Move the local whole-guest backup off the guest's own device (demo-hp + demo-felhom)
Supervised operational run. No code, no version bump, nothing deleted.
Primary backup tier on both demo boxes moved from `local` (a dir storage on
/var/lib/vz -- the SAME physical device as the guest) to `felhom-backup`, a dir
storage on each box's secondary drive:
demo-hp /mnt/nvme-1tb uuid:91d2dc2d-... archive 2,256,044,492 B
demo-felhom /mnt/hdd_1 uuid:47a3361a-... archive 5,957,878,962 B
Both proven end to end via the real UI path: archive lands on the secondary
drive (df delta matches the archive byte-for-byte), restore-test auto-selects it
and passes with mount_parity: ok, and freshness survives an agent restart with
an empty in-memory store -- so the age can only have come from the new storage.
Phase 0: the target is CONFIGURATION, not converged (the sole writer of
agent.json touches only escrow.pbs_storage_id and preserves unknown keys), so
the runbook's STOP did not fire. No consumer hardcodes "local" on the backup path.
Findings:
- F-1 the storage path must BE the mountpoint; a subdirectory fails exactMount
and the target reports disconnected permanently (observe.go:321)
- F-2 --is_mountpoint 1 is load-bearing; proven live, an unguarded storage on a
non-mounted path reports active with the ROOT filesystem's free space and
had already created dump/ on pve-root -- a silent retarget onto the very
device this change escapes
- F-3 FelhomAgentStore is granted per storage path; without it every backup
403s. felhom-host-install.sh must issue it for new installs
- R-109 (new) the DR recipe records no backup target, and each box now carries
two content=backup dir storages, one live and one frozen
- R-105 narrowed and TRACED: dr_recipe drives was [] fleet-wide because the
enrolled drives were never PVE storages, so isUserDataDrive never saw
them. Both boxes now populate drives; SMART on the backup drives too
Absent-drive behaviour today is fail-loudly with no silent retarget (PVE half
live-proven; agent half source-traced). That is NOT the intended fall-back-and-
alarm design -- filed as E-2 with the honest single-drive label.
Reported in full in the record: the agent was restarted with a felhom-pbs backup
in flight, producing a spurious tier failure. The backup had in fact succeeded
(PVE task OK, 6,264,034,053 B snapshot) and the spurious failure reached no
channel -- R-84 ground truth superseded it.
Outstanding: full drive-loss recovery (needs physical access) and the agent half
of the absent-drive behaviour.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ State: `BLOCKED` · `READY` · `WAITING-ON-OPERATOR` · `WATCHING`. Every row ha
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| **F-REBOOT** | ~~A guest rebooted during its backup does not come back — shutdown completes, start never happens, no self-heal; 9m47s total appliance outage with every alarm silent~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (agent v0.107.0, 2026-07-28) | — | 60 s guest-power watchdog; `onboot` is the deliberate-stop discriminator (already the stale-lock path's, and what `pve-guests` consults), retry bounded 3x/1m-2m-4m then escalates once. Live on demo-hp: **120 s unattended** vs the incident's 587 s with a human; Scenario B proven (an `onboot:0` guest left stopped) | — |
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| **F-LEAK** | ~~A failed restore-test cannot destroy its own scratch guest (403 `VM.Allocate`); the 10-slot VMID band shrinks silently~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (agent v0.110.0 + host-install v1.21.0, 2026-07-28) | — | **Three attempts, two refuted live.** (1) Pool adoption: `PUT /pools/{pool}` also needs `VM.Allocate` on the VM — membership cannot bootstrap its own authority. (2) Per-path `/vms/990000..990009` ACLs: work, but PVE's destroy calls `remove_vm_access` (`LXC.pm:906`) which deletes every ACL at `/vms/<vmid>` — **consumed by the op it authorises**, one use per slot. (3) SHIPPED: 4th root-fenced exception, band enforced in sudoers **literally** (`pct destroy 99000[0-9] --purge`) + in code + at the caller; API destroy still tried first. Live: band PERMITTED, `9201`/`9100`/`9999`/`990010`/`1` REFUSED, and `pct start 990000` REFUSED too | — |
