hub v0.111.1: the alarm stops promising a rescue that does not exist, and the arc is closed for beta
gates / gates (push) Successful in 17s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 17s
R-434 CLOSED — and the row's own "blocked on R-433" verdict was wrong, which is the point.
The fix is a DELETION, not a replacement: withdraw the promise instead of swapping it for a
new one, and the sentence is true under every possible answer to the provider questions, so
it never needs a second rewrite. A replacement would have been blocked; a withdrawal is not.
was: "...still hold the older copy, so this is recoverable file-by-file; it is NOT
confirmed data loss. Check whether a deletion ran on the box before restoring."
now: "...still hold the older copy. The route back out of them is not yet established,
so treat this as neither confirmed data loss nor confirmed recovery. Get in touch
before restoring anything, and check whether a deletion ran on the box."
It must not swing the other way either: "your backups are gone" is still usually false.
Clause (a) — the box cannot WRITE into the snapshot area — stands and is re-confirmed.
Tests: offsite_r434_test.go, three, all driving the production path so they assert the
sentence an operator RECEIVES. ASCII-only fragments, positive and negative controls.
RED-PROOF: restoring the v0.111.0 sentence failed all three, on every fragment, with the
offending sentence printed. TestR431_FiresOnAMassDeletion asserted "NOT confirmed data
loss" and caught this fix correctly; its wording fragment is REMOVED rather than updated,
so the wording keeps ONE home.
R-435 written into the detector's own documentation, no threshold changed: it sees a mass
deletion, not one app being wiped (69 across 9 apps -> ~35 needed, one tag is ~9, and
forget --prune groups by host,tags). Says explicitly not to lower the numbers.
THE STOPPING LINE, in all three places — register, 07 section 8 head, STATUS.md.
Deferred set ENUMERATED, not described: 07 section 8 rows 4, 8, 9, 10, 11 (+11b), 12,
each tagged [BETA-DEFERRED]. A number in the brief was wrong and is corrected in place:
six rows are DEFERRED, ELEVEN carry a blank RTO (4,5,8,9,10,11,11b,12,13,14,15); the other
five are blank for reasons that are not deferred work, and row 15 is an open DEFECT (R-104)
that the stopping line does NOT cover. NO STATUS MOVED — nothing was proven today.
Two provider questions drafted, not sent, no API called (11-D stands):
documentation/runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md, linked from R-95 and R-433, and
tracked by a dated DUE-CHECKS row (2026-09-15) — the 2026-07-27 check that sat unconfirmed
for 36 days is the scar that block exists for.
R-95, R-433 BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER. R-95's one-day demotion on a clause that did not hold is
recorded; the proposal to rank it back near the top is stated and NOT acted on. R-430 marked
LATENT with its trigger: it becomes live the moment delete is withdrawn, so it is a
precondition on the R-95 build, not a follow-up. The stale ranking paragraph ("armed",
"zero snapshots") is corrected in place, order unchanged.
Register 621 -> 688 lines; 181 rows throughout; open-state 170 -> 169.
No controller or agent change. No golden owed, no floor change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LB8FmJaGd2cyjvy6dbEjpM
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
10c223bdfe
commit
db38f4c800
9 files changed
+673
-35
No files matched your search
@@ -859,6 +859,24 @@ crosses the line — **R-158**.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. The failure → recovery matrix
|
||||
|
||||
> ### THE ARC IS CLOSED FOR BETA — read this before the blanks below (2026-09-01)
|
||||
>
|
||||
> **Closed at controller v0.232.0 / hub v0.111.1.** Everything a **customer** does for themselves is
|
||||
> finished and proven live — rows **1, 2, 3, 3b, 3c, 6, 7, 14**. Everything only an **operator** does
|
||||
> is **deliberately deferred until after beta** — rows **4, 8, 9, 10, 11 (+11b), 12**, each carrying
|
||||
> the marker **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** in its status cell so the set greps as a group.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> **The blanks in the RTO column below are now blank ON PURPOSE, and that is the whole difference.**
|
||||
> Eleven rows carry a blank RTO — 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 11b, 12, 13, 14, 15 — and only six of those are
|
||||
> deferred work. **Row 5** has no recovery to time (a derived copy), **row 13** has no route by
|
||||
> design, **row 14** is proven and merely never stopwatched, **row 11b** is a note not a row, and
|
||||
> **row 15 is an open DEFECT (R-104) that this line does NOT cover.**
|
||||
>
|
||||
> **NO STATUS MOVED ON THE DAY THIS WAS WRITTEN, because nothing was proven that day.** A stopping
|
||||
> line that promotes a row is a stopping line that lies. Full text, and the conditions that reopen
|
||||
> this: `documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`, *"DECIDED — the backup and restore arc is CLOSED FOR
|
||||
> BETA"*.
