security review 2: findings, coverage, comparison with October; 13 more rows (R-1420..R-1432), notes on five rows, decisions D90 and D91, REPORT (254 -> 272 rows; docs only)
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# Comparison with the October review (2026-10-12) — Part R
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October's list was opened only after all areas of this pass were read and the second reads were back.
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## 1. Tags
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New: 26 of 29 ids. Known: S2-02 (October SR-17, R-984 — filed there as „low risk", P4; this pass ranks it High),
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the mkfs part of S2-23 (SR-17), S2-29 (SR-12, SR-13). **Regression: none found.**
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Seven findings are gaps in a fix made after October (the allow-list of R-971: S2-03, S2-06, S2-07, S2-08, S2-09,
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S2-14, S2-15). They are new, not regressions: what R-971's fix checks, it still checks.
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## 2. October findings that were fixed — is the fix still there?
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| October | row | fix in the reviewed commit? | test exists and passes? (run in an export of the reviewed commit) |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| SR-01 global key in history | R-950 | the key is not in the manifest (`manifests/hub.yaml:76-80`) | manifest gate present; not re-run against history |
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| SR-02 three open hub routes | R-951 | yes | `TestCustomersRoutes_NoCredentialIsRefused`, `TestAPIRoutes_NoCredential` — pass |
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| SR-03 hub-key settings route on the box | R-970 | yes, no route takes the hub key | `r970_no_hub_key_door_test.go` — passes |
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| SR-04 catalog privileges | R-971 | yes, `internal/privpolicy` — **with the seven gaps above** | `privpolicy` package — passes |
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| SR-05 old Go, base images | R-972 | yes: Go 1.27.4 in all three, base images by digest | — |
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| SR-06 forced backups prune | R-973 | yes, cadence cap | `localapi` cap tests — pass |
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| SR-08 unsealed tokens | R-975 | yes | store seal tests — pass |
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| SR-09 family sessions | R-976 | yes | `r983_r976_test.go` — passes |
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| SR-10 FileBrowser default, tunnel before claim | R-977 | not re-checked in this pass | — |
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| SR-11 escrow ceremony voids the code | R-978 | agent side yes; **the hub side is S2-18** | `localapi` — passes |
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| SR-14 homepage with the Docker socket | R-981 | yes, no socket in any template | — |
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| SR-15 root password SSH from the LAN | R-982 | yes (measured on demo-hp) | — |
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| SR-16 seven dashboard items | R-983 | the try reservation is there; the other six not re-checked one by one | `r983_r976_test.go` — passes |
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| SR-18 zero-knowledge wording | R-985 | not re-checked | — |
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| SR-19 scanner on push | R-986 | `scripts/security_scan_gate.py` exists | not run |
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| SR-20 exposure window | R-954 | a decision; closed by the rotation (Tester 2: R-1139 open) | — |
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| SR-22 hub route guard | R-952 | yes; it pins the switch, not the handlers (S2-26) | route table tests — pass |
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| SR-23 ArgoCD prune | R-953 | not re-checked (live cluster) | — |
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## 3. Areas October marked „not reviewed" — reached now?
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| October's gap | now |
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|---|---|
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| the claim engine | reached (holds; S2-11 is its cost under a taken-over hub) |
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| the `/bind` page's guessing limits | reached (holds; two lows in S2-26; address limit: cannot tell, S2-19) |
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| server-side fetches beyond Cloudflare and Gitea | reached (holds) |
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| live cross-box GETs (R-955) | not done — source and tests only |
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| Gitea branch and tag protection (live) | not done |
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| the CI runner as a push path | reached, static (S2-25) |
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| the golden image's start unit | not done |
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| the hub's request logging | partly (the access log's path redaction holds) |
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| export and debug bundles | export: reached (S2-03, S2-04); debug bundle content: not done |
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| catalog apps changed before 2026-09-28 | out of scope here |
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## 4. October findings this pass did NOT find
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| October | why |
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|---|---|
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| SR-07 (R-974) the PBS root wrapper | area reached; the helper saw the open row and did not re-read the wrapper — not an independent find |
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| SR-17, three of its nine items: the local API reachable from the LAN by a static route; a sudoers inspect pattern wider than needed; install passes secrets on the command line | reached but missed (the LAN scan of the host's own address shows 8443 closed; a static route was not tried) |
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| SR-19 second half (R-987), catalog images never scanned | out of scope by the brief |
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| SR-21 a gate test writes into the real repo from a worktree | out of scope (process) |
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| SR-24 (R-955) | confirmed, not „found": no cross-box route exists in source |
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Found again without knowing October's list: SR-12, SR-13, and five of SR-17's items (backup target, mkfs, no size
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bounds on the guest spec, world-readable guest settings, rpcbind and DNS on the LAN).
