hub v0.76.0 — R-82 Slice C: tier-aware backup thresholds

R-81 merged every backup signal into one 'newest' against a single 26h limit.
backupStaleAfter's own comment recorded why that stops being right under a
weekly offsite tier. Each tier is now judged against its own threshold;
R-81's structure (three verdicts, anchored absence, distinct reasons) and its
boundary test are preserved intact.

- offsiteBackupStaleAfter = 8d (7d cadence + headroom); backupStaleAfter keeps
  26h and now names the HOST tier only
- splitTiers / assessTier / newestBackupEvidenceByTier

Slice-A.4 rule implemented: a PBS-targeted vzdump appears in BOTH arrays, so
classification is by TARGET TYPE (target_id -> storage_targets[].name -> type),
never by array membership — otherwise a PBS backup makes a stale host tier look
fresh. storage_targets is used rather than pbs_dr.storage_id because the latter
is null on a box with a PBS storage but no DR descriptor.

A tier is only judged when the box HAS it, else every box without an offsite
tier would alarm once the anchor elapsed — R-81's mistake one level down. With
neither tier identifiable (old agent) the pre-Slice-C path runs unchanged.

Intended behaviour change: a 30h offsite snapshot no longer alarms. Three
fixtures asserted the merged threshold; each still asserts an alarm at the
correct limit. No assertion was weakened.

RECORDED LIMITATION: the hub infers 'PBS => weekly' from storage type.
defaultBackupTarget is felhom-pbs, so a box that never sets local_backup_target
would run PBS as its DAILY tier and be judged against 8 days — 7 days of
blindness. No box is in that shape today; the real fix is the agent reporting
per-tier cadences. Own task.

Red-proof observed. Replayed live: demo-felhom OK, demo-hp UNKNOWN (defers
correctly), drill-r50 MISSED (true positive). No customer email would be sent.
This commit is contained in:
Claude Code
2026-07-26 16:58:38 +02:00
parent 945b7818b5
commit b11607b26b
6 changed files with 549 additions and 14 deletions
+68
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@@ -1,5 +1,73 @@
# Felhom Hub — Changelog
## v0.76.0 — R-82 Slice C: tier-aware backup thresholds (2026-07-26)
R-81 merged every backup signal into one "newest" and judged it against a single 26 h limit. That
was right while a box had exactly one whole-guest tier. `backupStaleAfter`'s own comment recorded
why it stops being right:
> *"The moment PBS moves to a WEEKLY cadence, a perfectly healthy weekly snapshot is >26h old six
> days in seven and this constant alarms on it."*
Each tier is now judged against **its own** threshold. **R-81's structure is preserved intact**
three-valued verdicts, absence anchored at first contact, one distinct reason per failure mode — and
its boundary test is untouched.
### Added
- **`offsiteBackupStaleAfter = 8d`** (7-day cadence + a day of headroom — the same ratio 26 h gives
a 24 h cadence). `backupStaleAfter` keeps 26 h and now names the **host** tier only.
- **`splitTiers`** — classifies a report's evidence into host and offsite tiers.
- **`assessTier`** — R-81's exact logic, parameterised by tier and threshold.
- **`newestBackupEvidenceByTier`** — the retained-window scan, per tier.
### The Slice-A.4 rule, implemented
A PBS-targeted vzdump appears in **both** `backups[]` (as a `Backup` with `target_id:"felhom-pbs"`)
and `pbs_snapshots[]` (enumerated independently from PBS). Classification is therefore by **TARGET
TYPE** — `target_id``storage_targets[].name``.type == "pbs"`**never by array membership**.
Getting that wrong would let a PBS backup make a **stale host tier look fresh**, silently losing the
daily tier's alarm. Pinned by `TestTierAware_PBSTargetedVzdumpIsNotHostEvidence`.
`storage_targets` is used rather than `pbs_dr.storage_id` because the latter is null on a box that
has a PBS storage but no DR descriptor yet (drill-r50 was exactly that shape).
### A tier is only judged when the box HAS it
`expected` gates each tier on a configured storage of that kind, or evidence for it. Without that,
every box without an offsite tier would alarm as soon as the anchor elapsed — the
absence-is-not-failure mistake R-81 exists to prevent, re-introduced one level down. When NEITHER
tier is identifiable (an old agent reporting no `storage_targets` and no `target_id`) the pre-Slice-C
combined path runs unchanged, so nothing regresses on a fleet mid-upgrade.