|
||||
|
||||
**This is the core artifact.** One row per failure. It is authoritative for recovery routes;
|
||||
`00-capability-map.md` stays authoritative for per-capability status.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -879,16 +897,16 @@ crosses the line — **R-158**.
|
||||
| 3 | **An app's DB and named volumes are lost** | the guest, the unit | „Visszaállítás indítása" — Tier-1 unit restore (the **only** path that unpacks volume tars) | **customer** | **18.25 s** (path execution) · **27.6 s** (D5 drill, guest `app.yaml` absent) | 24 h | **PROVEN** (content recovery proven 2026-07-30) | CAMPAIGN-9 A2 proved the path executes; **D5 v0.188.0 closed the content gap** — after a restore with the guest's `app.yaml` moved aside, the app read the seeded row **over TCP with its own credential**, the pre-backup row returned and a post-backup row was gone (so the tar was really restored). No `.sql` dump in the unit ⇒ the DB came back from the volume tar. **2026-08-30 — this row KEEPS its PROVEN status and the reason is worth stating: R-353 was a defect in the MESSAGE, not in the mechanism.** The restore really did return what the unit held, every time; what it could not do was say so, because the count was discarded one call deep. Controller v0.226.0 fixed the sentence and changed nothing about the recovery path. A status that measures whether data comes back must not move because a status line was wrong |
|
||||
| 3c | *same, with the GUEST GONE (secrets unavailable)* | the drive | Tier-1 unit restore — **the unit carries the portable secrets** | **customer** | **27.6 s** | 24 h | **PROVEN** | D5, §7.4. Before v0.188.0 this row was **NONE**: the data-key gate refused and the customer's own copy of their own data was not a recovery |
|
||||
| 3b | *same, for a class-B app via Tier-2* | the Tier-2 copy on the second drive | „Teljes visszaállítás a másolatból" — **Tier-2 unit restore** (`POST /backup/tier2/unit-restore` → `RestoreTier2Unit` → `RestoreFromRecoveryUnitAt`), controller **v0.229.0** | **customer** | **28.65 s** (3 volumes, 1 database, 114.5 MB unit) | 24 h | **PROVEN** (2026-08-31) | `audits/DRILL-r102-tier2-unit-2026-08-31/`. docmost — a class-B app whose Tier-2 run reports **0 leg(s)** — restored **with the primary unit moved aside**: 3 volumes of 3 and 1 database of 1, from `/mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1/backups/secondary/docmost/recovery-unit`. **The observable is the DATA:** an accented Hungarian filename returned byte-for-byte (verified as hex, R-364) and the app read its own row **over TCP with its own credential**; the post-backup discriminator was **gone**, so the tar was genuinely replayed. Repeated with the guest's `app.yaml` also aside → `secrets recovered=2/2` from the mirrored unit. **R-102 CLOSED** |
|
||||
| 4 | **Primary drive dies** | Tier-2 copy on the second drive; Tier-3 offsite; the guest | Tier-2 for **file legs** (7 of 53 apps) **and, since controller v0.229.0, for the unit mirror — its volume tars and DB dump, i.e. the whole of what the other 45 own**; Tier-3 reconstitute for files + DB **+ the named-volume tars since v0.218.0** (`volReplay`) | **customer** (all) | | 24 h | **PARTIAL** | §7.2. **Both unreachability gaps are now closed — R-107 (v0.218.0) and R-102 (v0.229.0).** This row stays **PARTIAL** deliberately: what is proven is the ROUTE (row 3b, live, primary unit absent), not the JOURNEY. **No drive has ever actually died or been replaced under this recovery** — the drill removed a unit directory, not a disk, so drive re-attachment by `durable_id`, the agent's enrolment of a replacement, and a Tier-2 copy read from a drive that is the ONLY surviving one are all still unexercised. Promoting this row to PROVEN needs that journey, not another unit restore |
|
||||
| 4 | **Primary drive dies** | Tier-2 copy on the second drive; Tier-3 offsite; the guest | Tier-2 for **file legs** (7 of 53 apps) **and, since controller v0.229.0, for the unit mirror — its volume tars and DB dump, i.e. the whole of what the other 45 own**; Tier-3 reconstitute for files + DB **+ the named-volume tars since v0.218.0** (`volReplay`) | **customer** (all) | | 24 h | **PARTIAL** **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** | §7.2. **Both unreachability gaps are now closed — R-107 (v0.218.0) and R-102 (v0.229.0).** This row stays **PARTIAL** deliberately: what is proven is the ROUTE (row 3b, live, primary unit absent), not the JOURNEY. **No drive has ever actually died or been replaced under this recovery** — the drill removed a unit directory, not a disk, so drive re-attachment by `durable_id`, the agent's enrolment of a replacement, and a Tier-2 copy read from a drive that is the ONLY surviving one are all still unexercised. Promoting this row to PROVEN needs that journey, not another unit restore |
