The census answers no, three receipts found, and the prune was on file all along
gates / gates (push) Successful in 13s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 13s
CENSUS (read-only, hub store, tester's machine not contacted): no machine that is not ours can be in the state that cost demo-felhom its history. The hub holds escrow for three hosts; both demo boxes lost their pre-fix key in the same four hours on 2026-08-04; peti-felhom and david have no host row and no escrow at all. A control ran FIRST and had to pass -- the query returned "present (572 bytes)" for a host known to have material and "absent (NULL)" for one known not to. Corrected my own instrument on the way: a date-only comparison mislabelled both losses as after the fix, so the in-force moment is now pinned from the hub's first post-fix escrow row (11:11:37Z), which independently agrees with the register. PART 1 ESTABLISHED. The prune is recorded inside R-267 -- the row about the Configuration page being slow -- because pruning artifacts is what made that page fast. Arithmetic checks (23+7=30, plus three versions that only surfaced after the first thirty moved them onto page one = 33) and the PAGINATED listing shows both generics at exactly ten. R-291's blocking condition is released: the operator was being asked to establish something already written down. And my counter-argument yesterday was wrong in exactly the way R-267 warns about -- "containers hold 19" came from an unpaginated query; paginated they hold 270 and 169. RECEIPTS: three restored (drives.enrol, backup.tier1, fail.lost-recovery-code), each citing the document that walked it; the map already read PROVEN-LIVE for all three, so this follows the map rather than raising a status in the view. NINE HONEST GREYS. fault.selfheal's best hit argues against it -- an incident recording self-heal's absence through a 1h15m outage. THE DECAY RULE FIRED FOR THE FIRST TIME. backup.restore-proof has a receipt from 28 July and is superseded anyway: demo-hp's restore-test failed 5 August and the box has since been rebuilt. A claim about a continuing behaviour cannot rest on an old observation. The capability map still reads PROVEN-LIVE and is now the thing out of step -- recorded, not silently rewritten. PART 4 specified, not implemented. The orphan card promises restorability the box rendering it cannot evaluate: the discriminator is on the hub and no wire field carries it. A conditional promise the system cannot evaluate is the same defect as an unconditional false one, so the copy stops promising, says what happens, and names a route. Ships with the next controller change so one bake covers both.
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@@ -515,12 +515,14 @@ applied.** The one that matters: Scenario A **fails against today's tree** with
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| **R-284** | **„A kiválasztott tárhely majdnem megtelt." on a store that is 93 % FREE — an apparent inverted threshold.** Calibre-Web's deploy page rendered `<option value="/mnt/sys_drive" data-free-percent="93">` alongside „Tárhely (sys_drive) — **64.2 GB szabad**" and the warning „A kiválasztott tárhely majdnem megtelt." 93 % free read as 93 % used is the obvious candidate, and `checkStorageSpace(this)` is the function to look at. **Not confirmed by reading the code** — reported as measured output only. A capacity warning that cries wolf on an empty disk is one a customer learns to click past | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Check `checkStorageSpace`'s comparison against `data-free-percent`; add a render test per branch | CC |
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| **R-285** | **A planned, supervised reinstall pages the operator as if the machine had died — there is no notion of expected downtime anywhere.** During the 2026-08-09 rehearsal the hub sent, all `status: sent` to the operator channel: `host_stale` 08:58 UTC, `node_stale` 09:00, **`host_down` 09:28 (error)**, **`node_down` 09:30 (error)**, `host_leaf_changed` 09:31, `host_recovered` 09:31, `node_recovered` 09:34, `offsite_delivery_stuck` 09:34 — eight operator mails for work that was deliberate, attended and announced. **This is the OPPOSITE gap from the one R-281 filed:** the alarms are not missing, they are indiscriminate. `host_stale` at 30 min and `host_down` at 60 min (`monitor/host_staleness.go:22-23`, `downAfter = 2 * threshold`) cannot distinguish a wiped-on-purpose box from a dead one, and `host_leaf_changed` firing on a reinstall is correct-but-expected. **Note the interaction with the mute used on 2026-08-09 evening:** blocking a customer silences everything, so today the only two settings are *page me for planned work* and *tell me nothing at all*. **What is owed is a middle:** a maintenance window, or an operator-set expected-downtime flag, that suppresses staleness and leaf-change while leaving genuine faults audible | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | The evidence is the operator's mailbox plus `events`/`notification_log` for 2026-08-09 | CC |