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**The count: of October's 6 still-open findings, this pass found 2 fully and 1 mostly on its own, confirmed 1, did
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not re-read 1, and 1 was out of scope. October did not have 26 of this pass's 29.**
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@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
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# Coverage — security review 2 (2026-11-19)
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Reviewed commits: see `REPORT.md`. An area not yet written here is **not reviewed yet**.
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Reviewed commits: see `FINDINGS.md`. Method per area: first the files changed since October's commit, then the whole
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area. Source reading by one helper per area (no two on one area); every Critical and High re-traced by a fresh second
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reader; live measurements only on `demo-hp` and its scratch guest 9202. Nothing was provisioned. Throwaway containers
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and temp files made for three measurements on 9202 were removed in the same command (checked: none left).
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| area | state |
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|---|---|
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| C2 hub | not reviewed yet |
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| C4 hub → agent jobs | not reviewed yet |
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| C5 supply chain | not reviewed yet |
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| C1 box from the internet | not reviewed yet |
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| C3 controller → agent | not reviewed yet |
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| C6 secrets | not reviewed yet |
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| C7 host and guest hardening | not reviewed yet |
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| C8 public sites | not reviewed yet |
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| area | changed-since-October files reviewed | checked and holds | checked and fails | not reviewed |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| **C2 hub** | all 20 non-test files of `hub/internal/api/`; `web/` routes, tokens, opactions, offsite_window, server, selfbind*, configs, hosts, os_updates, customer_delete/reset, logbundle, logtail; `claim/engine`; `notify/dispatcher` (send path); `configgen`; `accesslog`; `manifests/hub.yaml` | **no route lets one box's key read or change another box's or customer's record** (all 54 API routes, ids in path, body and second-order ids); box keys 256-bit, sealed, constant-time; global key constant-time, empty never matches; operator tokens hashed, expiring, never reach a credential; CSRF before the switch on every non-GET; self-bind token 256-bit, one use, 5 failures lock; SQL parameterised everywhere; no fetch to a box-supplied address; all HTML through `html/template`; own-host escrow reads recorded and mailed; October's route-table tests pass and cover all cases | S2-10, S2-11, S2-12, S2-13, S2-17, S2-18, S2-19, S2-20, S2-26 | D84 off-site-ending internals; `osupdates/kernel.go` and the approval code; `dbsnap`, `mailhold`, `wgsync`, `tenantsync`, `hetznerapi`, `pbsdrheal`, `offsiteheal`, `monitor` bodies; templates line by line; **the ingress controller's own settings (not in git)**; which operator password is live |
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| **C4 hub → agent jobs** | `signedjobs/*`, `authz/*`, `felhom-opsign`, `hub/client,loop,report`, `osupdate/bundle,kernel,leg`, `selfupdate/commit,executor`, `configs/felhom-os-apply` (verify, update, bundle, plan checks), `reconcile/classify`, `localapi/opactions,opreboot` | **no unsigned hub instruction destroys or overwrites the only copy of data**; the verify order is as `04` §2.3 in the Go agent and in the root wrapper; box A's signature refused at box B; an invalid signature never burns a number; the Go number store survives restart and fails closed; a bundle cannot change who may sign; the binary is checked as root against the signed hash; decommission and restore-overwrite by desired state are refused | S2-16, S2-28 | `felhom-os-apply`: profile refresh, CA copy, kernel clean-up, the after-boot modes, the apply body; `reconcile/bringup`, restore-test; `wgtunnel`; `felhom-backup-target-apply` (C3 read it) |
