring anything, and check whether a deletion ran on the box."
It must not swing the other way either: "your backups are gone" is still usually false.
Clause (a) — the box cannot WRITE into the snapshot area — stands and is re-confirmed.
Tests: offsite_r434_test.go, three, all driving the production path so they assert the
sentence an operator RECEIVES. ASCII-only fragments, positive and negative controls.
RED-PROOF: restoring the v0.111.0 sentence failed all three, on every fragment, with the
offending sentence printed. TestR431_FiresOnAMassDeletion asserted "NOT confirmed data
loss" and caught this fix correctly; its wording fragment is REMOVED rather than updated,
so the wording keeps ONE home.
R-435 written into the detector's own documentation, no threshold changed: it sees a mass
deletion, not one app being wiped (69 across 9 apps -> ~35 needed, one tag is ~9, and
forget --prune groups by host,tags). Says explicitly not to lower the numbers.
THE STOPPING LINE, in all three places — register, 07 section 8 head, STATUS.md.
Deferred set ENUMERATED, not described: 07 section 8 rows 4, 8, 9, 10, 11 (+11b), 12,
each tagged [BETA-DEFERRED]. A number in the brief was wrong and is corrected in place:
six rows are DEFERRED, ELEVEN carry a blank RTO (4,5,8,9,10,11,11b,12,13,14,15); the other
five are blank for reasons that are not deferred work, and row 15 is an open DEFECT (R-104)
that the stopping line does NOT cover. NO STATUS MOVED — nothing was proven today.
Two provider questions drafted, not sent, no API called (11-D stands):
documentation/runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md, linked from R-95 and R-433, and
tracked by a dated DUE-CHECKS row (2026-09-15) — the 2026-07-27 check that sat unconfirmed
for 36 days is the scar that block exists for.
R-95, R-433 BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER. R-95's one-day demotion on a clause that did not hold is
recorded; the proposal to rank it back near the top is stated and NOT acted on. R-430 marked
LATENT with its trigger: it becomes live the moment delete is withdrawn, so it is a
precondition on the R-95 build, not a follow-up. The stale ranking paragraph ("armed",
"zero snapshots") is corrected in place, order unchanged.
Register 621 -> 688 lines; 181 rows throughout; open-state 170 -> 169.
No controller or agent change. No golden owed, no floor change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM
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@@ -7,6 +7,66 @@ a non-overwritten `REPORT-<topic>.md` sibling instead (`CLAUDE.md:82-87`), of wh
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State: `BLOCKED` · `READY` · `WAITING-ON-OPERATOR` · `WATCHING`. Every row has an owner.
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## DECIDED — the backup and restore arc is CLOSED FOR BETA (2026-09-01)
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**Written in the voice this file uses for a settled decision: what was decided, and the condition
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that reopens it.** It exists because nobody ever said the arc was finished, and an arc nobody closed
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gets picked up again in a month by someone who reads the blanks in `07` §8 as unfinished work.
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**CLOSED FOR BETA at controller v0.232.0 / hub v0.111.1 (2026-09-01).**
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**What is finished, and proven live:** everything a customer does for themselves — losing files,
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losing an app's data, losing a whole app, losing a drive. The restore states what it returned,
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refuses without room, cannot be fed a part-copy, and puts the customer's own data back if it fails.
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The second drive's copy is a route. A poorer copy cannot delete a richer one. The off-site store is
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verified weekly at full depth and proved nightly to still contain something.
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**Rows 1, 2, 3, 3b, 3c, 6, 7 and 14 of `07` §8 — every one PROVEN.**
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**What is deliberately deferred until after beta — `[BETA-DEFERRED]`, and these are the row numbers,
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not a description:**
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| `07` §8 row | the failure | status today |
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|---|---|---|
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| **4** | primary drive dies — the drive-loss **journey** (the route is proven; no disk has ever died under it) | `PARTIAL` |
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| **8** | host dies, drives intact — a host rebuilt as itself | `IMPLEMENTED`, never executed |
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| **9** | whole box lost (fire/theft) | `IMPLEMENTED / UNPROVEN` |
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| **10** | ransomware / malicious deletion — a ransomware-shaped recovery | `PARTIAL` |
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| **11** (and **11b**) | hub lost — a hub restore | `UNPROVEN`; it has never been performed |
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| **12** | off-site provider lost (Hetzner) | `[FACT]` only |
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**These are real, they are recorded, and none of them is a beta blocker.** Every one is invocable by
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the operator, not the customer; every one needs hardware, a provider, or a destructive rehearsal that
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beta does not.
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**A NUMBER IN THE BRIEF FOR THIS SECTION WAS WRONG AND IS CORRECTED HERE.** It said *"six rows of §8
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still have no measured time"*. **Six rows are DEFERRED; ELEVEN rows carry a blank RTO** — counted, not
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estimated: 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 11b, 12, 13, 14, 15. The other five are blank for reasons that are not
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deferred work, and collapsing them into one number is how a blank stops meaning anything:
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* **row 5** — `PROVEN` by construction; the secondary is a derived copy, so there is no recovery to time.
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* **row 13** — `NONE for host-loss` **by design**; R exists in zero system copies, so there is no route.
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* **row 14** — `PROVEN`; the break-glass route works and has simply never been stopwatched.
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* **row 15** — an **open DEFECT** (R-104, the stale-lock path), not a deferred recovery. **It is NOT
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inside this stopping line** and must not be read as parked by it.
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* **row 11b** — a consequences note attached to row 11, not a recovery row of its own.
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**What is NOT deferred and stays open:** **R-95** and **R-433**, both `BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER` behind
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`documentation/runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md`; **R-435**, documentation only; and
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**R-104**, row 15's defect. The alarm text (**R-434**) was fixed the same day and is closed.
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**THIS REOPENS IF:** a customer-facing recovery path is found broken; **or** Hetzner's answers change
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what the snapshots are worth (either answer in Part 3's file can do it — "full restore only" makes
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row 10 urgent, "append-only enforced" makes R-95's root cause cheap to remove); **or** a real
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customer's data is at stake in one of the deferred rows.
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**THE MARKER.** Every deferred row carries the literal string **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** in `07` §8, so
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`grep -n '\[BETA-DEFERRED\]' documentation/architecture/07-backup-architecture.md` returns the set
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as a group. **It returns EIGHT lines, not seven** — the seven tagged rows plus the one line in §8's
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own header that defines the marker. That is stated rather than hidden, because a count that does not
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match what the reader sees is how an instrument stops being believed (R-421). It is a marker, not a status — the status cells are unchanged, because
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**nothing was proven on the day this line was drawn** and a stopping line that moves a status is a
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stopping line that lies.