### Changed behaviour (intended)
A 30 h-old offsite snapshot no longer alarms — under a weekly tier it is healthy. Three existing
fixtures asserted the old merged threshold; each still asserts an alarm, now at the correct limit
(9 days for offsite, 30 h for host). **No assertion was weakened to make the code pass.**
### ⚠️ Recorded limitation — the hub infers cadence from storage TYPE
"PBS ⇒ weekly" is an inference, not a fact the box tells us. `defaultBackupTarget` is `"felhom-pbs"`,
so a box that never sets `local_backup_target` would run PBS as its **daily primary** tier and the
hub would judge it against 8 days — **seven days of blindness**. No box is in that shape today (both
demo boxes set `local`, and the installer pins it), but it is a latent mis-classification of exactly
the kind that became R-80. The real fix is the agent reporting each tier's **actual cadence** in the
host-report; own task.
### Tests
Full suite green (17 packages). Red-proof observed: giving `tierOffsite` the host threshold — i.e.
restoring the merged limit — fails the 6-day case with
`offsite tier: newest backup is 144h0m0s old (limit 26h0m0s)`, verbatim the cry-wolf this slice
removes. Restored.
**Replayed against the live hub DB** through the real store queries:
```
demo-felhom host=07-26T14:38Z offsite=07-26T12:21Z -> OK
demo-hp host=07-26T07:06Z offsite=none -> UNKNOWN (offsite watched 119h of a 192h grace)
drill-r50 host=none offsite=not expected -> MISSED (host tier, no evidence in 29h)
```
**No customer email would be sent by this deploy.** demo-felhom is clean; demo-hp defers correctly
and will alarm in ~3 days if its offsite tier stays empty (the true R-82 finding, arriving on
schedule); drill-r50's alarm is a true positive and it has no customer channel.
## v0.75.0 — R-81: "no signal" is not "bad signal" — the backup deadline check is ANCHORED (2026-07-26)
The third instance of one bug class, fixed as a class. `expected_backup_missed` fired on
+45
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@@ -45,9 +45,19 @@ type hostReportBackups struct {
VerifyState string `json:"verify_state"`
} `json:"pbs_snapshots"`
Backups []struct {
// TargetID is the SLICE-C discriminator: a backups[] entry belongs to whichever tier its
// target storage belongs to, never to "the local tier" by virtue of being in this array.
TargetID string `json:"target_id"`
StartedAt string `json:"started_at"`
Success bool `json:"success"`
} `json:"backups"`
// StorageTargets carries the target TYPE, which is how a backups[] entry is attributed to a
// tier (target_id → name → type == "pbs"). See pbsTargetSet.
StorageTargets []struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Content string `json:"content"`
} `json:"storage_targets"`
}
// backupVerdict is the three-valued outcome of the freshness policy. The middle value is the
@@ -78,6 +88,15 @@ type backupEvidence struct {
newestSeen time.Time
haveSeen bool
// Per-tier window evidence (R-82 Slice C). A single "newest across everything" would let a
// fresh daily host backup satisfy the OFFSITE tier's lookup — the same error Slice A fixed
// agent-side. newestSeen/haveSeen above remain the pre-Slice-C combined values, used only by
// the no-tier fallback path.
newestHost time.Time
haveHost bool
newestOffsite time.Time
haveOffsite bool
// firstReportAt is when the hub first saw ANY host-report from this customer — the
// observation anchor. Zero when unknown, which the policy treats as "cannot defer"
// (fail toward visibility, matching the v0.73.0 zero-anchor branch).
@@ -163,6 +182,22 @@ func assessBackupFreshness(reportJSON string, ev backupEvidence, now time.Time)
}
}
// ── R-82 Slice C: TIER-AWARE assessment ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Judge each tier against ITS OWN threshold. Falls through to the pre-Slice-C combined logic
// below only when NEITHER tier is identifiable — an old agent whose report carries no
// storage_targets and no target_id — so nothing regresses on a fleet mid-upgrade.
hostView, offView := splitTiers(hr)
if hostView.expected || offView.expected {
var as []backupAssessment
if hostView.expected {
as = append(as, assessTier(tierHost, hostView, ev.newestHost, ev.haveHost, ev.firstReportAt, now))
}
if offView.expected {
as = append(as, assessTier(tierOffsite, offView, ev.newestOffsite, ev.haveOffsite, ev.firstReportAt, now))
}
return worst(as...)