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| **F-OBS** | ~~`deadapp-check` leaves NO positive observable on a default (info-level) box — "no alarms" was indistinguishable from "never ran"~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (controller v0.180.0 + agent v0.109.0, 2026-07-28) | — | INFO summary every 20th scan carrying scans/evaluated/down. **Agent v0.109.0 fixes the same shape in the guest-power watchdog shipped hours earlier in v0.107.0** — it logged only at startup and when it acted, so its health could be read only from absence | — |
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| **E-2** | Drive-role machinery around the moved vzdump target: backup-target role on `StoragePath`, wizard assignment (never by transport/`removable`), no automatic roles, stickiness, `felhom-host-install.sh` creating the target **+ its `FelhomAgentStore` ACL**, absent-target policy, retention/space on a shared drive, honest single-drive label, remaining fleet migration | **READY (M)** | — | Architecture change PROVEN by hand on both demo boxes 2026-07-28 (`runbooks/RUNBOOK-vzdump-target-move-2026-07-29.md`); this is the machinery around a proven thing. Flips matrix row 4 | CC |
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| **R-109** | **The DR recipe records no backup target.** It lists every storage's name/type/content but never which one holds the local archives — and each demo box now carries TWO `content=backup` dir storages, `felhom-backup` (live) and `local` (frozen 2026-07-28 archives) | READY (XS) | — | Add the resolved `BackupTarget()` to the host-half. Third recipe-completeness defect beside R-105/R-106 | CC |
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| **R-89** | Retention as a per-customer **commercial** policy on the hub | READY (increment 2) | — | Policy object + reconciler → ep0 prune job; keep box tokens write-only | CC |
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| **R-92** | Hub PBS-DR gauge is 0.1 GB-granular — small deltas unverifiable | READY (XS) | — | Widen precision when retention becomes customer-visible | CC |
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| **R-93** | `drill-r50` is both a blocked customer and the only drift fixture | READY (XS) | — | Retire it for a synthetic fixture, or unblock + silence per-customer | CC |
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@@ -99,10 +99,12 @@
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| R-102 | **Tier-2 writes a full `recovery-unit/` mirror on every run and no code path reads it.** Written at `internal/backup/tier2.go:368-369` ("Unit leg (always)"); `RecoveryUnitPath` resolves to `backups/**primary**/` (`internal/appbackup/paths.go:46-48`) and the only reader of the secondary tree is `internal/backup/tier2_restore.go`, which reads `hdd/`+`userdata/` only (`:101-104`) | M | READY — 2026-07-28 | **Was C9-F4** (`OPEN-ITEMS.md`). The sharp edge is *when* it bites: Tier-2 exists for primary-drive loss, and in exactly that failure the primary unit is gone while this mirror survives on the second drive, unreachable by any customer action — leaving offsite as the only route. LIVE: demo-felhom's `backups/secondary/{bookstack,docmost}/` hold `recovery-unit` and nothing else, at 156 MB and 86 MB. Flips: the Tier-2 row in map §C; `07` §6.3, §7.2 |
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| R-103 | **The Tier-2 no-coverage refusal names the working action but does not route to it.** v0.183.0 refuses up front without stopping the app and tells the customer to use „Visszaállítás indítása" on the other page; it does not take them there | S | READY — 2026-07-28 | **Was C9-F1b.** Deliberately its own item: it puts a DESTRUCTIVE operation (overwrites live data with the backup state) behind a button reached via a NON-destructive one, so the confirm copy must carry that difference. Flips: nothing until shipped; `07` §10.2 |
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| R-104 | **An interrupted offsite run leaves an exclusive restic lock the existing self-heal cannot reach.** `resticStep` has `unlock --remove-all` (`internal/backup/offbox.go:634-648`) but `ensureOffboxRepo`'s probe fails first, `classifyResticProbe` (`:77-93`) has no lock case → `"other"` → fail-fast; `ClassifyOffsiteFailure` likewise, so the operator is told *„A távoli mentés ismeretlen okból nem sikerült"* for a precisely-known, self-healable condition | S | READY — 2026-07-28 | **Was C9-F3.** Reachable by any interruption — container restart, OOM, network drop, host reboot mid-backup. The tier stays dead until a human runs `restic unlock --remove-all`. Flips: the offsite row in map §C; `07` §8 row 15 |