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## Operator rulings — 2026-08-04
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Recorded here because a ruling that lives only in a conversation binds nobody (the R-96 standing rule).
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@@ -224,7 +284,7 @@ unconditional promise, which CAMPAIGN-11 §7 step 7 measured the customer-facing
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| **E-2d** | **Prove E-2 on a fresh VM** — a real `felhom-host-install.sh` 1.22.0 run, Case B naturally, a claimable customer, then add a drive (the offer) and unplug it (`backup_target_absent` end-to-end) | **CLOSED — PARTIALLY PROVEN** (2026-07-29) | — | **C1, C2 proven** (`audits/E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29.md`); **C3, C4 proven live** (`audits/SESSION-C-2026-07-29.md`); **C5 FAILED → R-116** — the gate fires and an alarm reaches the hub, but it is the generic event, so the alarm and its recovery cannot be paired. **R-116 is the single named open leg**; per the Session-C runbook §9, decided in advance, a failed claim closes the item as partially proven rather than triggering a re-run. Both audits carry the full record — the `local-lvm` fence, the ISO/PAIRING derivation, the Phase 0 answers, the per-claim observables and the teardown evidence — and are the place to read it, not this cell. **The arc's actual definition of done is R-106 + R-109, R-108 and D5**, none of which this detour touched | CC |
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| **R-121** | **A BOX's installed agent can sit releases behind the vouched one and nothing notices — the R-120 gate does not cover it.** demo-hp ran agent **0.113.0** while the hub vouched **0.116.0**, through the whole R-116/R-117 arc, and no signal existed on any channel | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-07-30** | — | **Fourth instance of the drift family** (R-111 golden's agent 17 releases behind, R-115 built+deployed but never published, R-120 golden a controller behind — and now installed-vs-vouched on a live box). **Confirmed at source that R-120's gate cannot catch it:** `hub/internal/web/configs.go:1165-1169` compares `goldenVer` against `store.NewestReportedControllerVersion()` — it is a **golden-artifact vs fleet-CONTROLLER** check and says nothing about the agent installed on a box. **`MinAgent` does not cover it either:** it is used to HOLD the controller floor for a box whose agent is too old (`hub/internal/api/handler.go:530-538`, `store.go:1857`) — protective, not an alarm — and demo-hp's 0.113.0 **equalled** `min_agent` 0.113.0, so even a floor comparison was satisfied. **The cost, measured:** R-117's whole subject is the R-113 conjunction, which landed in **0.114.0** — so the designated drill host could not exercise the code under investigation at all, and the R-117 spike had to route every predicate result through an out-of-repo probe built from `main` instead of the installed agent (`audits/SPIKE-r117-bind-liveness-2026-07-30.md` §1, §2.3). Discovered because the R-117 task made bringing the box current an explicit prerequisite. **Fix shape (not implemented):** the hub already receives `AgentVersion` on every host report, and already has semver comparison in Go — the missing piece is a checker comparing reported agent vs the **vouched** agent and surfacing it, operator-tier. Note the honest tension: a box legitimately lags between publish and deploy, so this wants a staleness window rather than an instant alarm | CC |
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| **R-118** | **An absent drive's union row advertises the ROOT filesystem's capacity as its own.** In the absent-state payload the registry-union row reports `total_bytes: 49675956224 / used_bytes: 4584579072` — **byte-identical to the `local` row** (`durable_id: path:/var/lib/vz`, i.e. `pve-root`) in the same response. The real drive is **4 GB** | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-07-30** | — | Cause: `statfsCapacity(d.MountPath)` (`disks.go:335-338`) statfs's `/mnt/cel`, which with the device gone is a **bare directory on the root filesystem**. `observe.go:176-183`'s comment warns about exactly this trap and guards the Observe path ("*an unmounted removable dir-storage's mountpoint reverts to a bare directory on root … catastrophic DR mis-id*"); **the union path has no equivalent guard.** **Not a DR mis-id** — `durable_id` on that row is still the correct `uuid:…`, so re-attach identity is safe. It is a **false capacity** reaching every consumer of `total_bytes`/`used_fraction` (fill monitors, storage cards): a detached 4 GB drive advertises 46 GiB at 9.2 % used. Same class as `role.go:180-181` — an absent drive's fields decaying to the root filesystem's. Evidence: `audits/DIAG-r116-disks-payload-2026-07-30.md` §12 | CC |
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| **R-95** | restic offsite credential **can delete** (`readonly=False`, `forget --prune` runs from the box); SFTP cannot express append-only | **READY** | — | Root exposure still open. Mitigation now ARMED — split prune off-box or move to REST `--append-only` | CC **SPIKE 2026-09-01 — `audits/SPIKE-r95-offsite-delete-2026-09-01.md`. THE WORD "ARMED" ABOVE IS NOT SUPPORTED AND IS WITHDRAWN PENDING R-429:** no `.snapshots` is visible to either box's sub-account (measured, both machines, with controls), so the seven-day bound is unverified and unverifiable from the product side. **Q3 (documented, `hub/internal/hetznerapi/hetznerapi.go:38-45`): the sub-account API has ONE permission axis, `readonly` — there is no append-only, so the PBS shape does NOT transfer** (PBS is a server that can refuse; a Storage Box is a filesystem that runs nothing). **Q5 (measured): withdrawing delete does NOT wedge the store** — restic treats a dead owner's lock as stale and proceeds — so the constraint everyone feared is not the blocker; but `unlock --remove-all` lies about success (R-430), and the crash-lock window is UNKNOWN. **Q6 (measured): restic 0.14.0 DOES speak `rest:`** (control: `banana:` → invalid backend), and append-only is a rest-server flag, not a restic one — reachable, but it needs a machine in the recovery path and ep0 is protected. **Q7 (measured): detection is nearly free** — `snapshot_count` already reaches the hub and the hub APPENDS reports, so the comparison needs no box change. **RECOMMENDATION: answer R-429 first (Viktor, ten minutes), then build detection, then move retention off the box; defer the transport change.