}
// The newest evidence the LATEST report itself carries.
newest := newestPBS
haveNewest := havePBS
@@ -337,6 +372,16 @@ func CheckBackupDeadlines(s *store.Store, staleness *StalenessChecker, onEvent E
logger.Printf("[WARN] Deadline check: failed to read host-report window for %s: %v", id, rerr)
} else {
ev.newestSeen, ev.haveSeen = newestBackupEvidence(rows, nowUTC)
// Slice C: per-tier window evidence. Which tiers to look for comes from the LATEST
// report, so a box with no offsite tier never pays for scanning one.
var latest hostReportBackups
wantHost, wantOffsite := true, true
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(reportJSON), &latest) == nil {
h, o := splitTiers(latest)
wantHost, wantOffsite = h.expected, o.expected
}
ev.newestHost, ev.haveHost, ev.newestOffsite, ev.haveOffsite =
newestBackupEvidenceByTier(rows, wantHost, wantOffsite, nowUTC)
}
if first, ferr := s.GetFirstHostReportAt(id); ferr != nil {
logger.Printf("[WARN] Deadline check: failed to read first host-report for %s: %v", id, ferr)
+12 -8
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@@ -184,14 +184,16 @@ func TestBackupFreshness_ExistingBehavioursUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
}
})
t.Run("2 newest backup >26h still alarms with the same string", func(t *testing.T) {
r := `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-30*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}]}`
// Window evidence is ALSO 30h old — nothing fresher exists anywhere.
got := assessBackupFreshness(r, evidenceAt(now, 30*time.Hour, anchor), now)
t.Run("2 a backup past its tier limit still alarms", func(t *testing.T) {
// Slice C: the HOST tier keeps the 26h limit verbatim, so this is the same assertion the
// merged code made — now scoped to the tier it actually belongs to.
r := `{"backups":[{"target_id":"local","started_at":"` + at(-30*time.Hour) + `","success":true}]}`
ev := backupEvidence{newestHost: now.Add(-30 * time.Hour), haveHost: true, firstReportAt: now.Add(-anchor)}
got := assessBackupFreshness(r, ev, now)
if !got.missed() {
t.Fatalf("stale backup must still alarm; got verdict=%d reason=%q", got.verdict, got.reason)
t.Fatalf("stale host backup must still alarm; got verdict=%d reason=%q", got.verdict, got.reason)
}
if got.reason != "newest backup is 30h0m0s old (limit 26h0m0s)" {
if got.reason != "host tier: newest backup is 30h0m0s old (limit 26h0m0s)" {
t.Fatalf("stale reason string changed: %q", got.reason)
}
})
@@ -202,7 +204,9 @@ func TestBackupFreshness_ExistingBehavioursUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
if !got.missed() {
t.Fatalf("failed verify must still alarm; got verdict=%d reason=%q", got.verdict, got.reason)
}
if got.reason != "newest PBS snapshot failed verification" {
// Slice C prefixes the tier. The FAILURE MODE is unchanged and still has its own distinct
// string; only the tier name was added, which is the point of tier-aware reasons.
if got.reason != "offsite tier: newest PBS snapshot failed verification" {
t.Fatalf("verify-failed reason string changed: %q", got.reason)
}
})
@@ -236,7 +240,7 @@ func TestBackupFreshness_ReasonStringsAreDistinct(t *testing.T) {
reasons := map[string]string{
"unparseable": assessBackupFreshness(`nope`, backupEvidence{}, now).reason,
"stale": assessBackupFreshness(`{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"`+at(-40*time.Hour)+`","verify_state":"ok"}]}`, backupEvidence{}, now).reason,
"stale": assessBackupFreshness(`{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"`+at(-9*24*time.Hour)+`","verify_state":"ok"}]}`, backupEvidence{}, now).reason,
"verify failed": assessBackupFreshness(`{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"`+at(-2*time.Hour)+`","verify_state":"failed"}]}`, evidenceAt(now, 2*time.Hour, 30*24*time.Hour), now).reason,
"absence timed": assessBackupFreshness(`{"backups":[]}`, noEvidence(now, 240*time.Hour), now).reason,
"absence unanch": assessBackupFreshness(`{"backups":[]}`, backupEvidence{}, now).reason,
+18 -6
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@@ -112,11 +112,16 @@ func TestCheckBackupDeadlines_FreshVerifiedPBS_NoBackupAlarm(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestCheckBackupDeadlines_StalePBS_Alarms: newest backup older than 26h → alarm.