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| **R-286** | **A control drawn from the same channel as the measurement cannot detect a defect in that channel — and this one passed while the measurement was wrong.** The P7 check asked *"did the hub record anything?"* against a stale snapshot, got "no", and then validated itself with *"is the hub recording ANY events today, for anyone?"* — **against the same stale snapshot**. It answered "2 events all day", which was internally consistent and entirely false. The standing rule (*an absent log line is not evidence*) was followed in form: a positive control WAS run. **It was the wrong kind of control**, and nothing in the rule as written says so. **The independent channel existed and was available the whole time: the operator's mailbox.** One glance at it would have shown eight alarms in the window. **The durable lesson, to be added where the standing rules live:** a control must come from a DIFFERENT channel than the measurement — same query, same snapshot, same API, same clock all fail this. **Concrete follow-through owed:** (a) add this to the standing rules in `runbooks/workspace-CLAUDE.md`; (b) any hub-state check in a runbook must copy `-wal` or query the pod directly, never `cat hub.db` alone — the trap `operations/nodes.md` already documents | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Parent: R-281 (withdrawn) | CC |
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| **R-287** | **`felhom-agent` CI is red for a TRUE reason, and the diagnosis it was filed under is wrong in every particular.** The task premise was *"the gate is sensitive to being run against a tag ref rather than a branch"*. **It is not.** `check-published-versions.py` enumerates releases from the **Gitea tags API** (`/api/v1/repos/admin/felhom-agent/tags?limit=200`, `main()`), so the checked-out ref is irrelevant; and the two previous tag pushes **passed** (run 190 `v0.126.0`, run 216 `v0.127.0`). **What is actually true:** run 267 (main, `28ba8593b8`, 2026-08-08 14:29 UTC) printed `ok v0.120.0: binary downloadable`; run 284 (tag, **the same commit**, 2026-08-09 09:30 UTC) printed `FAIL v0.120.0 — binary NOT downloadable (HTTP 404)`. **A published release became uninstallable between those two runs.** The registry now holds exactly the ten newest versions (0.121.0…0.128.0); `0.128.0` was published **2026-08-08 16:47 CEST = 14:47 UTC, eighteen minutes after run 267**, and `0.120.0` is gone. **WHO REMOVED IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED, and that is stated rather than guessed:** `package_cleanup_rule` is **empty** (queried in Postgres), `app.ini` sets no package limit, `publish-agent.sh` only pre-deletes the version it is publishing (`:77`), the Gitea pod has **53 days uptime and 0 restarts** so `RUN_AT_START` did not fire, and I wrote that *"no DELETE on the packages API appears in 48 h of Gitea router logs"*. **THAT SENTENCE WAS AN OVER-CLAIM AND IS WITHDRAWN 2026-08-09 (evening).** Re-checked: `kubectl logs --since=72h` on the Gitea pod returns nothing older than **2026-08-09 16:35** — the container log has rotated, and it contains **zero** `api/packages` lines even for requests I made myself. **The log does not cover the window, so its silence was never evidence** — the exact rule this project keeps re-learning. **A SECOND ATTEMPT TO ATTRIBUTE THE DELETION ALSO FAILED, and the deleter remains NOT ESTABLISHED.** Sources exhausted: (1) no register row records a package prune — **R-210** is the only prune-adjacent row, it is `WAITING-ON-OPERATOR`, it says in terms *"Nothing was deleted; this is a list, not an action"*, and it concerns **local Docker images on DooPlex, not the Gitea registry**; (2) `package_version` has **no soft-delete column** (`created_unix, creator_id, download_count, id, is_internal, lower_version, metadata_json, package_id, version`) so a deletion leaves no row; (3) Gitea's `action` feed carries **no package operation at all** in 2026-08-08 → 2026-08-09, and **nothing whatever on the evening of 2026-08-08**; (4) a uniform *"newest ten per package"* cap is **not visible in the current state** — `felhom-agent` generic holds 10, but `felhom-controller` and `felhom-hub` container packages hold **19 each**. **It may be unestablishable from this side: Gitea keeps no package-deletion trail.** What remains established is unchanged — v0.120.0 downloadable 2026-08-08 14:29 UTC, 404 by 2026-08-09 09:30 UTC, and the generic package now holding exactly the newest ten. **THEREFORE NO GATE WAS SILENCED AND NO WORKFLOW WAS CHANGED.** Silencing it would hide a released-but-uninstallable version, which is the exact R-115 defect the gate exists to catch. **It will recur:** if the ten-version window is real, the next publish evicts `0.121.0`. **Two honest fixes, both out of tonight's scope:** bound the gate to versions at or above the vouched `min_agent` floor (0.127.0 today — nothing installs 0.120.0 and nothing can), or retire ancient tags when their packages go. **Also measured, and good news:** the failure alarm DID send — `RESEND-ACCEPTED id=fa1a7a83-714f-4357-b0ca-d3c4bb7ae73f` | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Establish the deleter first; do not raise the retention until it is known | Viktor |