** Two `forget --prune` sites must be disarmed together — `offbox.go:1388` AND `offbox.go:1759` — or R-191 repeats. **RE-SCOPED 2026-09-01 — THE STORY WAS WORSE THAN THE TRUTH FOR TWO MONTHS.** The box can delete its own LIVE repository, **but it cannot write to the daily snapshots of it** — MEASURED, not cited: a write into `/.zfs/snapshot` is refused on both boxes while the same write to the account home succeeds (R-432). Seven daily snapshots are confirmed in the panel (R-429). **So a deletion costs at most the data written since the last daily snapshot, and the rest is recoverable — file by file, one customer at a time, with no effect on anyone else** (vendor: *"You can download individual files or entire directories as usual"*; *"It is not possible to write to the `/.zfs` directory or its subfolder"*). **NOT open-ended loss.** Two caveats kept honest: a panel-driven snapshot restore rolls back the WHOLE Storage Box and deletes newer snapshots, which is why the per-file route matters; and per-file recovery is **operator-only today** (R-432). **DETECTION SHIPPED hub v0.111.0 (R-431)** — an unexplained fall is noticed within a day. **THE RANKING IS VIKTOR'S:** this has been #1 since July on the old story. On the new facts I would rank it below the items that can still lose data outright, but I am not re-ranking it myself. `audits/SPIKE-r95-offsite-delete-2026-09-01.md` **DRILL 2026-09-01, LATER THE SAME DAY — THE RE-SCOPE'S SECOND HALF IS WITHDRAWN.** The drill that was to walk the recovery found there is no route to walk: **no snapshot is reachable from a sub-account by ANY name** (R-433) — 777,600 exact names in the vendor format over nine days, zero hits, with a passing control, plus the structural reason (`/home` st_dev 0,82 vs `/.zfs/snapshot` st_dev 0,276, and `/home/.zfs` absent). **Clause (a) stands: the box can delete the live repo and cannot write into the snapshot area.** Clause (b) — *"the rest is recoverable file by file"* — is NOT SUPPORTED. **The drill was STOPPED before its destructive phase on the operator's ruling**, because with no recovery route the deletion would have destroyed real history to buy only an alarm test that could not fire at the specified size (R-435). Nothing was deleted; the store is verified untouched at 69 snapshots. **So the comfort that lowered this row rested on an unwalked route, and the route does not exist.** Two new leads decide what happens next: **R-433** (can the MAIN account see them? nobody here holds that credential) and **R-436** (`rclone serve restic --stdio` is offered server-side and restic speaks `rclone:` — measured — which could make real prevention cheap, IF the provider pins `--append-only`). **The rank stays Viktor's. Plainly: the argument that moved this row down is the argument the drill removed.** `audits/evidence-drill-r95-recovery-2026-09-01/` |
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| **R-95** | restic offsite credential **can delete** (`readonly=False`, `forget --prune` runs from the box); SFTP cannot express append-only | **READY** | — | Root exposure still open. Mitigation now ARMED — split prune off-box or move to REST `--append-only` | CC **SPIKE 2026-09-01 — `audits/SPIKE-r95-offsite-delete-2026-09-01.md`. THE WORD "ARMED" ABOVE IS NOT SUPPORTED AND IS WITHDRAWN PENDING R-429:** no `.snapshots` is visible to either box's sub-account (measured, both machines, with controls), so the seven-day bound is unverified and unverifiable from the product side. **Q3 (documented, `hub/internal/hetznerapi/hetznerapi.go:38-45`): the sub-account API has ONE permission axis, `readonly` — there is no append-only, so the PBS shape does NOT transfer** (PBS is a server that can refuse; a Storage Box is a filesystem that runs nothing). **Q5 (measured): withdrawing delete does NOT wedge the store** — restic treats a dead owner's lock as stale and proceeds — so the constraint everyone feared is not the blocker; but `unlock --remove-all` lies about success (R-430), and the crash-lock window is UNKNOWN. **Q6 (measured): restic 0.14.0 DOES speak `rest:`** (control: `banana:` → invalid backend), and append-only is a rest-server flag, not a restic one — reachable, but it needs a machine in the recovery path and ep0 is protected. **Q7 (measured): detection is nearly free** — `snapshot_count` already reaches the hub and the hub APPENDS reports, so the comparison needs no box change. **RECOMMENDATION: answer R-429 first (Viktor, ten minutes), then build detection, then move retention off the box; defer the transport change.** Two `forget --prune` sites must be disarmed together — `offbox.go:1388` AND `offbox.go:1759` — or R-191 repeats. **RE-SCOPED 2026-09-01 — THE STORY WAS WORSE THAN THE TRUTH FOR TWO MONTHS.** The box can delete its own LIVE repository, **but it cannot write to the daily snapshots of it** — MEASURED, not cited: a write into `/.zfs/snapshot` is refused on both boxes while the same write to the account home succeeds (R-432). Seven daily snapshots are confirmed in the panel (R-429). **So a deletion costs at most the data written since the last daily snapshot, and the rest is recoverable — file by file, one customer at a time, with no effect on anyone else** (vendor: *"You can download individual files or entire directories as usual"*; *"It is not possible to write to the `/.zfs` directory or its subfolder"*). **NOT open-ended loss.** Two caveats kept honest: a panel-driven snapshot restore rolls back the WHOLE Storage Box and deletes newer snapshots, which is why the per-file route matters; and per-file recovery is **operator-only today** (R-432). **DETECTION SHIPPED hub v0.111.0 (R-431)** — an unexplained fall is noticed within a day. **THE RANKING IS VIKTOR'S:** this has been #1 since July on the old story. On the new facts I would rank it below the items that can still lose data outright, but I am not re-ranking it myself. `audits/SPIKE-r95-offsite-delete-2026-09-01.md` **DRILL 2026-09-01, LATER THE SAME DAY — THE RE-SCOPE'S SECOND HALF IS WITHDRAWN.** The drill that was to walk the recovery found there is no route to walk: **no snapshot is reachable from a sub-account by ANY name** (R-433) — 777,600 exact names in the vendor format over nine days, zero hits, with a passing control, plus the structural reason (`/home` st_dev 0,82 vs `/.zfs/snapshot` st_dev 0,276, and `/home/.zfs` absent). **Clause (a) stands: the box can delete the live repo and cannot write into the snapshot area.