// TestCheckBackupDeadlines_StalePBS_Alarms: an offsite snapshot past the OFFSITE limit → alarm.
//
// R-82 Slice C changed the threshold this fixture must cross, NOT the behaviour it asserts. 30h was
// "stale" while one 26h limit covered every tier; under a weekly offsite tier a 30h snapshot is
// healthy, and alarming on it is exactly the cry-wolf `backupStaleAfter`'s comment predicted. The
// test still proves a stale offsite tier alarms — now at 9 days, past the 8-day offsite limit.
func TestCheckBackupDeadlines_StalePBS_Alarms(t *testing.T) {
st := newDeadlineStore(t)
st.SaveEvent("c1", "db_dump_completed", "info", "", "{}", "controller")
report := hostReportJSON(t, [][2]string{{rfc(-30 * time.Hour), "ok"}}, nil)
report := hostReportJSON(t, [][2]string{{rfc(-9 * 24 * time.Hour), "ok"}}, nil)
if err := st.SaveHostReport("h1", "c1", []byte(report), store.HostReportDenorm{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -188,12 +193,19 @@ func TestAssessBackupFreshness(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"fresh verified PBS", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-3*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}]}`, false},
{"fresh unverified (none) is not a failure", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-3*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"none"}]}`, false},
{"stale verified", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-30*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}]}`, true},
// Slice C: a 30h offsite snapshot is HEALTHY under the weekly (8d) offsite limit.
{"offsite 30h is fresh under the weekly limit", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-30*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}]}`, false},
{"offsite 6d is fresh under the weekly limit", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-6*24*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}]}`, false},
{"offsite 9d is STALE past the weekly limit", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-9*24*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}]}`, true},
{"fresh but verify failed", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-2*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"failed"}]}`, true},
{"no snapshots and no backups", `{"pbs_snapshots":[],"backups":[]}`, true},
{"vzdump fallback fresh success", `{"backups":[{"started_at":"` + at(-4*time.Hour) + `","success":true}]}`, false},
{"vzdump only, failed → counts as none", `{"backups":[{"started_at":"` + at(-4*time.Hour) + `","success":false}]}`, true},
{"newest vzdump fresh rescues stale PBS", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-40*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}],"backups":[{"started_at":"` + at(-2*time.Hour) + `","success":true}]}`, false},
{"host vzdump fresh success", `{"backups":[{"target_id":"local","started_at":"` + at(-4*time.Hour) + `","success":true}]}`, false},
{"host vzdump only, failed → counts as none", `{"backups":[{"target_id":"local","started_at":"` + at(-4*time.Hour) + `","success":false}]}`, true},
{"host fresh + offsite within weekly → both healthy", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-40*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}],"backups":[{"target_id":"local","started_at":"` + at(-2*time.Hour) + `","success":true}]}`, false},
// Slice C's core: the tiers are judged SEPARATELY. A fresh host backup must NOT rescue an
// offsite tier that is genuinely past its own (weekly) limit — the merged threshold did.
{"host fresh does NOT rescue a 9d offsite tier", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-9*24*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}],"backups":[{"target_id":"local","started_at":"` + at(-2*time.Hour) + `","success":true}]}`, true},
{"offsite fresh does NOT rescue a 30h host tier", `{"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(-2*time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}],"backups":[{"target_id":"local","started_at":"` + at(-30*time.Hour) + `","success":true}]}`, true},
{"unparseable report", `not json`, true},
}
for _, c := range cases {
+214
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@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
package monitor
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
)
// R-82 Slice C — TIER-AWARE backup freshness.