|
||||
| 5 | **Secondary drive dies** | everything the customer uses | none needed — Tier-2 is a derived copy, rebuilt on the next run (`07` §8 migration rule: *"Migration = rebuild, not preserve"*) | automatic | | 24 h | **PROVEN** (by construction) | tier2 v2 layout marker + rebuild, `internal/backup/tier2.go`. **The derived-copy rule is UNCHANGED by R-403 (controller v0.230.0) and the single exception is stated in §8.2 below — read it before "fixing" a skip you find in the code** |
|
||||
| 6 | **Guest lost or corrupted** | the host, both whole-guest tiers, the data drives (they are host binds) | `pct restore` from `local:` or `felhom-pbs:` | **operator** (SSH) | **84–112 s** local · **1101 s** PBS (both = restore-test into a scratch guest, boot + verify + teardown) | 24 h local · 7 d offsite | **PROVEN** | CAMPAIGN-2 T-P9; CAMPAIGN-8 Phase C (exact mount parity, `unprivileged: 1` preserved); LIVE restore-tests on both boxes this session |
|
||||
| 7 | **Guest stopped and does not come back** | everything | guest-power watchdog (60 s, `onboot` as the deliberate-stop discriminator) | automatic | **120 s** | | **PROVEN** | agent v0.107.0 replay — 120 s unattended vs the incident's 587 s with a human |
|
||||
| 8 | **Host dies (hardware), drives intact** | the data drives; ep0's PBS namespace; the hub's Recipe + Escrow | **install a new host, then** `--selftest=bring-up -mode dr` per guest, **then** re-attach drives by `durable_id` | **operator** (SSH) | | 7 d | **IMPLEMENTED** | bring-up code exists and has **never been executed** (`CAMPAIGN-8…:522`); the drive half of the plan is empty on every box (**R-105**) |
|
||||
| 9 | **Whole box lost (fire/theft) — host and drives gone** | ep0 PBS namespace; the restic repo; the hub's Recipe + Escrow | new hardware → day-0 → escrow-consume with **R** → restore guests from PBS → app data from Tier-3 | **operator + customer** (R) | | 7 d (guest) · 24 h (app data) | **IMPLEMENTED / UNPROVEN** | every leg exists; the composed path has never been run. The destructive S5 drill is operator-gated and unrun (`06-offsite-connectivity.md:327`) |
|
||||
| 10 | **Ransomware / malicious deletion inside the guest** | PBS offsite (the box **cannot** delete its own snapshots); **the restic repo is NOT protected the same way** | whole-guest restore from PBS to a point before the event | **operator** (SSH) | | 7 d | **PARTIAL** | R-89 proved the box is refused when deleting its own PBS snapshot (`CAMPAIGN-8…:514-515`). **R-95 (open, ranked #1):** the restic credential **can delete** — `readonly=False`, `forget --prune` runs from the box, and SFTP cannot express append-only (`OPEN-ITEMS.md:13`) **2026-08-30 (R-359): the store is now VERIFIED on a cadence** — a daily `offsite-integrity` job runs `restic check` when the last successful one is over 7 days old. **This is a readability check, not a restore-test (R-87 stays open).** The depth that ships ON now re-reads **100%** of the pack data (R-399 CLOSED, controller v0.228.0) — the sentence here previously said the opposite and was stale. **2026-08-31 (SPIKE R-87):** a scratch restore of every app on demo-hp was measured at **25 s for 8 snapshots / 774 MB**, against 40.3 s for one weekly check — but restic 0.14.0's `--verify` checks size and mtime, **not content**, so nothing available today can vouch for the restored BYTES. Row 4's verdict is UNCHANGED by the spike. `audits/SPIKE-restic-restore-test-2026-08-31.md`. **2026-09-01 (SPIKE R-95, `audits/SPIKE-r95-offsite-delete-2026-09-01.md`) — THIS ROW'S STATUS IS UNCHANGED, but the seven-day bound beside it is now known to be unverified.