** Clause (b) — *"the rest is recoverable file by file"* — is NOT SUPPORTED. **The drill was STOPPED before its destructive phase on the operator's ruling**, because with no recovery route the deletion would have destroyed real history to buy only an alarm test that could not fire at the specified size (R-435). Nothing was deleted; the store is verified untouched at 69 snapshots. **So the comfort that lowered this row rested on an unwalked route, and the route does not exist.** Two new leads decide what happens next: **R-433** (can the MAIN account see them? nobody here holds that credential) and **R-436** (`rclone serve restic --stdio` is offered server-side and restic speaks `rclone:` — measured — which could make real prevention cheap, IF the provider pins `--append-only`). **The rank stays Viktor's. Plainly: the argument that moved this row down is the argument the drill removed.** `audits/evidence-drill-r95-recovery-2026-09-01/` **BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER 2026-09-01, and the record of the demotion is kept deliberately: this row spent ONE DAY demoted on a clause that did not hold.** It was re-scoped down on the morning of 2026-09-01 on the strength of *"recoverable file by file"*, and that clause was measured false the same afternoon (R-433). **On today's evidence it belongs back near the top — that is a proposal, not an action; CC has not re-ranked it and will not.** Line truncated
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| **R-191** | **Every weekly offsite backup UPLOADS successfully and then FAILS the job on a prune the box is deliberately not allowed to do — on both demo boxes.** Measured on demo-felhom 2026-08-04 06:49–06:53: the upload completed (223 s, 629 MiB of 1.874 GiB, **67.2 % reused incrementally**), then `ERROR: prune 'ct/9201': proxmox-backup-client failed: Error: permission check failed - missing Datastore.Modify\|Datastore.Prune on /datastore/felhom-offsite/demo-felhom` → `ERROR: Backup of VM 9201 failed - error pruning backups` → `TASK ERROR: job errors`. The hub raised `whole_guest_backup_failed` | **CLOSED — SHIPPED 2026-08-04** (installer **1.25.0**; both live boxes corrected) | — | **This is R-89's rule not reaching the config.** R-89 moved PBS pruning SERVER-SIDE — *"boxes set `keep_last: 0`, ep0 runs prune jobs; box tokens stay write-only, never widen the grant"*. The token behaves exactly as designed: it refuses. But **both** demo boxes still arm the offsite tier with `keep_last=2 prune_pbs_allowed=true` (`backup_targets: [{target_id: felhom-pbs, cadence_seconds: 604800, keep_last: 2}]`), so every run asks for a prune that must fail. **The data is SAFE and that is why this is not a P1:** the snapshot lands before the prune is attempted; what is wrong is the job's VERDICT and the weekly operator e-mail it produces. **But it is corrosive in the specific way this project keeps finding:** a backup that reports FAILED while succeeding trains the operator to discount `whole_guest_backup_failed`, which is the same alert that would carry a real one — and it is exactly the failure the R-100 corollary warns about, an alarm whose text is true and whose trigger is not the thing you would act on. **Fix is one config line per box** (`keep_last: 0` on the PBS tier) plus whatever writes it on a fresh install; **deliberately NOT applied in this session** — the session was a runbook with an explicit "change nothing, and if a change appears necessary, stop and report" rule, and a retention field on a live backup tier is not a change to slip into an observation run. **Check before fixing:** whether ep0's prune jobs actually cover these two namespaces, or the snapshots simply accumulate once the box stops asking **THE GATE WAS RUN FIRST, AND IT MATTERED.** Before disabling anything, ep0 was read (read-only, Tier 2): prune jobs `prune-demo-felhom` and `prune-demo-hp` exist on datastore `felhom-offsite`, one per namespace, `schedule 03:30`, `keep-last 2`, comment *"R-82 retention keep-last=2, server-side (box tokens are write-only)"* — and they have run **every day since 2026-07-27: 18 tasks, all `status=OK`**. The newest task log reads `retention options: --ns demo-felhom --max-depth 0 --keep-last 2` / `keep ct/9201/2026-07-27…` / `keep ct/9201/2026-07-28…` / `TASK OK`. Retention happens, and it happens there. **A METHODOLOGICAL WARNING WORTH MORE THAN THE FIX.** Three separate queries said the OPPOSITE — *no prune jobs have ever run* — and **all three were broken instruments**: `worker-type` where the field is `worker_type`; the value `prune` where the worker type is `prunejob`; and `journalctl -u proxmox-backup` where the unit is `proxmox-backup-proxy`. A fourth reading (3 snapshots under keep-last 2) was mis-framed by CC and self-corrected — the third snapshot had landed AFTER that day's 03:30 window. Acting on any of them would have disabled the only pruning ATTEMPT while reporting that nothing prunes: a weekly false alarm traded for unbounded growth on the protected endpoint, invisible for months. **The gate is what caught it, and only because it demanded evidence rather than a verdict.** **Shipped:** installer **1.25.0** writes `keep_last: 0` on the offsite tier (the agent's existing guard `allowPBSPrune = !primary && keep_last > 0` already reads that as *never prune from the box* — no agent change), the justifying paragraph is rewritten to say where retention lives and cite R-89, and `hostinstall_gates.py` asserts it (red-proved: pinning `keep_last: 2` back fails the gate). **Both live boxes corrected in their own config** — `backup tier armed target=felhom-pbs … keep_last=0 … prune_pbs_allowed=false` on demo-felhom and demo-hp, with the local tier untouched at `keep_last=3`. Served over HTTPS at `1.25.0` with `"keep_last":0` in the served bytes. **STILL TO OBSERVE:** the next weekly offsite run completing OK end-to-end. The change removes the failing step; the *schedule* proving it is next week's event, and this row should carry that line when it happens. | CC |