//
// R-81 merged every backup signal into one "newest" and judged it against a single 26h threshold.
// That was correct while a box had exactly one whole-guest tier. With the R-82 split it is not:
// `backupStaleAfter`'s own comment records why —
//
// "The moment PBS moves to a WEEKLY cadence, a perfectly healthy weekly snapshot is >26h old six
// days in seven and this constant alarms on it."
//
// So each tier is now judged against ITS OWN threshold, and R-81's structure is preserved intact:
// three-valued verdicts, absence anchored at first contact, and one distinct reason string per
// failure mode.
// offsiteBackupStaleAfter is the maximum age of the newest OFFSITE (PBS) snapshot. 8 days = the 7-day
// weekly cadence plus a day of headroom — the same ratio the 26h host threshold gives a 24h cadence,
// so a healthy weekly tier never trips it and a genuinely missed week always does.
const offsiteBackupStaleAfter = 8 * 24 * time.Hour
// backupTier names one whole-guest backup tier, for thresholds and for reason strings.
type backupTier struct {
name string // "host" | "offsite" — used verbatim in reason strings
staleWhen time.Duration
}
var (
tierHost = backupTier{name: "host", staleWhen: backupStaleAfter}
tierOffsite = backupTier{name: "offsite", staleWhen: offsiteBackupStaleAfter}
)
// tierView is what one tier's evidence looks like in a single report.
type tierView struct {
expected bool // this box HAS this tier — absence is meaningful
newest time.Time // newest evidence in THIS report
have bool
verifyOK bool // false only when the newest OFFSITE snapshot's verify_state is literally "failed"
failed bool
}
// pbsTargetSet returns the storage ids that are PBS-type backup storages on this host.
//
// THIS IS THE SLICE-A.4 RULE, and getting it wrong is the trap that slice recorded: a PBS-targeted
// vzdump appears in BOTH `backups[]` (as a Backup with target_id "felhom-pbs") AND in
// `pbs_snapshots[]` (enumerated independently from PBS by the agent's verify loop). Classifying by
// ARRAY MEMBERSHIP would therefore attribute a PBS backup to the host tier and make a stale host
// tier look fresh. Classify by TARGET TYPE — join target_id → storage_targets[].name → .type.
//
// storage_targets is preferred over pbs_dr.storage_id because pbs_dr is null on a box that has a PBS
// storage but no DR descriptor yet (drill-r50 was exactly that shape).
func pbsTargetSet(hr hostReportBackups) map[string]bool {
out := map[string]bool{}
for _, st := range hr.StorageTargets {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(st.Type), "pbs") && st.Name != "" {
out[st.Name] = true
}
}
return out
}
// splitTiers classifies one report's backup evidence into the host and offsite tiers.
//
// A tier is "expected" when the box demonstrably HAS it — either a storage of that kind is
// configured, or evidence for it exists. Without that gate every box without an offsite tier would
// alarm as soon as the anchor elapsed, which is precisely the absence-is-not-failure mistake R-81
// exists to prevent, re-introduced one level down.
func splitTiers(hr hostReportBackups) (host, offsite tierView) {
pbs := pbsTargetSet(hr)
for name := range pbs {
_ = name
offsite.expected = true
}
for _, st := range hr.StorageTargets {
if pbs[st.Name] {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(st.Content, "backup") {
host.expected = true
}
}
// PBS snapshots are offsite evidence by construction.
for _, ps := range hr.PBSSnapshots {
offsite.expected = true
t, ok := parseBackupTime(ps.BackupTime)
if !ok {
continue
}
if !offsite.have || t.After(offsite.newest) {
offsite.have, offsite.newest = true, t
offsite.failed = strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(ps.VerifyState), "failed")
}
}
// vzdump records land in whichever tier their TARGET belongs to.
for _, b := range hr.Backups {
tv := &host
if pbs[b.TargetID] {
tv = &offsite
}
tv.expected = true
if !b.Success {
continue
}
t, ok := parseBackupTime(b.StartedAt)
if !ok {
continue
}
if !tv.have || t.After(tv.newest) {
tv.have, tv.newest = true, t
if tv == &offsite {
// A vzdump record carries no verify_state; it never clears a failed snapshot verdict
// and never sets one.