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| **R-288** | **The capability map is too long to be read, and that is why it stops being true.** `architecture/00-capability-map.md` is **134 642 bytes / 19 456 words across 99 table rows in only 159 lines** — because the rows ARE the length. Measured, longest first: the unaided-recovery-journey row is **3 024 words**, the offsite-password-recovery row **1 087**, the unattended-restore-proof row **971**, the app/guest-network-failure row **904**. That single longest row is a novella of nested corrections, each appended rather than resolved. Its own verification stamp reads **2026-07-16 against evidence corpus @ felhom.eu tip `4b18cc5`** (line 23) — three weeks stale, which is the measurable consequence: nobody re-reads a row they cannot finish. **This is the project's memory, so restructuring it is surgery and wants daylight** — filed, deliberately not attempted in the 2026-08-09 session. **What the shape should probably be:** one line of status per capability plus a dated evidence pointer, with the argument moved to the audit it came from | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Do not fold this into another session; it needs its own | Viktor |
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| **R-287** | **`felhom-agent` CI is red for a TRUE reason, and the diagnosis it was filed under is wrong in every particular.** The task premise was *"the gate is sensitive to being run against a tag ref rather than a branch"*. **It is not.** `check-published-versions.py` enumerates releases from the **Gitea tags API** (`/api/v1/repos/admin/felhom-agent/tags?limit=200`, `main()`), so the checked-out ref is irrelevant; and the two previous tag pushes **passed** (run 190 `v0.126.0`, run 216 `v0.127.0`). **What is actually true:** run 267 (main, `28ba8593b8`, 2026-08-08 14:29 UTC) printed `ok v0.120.0: binary downloadable`; run 284 (tag, **the same commit**, 2026-08-09 09:30 UTC) printed `FAIL v0.120.0 — binary NOT downloadable (HTTP 404)`. **A published release became uninstallable between those two runs.** The registry now holds exactly the ten newest versions (0.121.0…0.128.0); `0.128.0` was published **2026-08-08 16:47 CEST = 14:47 UTC, eighteen minutes after run 267**, and `0.120.0` is gone. **WHO REMOVED IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED, and that is stated rather than guessed:** `package_cleanup_rule` is **empty** (queried in Postgres), `app.ini` sets no package limit, `publish-agent.sh` only pre-deletes the version it is publishing (`:77`), the Gitea pod has **53 days uptime and 0 restarts** so `RUN_AT_START` did not fire, and I wrote that *"no DELETE on the packages API appears in 48 h of Gitea router logs"*. **THAT SENTENCE WAS AN OVER-CLAIM AND IS WITHDRAWN 2026-08-09 (evening).** Re-checked: `kubectl logs --since=72h` on the Gitea pod returns nothing older than **2026-08-09 16:35** — the container log has rotated, and it contains **zero** `api/packages` lines even for requests I made myself. **The log does not cover the window, so its silence was never evidence** — the exact rule this project keeps re-learning. **A SECOND ATTEMPT TO ATTRIBUTE THE DELETION ALSO FAILED, and the deleter remains NOT ESTABLISHED.** Sources exhausted: (1) no register row records a package prune — **R-210** is the only prune-adjacent row, it is `WAITING-ON-OPERATOR`, it says in terms *"Nothing was deleted; this is a list, not an action"*, and it concerns **local Docker images on DooPlex, not the Gitea registry**; (2) `package_version` has **no soft-delete column** (`created_unix, creator_id, download_count, id, is_internal, lower_version, metadata_json, package_id, version`) so a deletion leaves no row; (3) Gitea's `action` feed carries **no package operation at all** in 2026-08-08 → 2026-08-09, and **nothing whatever on the evening of 2026-08-08**; (4) a uniform *"newest ten per package"* cap is **not visible in the current state** — `felhom-agent` generic holds 10, but `felhom-controller` and `felhom-hub` container packages hold **19 each**. ~~**It may be unestablishable from this side: Gitea keeps no package-deletion trail.**~~ **ESTABLISHED 2026-08-10, AND IT WAS WRITTEN DOWN ALL ALONG — INSIDE R-267.** The execution record is in the R-267 row (the Configuration-page performance row), because pruning artifacts is what made that page fast: *"Pruned to the newest 10 per package on the operator's rule, with the live-vouched golden/agent/floor asserted into the KEEP set before a single DELETE was issued; 33 deletions, all HTTP 204, and golden 0.210.0 / agent 0.128.0 / agent 0.127.0 verified still fetchable afterwards."