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| **R-194** | **PVE's permission cache delays every grant-state verdict by an unknown amount, so "the agent can read it" and "the ACL exists" are not the same measurement.** Observed twice while validating R-190's self-repair on demo-felhom 2026-08-04: both ACL rows for `/storage/felhom-backup` were deleted, and `GET /access/permissions` continued to report `Datastore.AllocateSpace` present — for **~40 s** in one run and **~16 minutes** in another. During that window the capability probe reads healthy and the self-repair does not fire | **OPEN** | — | **Why it matters beyond the delay:** it puts a floor under how fast a lost grant can be noticed, it makes any single permission read a lagging indicator, and — the interesting part — **it is a candidate contributor to R-190's own timeline**: a grant removed at an unknown moment could keep working until a cache expiry, which is exactly the shape of *worked at 04:44, refused at 09:24*. That does not explain what removed it, but it may explain when the refusal SURFACED, and the two have been treated as the same instant. **Not a defect in our code** — it is PVE behaviour, and the mitigation already tolerates it (the repair fires on the next probe after the cache clears). **What is worth deciding:** whether the store-grant probe should ALSO consult the storage content listing as a second signal, since that appeared to reflect the loss immediately (`{"data":[]}` while the permission read still said present) — two signals disagreeing is itself information, and today only one of them is read | CC |
|
||||
| **R-200** | **The DR password-injection seam has a handler, a route and tests — and no form.** `POST /backup/offbox/inject-password` is routed (`controller/internal/web/server.go:510`) to `offboxInjectPasswordHandler` (`offbox_handlers.go:174-196`) → `InjectOffboxPassword` (`backup/offbox.go:541`). **No template in the repository contains that path or any form posting to it** (grep over `internal/web/templates/`: one unrelated hit, an XSS comment) | **PLUMBING COMPLETE** (controller **v0.196.0**); **the FORM is not built — still open** | — | **The tenth instance of this project's built-but-never-wired class, and the exact shape `CLAUDE.md` and `felhom.eu/CLAUDE.md`'s seam-wiring rule were written for:** handler tests that POST directly (`offbox_escrow_test.go:167,180`) prove nothing about reachability. To use the only implemented recovery seam today, a person must hand-craft an authenticated POST with a session cookie and CSRF token. **Note the layering while fixing it:** this form takes a **64-hex repo password**, not a recovery code (`offboxRepoPwPattern`, `offbox.go:543`) — they are different secrets at different layers, and the operator's 2026-08-04 ruling asks for a form that takes **R**. Build the R form and treat this one as the operator/DR fallback it was written as, but **ship it with a render test per branch of whatever gate it sits behind**. Source: `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3 link 9 **THE DIAGNOSTIC HALF IS DONE AND IT ANSWERED THE QUESTION.** `--recover-offsite-check` is a `docker exec` escape hatch in the shape of `--print-reset-code`: R on **STDIN** (never argv, never `ps`, never shell history, never a transcript), fetch+unseal via the agent, and a verdict of **two sha256 hashes**. **It compares and never installs** — the recovered password is not written to `offbox/repo_password`; a test asserts the data dir is byte-unchanged and its red-proof (adding the install call) fails it. Confirmed live: `repo_password` mtime still `2026-08-03 07:18:02` after the successful check at `2026-08-04 11:49`. **Exit codes are load-bearing** — `0` match, `2` a clean MISMATCH, `1` a step failed; "it failed" and "it worked and disagreed" must never share a status because only one is a finding about the system. A box with no local password reports distinctly (the rebuilt-box shape, where the next step is to INSTALL rather than compare). **WHAT IS NOT BUILT, deliberately:** no card, no form, no preview, no customer-facing text — building an interface on top of a chain nobody had walked is how the preceding three weeks went wrong. **What remains for this row:** link 9 (the recovered password placed so `WriteOffboxSecrets` keeps it) and the customer-facing shape the operator ruled on 2026-08-04 (yell → R form → preview → proceed), which is now priced against a chain that exists rather than one that is assumed **PART 0 SHIPPED 2026-08-04 (v0.196.0):** `--recover-offsite-install` is the sibling of the check — same fetch/unseal path, same STDIN discipline for R — and it **places** the recovered password via `InjectOffboxPassword`. The confirmation is a SECOND invocation (`--confirm-install`): without it, both hashes print and nothing is written, so the operator sees the comparison before a write is possible. Three outcomes named distinctly: **installed** (no local password — the rebuilt-box shape), **unchanged** (identical key, nothing written), **refused** (a DIFFERENT key present — installing would clobber the key the current repository is encrypted under; exit 2, no force offered). It re-reads the file after writing rather than trusting the call. **Red-proof observed:** removing the confirmation gate makes the dry run write the password. The R-persistence test carries a **positive control** (a planted copy found, then removed and not found). **NOT YET EXERCISED AGAINST A LIVE RECOVERY** — the R-201 drill halted before step 9, so this is unit-proven only. **What remains for this row:** the customer-facing shape the operator ruled on 2026-08-04 (yell → recovery-code form → preview → proceed) | CC |
|
||||
@@ -445,9 +505,15 @@ This covers the next few only — it is deliberately **not** a full ordering of
|
||||
there is one ranking to maintain rather than two.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **R-95** — the largest *data* exposure: the tier holding the customer's documents and photos is the
|
||||
one whose credential can delete. The snapshot mitigation is now **armed** (daily 00:00, keep 7),
|
||||
but it has taken zero snapshots so far and it does not touch the root cause — the box can still
|
||||
`forget --prune` its own repo.
|
||||
one whose credential can delete. **THIS PARAGRAPH WAS STALE UNTIL 2026-09-01 AND ITS OLD TEXT IS
|
||||
NAMED SO THE CORRECTION IS NOT MISTAKEN FOR A RE-RANK.** It said the snapshot mitigation was
|
||||
*"armed (daily 00:00, keep 7), but it has taken zero snapshots so far"*. **Both halves were wrong:**
|
||||
seven daily snapshots do exist (R-429), and the word "armed" was withdrawn by the spike that same
|
||||
day. **What is true now:** the snapshots exist and the box cannot write into them, but **no account
|
||||
we hold can read anything out of one** (R-433, measured — 777,600 names, zero hits, controlled), so
|
||||
they do not yet bound this exposure. The root cause is untouched either way — the box can still
|
||||
`forget --prune` its own repo, from two call sites. **The ORDER of this list is unchanged and is
|
||||
Viktor's**; only the facts under item 1 were corrected.