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| **C5 supply chain** | `privpolicy/*` (new), `stacks/allowlist`, `media_library` (new), `deploy`, `sync/sync`, `selfupdate/updater`, `bootstrap`, `appexport/restore`, `infra/*`; all 66 catalog compose files; the CI workflows; `homelab-manifests` runner, Gitea and ArgoCD app files | the allow-list's own classes hold as written (long-syntax binds, `..`, variables, merge keys); it runs before the write on install, sync, settings change, update and unit restore; the agent accepts only our controller image name and version; the floor only moves a box up; the agent binary and bundle are bound by a signed hash; OS packages by exact version, no unlisted package; **no catalog template uses privileged mode, added capabilities, devices, host or pid namespaces, the Docker socket or a host path outside its roots**; Gitea sign-up off; registry refuses an anonymous read (measured) | S2-06, S2-07, S2-08, S2-09, S2-14, S2-15, S2-25, S2-29 | hub `osupdates` approval logic; the traefik dynamic files written from catalog strings; `steps/*.yml` beyond the admit call; the catalog's own CI privilege gate; ISO build scripts; the golden pipeline; **Gitea's live settings (who can push, branch protection)** |
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| **C1 box from the internet** | `cmd/controller/main.go`; `web/` server, auth, csrf, claim, clientaddr, session_store, setup_gate, family_gate, files_sso (new), share*, after_start (new), media_events; `family`; `infra` templates; `mailrelay/*`; `assets/syncer`; `report/claim_sync`; `appexport/*`; `stacks/` allowlist, deploy, delete, samba, kept, migrate; storage, sharing and export handlers; page scripts of 9 templates | every route but the health check is behind the session and CSRF; **no route takes the hub key** (October's test passes); the visitor address is read from the right hop only; client-written forwarding headers are removed; the try is reserved before the slow compare on sign-in, share, family and re-auth; sessions stored as fingerprints, host-only cookie, ended by a password change; no open redirect; a family session never opens the dashboard; share links 160-bit; archive unpack confined (`os.Root`); off-site target arguments checked; install values travel as environment, not a file | S2-03, S2-04, S2-05, S2-11, S2-17, S2-21, S2-22, S2-27 | most of `handlers.go`; the bodies of off-site, recovery, network-storage and kept handlers; `internal/backup` beyond target checks and the copy deletes (about 50 000 lines); `quiesce`, `aftercrash`, `offsiteapply`, `recovery`, `cloudflare`, `integrations`, `upwatch`; `/api/debug/*` bodies; the error-path lens |
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| **C3 controller → agent** | `localapi/` server, backup_cap, backup_target, disks, intermediary, hostpoweroff, guestmemory, guest_oom, linetest, samedisk, escrow_ceremony; `poweroff/state`; both sudoers files; `felhom-priv-apply`, `-mkfs-guarded`, `-internal-place`, `-thin-check`, `-vzdump-partial-clean`, `-selfupdate-guarded`, `-backup-target-apply` | every route bound to the token's guest, constant-time; 64 KiB body cap; **October's three guards still hold**: the backup cadence cap (R-973), the escrow upload only at the claim (R-978, agent side), power-off once per power-on (R-998); controller swap accepts only our image, checked again as root; network mounts need `nosuid,nodev`; no handler returns a host secret | S2-01, S2-02, S2-23, S2-24, S2-28 | `felhom-os-apply` beyond its arguments; `felhom-pbs-apply` (R-974 open, not re-read); the root side of the escrow ceremony; packages `backup`, `pbs`, `pbsdr`, `dr`, `provision`, `proxmox`, `guestnet` and 9 more; 11 smaller `localapi` files |
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| **C6 secrets** | lines added since October in all four repos, searched for secret shapes | no new secret literal in code since October (pattern search; R-925's old file is open and known); on demo-hp (measured): agent state, keys and config 0600, agent runs as its own user, root-owned binary and wrappers; in guest 9202: controller settings hold only bcrypt hashes and one encrypted value; app records 0600; a week of agent and controller logs holds no token or password value | S2-28 (pairing code file 0644 on the host) | hub-side storage (the read of the running hub was refused to CC); the debug dump's content; export bundles' content |
