docs: SLICE 3 — hub README, REPORT, CONTEXT
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PSK5g6qYLknKj8u3QAFEr6
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> **Overwrite** this file with a summary of the most recent task only (uniform with the other repos; not cumulative). The cumulative hub history lives in [hub/CHANGELOG.md](hub/CHANGELOG.md); the scripts history lives in [scripts/CHANGELOG.md](scripts/CHANGELOG.md).
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## TASK — offsite provisioning hardening (F2/F4/F5 + key-auth-first + staged-secret wipe) — 2026-07-09 — DEPLOYED
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## TASK — offsite SLICE 3: hub-verified escrow auto-confirm — 2026-07-09 — DEPLOYED
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**Shipped (felhom.eu):** hub **v0.39.0** `17cc67f` + bump `17d9af5` — LIVE (Synced/Healthy, provisioner
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enabled). Bundle pairs: controller **v0.107.0** (key-auth-first bridge + wipe-on-escrowed; live on 9201) +
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agent **v0.78.0** (`DELETE /escrow/stage-secret`; live on felhom-pve, 56/56). All three green-gated with
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companion red-proofs.
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**Shipped (felhom.eu):** hub **v0.40.0** `49d1233` + bump `c24d4af` — LIVE (Synced/Healthy). Chain pairs:
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agent **v0.79.0** (felhom-pve, 56/56) + controller **v0.108.0** (9201, healthy) — all live. Operator-free
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task (Viktor ran nothing).
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**Hub changes:**
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- **F4 (pilot-gating) — "Re-issue offsite credentials":** `Provisioner.ReissueCredentials` + UI button
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(confirm-gated, shown only when provisioned) + `POST /configs/{id}/offsite-reissue`. Resets the
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sub-account password (or dedicated-box password via the new `hetznerapi.ResetBoxPassword`), stores a
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FRESH one-time secret, re-saves the config unchanged → `ConfigVersion` bump → the stuck guest's next
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refresh re-runs the bridge. **Hard-scoped:** refuses unless the `felhom-customer=<id>` label lookup finds
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exactly 1 resource (red-proofed). Explicit action only — never implicit rotation. Password never logged.
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- **F2:** `scanWithRetry` — the host-key scan retries through fresh-subaccount DNS lag (2/4/8/16/30s ≈ 60s,
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inside the F1 3-min detached ctx; fail-closed past budget; red-proofed).
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- **F5:** the config form disables its submit buttons + shows an in-flight notice on submit (the re-click
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bait that caused live F1).
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**The verification chain:** the ceremony hashes the staged repo password it seals (agent) → the hub stores
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`restic_pw_sha256` alongside the escrow blob (additive migration; NULL on legacy rows) and serves
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`escrow:{identity_blob_present, restic_pw_sha256, created_at}` in the **report ACK** → the controller flips
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offbox `EscrowState` pending→escrowed ONLY on `sha256(local repo_password)` match. **Blob-presence alone
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never confirms** — a stale blob (re-provision/inject/history) would be a false custody claim re-opening the
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fork-4 gap; this is the red-proofed core (blob-present-only check → stale-blob test flips → FAIL).
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Mismatch → pending + loud warn naming the ceremony (deduped per hash); never un-confirms. On flip the
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agent-staged secret is wiped (v0.107.0 path). The two hashers are pinned by the SAME cross-repo test vector
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(trimmed-string sha256). Manual confirm-escrow → documented deprecated fallback for legacy hash-less blobs.
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**One-off cleanup (executed):** the staged secret lingering on felhom-pve from the e2e's Option-A confirm
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was wiped through the NEW agent endpoint (controller container → pinned local API → `{"removed":true}`),
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verified gone; idempotent re-wipe returned `{"removed":false}`. No secret printed.
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**Hub specifics:** `host_escrow.restic_pw_sha256` migration; `SaveHostEscrow`/`HostEscrow`/`GetHostEscrow`
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NULL-safe; `GetEscrowStatusForCustomer` (hosts⋈host_escrow, latest-updated wins); ACK object omitted when
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no escrow row (fresh customers stay silently pending); `TestEscrowUploadContract` mirrors agent v0.79.0.
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**Deliberately NOT exercised live:** the F4 reset itself (it would rotate the demo's working credential —
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touching it is forbidden; a live exercise needs a throwaway customer under supervision). Unit red-proofs
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cover the guards. F5 is template JS — verified on the next operator save.
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**Live state check (no operator action):** migration applied on the production DB — all 3 legacy rows
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(demo included) read hash-NULL; the demo's `escrowed` target produced **zero** `escrow-confirm` controller
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log lines after reports through the new hub (Scenario E — never-revisit — proven live for free); no hub
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errors.
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**NEXT:** SLICE 3 (escrow auto-confirm — inherits wipe-on-escrowed), SLICE 4 (soft-quota on `quota_gb`),
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NEW-box restore round-trip → retire the old-box archive, Peti onboarding runbook.
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**NOT yet live-exercised:** the full happy chain (fresh enable → ceremony records the hash → ACK →
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auto-flip) — the first real offsite enable (Peti onboarding) proves it; unit red-proofs carry the logic.
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**NEXT:** SLICE 4 (soft-quota on `quota_gb`), Peti onboarding runbook (live-exercises auto-confirm + F4
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re-issue), NEW-box restore round-trip → retire the old-box archive.
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