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| R-105 | **Three hub-held DR records are empty on the entire live fleet.** `hosts.dr_record_json` = `{}` on all 3 hosts; `host_escrow.directive_json` = `{}` on both escrowed hosts; `dr_recipe.host_half.drives` = `[]` on every customer **including two with enrolled data drives** (916 GB USB on demo-felhom, 938 GB NVMe on demo-hp) | M | READY — 2026-07-28 | These are exactly the fields a host-loss recovery reads: `05-hub-architecture.md:175-176,186` names the slim DR record as one of four durable sources; `06-offsite-connectivity.md:148-150` says the escrow upload carried the DR directive; `felhom-agent/internal/dr/plan.go:34-35` makes `PlannedDrive` the re-attach-by-`durable_id` wrong-disk guard. **The three may have different causes** — `isUserDataDrive` (`internal/hub/dr_recipe.go:129-136`) requires type `usb`/`local-dir` **and** a non-empty `DurableID` **and** `MountPath`, and which of the three fails was not traced. Evidence: `architecture/_recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md` Part D2.3. Flips: `07` §4 |
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| R-105 | **Three hub-held DR records are empty on the entire live fleet.** `hosts.dr_record_json` = `{}` on all 3 hosts; `host_escrow.directive_json` = `{}` on both escrowed hosts; `dr_recipe.host_half.drives` = `[]` on every customer **including two with enrolled data drives** (916 GB USB on demo-felhom, 938 GB NVMe on demo-hp) | M | READY — 2026-07-28 | These are exactly the fields a host-loss recovery reads: `05-hub-architecture.md:175-176,186` names the slim DR record as one of four durable sources; `06-offsite-connectivity.md:148-150` says the escrow upload carried the DR directive; `felhom-agent/internal/dr/plan.go:34-35` makes `PlannedDrive` the re-attach-by-`durable_id` wrong-disk guard. **The three may have different causes** — `isUserDataDrive` (`internal/hub/dr_recipe.go:129-136`) requires type `usb`/`local-dir` **and** a non-empty `DurableID` **and** `MountPath`, and which of the three fails was not traced. Evidence: `architecture/_recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md` Part D2.3. **UPDATE 2026-07-28 (vzdump-target move): the `drives` third is TRACED and now POPULATED on both demo boxes.** Cause: the enrolled data drives were never PVE storages at all — only agent-generated systemd mounts — so they never entered `report.StorageTargets` and `isUserDataDrive` never saw them. Giving each drive a `dir` storage at its own mountpoint supplied all three required fields at once (type `local-dir`, fs-UUID durable id, mount path), and the recipe now emits `uuid:91d2dc2d-…`/`/mnt/nvme-1tb` on demo-hp and `uuid:47a3361a-…`/`/mnt/hdd_1` on demo-felhom. **The other two fields (`hosts.dr_record_json`, `host_escrow.directive_json`) are untouched and still `{}`** — this narrows R-105, it does not close it. See `runbooks/RUNBOOK-vzdump-target-move-2026-07-29.md` §5.4. Flips: `07` §4 |
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| R-106 | **The DR recipe records the PBS namespace as `"root"` on every box** while the real namespaces are `demo-felhom` / `demo-hp` | XS | READY — 2026-07-28 | Traced to source: `Snapshot.Namespace` decodes a `ns` field (`felhom-agent/internal/pbs/client.go:97`) that PBS does not echo per item when the request is already namespace-scoped via `?ns=` (`:117-120`), so it is empty and `ToHub` normalises empty → `"root"` (`internal/pbs/report.go:23-27`), which `latestPBSCoord` writes into the recipe (`internal/hub/dr_recipe.go:149`). `latest_snapshot_id: "9201"` is **not** a defect — it is `BackupID`, documented as a coordinate (`:56`). Verified against ep0's real namespaces and a live `pct restore` command line carrying `--ns demo-felhom`. Flips: `07` §4 |
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| R-107 | **No offsite action unpacks the named-volume tars Tier-3 captures on every run.** `ReconstituteFromOffsite` skips the unit outright (`internal/backup/offbox_reconstitute.go:284-289`); `PlaceOffsiteRestore` places it only when the live unit is ABSENT (`internal/backup/offbox_restore.go:352-356`). The DB **is** replayed, from the scratch unit's `db-dumps/` | M | READY — 2026-07-28 | 52 of 53 catalog templates keep data in Docker named volumes, so for most apps the offsite tier carries the volume data and cannot itself put it back. A two-step route exists (full restore → place → Tier-1 restore, which does unpack tars) but **no single action does it and no UI routes it** — the R-103 shape one tier over. Sibling of R-102: both are "captured and never read". Flips: the offsite-restore row in map §C; `07` §6.3, §7.2 |