_ = tv
}
}
}
return host, offsite
}
// assessTier judges ONE tier, preserving R-81's structure exactly: absence is UNKNOWN until it
// outlives the tier's OWN threshold measured from first contact.
func assessTier(t backupTier, v tierView, windowNewest time.Time, windowHave bool, firstReportAt, now time.Time) backupAssessment {
newest, have := v.newest, v.have
if windowHave && (!have || windowNewest.After(newest)) {
newest, have = windowNewest, true
}
if !have {
if firstReportAt.IsZero() {
return backupAssessment{verdict: verdictMissed,
reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s tier: no backup evidence in any retained host-report, and no first-contact anchor to defer against", t.name)}
}
watched := now.Sub(firstReportAt)
if watched <= t.staleWhen {
return backupAssessment{verdict: verdictUnknown,
reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s tier: no backup evidence yet, but only watching for %s (grace %s since first contact %s) — newborn tier, not a fault",
t.name, watched.Round(time.Hour), t.staleWhen, firstReportAt.Format(time.RFC3339))}
}
return backupAssessment{verdict: verdictMissed,
reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s tier: no backup evidence in any host-report for %s (limit %s, first contact %s)",
t.name, watched.Round(time.Hour), t.staleWhen, firstReportAt.Format(time.RFC3339))}
}
if age := now.Sub(newest); age > t.staleWhen {
return backupAssessment{verdict: verdictMissed,
reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s tier: newest backup is %s old (limit %s)", t.name, age.Round(time.Hour), t.staleWhen)}
}
if v.failed {
return backupAssessment{verdict: verdictMissed,
reason: fmt.Sprintf("%s tier: newest PBS snapshot failed verification", t.name)}
}
return backupAssessment{verdict: verdictOK}
}
// worst folds per-tier verdicts into one. MISSED dominates UNKNOWN dominates OK, and the reason
// travels with the winner so the event still names exactly one cause. When several tiers are
// missed, both reasons are joined — a box with two broken tiers must not report only one.
func worst(as ...backupAssessment) backupAssessment {
out := backupAssessment{verdict: verdictOK}
var reasons []string
for _, a := range as {
if a.verdict > out.verdict {
out.verdict = a.verdict
reasons = nil
}
if a.verdict == out.verdict && a.reason != "" {
reasons = append(reasons, a.reason)
}
}
out.reason = strings.Join(reasons, "; ")
return out
}
// newestBackupEvidenceByTier is newestBackupEvidence's tier-aware twin: it walks the retained
// host-report window and returns the newest evidence PER TIER.
//
// Per-tier is load-bearing, not tidiness: R-81's single "newest across everything" would let a fresh
// daily host backup satisfy the offsite tier's window lookup, which is the same class of error as
// the agent-side one Slice A fixed (a fresh local backup satisfying the weekly PBS cadence).
//
// Early exit: stop as soon as every EXPECTED tier has evidence inside its own threshold — nothing
// older can change any verdict then. The healthy path reads one row.
func newestBackupEvidenceByTier(rows []store.HostReportRow, wantHost, wantOffsite bool, now time.Time) (hostNewest time.Time, hostHave bool, offNewest time.Time, offHave bool) {
for _, r := range rows {
var hr hostReportBackups
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(r.ReportJSON), &hr); err != nil {
continue // one malformed retained report must not blind the scan
}
h, o := splitTiers(hr)
if h.have && (!hostHave || h.newest.After(hostNewest)) {
hostNewest, hostHave = h.newest, true
}
if o.have && (!offHave || o.newest.After(offNewest)) {
offNewest, offHave = o.newest, true
}
hostSettled := !wantHost || (hostHave && now.Sub(hostNewest) <= tierHost.staleWhen)
offSettled := !wantOffsite || (offHave && now.Sub(offNewest) <= tierOffsite.staleWhen)
if hostSettled && offSettled {
break
}
}
return hostNewest, hostHave, offNewest, offHave
}
+192
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@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
package monitor
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// R-82 Slice C — tier-aware thresholds.