* **Every corroboration checked and every one holds:** the arithmetic (23 agent + 7 golden = 30, plus three older agent versions 0.81.0/0.80.0/0.79.0 that *"only became visible after the first 30 deletions moved them onto page one"* = **33**); and the live PAGINATED listing — 14 pages, 653 package-versions — showing `felhom-agent` generic at **exactly 10** and `felhom-golden` generic at **exactly 10**, which is what a newest-10 prune leaves. **The midnight-cleanup candidate is RETIRED.** **AND MY OWN COUNTER-ARGUMENT WAS WRONG, IN THE WAY R-267 WARNS ABOUT.** On 2026-08-09 I argued against the prune because *"container packages hold 19 each"*, so no uniform cap was visible. That number came from an **unpaginated** query, which the API caps at 50 per page. Paginated, the containers hold **270** and **169** — they were never in the prune at all, and the generics are at exactly 10. R-267 records the identical trap one paragraph above the sentence I could not find: *"An unpaginated listing is not evidence of a total — this repo's own rule, walked into while measuring."* I walked into it a day later and used the bad number to argue against the record that documents it. What remains established is unchanged — v0.120.0 downloadable 2026-08-08 14:29 UTC, 404 by 2026-08-09 09:30 UTC, and the generic package now holding exactly the newest ten. **THEREFORE NO GATE WAS SILENCED AND NO WORKFLOW WAS CHANGED.** Silencing it would hide a released-but-uninstallable version, which is the exact R-115 defect the gate exists to catch. **It will recur:** if the ten-version window is real, the next publish evicts `Line truncated
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| **R-288** | **The capability map is too long to be read, and that is why it stops being true.** `architecture/00-capability-map.md` is **134 642 bytes / 19 456 words across 99 table rows in only 159 lines** — because the rows ARE the length. Measured, longest first: the unaided-recovery-journey row is **3 024 words**, the offsite-password-recovery row **1 087**, the unattended-restore-proof row **971**, the app/guest-network-failure row **904**. That single longest row is a novella of nested corrections, each appended rather than resolved. Its own verification stamp reads **2026-07-16 against evidence corpus @ felhom.eu tip `4b18cc5`** (line 23) — three weeks stale, which is the measurable consequence: nobody re-reads a row they cannot finish. **This is the project's memory, so restructuring it is surgery and wants daylight** — filed, deliberately not attempted in the 2026-08-09 session. **What the shape should probably be:** one line of status per capability plus a dated evidence pointer, with the argument moved to the audit it came from | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Do not fold this into another session; it needs its own. **SECOND CONCRETE COST, 2026-08-10 — and it is a different failure mode from the first.** An *execution record* — 33 package deletions on the operator's rule — was undiscoverable for two days because it lives **inside the row about the Configuration page being slow**. Two sessions searched for it: one reported "no register row records a package prune", the other exhausted the Gitea logs, the activity feed and the schema before concluding it might be unestablishable. It was in `OPEN-ITEMS.md` the whole time. **The first cost (2026-08-09) was two records that looked contradictory and were not; this one is a record that could not be found at all.** Illegibility now has two measured costs and they are different in kind: prose rows make claims ambiguous, and rows-about-other-things make facts unfindable. **The rule this earns is in CONTEXT.md: a record that lives inside a row about something else has not been recorded** | Viktor |
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| **R-289** | **R-182's register row describes a defect the code no longer has — an OPEN row that is a false alarm.** The row reads *"A full disk tells the operator about ONE app and silently swallows every other app's refusal for an hour"*, cited at `hub/internal/notify/dispatcher.go:268`. **Read against live source 2026-08-09, that is fixed:** the per-run digest `backup_run_failures` is allowlisted (`hub/internal/api/handler.go:1837`), operator-only (`dispatcher.go:423`) and templated (`notify/templates.go:48`); `recovery_unit_capture_failed` is now a **record-only** event (`dispatcher.go:376`) whose notification IS the digest, listing every failed app in one mail; and a cooldown drop now writes a `suppressed` row instead of vanishing (`dispatcher.go:314-330`). The capability map already records the fixed shape (*"EVERY failing app, in ONE mail per run"*). **So the register is behind the code, which is the mirror of the decay this session was looking for** — the session expected stale PROOFS and found a stale DEFECT. **Not closed here, deliberately:** the digest's *delivery* has never been observed end to end (the page's own "an app crashes — the email leg has never been confirmed" card), so the honest move is to re-scope R-182 to that residue rather than tick it | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Re-scope R-182 to "the digest has never been seen delivering", or close it and open that | CC |