** Measured on BOTH boxes over their own SFTP credential, with controls: **no `.snapshots` is visible to either sub-account**, and the account is jailed. Either none exist or a sub-account cannot see them — and a snapshot the box cannot see is one the box cannot restore from, so recovery would be an operator act at the Hetzner panel, not a product capability (R-429; the confirming field needs the provider API, fenced by §11-D). **The PBS shape does NOT transfer**: the sub-account API has one permission axis, `readonly`, and a backup target cannot be read-only — PBS is a server that can refuse, a Storage Box is a filesystem that runs nothing. **What the spike removed as a fear:** withdrawing delete does NOT wedge the store (measured — restic treats a dead owner's lock as stale and proceeds). **What it added:** `unlock --remove-all` reports success while deleting nothing (R-430). **2026-09-01, LATER THE SAME DAY — THE PROBE ABOVE LOOKED FOR THE WRONG NAME AND THIS ROW'S SECOND CLAUSE IS NOW HALF WRONG.** It searched `.snapshots`; the vendor documents `/.zfs/snapshot`. Re-probed at the documented path on BOTH boxes, with controls, the two halves separate cleanly: **(a) the LIVE repository is deletable by the box — unchanged, R-95 stands;** **(b) the daily SNAPSHOTS of it are not writable by anything — PROVEN, not cited:** a write into `/.zfs/snapshot` is refused (`dest open …: Failure`) while the identical write to the account home succeeds. Seven daily snapshots confirmed in the panel (R-429). **So this row's "the restic repo is NOT protected the same way" is true of the repository and FALSE of its snapshots** — a deletion costs at most the day since the last snapshot, recoverable per-file (vendor). **Two limits kept honest:** a sub-account sees the snapshot directory EMPTY, so per-file recovery is operator-only today (R-432); and a panel-driven restore rolls back the WHOLE box. **The status is NOT moved** — evidence (b) is measured, but the recovery ROUTE has never been walked, which is what PARTIAL means. **Detection shipped hub v0.111.0 (R-431):** an unexplained fall in the snapshot count is noticed within a day — **but only a fall of MORE than half (R-435).** **2026-09-01, THE DRILL — CLAUSE (b) OF THE RE-SCOPE ABOVE IS WITHDRAWN; THE STATUS IS STILL NOT MOVED.** The re-scope said a deletion is *recoverable per-file*. **It is not, from the box: no snapshot is reachable by ANY name.** MEASURED on demo-hp, read-only, no delete verb issued: **777,600** exact names in the vendor form `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS` (nine full days, second granularity) plus 126 alternative shapes — **zero hits**, against a control where the identical 600-name batch returns a path that exists (6/6). **Structural cause:** `/home` (`u629488-sub3`) is **st_dev 0,82**, `/.zfs/snapshot` is **st_dev 0,276**, and `/home/.zfs` does not exist — a snapshot under `/.zfs/snapshot` belongs to a different dataset than the one holding the repository. **Clause (a) — the box cannot WRITE into the snapshot area — is unchanged and re-confirmed.** So this row's *"recoverable per-file (vendor)"* and its limit *"per-file recovery is operator-only today (R-432)"* both overstate what exists: the remaining routes are a panel rollback of the WHOLE Storage Box and the provider API (fenced, and the hub's client has no snapshot method at all). **R-432 ANSWERED negatively; R-433 opened. RTO still blank — nothing was recovered, so nothing was timedLine truncated
|
||||
| 11 | **Hub lost** | every box's data plane, every tier, every Lane-1 route | none needed for recovery **of a box**; the hub itself restores from its Longhorn volume backup | operator (`kubectl`) | | 24 h + weekly (Longhorn `RETAIN 1` each) | **UNPROVEN** | a hub restore has never been performed. The backup target is `nfs://192.168.0.180` — **DooPlex itself** — and exactly **2** restore points exist (LIVE, INV Part D2.2) |
|
||||
| 11b | *consequences while the hub is gone* | — | — | — | | | **[FACT]** | **day:** nothing customer-visible breaks; events queue (`settings.go:1466-1485`). **week:** the operator alarm plane is dark, no claim/reset codes, no config or floor convergence, no PBS-secret re-issue. **permanently:** escrow custody and break-glass credentials are gone (INV Part D2.4) |
|
||||
| 12 | **Offsite provider lost (Hetzner)** | everything on-premises: both drives, both whole-guest tiers | none needed — on-premises recovery is unaffected. Re-provision a new offsite target. | operator | | | **[FACT]** | **restic and PBS share the provider** (INV Part E.1). Whether they share an account and payment method is **UNKNOWN** → §11-D |