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| **C7 host and guest** | — | measured on demo-hp: from the LAN only 22, 53, 111, 3128, 8006 answer (full TCP connect scan from DooPlex); the operator's SSH door (8822) and the local API (8443) do not answer from the LAN; host SSH is key-only for root and no other account has a password; guests unprivileged, guest root has no password; the agent's Proxmox rights are pool-scoped | S2-23, S2-28 | the firewall rule that keeps the local API off the LAN was not read; `nmap` is not installed on DooPlex, so the scan was a plain connect loop |
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| **C8 public sites** | — | read-only GETs: http → https on felhom.eu; no `.git` or `.env`; HSTS on the hub; the registry and `homelab-manifests` refuse anonymous reads | S2-26 (no frame or content-type header on the hub's pages; felhom.eu sends no HSTS header of its own) | everything beyond response headers of ten addresses |
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# Security review 2 (2026-11-19) — findings
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Reviewed: `felhom.eu@b7d8f75b` (hub 0.182.0) · `felhom-controller@10df99b8` · `felhom-agent@3411592b` ·
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`app-catalog-felhom.eu@b6058150` · `homelab-manifests@1908bc68` (hub, runner and registry parts only).
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**For an open finding this page names the missing check and the harm only.** The evidence column gives ONE landmark
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(`file:line` of the place where the check is missing). The full path through the code, the measurements and the second
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readers' answers are held off-git on DooPlex: `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/security-review-2-2026-11-19-PRIVATE/`
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(`INDEX.md` maps each id to its files).
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Columns: `who` = attacker of `13-threat-model.md` §3 (a stranger · b LAN · c family member · d bad app · e taken-over
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controller · f taken-over hub · g taken-over Gitea/registry · j hacked DooPlex pod). `ctl` = felhom-controller
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`controller/`, `agt` = felhom-agent, `hub` = felhom.eu `hub/`. `second read`: a fresh helper that did not see the
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reasoning (holds / does not hold / disputed), or „self". No finding is disputed.
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| ID | area | title | who | harm | evidence (landmark) | static / measured | design or defect | new / known | tech sev | Sev | second read | row |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| S2-01 | C3 | The agent's disk assign and guest-attach routes act as root on caller-named paths; no enrolled-drive check, links followed | e | root on the Proxmox host | `agt internal/localapi/disks.go:494`, `intermediary.go:187-194` | static; the 3 host facts measured (demo-hp) | defect | new | Critical | P2 | holds | R-1406 |
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| S2-02 | C3 | The backup-target route accepts a mount the guest can write, with a caller-chosen storage id | e | whole-guest backups moved where the guest can erase or forge them, no signature | `agt internal/localapi/backup_target.go:113-137` | static | defect | known (October SR-17, R-984 — under-ranked) | High | P2 | holds | R-984 (note, re-ranked) |
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| S2-03 | C1 | A `.fab` import never asks the privilege allow-list; any bundle file is written and started; infrastructure names accepted | household click on a file from anyone; b via a network share | root in the guest | `ctl internal/appexport/restore.go:551-590` | static | defect | new (the allow-list of R-971 postdates October) | High | P2 | holds | R-1407 |
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| S2-04 | C1 | A `.fab` import unpacks drive data where the bundle says; also into another app's volume | as S2-03 | root-owned file write across apps and stacks | `ctl internal/appexport/restore.go:745-754` | static | defect | new | High | P2 | holds | R-1407 |
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| S2-05 | C1 | Job error text is put into dashboard pages unescaped; it can hold an app-chosen file name or a bundle field; no script policy | d, or a prepared bundle | script with the household's session: every dashboard act | `ctl internal/web/templates/app_data.html:447` | static | defect | new | High | P2 | holds | R-1408 |