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| **R-290** | **Most capability-map rows that back a green dot cite no evidence document at all — measured, 20 of 28 probed.** The page's *Walked* means *"done end to end on real hardware, evidence on file"*. Extracting the evidence column for the 28 rows behind the page's claims found a `tests/` or `audits/` path in **8**; the other 20 carry prose only. **Consequence, applied this session:** of 32 claims the page drew as Walked, **12 were downgraded to Built** because no walk document exists for them — `install.installer-by-tag`, `use.lifecycle`, `drives.enrol`, `drives.migrate`, `backup.tier1`, `backup.whole-machine`, `backup.restore-proof`, `fault.selfheal`, `fault.operator-email`, `fail.drive-filling`, `fail.lost-recovery-code`, `fail.hub-down`. **This is not a claim that those twelve are false** — several are near-certainly fine — it is a claim that nothing on file distinguishes them from an opinion, which is exactly what the status word promises. **The gate now enforces it going forward:** `scripts/check_stands.py` fails on `status: walked` with no `evidence:` source. **What is owed:** either a walk document per row, or an honest demotion in the map itself (the map is the source; the dataset only follows it) | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-09** | R-288 | The dataset was corrected; **the capability map itself still says PROVEN-LIVE for these rows** and is the thing to fix | Viktor |
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| **R-291** | **CI's installability assertion is now BOUNDED by a retention number, and the narrowing is recorded here so it can be widened deliberately rather than discovered.** `check-published-versions.py` demanded that **every** `v<semver>` tag still be downloadable while the registry demonstrably does not retain every version — two sensible rules that cannot both hold, which is why CI went red at a commit whose own run had been green the day before, and would have gone red again at the next publish. **The fix couples them:** `felhom-agent/scripts/retention-policy.json` is THE number (`generic_versions_kept: 10`) and the check reads it. **WHAT CI NO LONGER COVERS, stated plainly: a released version older than the retention window is no longer asserted downloadable.** Its git TAG and its config tree are still asserted — only the binary's presence is dropped — and the check **prints the dropped versions on every run**, so the narrowing cannot go quiet. Controls run: widened to 11 the evicted version re-enters and convicts (exit 1); the policy file removed gives INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2), never silently unbounded. **The number is an OBSERVED state, not a located ruling** (R-287) and the file says so. **The better bound, recorded rather than built:** the hub's vouched `min_agent` floor — nothing can install an agent below it, so a sub-floor version being un-downloadable costs nothing real; it needs the gate to read the hub, which is network it does not have today | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-09** | R-287 | Widen or replace the number when the deleter is established, or move the bound to the floor | CC |
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| **R-291** | **CI's installability assertion is now BOUNDED by a retention number, and the narrowing is recorded here so it can be widened deliberately rather than discovered.** `check-published-versions.py` demanded that **every** `v<semver>` tag still be downloadable while the registry demonstrably does not retain every version — two sensible rules that cannot both hold, which is why CI went red at a commit whose own run had been green the day before, and would have gone red again at the next publish. **The fix couples them:** `felhom-agent/scripts/retention-policy.json` is THE number (`generic_versions_kept: 10`) and the check reads it. **WHAT CI NO LONGER COVERS, stated plainly: a released version older than the retention window is no longer asserted downloadable.** Its git TAG and its config tree are still asserted — only the binary's presence is dropped — and the check **prints the dropped versions on every run**, so the narrowing cannot go quiet. Controls run: widened to 11 the evicted version re-enters and convicts (exit 1); the policy file removed gives INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2), never silently unbounded. **The number is an OBSERVED state, not a located ruling** (R-287) and the file says so. **The better bound, recorded rather than built:** the hub's vouched `min_agent` floor — nothing can install an agent below it, so a sub-floor version being un-downloadable costs nothing real; it needs the gate to read the hub, which is network it does not have today | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-09** | R-287 | ~~Widen or replace the number when the deleter is established~~ — **CONDITION RELEASED 2026-08-10: the deleter IS established (R-287), so the operator is no longer blocked on establishing what was already written down.** The number can now be confirmed or replaced on its merits. The better bound remains the vouched `min_agent` floor | CC |