|
||||
| 8 | **Host dies (hardware), drives intact** | the data drives; ep0's PBS namespace; the hub's Recipe + Escrow | **install a new host, then** `--selftest=bring-up -mode dr` per guest, **then** re-attach drives by `durable_id` | **operator** (SSH) | | 7 d | **IMPLEMENTED** **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** | bring-up code exists and has **never been executed** (`CAMPAIGN-8…:522`); the drive half of the plan is empty on every box (**R-105**) |
|
||||
| 9 | **Whole box lost (fire/theft) — host and drives gone** | ep0 PBS namespace; the restic repo; the hub's Recipe + Escrow | new hardware → day-0 → escrow-consume with **R** → restore guests from PBS → app data from Tier-3 | **operator + customer** (R) | | 7 d (guest) · 24 h (app data) | **IMPLEMENTED / UNPROVEN** **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** | every leg exists; the composed path has never been run. The destructive S5 drill is operator-gated and unrun (`06-offsite-connectivity.md:327`) |
|
||||
| 10 | **Ransomware / malicious deletion inside the guest** | PBS offsite (the box **cannot** delete its own snapshots); **the restic repo is NOT protected the same way** | whole-guest restore from PBS to a point before the event | **operator** (SSH) | | 7 d | **PARTIAL** **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** | R-89 proved the box is refused when deleting its own PBS snapshot (`CAMPAIGN-8…:514-515`). **R-95 (open, ranked #1):** the restic credential **can delete** — `readonly=False`, `forget --prune` runs from the box, and SFTP cannot express append-only (`OPEN-ITEMS.md:13`) **2026-08-30 (R-359): the store is now VERIFIED on a cadence** — a daily `offsite-integrity` job runs `restic check` when the last successful one is over 7 days old. **This is a readability check, not a restore-test (R-87 stays open).** The depth that ships ON now re-reads **100%** of the pack data (R-399 CLOSED, controller v0.228.0) — the sentence here previously said the opposite and was stale. **2026-08-31 (SPIKE R-87):** a scratch restore of every app on demo-hp was measured at **25 s for 8 snapshots / 774 MB**, against 40.3 s for one weekly check — but restic 0.14.0's `--verify` checks size and mtime, **not content**, so nothing available today can vouch for the restored BYTES. Row 4's verdict is UNCHANGED by the spike. `audits/SPIKE-restic-restore-test-2026-08-31.md`. **2026-09-01 (SPIKE R-95, `audits/SPIKE-r95-offsite-delete-2026-09-01.md`) — THIS ROW'S STATUS IS UNCHANGED, but the seven-day bound beside it is now known to be unverified.** Measured on BOTH boxes over their own SFTP credential, with controls: **no `.snapshots` is visible to either sub-account**, and the account is jailed. Either none exist or a sub-account cannot see them — and a snapshot the box cannot see is one the box cannot restore from, so recovery would be an operator act at the Hetzner panel, not a product capability (R-429; the confirming field needs the provider API, fenced by §11-D). **The PBS shape does NOT transfer**: the sub-account API has one permission axis, `readonly`, and a backup target cannot be read-only — PBS is a server that can refuse, a Storage Box is a filesystem that runs nothing. **What the spike removed as a fear:** withdrawing delete does NOT wedge the store (measured — restic treats a dead owner's lock as stale and proceeds). **What it added:** `unlock --remove-all` reports success while deleting nothing (R-430). **2026-09-01, LATER THE SAME DAY — THE PROBE ABOVE LOOKED FOR THE WRONG NAME AND THIS ROW'S SECOND CLAUSE IS NOW HALF WRONG.** It searched `.snapshots`; the vendor documents `/.zfs/snapshot`. Re-probed at the documented path on BOTH boxes, with controls, the two halves separate cleanly: **(a) the LIVE repository is deletable by the box — unchanged, R-95 stands;** **(b) the daily SNAPSHOTS of it are not writable by anything — PROVEN, not cited:** a write into `/.zfs/snapshot` is refused (`dest open …: Failure`) while the identical write to the account home succeeds. Seven daily snapshots confirmed in the panel (R-429). **So this row's "the restic repo is NOT protected the same way" is true of the repository and FALSE of its snapshots** — a deletion costs at most the day since the last snapshot, recoverable per-file (vendor). **Two limits kept honest:** a sub-account sees the snapshot directory EMPTY, so per-file recovery is operator-only today (R-432); and a panel-driven restore rolls back the WHOLE box. **The status is NOT moved** — evidence (b) is measured, but the recovery ROUTE has never been walked, which is what PARTIAL means. **Detection shipped hub v0.111.0 (R-431):** an unexplained fall in the snapshot count is noticed within a day — **but only a fall of MORE than half (R-435).