SPIKE R-459: the skipped MariaDB conversion is stable, and the trade it implied does not exist

Outcome A, qualified. Not B and not C.

It does not degrade: 5 of 5 restarts of 12.3 on an 11.6 datadir, readback passed
every time, mariadb_upgrade_info unchanged, the entrypoint line never escalated
past [Note]. It also never heals - the engine answers 'Major version upgrade
detected from 11.6.2-MariaDB to 12.3.3-MariaDB. Check required!' on every start
and will forever.

The trade R-459 was expected to produce is not real. Converting properly SUCCEEDS
across the multi-major jump, takes 7 seconds, backs up the system database
unasked - and putting 11.6 back afterwards STILL starts and serves the data. So
the operator is being handed a cheap correction, not a choice between a correct
engine and a reversible one.

The exit-code polarity was measured rather than read: 0 means the upgrade IS
needed, 1 means it is not. Assuming either the flag name or the polarity would
have inverted the headline. And run without credentials the same command returns
a confident-looking FATAL ERROR that is an auth failure.

R-464: after converting and going back, the entrypoint prints 'MariaDB upgrade
not required' on a state the same engine calls an unsupported downgrade. The
obvious cheap instrument for R-459 would have been to grep for that line, and it
would have reported fine for the broken case.

R-463: the PostgreSQL analogue, deliberately NOT measured here. 11 templates, 8
on postgres:16-alpine, register grep for pg_upgrade returns zero. The two engines
fail in OPPOSITE directions - MariaDB skips quietly, Postgres refuses to start -
so that one cannot hide; it presents as eight apps down at once.

No template changed. Teardown all three layers, hub checked rather than asserted,
local-lvm 30.53 percent before and after.

documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 
 | ID | Item | Size | Status | Notes |
 |----|------|------|--------|-------|
-| **UPDATE-ARC** | **The app-update arc — seven slices, from "nobody knows what any box runs" to "an update is a decision the box can take safely."** Opened after `audits/SPIKE-app-update-2026-09-01.md` measured what an update actually does. | L | **slices 1, 1b, 2, 3 & 5 SHIPPED (controller v0.233.0 / v0.234.0 / v0.235.0; harness `app-catalog/scripts/upgrade-test.py`); slices 4, 6, 7 open** | **The reasoning has a home and it is the point of the exercise: `architecture/09-update-architecture.md`** — a LIVING document, updated by every slice in the same session, created because its ABSENCE was a finding (R-438: the mechanism was chosen deliberately and written down nowhere). **Capability-map rows this flips:** the App-lifecycle row (`00-capability-map.md`, "start/stop/restart/update/logs/remove/redeploy") and its 2026-09-01 sibling ("what restart and update do to a deployed app whose compose file the catalog already moved") — both recorded that the ACTIONS work and said nothing about VERSIONS. Slices 1 and 2 add the version half. **The findings live in the register, per the ONE REGISTER ruling:** R-438, R-440, R-441, R-443 (existing) and R-446..R-452 (this session) — one row per remaining slice, each with a rank and an owner, so the arc is visible in the register and not only in a task file. **Slice 3 SHIPPED 2026-09-06 (controller v0.235.0) on the operator's ruling — Option 1, *freeze the version, keep the fixes flowing*.** It was BLOCKED until then, deliberately: changing what the syncer does to a deployed app reverses a decision, not a bug. R-447, R-441 and R-438 are CLOSED by it; **Slice 5 SHIPPED 2026-09-06 as a spike** — `scripts/upgrade-test.py`, 7 edges over 3 apps, proven by a RED negative control, closing R-449 and opening R-459/R-460/R-462. **Its headline changes an assumption this arc was carrying: whether an update can be undone is a property of the individual APP, not of updates** — docmost refuses, privatebin does not — so any design assuming one answer for all 53 is designing against a checked-and-false fact. **R-448 (slice 4, the guarded update) is now the head of the arc** and is where the backup precondition goes — slice 3 did NOT make the Update button safer and must not be read as having done so. |
+| **UPDATE-ARC** | **The app-update arc — seven slices, from "nobody knows what any box runs" to "an update is a decision the box can take safely."** Opened after `audits/SPIKE-app-update-2026-09-01.md` measured what an update actually does. | L | **slices 1, 1b, 2, 3 & 5 SHIPPED (controller v0.233.0 / v0.234.0 / v0.235.0; harness `app-catalog/scripts/upgrade-test.py`); slices 4, 6, 7 open** | **The reasoning has a home and it is the point of the exercise: `architecture/09-update-architecture.md`** — a LIVING document, updated by every slice in the same session, created because its ABSENCE was a finding (R-438: the mechanism was chosen deliberately and written down nowhere). **Capability-map rows this flips:** the App-lifecycle row (`00-capability-map.md`, "start/stop/restart/update/logs/remove/redeploy") and its 2026-09-01 sibling ("what restart and update do to a deployed app whose compose file the catalog already moved") — both recorded that the ACTIONS work and said nothing about VERSIONS. Slices 1 and 2 add the version half. **The findings live in the register, per the ONE REGISTER ruling:** R-438, R-440, R-441, R-443 (existing) and R-446..R-452 (this session) — one row per remaining slice, each with a rank and an owner, so the arc is visible in the register and not only in a task file. **Slice 3 SHIPPED 2026-09-06 (controller v0.235.0) on the operator's ruling — Option 1, *freeze the version, keep the fixes flowing*.** It was BLOCKED until then, deliberately: changing what the syncer does to a deployed app reverses a decision, not a bug. R-447, R-441 and R-438 are CLOSED by it; **Slice 5 SHIPPED 2026-09-06 as a spike** — `scripts/upgrade-test.py`, 7 edges over 3 apps, proven by a RED negative control, closing R-449 and opening R-459/R-460/R-462. **Its headline changes an assumption this arc was carrying: whether an update can be undone is a property of the individual APP, not of updates** — docmost refuses, privatebin does not — so any design assuming one answer for all 53 is designing against a checked-and-false fact. **R-459 was measured 2026-09-06 and narrowed to a decision, not a defect:** the skipped MariaDB conversion is stable but never self-resolving, and correcting it costs 7 s and does **not** cost the ability to abort — so the trade that row was expected to produce does not exist. Opened R-463 (the PostgreSQL analogue, which fails in the OPPOSITE direction — it refuses to start, and 8 templates sit on `postgres:16-alpine`) and R-464 (an entrypoint line that says `upgrade not required` on an unsupported downgrade). **R-448 (slice 4, the guarded update) is now the head of the arc** and is where the backup precondition goes — slice 3 did NOT make the Update button safer and must not be read as having done so. |