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| R-108 | **Network storage can host an app's namespace, and FileBrowser binds a network share at its ROOT — this BLOCKS D5.** For local drives FileBrowser binds `<drive>/userdata` only (`internal/web/handlers.go:2450-2460`); for network paths it binds the share **root** with `:rslave` (`:2432`) and serves it with `download: true` (`internal/infra/infra.go:326`). Nothing stops an app's namespace landing there: `GetSchedulableStoragePaths()` has no `IsNetwork()` filter (`internal/settings/settings.go:904-914`, feeds the deploy dropdown at `handlers.go:462-473`), the per-app migrate target list has none (`handlers.go:674-679`), and `handleStorageMigrateApp` does not call `refuseNetworkLifecycle` though its whole-namespace sibling does (`internal/web/storage_handlers.go:397` vs `:410-424`) | M | **READY — blocks an architectural target** — 2026-07-28 | **Today this is not a secret leak** — the recovery unit's `app.yaml` is secret-stripped (`internal/backup/recovery_unit.go:73`). It becomes one under **D5**, which would put app secrets in the local unit precisely so Tier-1/Tier-2 restore stop needing the guest. Verified LIVE in demo-hp's generated compose, where the asymmetry is visible rather than inferred: `- /mnt/felhom-drives/nvme-1tb/userdata:/srv/nvme-1tb` beside `- /mnt/felhom-drives/Felhom-Share:/srv/Felhom-Share:rslave`. **Second effect, independent of D5:** `.fab` bundles already carry **plaintext** secrets by design with an OPTIONAL password (`internal/appexport/export.go:484,506-511,307`) and `storageDriveList()` does not filter network paths (`internal/web/handler_export.go:377-387`), so one can be exported onto a NAS today. Full sweep of every read surface: `07-backup-architecture.md` §10.1. Flips: `07` §7.3 (D5 target → adopted) once closed |
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| R-109 | **The DR recipe records no backup target.** `BuildDRRecipeHostHalf` (`felhom-agent/internal/hub/dr_recipe.go:86`) emits `guests`, `drives`, `pve_storage` and the PBS coordinate, but nothing that says WHICH storage holds the local whole-guest archives. Harmless while the target was the well-known `local`; not harmless now — after the 2026-07-28 vzdump-target move each demo box carries **two** `content=backup` dir storages, `felhom-backup` (live) and `local` (frozen 2026-07-28 archives, never refreshed again) | XS | READY — 2026-07-28 | Found by `runbooks/RUNBOOK-vzdump-target-move-2026-07-29.md` Phase 0 §5 and confirmed live in the recipe both boxes emit. A restorer reading the recipe cannot distinguish the live target from the stale one, and picking wrong yields a silently outdated guest. Add the resolved `BackupTarget()` to the host-half. Sits with **R-105**/**R-106** as the third recipe-completeness defect. Flips: `07` §4 |
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| E-2 | **Drive-role machinery around the moved vzdump target.** The 2026-07-28 runbook proved the architecture change by hand on both demo boxes; this is the machinery: a **backup-target role** on `StoragePath` beside `Schedulable`/`IsDefault`/`Kind`; **assignment in the storage wizard** (suggest by attribute, refuse the absurd, never decide by transport or `removable` — on the reference hardware demo-felhom's target IS a USB HDD and BOTH drives report `removable=0`); **unassigned drives do nothing automatically**; **stickiness** (never silently retarget); `felhom-host-install.sh` creating the target with `--is_mountpoint 1` **and** issuing the `FelhomAgentStore` ACL; **absent-target policy**; **retention/space accounting** on a drive the customer shares; the honest **single-drive label**; remaining fleet migration | M | READY — 2026-07-28 | Full scope + rationale in `runbooks/RUNBOOK-vzdump-target-move-2026-07-29.md` §7. Two traps already paid for live: the storage `path` must BE the mountpoint or the agent reports the target `disconnected` forever (`internal/storage/observe.go:321`), and the per-storage `FelhomAgentStore` grant is mandatory or every backup 403s. Absent-drive behaviour today is **fail-loudly, no silent retarget** (`is_mountpoint 1` proven live) — which is NOT the intended fall-back-and-alarm design. Flips: matrix row 4 |
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## P3 — post-alpha
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