security review 2: findings, coverage, comparison with October; 13 more rows (R-1420..R-1432), notes on five rows, decisions D90 and D91, REPORT (254 -> 272 rows; docs only)
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@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ Newest first. CC's pick is in the „Pick" column. Each row also has its full te
| # | Row | Question | Pick (why) | The other option costs | If you do nothing | Blocked |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D91 | R-1410 | **Answer today.** The scrambled form of the hub's FIRST password has been in the public repository since 2026-02-16, and the hub has no limit on wrong tries. Did you change the hub password on the Configuration page after that date — and will you change it now in any case? | **Change it now** (one minute on the Configuration page; then the public value opens nothing while the stored one is readable. CC could not read which password is live) | keep it: if the February password is still the live one, a stranger can guess at it offline with no trace, and it opens everything, the boxes' emergency passwords too — then R-1410 is a P1 | the same as „keep it” | the hub fix task (hash out of git, try limit, sign-out) |
| D90 | R-1422 | A taken-over hub can today give any claimed box a new reset code (and so a new dashboard password), and can choose where a box takes its apps from. Close this by design, or accept it for the beta? | **Close it** (a reset of a claimed box, and a change of the box's app source, need your signature, like an agent update; the hub then cannot do either alone) | accept: nothing is built; we write into the threat model that the hub alone can take over dashboards, and the security text for customers must not say otherwise | it stays as it is, and no document says so; the next reader files it again | the design note for R-1422; nothing else |
| D89 | R-1374 | When a household's notification address is changed while an off-site deletion waits, send one mail to the OLD address too? | **Yes** (it closes the last way a stolen login deletes copies unseen: today only the new address is told) | no: nothing new is mailed and no old address is kept; a person who changes the address and keeps it changed gets the notice himself | as built: only the address of the day is told | — |
| D88 | R-1374 | How do we prove the off-site deletion before households can use it: by time, or by hand-dated rows? | **By time** (the scratch box presses on the release day and is the first box whose copies go, 30 days later; nothing is written by hand) | by hand: the removal is seen on the release day, but two rows of the live hub's database are written by hand, and the 30-day clocks are not proven | by time | the release of Part A |
| D66 | R-1365 | Should a security-watch source that stays down mail again every 7 days, as an open notice does? Today it mails once, then only the Monday summary lists it. | **Yes** (a real outage then cannot be forgotten; the seven pins that can never be read no longer count, so it stays quiet when all is well) | no: one line in a long Monday mail stays the only reminder | a source that stays down mails once; the Monday list still shows it | — |