|
||||
2. **R-94** — **de-ranked 2026-07-29.** The prior rationale ("until it moves every hub-driven
|
||||
install gets the pre-R-82 default") was false: the constant selects no script and every install
|
||||
already fetches 1.22.0. What remains is a wrong label plus two pieces of dead safety equipment —
|
||||
@@ -602,11 +668,11 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
|
||||
| **R-426** | **The decoy-coverage exemption list — 20 registered gates that ship WITHOUT a decoy test, each named.** `scripts/decoy_coverage_gate.py`'s `EXEMPT` map is debt, and this row owns it so it lives in the register and not only in a Python literal. **Four kinds:** (a) genuinely covered in the 2026-09-01 sweep but not yet moved into a suite — `hub-copy`, `instructions`, `docker-v`, `image-pins`; (b) blocked by an open hole and therefore un-assertable as rejecting — `site` (R-423), `one-register` (R-424), `offbox-rename` (R-425); (c) shared scripts whose decoy lives in `felhom.eu` and is counted there — `reuse-refs`, `instructions`, `observations` in the controller and agent runners; (d) **no plausible decoy constructed yet** — `hostinstall`, `wire-contract`, `due-checks`, `published`, `image-resolvable`, `volume-persistence`. Group (d) is the honest unknown: six gates whose soundness is UNTESTED, not established. **The list is green today and shrinks; a NEW gate with no decoy fails immediately.** | **OPEN — 20 names; group (d) is six untested gates** |
|
||||
| **R-427** | **`closed_register_gate.py` checks ONE direction only: an open word in a CLOSED row. The mirror — a CLOSED verdict on a row still sitting in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` — is unchecked, and there are TWELVE.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 during the decoy sweep, by reading the leading verdict of every open row with the gate's own predicate: **R-385, R-387, R-341, R-378, R-405, R-88a, R-88b** read unambiguously closed; **R-123, R-190, R-352** read `PARTLY CLOSED` / `MITIGATION SHIPPED` and almost certainly belong where they are. **The rows were NOT moved by this session** — telling a finished row from a partly-finished one is a judgement, and R-378 is itself the record of what happens when a machine makes that judgement on a substring (six still-open rows moved out of the register). **This is R-405's finding mirrored:** that row exists because R-87 sat in the CLOSED file while its state read READY, and the gate written for it looks only the way it was bitten. Fix: the same leading-verdict predicate applied to `OPEN-ITEMS.md`, reporting rather than convicting until the twelve are adjudicated by a person — a gate registered while twelve rows fail it would refuse every push. | **OPEN — 12 rows named; the adjudication is Viktor's, the gate is mine** |
|
||||
| **R-428** | **The decoy-coverage gate — written to catch instruments that match a NAME instead of a fact — identified a repository by its DIRECTORY NAME.** MEASURED on its own first CI run (felhom.eu job 490, 2026-09-01): `os.path.basename(root)` looked up in a `RUNNERS` map, and Gitea's act-runner checks the repo out into a directory called `hostexecutor`, so the gate reported *"unknown repo 'hostexecutor'"* and went INCONCLUSIVE. **The gate that hunts label-matching was matching a label, in the first ten lines of its own main loop, and it shipped that way.** FIXED the same day: it now identifies a repo by which registered runner FILE exists under the root, which is a fact. **Recorded rather than quietly patched because it is the strongest evidence in the sweep that this class is not a matter of carelessness** — it was written by a session that had spent the morning reading 29 gates for exactly this, with the four shapes on screen. Verified under a renamed directory before and after. | **CLOSED 2026-09-01 — fixed, and kept as the class's best example** |
|
||||
| **R-430** | **`restic unlock --remove-all` printed `successfully removed locks` while the lock was still there.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 in a throwaway local repo (no live store touched), under a faithful append-only model — a sticky locks directory owned by root holding a root-owned lock, restic run as `nobody`; both controls passed first (create allowed, delete refused). The command reported success, returned, and `ls` showed the lock present. **`resticStep`'s crash-lock self-heal is built directly on this call** (`felhom-controller/controller/internal/backup/offbox.go:~768`), and its licence to escalate rests on the escalation actually working. **A self-heal that cannot fail is a self-heal that cannot be trusted** — this is this project's *"exit codes that lie"* class, in the one path that runs unattended against the customer's off-site history. It is harmless TODAY because the credential can delete and the removal really happens; it becomes load-bearing the moment delete is withdrawn, which is what R-95 is about. **Not yet established:** whether restic reports success because it removed zero locks by design, or because it did not check. Settling it: read restic 0.14.0's unlock source, or re-run with `--verbose`. | **OPEN — precondition on any R-95 build** |
|
||||
| **R-430** | **`restic unlock --remove-all` printed `successfully removed locks` while the lock was still there.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 in a throwaway local repo (no live store touched), under a faithful append-only model — a sticky locks directory owned by root holding a root-owned lock, restic run as `nobody`; both controls passed first (create allowed, delete refused). The command reported success, returned, and `ls` showed the lock present. **`resticStep`'s crash-lock self-heal is built directly on this call** (`felhom-controller/controller/internal/backup/offbox.go:~768`), and its licence to escalate rests on the escalation actually working. **A self-heal that cannot fail is a self-heal that cannot be trusted** — this is this project's *"exit codes that lie"* class, in the one path that runs unattended against the customer's off-site history. It is harmless TODAY because the credential can delete and the removal really happens; it becomes load-bearing the moment delete is withdrawn, which is what R-95 is about. **Not yet established:** whether restic reports success because it removed zero locks by design, or because it did not check. Settling it: read restic 0.14.0's unlock source, or re-run with `--verbose`. **MARKED LATENT 2026-09-01.** It is **harmless today** and the reason is precise: the credential CAN delete, so the removal really happens and the success it reports is accidentally true. **THE CONDITION THAT MAKES IT LIVE — the only one, so it is stated as a trigger and not as prose: the moment delete is withdrawn from the box.** That is exactly what R-95's remedy does, by either route (retention moved off-box, or an append-only transport via R-436). From that moment `resticStep`'s crash-lock self-heal is escalating with a call that cannot fail, in the one path that runs unattended against the customer's off-site history. **So this is a PRECONDITION on the R-95 build, not a follow-up to it** — settle it in the same change or the self-heal ships already broken. | **OPEN — LATENT; becomes live the moment delete is withdrawn (precondition on any R-95 build)** |
|
||||