//
// The whole point: a healthy WEEKLY offsite snapshot is >26h old six days in seven, so the merged
// threshold would cry wolf on it — exactly what `backupStaleAfter`'s comment predicted. Each tier is
// now judged against its own limit, and R-81's structure (three verdicts, anchored absence, one
// distinct reason per failure mode) is preserved intact.
func tieredReport(pbsAge time.Duration, verify string, hostAge time.Duration, now time.Time) string {
at := func(d time.Duration) string { return now.Add(-d).Format(time.RFC3339) }
return `{
"storage_targets":[
{"name":"local","type":"local","content":"backup,iso"},
{"name":"felhom-pbs","type":"pbs","content":"backup"}
],
"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(pbsAge) + `","verify_state":"` + verify + `"}],
"backups":[{"target_id":"local","started_at":"` + at(hostAge) + `","success":true}]
}`
}
func freshEv(now time.Time, hostAge, offAge time.Duration) backupEvidence {
return backupEvidence{
newestHost: now.Add(-hostAge), haveHost: true,
newestOffsite: now.Add(-offAge), haveOffsite: true,
firstReportAt: now.Add(-60 * 24 * time.Hour),
}
}
// ── THE SCENARIO ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// A 6-day-old offsite snapshot with a fresh host backup is SILENT; the same snapshot at 9 days
// ALARMS.
//
// COMPANION RED-PROOF (observed): give tierOffsite the host threshold
// (`tierOffsite = backupTier{name:"offsite", staleWhen: backupStaleAfter}`) — i.e. restore the
// single merged threshold — and the 6-day case fails with
//
// 6-day-old offsite snapshot is HEALTHY under a weekly cadence and must be SILENT;
// got verdict=2 reason="offsite tier: newest backup is 144h0m0s old (limit 26h0m0s)"
//
// which is verbatim the cry-wolf this slice exists to remove. Restored.
func TestTierAware_SixDayOffsiteSilent_NineDayAlarms(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2026, 7, 26, 3, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
t.Run("6 days offsite + fresh host → SILENT", func(t *testing.T) {
got := assessBackupFreshness(tieredReport(6*24*time.Hour, "ok", 2*time.Hour, now),
freshEv(now, 2*time.Hour, 6*24*time.Hour), now)
if got.missed() {
t.Fatalf("6-day-old offsite snapshot is HEALTHY under a weekly cadence and must be SILENT; got verdict=%d reason=%q",
got.verdict, got.reason)
}
if got.verdict != verdictOK {
t.Fatalf("both tiers have evidence inside their limits → OK, not a deferred UNKNOWN; got verdict=%d reason=%q", got.verdict, got.reason)
}
})
t.Run("9 days offsite + fresh host → ALARMS, naming the offsite tier", func(t *testing.T) {
got := assessBackupFreshness(tieredReport(9*24*time.Hour, "ok", 2*time.Hour, now),
freshEv(now, 2*time.Hour, 9*24*time.Hour), now)
if !got.missed() {
t.Fatalf("9-day-old offsite snapshot is past the 8-day limit and MUST alarm; got verdict=%d reason=%q",
got.verdict, got.reason)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(got.reason, "offsite tier:") {
t.Fatalf("the reason must name the OFFSITE tier — a merged message would have made the R-80 diagnosis impossible; got %q", got.reason)
}
if strings.Contains(got.reason, "host tier") {
t.Fatalf("the host tier is fresh and must not appear in the reason; got %q", got.reason)
}
})
}
// Neither tier rescues the other. This is the merged-threshold bug in both directions.
func TestTierAware_TiersDoNotRescueEachOther(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2026, 7, 26, 3, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
t.Run("fresh host does not rescue a stale offsite tier", func(t *testing.T) {
got := assessBackupFreshness(tieredReport(9*24*time.Hour, "ok", time.Hour, now),
freshEv(now, time.Hour, 9*24*time.Hour), now)
if !got.missed() {
t.Fatalf("a fresh DAILY backup must not satisfy the WEEKLY tier; got %q", got.reason)
}
})
t.Run("fresh offsite does not rescue a stale host tier", func(t *testing.T) {
got := assessBackupFreshness(tieredReport(time.Hour, "ok", 30*time.Hour, now),
freshEv(now, 30*time.Hour, time.Hour), now)
if !got.missed() {
t.Fatalf("a fresh WEEKLY snapshot must not satisfy the DAILY tier; got %q", got.reason)
}
if !strings.Contains(got.reason, "host tier") {
t.Fatalf("the reason must name the HOST tier; got %q", got.reason)
}
})
t.Run("both stale → BOTH named", func(t *testing.T) {
got := assessBackupFreshness(tieredReport(9*24*time.Hour, "ok", 30*time.Hour, now),
freshEv(now, 30*time.Hour, 9*24*time.Hour), now)
if !got.missed() {
t.Fatalf("both tiers stale must alarm; got %q", got.reason)
}
if !strings.Contains(got.reason, "host tier") || !strings.Contains(got.reason, "offsite tier") {
t.Fatalf("a box with TWO broken tiers must not report only one; got %q", got.reason)
}
})
}
// ── The A.4 rule: classify by TARGET TYPE, never by array membership ─────────────────────────
//
// A PBS-targeted vzdump appears in BOTH arrays. Treating every `backups[]` entry as the host tier
// would let a PBS backup make a STALE HOST TIER LOOK FRESH — silently losing the daily tier's alarm.