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| S2-06 | C5 | App setting NAMES reach the compose tool's environment unfiltered, and no call names the file or project | g (no household act for an installed app); bundle | a definition the allow-list never judged runs | `ctl internal/stacks/manager.go:1627`, `:1664` | static + tool behaviour measured (9202) | defect | new | High | P2 | holds | R-1409 |
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| S2-07 | C5 | The media-library override file is built as text from catalog values and is never judged | g | any service key on a media app, outside the allow-list | `ctl internal/stacks/media_library.go:247` | static | defect | new | High | P2 | holds | R-1420 |
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| S2-08 | C5 | The compose file's own project `name` is not judged; a catalog app can address another stack's containers | g | catalog commands run inside an infrastructure container (traefik holds the Docker socket) | `ctl internal/privpolicy/privpolicy.go:280-307` | static + measured (9202, throwaway containers) | defect | new | High | P2 | holds | R-1420 |
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| S2-09 | C5 | A bind source is judged when written, not when the container starts; one template lets the app swap it | d (no catalog push) | at its next start the app gets a guest folder the allow-list would refuse | `app-catalog templates/transmission/docker-compose.yml:88,91` | static + measured (9202: re-resolved at restart) | defect (template) + design limit | new | High | P2 | holds | R-1421 |
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| S2-10 | C2 | The operator start password's hash is in the public hub manifest since 2026-02-16 and is the fallback password | a (offline) | if still live: the whole hub, break-glass passwords included | `felhom.eu manifests/hub.yaml:74` | static; live state NOT measured | defect | new (public source is accepted, R-925; this hash is not named there) | High (conditional) | P2 (P1 if live) | holds | R-1410 |
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| S2-11 | C2/C1 | The hub can give a CLAIMED box a new reset code, choose the box's catalog address and tunnel, and place files in the dashboard's origin — all unsigned | f (live hub; not a read-only copy) | every household's dashboard and app plane, no household act, no notice the hub cannot hold back | `ctl internal/report/claim_sync.go:40-52`, `internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go:184-223`, `internal/assets/syncer.go:273` | static | design (the reset by mail is chosen; its cost under a taken-over hub is written nowhere) | new | High | P2 | holds | R-1422 (decision D90) |
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| S2-12 | C2 | No limit on wrong operator sign-ins (form or Basic) | a (from HU/IE) | unlimited online guessing; cheap slow-down of the hub | `hub internal/web/server.go:916`, `:942` | static | defect | new | Medium | P2 | holds | R-1410 |
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| S2-13 | C2 | An operator session cannot be ended; a password change keeps it 7 days | holder of a stolen cookie | a rotation does not lock the thief out | `hub internal/web/server.go:1291` | static | design by comment only | new | Medium | P2 | holds | R-1410 |
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| S2-14 | C5 | `networks` is not judged at either level | g | an app joins the file manager's private route or the tunnel network (host network by this route: refused by Docker, measured) | `ctl internal/privpolicy/privpolicy.go:331` | static + measured | defect | new | Medium | P2 | holds | R-1420 |
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| S2-15 | C5 | Traefik labels are not judged; the provider has no constraint | g | a catalog app answers for the dashboard's or another app's name | `ctl internal/infra/templates/traefik.yml.tmpl:32-37` | static | design gap | new | Medium | P2 | self | R-1420 |
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| S2-16 | C4 | An unsigned job with a harmless op name crashes the agent; the job stays queued | f; holder of the hub's global key | agent down until someone removes the job at the box: no backups, no supervisor, no signed fix | `agt internal/signedjobs/runner.go:210-211` | static | defect (older than October) | new | Medium | P3 | self | R-1423 |