| **R-432** | **A customer's own sub-account can REACH the snapshot door and is REFUSED writes to it — but sees it EMPTY, so per-file recovery is not product-reachable.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 on BOTH live boxes, over the credential each already holds, with a positive and a negative control in the same run. **What is now PROVEN rather than cited:** `/.zfs` lists (`shares`, `snapshot`) from inside the jail; a write into `/.zfs/snapshot` is **REFUSED** — `dest open …: Failure` — while the identical write to the account home **succeeds** and was cleaned up. **That is the append-only property, measured, and it is the sentence the whole R-95 re-scope rests on.** **What is NOT available:** `/.zfs/snapshot` lists **empty** (link count 2) on both boxes, while the same Storage Box demonstrably holds seven snapshots — `storage-box-pool-1` IS `u629488` (`RUNBOOK-ep0-datastore-volume-2026-07-27.md:386`), the box these sub-accounts live on. So the contents are filtered from a sub-account. **CONSEQUENCE: recovery from a snapshot is an OPERATOR act in a browser, not something the product can drive** — which decides whether R-95's remedy can ever be customer-facing. **Cheapest next step, and it is Viktor's:** read one snapshot's name from the panel; a single `ls /.zfs/snapshot/<name>` from a box then settles whether a named snapshot can be entered even though the directory does not list (ZFS allows exactly that). If it can, per-file recovery becomes product-reachable and this closes cheaply. **ANSWERED 2026-09-01 (DRILL, `audits/evidence-drill-r95-recovery-2026-09-01/`) — NO, AND THE PANEL READ IS NOT NEEDED.** The named-entry hypothesis was tested exhaustively and fails: **777,600 exact names** in the vendor-documented format `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS` (nine full days, second granularity) plus 126 alternative shapes, **zero hits**, with a control proving the identical batch shape returns a path that does exist (6/6). **And there is a structural reason:** `df` reports `u629488-sub3` mounted on `/home` at **st_dev 0,82** while `/.zfs/snapshot` is **st_dev 0,276** — a different filesystem — and `/home/.zfs` does not exist. A ZFS snapshot under `/.zfs/snapshot` belongs to the dataset owning that `.zfs`, not to the child at `/home`, so a correctly-named snapshot there **could not contain `felhom-repo`**. Three tools agree with controls in the same run (SFTP, the port-23 shell, `rsync --list-only`). The empty listing is not a display toggle hiding a reachable tree — from a sub-account there is no tree. **CONSEQUENCE: per-file recovery is not "operator-only", it is unreachable from the box entirely** → R-433. | **ANSWERED 2026-09-01 — negatively; the panel-read next step is WITHDRAWN as unnecessary** |
|
||||
| **R-433** | **A sub-account cannot reach ANY Storage Box snapshot, by any name — so clause (b) of the 2026-09-01 R-95 re-scope ("the rest is recoverable file by file") is NOT SUPPORTED.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 on `demo-hp` over the credential the box already holds, read-only, no delete verb issued. **The sweep:** a batched `stat -c %n` over Hetzner's port-23 restricted shell (500–600 paths per round trip, stdout carrying only paths that exist) tried **777,600** names of the vendor form `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS` across nine full days at second granularity, and 126 alternative shapes — **zero resolved.** **The control is what makes the zero mean anything:** the identical 600-name batch with one real path appended returned it in 6 of 6 batches. **The structural cause:** `/home` (the customer data, `u629488-sub3`) is **st_dev 0,82**; `/.zfs/snapshot` is **st_dev 0,276**; `/home/.zfs` does not exist. A snapshot under `/.zfs/snapshot` belongs to a different dataset than the one holding `felhom-repo`. **What still stands:** clause (a) — the box can delete its live repository but cannot WRITE into `/.zfs/snapshot` — is unchanged and re-confirmed. **What is now open again:** the only routes to the older copy are a panel rollback of the WHOLE Storage Box (deletes newer snapshots, hits every customer on it) and the provider API (fenced by §11-D, and `hub/internal/hetznerapi/hetznerapi.go` has **no snapshot method at all**, so it needs new code regardless). **NOT ESTABLISHED, and it is the question that decides whether per-file recovery exists for anyone:** whether the MAIN account can see the snapshots. No main-account credential exists in this project. **The ranking is Viktor's; I am not re-ranking R-95 — but the argument that moved it down is the argument this drill removed.** `audits/evidence-drill-r95-recovery-2026-09-01/` | **OPEN — decides R-95's remedy and its rank** |
|
||||
| **R-434** | **The snapshot-drop alarm promises a recovery that cannot be performed.** `hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go` `emitSnapshotDrop` ships this text, live in hub **v0.111.0**: *"The daily Storage Box snapshots are read-only and still hold the older copy, **so this is recoverable file-by-file**; it is NOT confirmed data loss."* The first clause is true. The second is not reachable: not by the product (R-433), and not by the operator without a browser and a main-account credential that does not exist here. Its own comment states the intent — *"THE MESSAGE MUST NOT SAY THE DATA IS LOST, because after the 2026-09-01 measurement that is usually false"* — and the measurement it rests on was superseded the same day. **This is this project's own corollary landing on the alarm shipped that morning:** when a verdict changes which fact it counts from, the alarm text has to change with it, or the operator acts on a promise nobody can keep. **Fix is text-only and must not be made before R-433 settles what IS true** — an alarm rewritten twice in a week is worse than one rewritten once. | **OPEN — text-only, blocked on R-433** |
|
||||
| **R-435** | **The snapshot-drop detector is blind to a single-app deletion — the exact shape the box can produce.** `snapshotDropFraction = 0.5` and `snapshotDropFloor = 5` (`hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go`) require a fall of MORE than half the previous count. demo-hp's baseline is **69** across 9 apps, so ~35 snapshots must go before it speaks; **one app's tag is ~9 and is invisible.** `offbox.go:1388` runs `forget --prune` **grouped by host,tags** — a per-tag wipe is precisely the shape a faulty retention or a targeted deletion produces. **This is deliberate, not accidental:** the constant's own comment argues the insensitivity, and *"a detector that cries wolf is switched off within a fortnight"* is a lesson this project paid for. **So this row is NOT a demand to lower the threshold.** It is a demand that the blind spot be written where the operator reads it, because "an unexplained fall is noticed within a day" (R-431, and `STATUS.md`) is true only of falls above half. **Discovered by arithmetic while planning the drill's Phase 2/3 pairing, which could not have worked:** Phase 2 deletes one app and Phase 3 expects the alarm to fire. | **OPEN — documentation, not a threshold change** |
|
||||
| **R-433** | **A sub-account cannot reach ANY Storage Box snapshot, by any name — so clause (b) of the 2026-09-01 R-95 re-scope ("the rest is recoverable file by file") is NOT SUPPORTED.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 on `demo-hp` over the credential the box already holds, read-only, no delete verb issued. **The sweep:** a batched `stat -c %n` over Hetzner's port-23 restricted shell (500–600 paths per round trip, stdout carrying only paths that exist) tried **777,600** names of the vendor form `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS` across nine full days at second granularity, and 126 alternative shapes — **zero resolved.** **The control is what makes the zero mean anything:** the identical 600-name batch with one real path appended returned it in 6 of 6 batches. **The structural cause:** `/home` (the customer data, `u629488-sub3`) is **st_dev 0,82**; `/.zfs/snapshot` is **st_dev 0,276**; `/home/.zfs` does not exist. A snapshot under `/.zfs/snapshot` belongs to a different dataset than the one holding `felhom-repo`. **What still stands:** clause (a) — the box can delete its live repository but cannot WRITE into `/.zfs/snapshot` — is unchanged and re-confirmed. **What is now open again:** the only routes to the older copy are a panel rollback of the WHOLE Storage Box (deletes newer snapshots, hits every customer on it) and the provider API (fenced by §11-D, and `hub/internal/hetznerapi/hetznerapi.go` has **no snapshot method at all**, so it needs new code regardless). **NOT ESTABLISHED, and it is the question that decides whether per-file recovery exists for anyone:** whether the MAIN account can see the snapshots. No main-account credential exists in this project. **The ranking is Viktor's; I am not re-ranking R-95 — but the argument that moved it down is the argument this drill removed.** `audits/evidence-drill-r95-recovery-2026-09-01/` **BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER 2026-09-01.** The one question that can move this is drafted and ready to send: **Question 1** of `documentation/runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md` — *can the MAIN account retrieve individual files from a snapshot, without a whole-box restore?* **Neither answer leaves this row where it is:** "yes" makes per-file recovery real but permanently operator-only, and closes this; "no, full restore only" means the snapshots do not bound a single customer's exposure at all, because using them costs every other customer on the box their newer snapshots — **and R-95 becomes urgent.** Nothing here can progress without it, and it is not CC's to send (§11-D). Tracked by a dated check in the DUE-CHECKS block. | **BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER — Question 1 of `runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md`** |