 | R-6 | **Spike: LAN service discovery from the guest** — SSDP multicast (UDP 1900, DLNA), WSD (Windows discovery), mDNS; host-network vs macvlan; is the customer LXC LAN-bridged in appliance deployments? | M | **spiked (2026-07-18)** | **VERDICT: appliance guest IS LAN-bridged (own DHCP lease on the household /24); multicast discovery works ONLY in the guest netns — guest-direct or Docker `--network host` (SSDP/mDNS/WSD all PASS both ways); the default docker bridge is categorically DEAF to LAN multicast (WSD/mDNS RX FAIL, unicast-publish PASS). Real samba+wsdd on host-net → Windows 11 ProbeMatch + FELHOM-SPIKE renders in Explorer + 445 + authenticated SMB round-trip all PASS; real SSDP `MediaServer:1` advert reaches both LAN clients. → R-7 SMB stack MUST be host-network LAN-bound; R-8 Jellyfin-DLNA plausible if host-network. Caveat: `vmbr0 multicast_snooping=1` worked only because the household router is a live querier — customer LANs w/ snooping+no-querier, and Peti's BYO bridge, are UNTESTED gaps.** **S4b (human leg, the sharpest finding): wsdd makes the box VISIBLE but the Explorer double-click FAILS `0x80070035` — WSD gives no name resolution; the flat `\\FELHOM-SPIKE` resolved by no path. Adding `nmbd` (NetBIOS) fixed it live (flat name resolves + mounts). → R-7 needs smbd+wsdd+nmbd (+avahi/.local for modern clients), not wsdd alone.** Doc: `audits/SPIKE-lan-discovery-2026-07-18.md`. |
 | R-7b | **Share backup EXECUTION** — put share data into the live tier-2 + offsite runs (the design fork reported by R-7 slice 1) | M | **SHIPPED (controller v0.145.0, 2026-07-18)** | **Viktor's ruling: Model B′ — a SIBLING shares source.** New, additive job/leg code reusing the proven primitives (tier-2 mirror seam, restic wrappers, soft-quota/enlargement gate, status recorders) while leaving **every per-app engine path byte-identical** — NOT a synthetic recovery unit (breaks on multi-drive shares, wraps 1 KB of JSON in dump machinery) and NOT engine-loop surgery. The B′ invariant is enforced by test in both tiers, red-proofed. Tier 2 → `RunSharesTier2` (legs grouped by SOURCE drive → `backups/secondary/_shares/<driveKey>/<share>`, payload at `_payload/`, layout marker LAST). Tier 3 → `runOffboxSharesLeg`: ONE extra `restic backup --tag felhom-offbox --tag _shares` placed after the app loop and BEFORE retention, so `forget --group-by host,tags` covers the new group with no flag change; a quota-blocked push degrades to the **manifest only, never to nothing**. Restore → „Megosztások" on `/backups/restore`: scratch, then a missing-only merge whose every destination is PREFIX-ASSERTED against live storage roots, definitions merged existing-wins, then `ReconcileSamba`, then the credential. The **payload** (`_shares-manifest.json` + a best-effort secret-bearing `passdb.tar`) is what makes DR return files + configuration + password rather than loose bytes. **Fold-in: samba joins the liveness set** — `EffectiveProtected` adds the CONTAINER `felhom-samba` exactly while sharing is on. **FULLY PROVEN-LIVE on demo (2026-07-18), all four legs.** (1) tier-2: real `/api/backup/tier2` trigger → `_shares` tree + marker + payload on the cross-drive target, mirrored file md5-identical, payload 0600 preserved. (2) offsite: Viktor's manual run 12:18:16Z → snapshot **`e0b9d723`** (tags `felhom-offbox,_shares`) with the payload dir + both share folders; a second run via the „Távoli mentés" button → **`4e2b15ec`**, containing `_shares-manifest.json` (418 B) AND `passdb.tar` (855 040 B), both 0600, share files with uid 1000 preserved. (3) restore round-trip: probe file + the `dokumentumok` DEFINITION deleted via the real endpoints, then „Megosztások" restore + place → `1 file(s), 1 definition(s) re-added, 1 kept, 0 refused, credential=true`; probe back md5-identical, the two pre-existing files NOT overwritten (missing-only proven on live data), definition back with its ORIGINAL flags and created_at, `smb.conf` re-rendered, `filmek` untouched. (4) liveness: samba stopped → `health_critical` pushed and hub-accepted (200) → self-healed. Remaining human leg: SMB positive auth with the real household password (never persisted by design). **Correction:** an earlier revision of this row and of the ship REPORT wrongly claimed the demo box had no offsite target — the verification read a guessed settings key (`offbox_target`) instead of the real one (`offbox`); root cause dissected in REPORT §7b. Findings: the reserved-name assumption was FALSE (`nbNameRe` accepted „_shares" as a share name — now refused); the alert/e-mail pipeline needed NO change and adds no new event type. Docs: `controller/sharing.md`; ship report `felhom-controller/REPORT.md`. |
 | R-8 | DLNA (**gate input now exists — R-6 spiked 2026-07-18: SSDP reaches LAN clients from host-net**): validate Jellyfin's built-in DLNA server first; only add minidlna to the catalog if Jellyfin-DLNA fails | S | idea (unblocked) | Don't add catalog weight before proving the cheap path. **R-6 confirmed the cheap path is physically viable — Jellyfin DLNA must run host-network (same multicast constraint as R-7)** |