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| S2-17 | C2/C1 | The hub mails box-written text to a box-chosen address; `/notify` has no list or limit; `/mail` and the box's relay check only the sender's domain | e, d | mail that truly comes from Felhom's address to anyone; quota and reputation | `hub internal/api/handler.go:2759`, `internal/api/mail.go:124-134`; `ctl internal/mailrelay/policy.go:40-76` | static | defect (address by the box: design, D84) | new | Medium | P3 | self | R-1424 |
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| S2-18 | C2 | Re-enroll, while armed, needs no proof and can repeat; a second appliance register replaces the token and clears a bind; a host key can replace its sealed recovery package in place | a (armed window); b; host key holder | a caller becomes the host; a first-boot hand-over goes to the wrong caller; the recovery code opens nothing | `hub internal/api/dr.go:116-134`, `internal/store/appliance.go:74-100`, `internal/store/store.go:3592-3603` | static | defect (the open doors: design, `13` §4) | new (the hub half of October SR-11) | Medium | P3 | self | R-1425 |
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| S2-19 | C2 | No rate or size limit on any box route; limits by address rest on an ingress setting not in git; the geo rule lets any `10.` source in | e; a; j | one box fills or stalls the hub; address limits may be void | `hub internal/api/handler.go:458`; `felhom.eu manifests/hub.yaml:349` | static; ingress: cannot tell | defect | new | Medium | P3 | self | R-1426 |
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| S2-20 | C2/C5 | One ring-0 box alone decides a package in the automatic fleet release | taken-over demo box | box → hub → every ring-1 box's package list (name and version shape re-checked on the box) | `hub internal/osupdates/service.go:370` | static | design (`11` §) — to weigh | new | Medium | P3 | self | R-1426 |
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| S2-21 | C1 | A share's folder path is written raw into the Samba config; „add storage path" accepts the stacks folder | household session; d by a folder name | extra Samba settings; app definitions editable from the LAN | `ctl internal/infra/samba.go:116`, `internal/web/handlers.go:3609` | static | defect | new | Medium | P3 | self | R-1427 |
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| S2-22 | C1 | A stranger can keep the claim/reset page shut for everyone, and make the hub mail the household and replace a pending code | a | no claim, no reset, while it lasts | `ctl internal/web/claim.go:193-200`, `:447-481` | static | design in part (R-983) | new | Medium | P3 | self | R-1427 |
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| S2-23 | C3/C7 | Root helpers trust paths under the agent's own folder (bootstrap chown and bind, self-update marker); mkfs wrapper takes any block node | a taken-over agent process | root, or another guest's volume (BYO) | `agt configs/felhom-agent.sudoers:47-48`, `configs/felhom-selfupdate-guarded:123-137`, `configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh:69-80` | static | defect | mkfs: known (R-984); the rest new, same class as R-974 | Medium | P3 | self | R-1428 |
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| S2-24 | C3 | The format route's „confirmation" is sent by the controller itself | e | wipe of any plugged, unmounted, non-system disk (BYO: the owner's own) | `agt internal/localapi/disks.go:926` | static | design (`16`) against `03` §4 | new | Medium | P3 | self | R-1428 |
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| S2-25 | C5 | One CI runner serves all four repos in host mode with a shared file system; a nightly job holds a write token for `main` | whoever can push to one repo | one repo's push right becomes all four's | `homelab-manifests gitea-system/act-runner.yaml:131` | static | design + gap | new | Medium | P3 | self | R-1429 |
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| S2-26 | C2 | Hub lows: no security headers; a box-written link on the customer page; bind counter race and unswept limiter; reveal without a timeline row for an unbound host; token can read app log tails; id oracles; two fail-open reads; route tests pin the switch, not the handlers | a, e, operator | small each | list in the private index | static + headers measured | defect | new; R-955 and R-1054 noted | Low | P4 | self | R-1430 |
|
||||
| S2-27 | C1 | Controller lows: claim try counted after the compare; sign-in limit per address only; current-password check unlimited; cookie can be shadowed from an app subdomain; notice text from the address bar; debug log prints field values; unbounded bundle unpack; userdata skeleton follows a link; no test pins the no-session route list; stale compose file publishes port 8080; `initial_creds` reads any container; sync follows a git link | a, d, g | small each | list in the private index | static | defect | new | Low | P4 | self | R-1431 |