|
||||
| **R-434** | **The snapshot-drop alarm promises a recovery that cannot be performed.** `hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go` `emitSnapshotDrop` ships this text, live in hub **v0.111.0**: *"The daily Storage Box snapshots are read-only and still hold the older copy, **so this is recoverable file-by-file**; it is NOT confirmed data loss."* The first clause is true. The second is not reachable: not by the product (R-433), and not by the operator without a browser and a main-account credential that does not exist here. Its own comment states the intent — *"THE MESSAGE MUST NOT SAY THE DATA IS LOST, because after the 2026-09-01 measurement that is usually false"* — and the measurement it rests on was superseded the same day. **This is this project's own corollary landing on the alarm shipped that morning:** when a verdict changes which fact it counts from, the alarm text has to change with it, or the operator acts on a promise nobody can keep. **Fix is text-only and must not be made before R-433 settles what IS true** — an alarm rewritten twice in a week is worse than one rewritten once. **✅ CLOSED 2026-09-01, hub v0.111.1 — AND THE BLOCK ABOVE WAS WRONG, WHICH IS THE POINT WORTH KEEPING.** This row said the fix had to wait for R-433 to establish what IS true. **It did not, because the fix is a DELETION and not a REPLACEMENT.** The promise was withdrawn rather than swapped for a new one: *"The daily Storage Box snapshots are read-only and still hold the older copy. The route back out of them is not yet established, so treat this as neither confirmed data loss nor confirmed recovery. Get in touch before restoring anything, and check whether a deletion ran on the box."* **That sentence is true under EVERY possible answer to the provider questions, so it never needs a second rewrite** — which is the whole reason it was not blocked. A replacement would have been. **Three tests in `hub/internal/monitor/offsite_r434_test.go`**, all driving the production path so they assert the sentence an operator RECEIVES: the withdrawal is present, the promise is absent in three shapes, `confirmed data loss` may appear only inside its negation, and the stored row must not drift from the delivered mail. **RED-PROOF: restoring the v0.111.0 sentence failed all three**, on every fragment, with the offending sentence printed. **One existing test was edited and it had caught this fix correctly** — `TestR431_FiresOnAMassDeletion` asserted `"NOT confirmed data loss"`; the fragment was REMOVED rather than updated so the wording keeps ONE home. | **CLOSED 2026-09-01 — hub v0.111.1; the "blocked on R-433" verdict above was mine and it was wrong** |
|
||||
| **R-435** | **The snapshot-drop detector is blind to a single-app deletion — the exact shape the box can produce.** `snapshotDropFraction = 0.5` and `snapshotDropFloor = 5` (`hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go`) require a fall of MORE than half the previous count. demo-hp's baseline is **69** across 9 apps, so ~35 snapshots must go before it speaks; **one app's tag is ~9 and is invisible.** `offbox.go:1388` runs `forget --prune` **grouped by host,tags** — a per-tag wipe is precisely the shape a faulty retention or a targeted deletion produces. **This is deliberate, not accidental:** the constant's own comment argues the insensitivity, and *"a detector that cries wolf is switched off within a fortnight"* is a lesson this project paid for. **So this row is NOT a demand to lower the threshold.** It is a demand that the blind spot be written where the operator reads it, because "an unexplained fall is noticed within a day" (R-431, and `STATUS.md`) is true only of falls above half. **Discovered by arithmetic while planning the drill's Phase 2/3 pairing, which could not have worked:** Phase 2 deletes one app and Phase 3 expects the alarm to fire. **LIMITATION NOW WRITTEN INTO THE ALARM'S OWN DOCUMENTATION, hub v0.111.1** — the comment above `snapshotDropFraction` in `hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go` now states what the detector does NOT see, with the demo-hp arithmetic and the `forget --prune` grouping that makes the blind spot sit on the most likely single-app failure. **It also says explicitly that the numbers must NOT be lowered to "fix" this** and that per-app detection needs a SECOND signal keyed on the per-tag count. **The row stays OPEN because documenting a blind spot is not covering it** — and because `STATUS.md` and R-431 both still say "noticed within a day", which is true only of falls above half. | **OPEN — documented in code v0.111.1; the coverage gap itself is unclosed** |
|
||||
| **R-436** | **LEAD, NOT A DEFECT — append-only may be reachable without a new machine, which would make R-95's real prevention far cheaper than the spike concluded.** Hetzner's port-23 restricted shell advertises, in its own `help`, these server-side backends: `borg`, `rsync`, `scp`, `sftp`, **`rclone serve restic --stdio`**. And restic 0.14.0 **recognises the `rclone:` backend** — MEASURED 2026-09-01 with a control: `banana:` → `Fatal: parsing repository location failed: invalid backend`, while `rclone:` → `exec: "rclone": executable file not found in $PATH` (i.e. the backend parsed and it tried to run the helper). rclone is **not** in the controller image today. `rclone serve restic` carries an **`--append-only`** flag. **Why this matters:** the R-95 spike's option 3 was priced at a new always-on service in the recovery path plus either a mount in the hot path or migrating every customer's history — and it was deferred on that price. This route needs neither: the server side already runs at the provider. **THE CAVEAT, STATED FIRST because it may kill the idea:** the **client** supplies the server command line, so a compromised guest could simply omit `--append-only` unless the provider pins it. **NOT ESTABLISHED:** whether Hetzner pins the flag or accepts client-supplied arguments. **That is a vendor question and it is cheap** — it should be asked before any code is written, because if the answer is "client-supplied" this lead is worth nothing. | **OPEN — ask the vendor before building anything** |
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- DUE-CHECKS-BEGIN — machine-readable. Parsed by scripts/due_checks_gate.py.
|
||||
@@ -617,4 +683,5 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
|
||||
the R-row. Duplicating them here would create the second source this design avoids. -->
|
||||
| item | due (UTC) | what to measure |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| R-433 | 2026-09-15 | Have Hetzner answered `runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md`? Record BOTH answers in R-433 and R-436, or re-date this row with the reason. The 2026-07-27 snapshot check sat unconfirmed for 36 days because it was never entered here — that is the scar this row exists to avoid repeating. |
|
||||
<!-- DUE-CHECKS-END -->
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user