** **2026-09-01, THE DRILL — CLAUSE (b) OF THE RE-SCOPE ABOVE IS WITHDRAWN; THE STATUS IS STILL NOT MOVED.** The re-scope said a deletion is *recoverable per-file*. **It is not, from the box: no snapshot is reachable by ANY name.** MEASURED on demo-hp, read-only, no delete verb issued: **777,600** exact names in the vendor form `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS` (nine full days, second granularity) plus 126 alternative shapes — **zero hits**, against a control where the identical 600-name batch returns a path that exists (6/6). **Structural cause:** `/home` (`u629488-sub3`) is **st_dev 0,82**, `/.zfs/snapshot` is **st_dev 0,276**, and `/home/.zfs` does not exist — a snapshot under `/.zfs/snapshot` belongs to a different dataset than the one holding the repository. **Clause (a) — the box cannot WRITE into the snapshot area — is unchanged and re-confirmed.** So this row's *"recoverable per-file (vendor)"* and its limit *"per-file recovery is operator-only today (R-432)"* both overstate what exists: the remaining routes are a panel rollback of the WHOLE Storage Box and the provider API (fenced, and the hub's client has no snapshot method at all). **R-432 ANSWERED negatively; R-433 opened. RTO still blank — nothing was recoveredLine truncated
|
||||
| 11 | **Hub lost** | every box's data plane, every tier, every Lane-1 route | none needed for recovery **of a box**; the hub itself restores from its Longhorn volume backup | operator (`kubectl`) | | 24 h + weekly (Longhorn `RETAIN 1` each) | **UNPROVEN** **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** | a hub restore has never been performed. The backup target is `nfs://192.168.0.180` — **DooPlex itself** — and exactly **2** restore points exist (LIVE, INV Part D2.2) |
|
||||
| 11b | *consequences while the hub is gone* | — | — | — | | | **[FACT]** **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** | **day:** nothing customer-visible breaks; events queue (`settings.go:1466-1485`). **week:** the operator alarm plane is dark, no claim/reset codes, no config or floor convergence, no PBS-secret re-issue. **permanently:** escrow custody and break-glass credentials are gone (INV Part D2.4) |
|
||||
| 12 | **Offsite provider lost (Hetzner)** | everything on-premises: both drives, both whole-guest tiers | none needed — on-premises recovery is unaffected. Re-provision a new offsite target. | operator | | | **[FACT]** **`[BETA-DEFERRED]`** | **restic and PBS share the provider** (INV Part E.1). Whether they share an account and payment method is **UNKNOWN** → §11-D |
|
||||
| 13 | **Customer loses R** | every byte, every tier, the Recipe | **on-premises recovery is unaffected** — Tier-1/2/3 and the whole-guest tiers all work while the guest and host live. What is lost: the ability to re-establish **host identity** and to open the escrowed offsite key material after a host loss | — | | | **NONE for host-loss** | R exists in **zero** system copies by design (INV Part C, row 24). Whether the operator should be able to recover is **open** → §11-A, §11-B. **D5 narrows this further:** Tier-1/2 app recovery needs only the drive, so losing R now costs the offsite route and host identity, never local app recovery (§7.4) |
|
||||
| 14 | **Host SSH management plane dies** | everything | 3-layer break-glass: tmpfiles → 60 s watchdog → hub-vaulted `root@pam` on the PVE console | operator | | | **PROVEN** | `runbooks/break-glass.md`; the original incident and its fix |
|
||||
| 15 | **Interrupted offsite run leaves a stale lock** | everything | manual `restic unlock --remove-all` | **operator** (SSH) | | | **DEFECT** | the self-heal exists (`offbox.go:634-648`) but the probe fails first and `classifyResticProbe` has no lock case → fail-fast, operator told *„ismeretlen okból"* → **R-104** |
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user