|
||||
| S2-28 | C4/C7 | Agent lows: wrapper nonce file fails open; no „not older" rule for a signed update; `pbs_dr` grant before the type check; poke bound to an address, not the interface; hub TLS by public roots only; restart races; `pct` verbs take any vmid; local mount options; snapshot count; power-off key; plan file race; pairing code file left world-readable | f, taken-over agent | small each | list in the private index | static + measured | defect / design | new; R-984 noted | Low | P4 | self | R-1432 |
|
||||
| S2-29 | C5 | Controller image by tag (R-979) and installer by movable tag (R-980): both still open as written | g | — | — | static | — | known (October SR-12, SR-13) | High (as rows) | P3 | self | R-979, R-980 (notes) |
|
||||
|
||||
## The Critical and the Highs — one paragraph each
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-01 (Critical).** Missing: the agent does not tie the filesystem it mounts to a disk the product may use, does not
|
||||
require an enrolled drive for the attach, and its root steps follow a link. Harm: a taken-over controller reaches root
|
||||
on the host, which `13` §5 says cannot happen. Fix: accept only an offered disk; require a registered user-data drive;
|
||||
one root helper with no-follow opens; `nosuid,nodev`. Test: with the namespace folder a link to a sentinel directory,
|
||||
the attach refuses and the sentinel's owner is unchanged; an assign with a mounted system volume's id is refused.
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-02 (High, known as part of R-984).** Missing: a rule that the new target is a raw drive mount the guest cannot
|
||||
write, and a fixed storage id. Harm: the primary whole-guest backup silently moves where guest root can delete or
|
||||
replace it. Fix in the root wrapper; consider a signature for moving the target. Test: the wrapper refuses a
|
||||
guest-facing bind, a tmpfs and a network mount.
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-03 / S2-04 (High).** Missing: the allow-list call, a file-name list, an infrastructure-name refusal, and a
|
||||
data-path rule on the import path. Harm: one import click runs what the box refuses from the catalog and writes outside
|
||||
the app. Fix and test: in the R-1407 row.
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-05 (High).** Missing: escaping where page scripts insert job errors, and a script policy. Harm: a hacked app
|
||||
crosses from one container to the whole dashboard when the household exports or imports it. Test: markup in a step
|
||||
error renders as text; a template gate fails on an unescaped insert.
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-06 (High).** Missing: a rule on setting names, and an explicit file and project on every compose call. Harm: the
|
||||
allow-list (R-971's fix) is passed by a catalog commit alone. Test: a reserved name is dropped at load; the argument
|
||||
list carries the file.
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-07 / S2-08 (High).** Missing: a YAML encoder and a character rule for the override, the override in the judged
|
||||
set, and `name` as a refused key. Harm: as S2-06, by two more routes. Test: an override built from a value with a line
|
||||
break parses to exactly one `volumes` key; a compose with `name` is refused.
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-09 (High).** Missing: a check at start time, and a catalog rule against a bind inside another read-write bind.
|
||||
Harm: a hacked download app reaches guest folders after its own restart. Test: the catalog gate refuses the nested
|
||||
pair; a start path refuses a source that now resolves outside the app's roots.
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-10 (High, conditional).** Missing: the start hash is a secret-derived value in a public file. Harm: offline
|
||||
guessing of the one password that opens the hub — only while that password is live. Fix: Secret, new password, gate.
|
||||
Test: the manifest gate refuses a non-empty hash.
|
||||
|
||||
**S2-11 (High, a decision).** Not a missing check but an unstated cost: three unsigned controller-side channels let a
|
||||
taken-over hub take dashboards and choose the app source. The signed-job guarantee of `01` §4 holds where it is
|
||||
written (the agent). Options are in `STATUS.md` D90.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user