func TestTierAware_PBSTargetedVzdumpIsNotHostEvidence(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2026, 7, 26, 3, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
at := func(d time.Duration) string { return now.Add(-d).Format(time.RFC3339) }
// The host tier's own backup is 40h old (stale). A FRESH PBS-targeted vzdump sits in the same
// array — exactly the double-appearance Slice A.4 recorded.
report := `{
"storage_targets":[
{"name":"local","type":"local","content":"backup"},
{"name":"felhom-pbs","type":"pbs","content":"backup"}
],
"pbs_snapshots":[{"backup_time":"` + at(time.Hour) + `","verify_state":"ok"}],
"backups":[
{"target_id":"local","started_at":"` + at(40*time.Hour) + `","success":true},
{"target_id":"felhom-pbs","started_at":"` + at(time.Hour) + `","success":true}
]
}`
ev := backupEvidence{
newestHost: now.Add(-40 * time.Hour), haveHost: true,
newestOffsite: now.Add(-time.Hour), haveOffsite: true,
firstReportAt: now.Add(-60 * 24 * time.Hour),
}
got := assessBackupFreshness(report, ev, now)
if !got.missed() {
t.Fatalf("a PBS-targeted vzdump must NOT count as host-tier evidence — the host tier is 40h stale; got verdict=%d reason=%q",
got.verdict, got.reason)
}
if !strings.Contains(got.reason, "host tier") {
t.Fatalf("the stale HOST tier must be named; got %q", got.reason)
}
}
// splitTiers is the classifier the whole slice rests on.
func TestSplitTiers_Classification(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Date(2026, 7, 26, 3, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
at := func(d time.Duration) string { return now.Add(-d).Format(time.RFC3339) }
t.Run("no storage_targets and no evidence → neither tier expected (old-agent fallback)", func(t *testing.T) {
var hr hostReportBackups
mustUnmarshal(t, `{"pbs_snapshots":[],"backups":[]}`, &hr)
h, o := splitTiers(hr)
if h.expected || o.expected {
t.Fatalf("nothing identifiable must leave BOTH tiers unexpected so the pre-Slice-C path runs; got host=%v offsite=%v", h.expected, o.expected)
}
})
t.Run("a PBS storage alone makes the offsite tier expected", func(t *testing.T) {
var hr hostReportBackups
mustUnmarshal(t, `{"storage_targets":[{"name":"felhom-pbs","type":"pbs","content":"backup"}]}`, &hr)
_, o := splitTiers(hr)
if !o.expected || o.have {
t.Fatalf("a configured-but-empty offsite tier is EXPECTED with no evidence — that is the R-82 fault; got %+v", o)
}
})
t.Run("verify_state failed is carried on the newest offsite snapshot only", func(t *testing.T) {
var hr hostReportBackups
mustUnmarshal(t, `{"pbs_snapshots":[
{"backup_time":"`+at(48*time.Hour)+`","verify_state":"failed"},
{"backup_time":"`+at(time.Hour)+`","verify_state":"ok"}]}`, &hr)
_, o := splitTiers(hr)
if o.failed {
t.Fatalf("an OLDER failed snapshot must not condemn a newer good one; got %+v", o)
}
})
}
func mustUnmarshal(t *testing.T, s string, v any) {
t.Helper()
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(s), v); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}