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| **R-292** | **The artifact-save flash conflates three different facts, and a failing test found it rather than a reading.** `artifact_sha_invalid` reads *"the Gitea sha lookup failed (version missing / Gitea unreachable) or the manually-entered sha is invalid"* — three causes, one message, and the operator acts differently on each. It surfaced because scenario E of the new installability gate kept reporting `artifact_sha_invalid` where it expected `artifact_unverifiable`: `resolveArtifactSHA` ran first and swallowed the distinction. **Worked around in v0.102.0 by ORDERING** — the installability probes now run before the sha resolution, so an unreachable registry is reported as unreachable — **but the underlying message is untouched and still conflates on its own paths** | **READY (XS) — NEW 2026-08-09** | — | Split it into "version not found", "registry unreachable" and "invalid sha" | CC |
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| **R-293** | **CENSUS, 2026-08-10 — no machine that is not ours can be in the state that cost demo-felhom its history, and here is the whole population.** Read-only against the hub store, with a control run first (the query returned *present (572 bytes)* for a host known to have material and *absent (NULL)* for one known not to — both cases from the two demo boxes, so the instrument was shown to distinguish the states before it was trusted). **The hub knows three hosts.** `demo-felhom-8363b5` and `demo-hp-bb76ea` each hold one superseded escrow with **`identity_blob` ABSENT**, superseded **07:20:08** and **07:15:36** on 2026-08-04 — both **before** the retention fix was in force, pinned at **11:11:37Z** from the hub's own first post-fix escrow row (a date-only comparison mislabels these as "after" and was corrected). `drill-r50-0a4f9a` has no supersession. **`peti-felhom` — the tester's machine — has NO host row and NO escrow at all**, and neither does `david`; the orphan check found no escrow row pointing at an unknown host. **So the answer is: no, not today, and not tomorrow either** — any future enrolment escrows under the fixed code. **What this does NOT claim:** that a retained blob has ever been *unwrapped* on a superseded row. Retention is proven; the recovery FROM a superseded row is still unexercised | **CLOSED-INFORMATIONAL 2026-08-10** | — | The machine was not contacted; only the hub's records were read | CC |
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| **R-294** | **The orphan card promises restorability that the box rendering it cannot evaluate — specified, not implemented.** The card says the set-aside copies *"a hozzá tartozó helyreállítási kóddal később visszaállítható lehet"* (`controller/internal/web/templates/backups_remote.html:101`). **The discriminator lives in the hub** (`host_escrow_superseded.identity_blob`, `hub/internal/store/store.go:393`); **the box caches only `HubEscrowIdentityPresent`** (`controller/internal/settings/settings.go:71`), which describes the CURRENT escrow, not a superseded one; and **no field on the report or ACK wire carries superseded-blob retention**. So the renderer cannot tell which case the customer is in — **a conditional promise the system cannot evaluate is the same defect as an unconditional false one.** Replacement Hungarian copy, the surfaces at `file:line`, and the render tests that should pin it: **`documentation/design/SPEC-orphan-card-copy-2026-08-10.md`**. **Deliberately NOT implemented:** it lands in the controller, and a controller release is undelivered until a golden carries it (R-242) — one bake, one approval. **It should ship with the next controller change so one bake covers both**, and the spec says so. Parent: **R-202** | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-10** | R-202 | Implement with the next controller release, not on its own | CC |
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**Explicitly still open, untouched by this session:** R-246, R-255, R-256, R-257, R-261, R-262,
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R-263, **R-264** (the twenty-one undecided facts — a design session of its own), R-240, R-243,
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