probe fix, the gate, and the promotion train (R-618 closed, R-630..632 opened)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 28s

Part 1: tandoor/zipline/wger probes corrected in the catalog and red-proofed live on 9202 in both
directions - "Nem egeszseges" with the front door serving 200, then "Fut" after the real sync with
no redeploy. tandoor's failed edge re-walked: done at +41.1s where it was failed at +361.9s.

Part 2: fifteen proven versions on the live catalog, one commit per app; the guarded Update pressed
on four apps on demo-hp, all four done.

Opened: R-630 (paperless-ngx's probe has never run on any box - a silent absence, worse than the
wrong probe that was found in one night), R-631 (five templates no static rule can judge),
R-632 (28 of 53 templates never deployed by any drill). Closed: R-618.

Register 318 -> 321. No product code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
This commit is contained in:
adminandClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-09-22 11:10:58 +02:00
1 parent 462ab4a5ff
commit a975cfde5b
47 files changed
+4887 -1410

No files matched your search

+4 -1
View File
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
| **R-615** | **[P3-LOW] Pointing a box at a different app catalog by `git.repo_url` alone is INERT — the box keeps fetching from the repository it first cloned.** FOUND 2026-09-21 by reading `sync.go` **before** running it, which is the only reason the update night's drill catalog worked at all. `Syncer.gitCloneOrPull` (`controller/internal/sync/sync.go:274-306`) clones **only when `<data>/catalog-cache/.git` is absent**; on every later cycle it runs `git fetch --depth 1 origin <branch>` + `git reset --hard origin/<branch>` **against the remote stored in the clone**, which `buildRepoURL` wrote at clone time. Changing `git.repo_url` in `controller.yaml` and restarting therefore changes **nothing**: the sync keeps pulling the old catalog and reports success. Measured: after the repoint, `git -C <data>/catalog-cache remote -v` still read `app-catalog-felhom.eu`; the box only followed the drill repo once the cache directory was removed. **Why it matters beyond a drill:** this is the one knob that would move a box to a different or a staged catalog — for a migration, a per-customer catalog, or a rollback of the catalog itself — and it silently does not work. **Nothing is wrong with the CACHING**, which is right; what is missing is that a changed `repo_url` must invalidate the clone. **Fix shape:** on start, compare `git.repo_url` with the clone's `origin` and re-clone when they differ (or `git remote set-url` + a full fetch); log which happened. A test that changes `repo_url` under an existing cache and asserts the next sync reads the NEW repo — it fails today. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/04-9202-config-pre.txt`, `05-9202-follows-drill.txt`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** |
| **R-616** | **[P3-LOW] The catalog credentials are stored in PLAINTEXT in the box's catalog clone and are printed by an ordinary `git remote -v`.** FOUND 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 while pointing it at a private drill catalog. `Syncer.buildRepoURL` injects `username:token` into the HTTPS URL, and `git clone` persists that URL as the clone's `origin`, so `<data>/catalog-cache/.git/config` holds the token in the clear and **any** diagnostic that prints the remote leaks it — which is what happened in this session's own transcript, and is the same shape as R-580 (`curl -w '%{redirect_url}'`). `maskRepoURL` exists and is used for the LOG lines, so the masking intent is already there; the stored remote is the half that was missed. **INERT ON THE FLEET TODAY** — the live catalog is public and `git.token` is empty on every real box — which is exactly why it should be fixed before it is not: the day the catalog goes private, every box carries a readable credential and every support session that runs `git remote -v` prints it. **Fix shape:** store the remote WITHOUT credentials and supply them per-fetch (a credential helper, `http.extraHeader`, or `GIT_ASKPASS`), and a test asserting the clone's stored `origin` contains no `@`. **Operator action from tonight, unrelated to the fix:** the Gitea `admin` token used for the drill repo was printed by that command and must be rotated. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/05-9202-follows-drill.txt` (redacted). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller); one operator action (rotate the Gitea admin token)** |
| **R-617** | **[P3-LOW] The Gitea API token this project uses for pushes cannot create a repository through the documented endpoint, but CAN through `repos/migrate` — so "the token cannot do it" was nearly recorded as a fact when the truth was "one endpoint refuses it".** FOUND 2026-09-21 creating the drill catalog. Both `~/.git-credentials` tokens carry `write:misc,write:notification,write:package,write:issue,write:repository`; `POST /api/v1/user/repos` requires `write:user` and answers **403**, and `POST /api/v1/admin/users/<u>/repos` requires `write:admin` and answers 403 too. `POST /api/v1/repos/migrate` with the same token answered **201** and created the private repository. **Why this is a row and not a note:** a session that stopped at the first 403 would have recorded "CC cannot create a Gitea repository" — an unfalsifiable capability claim of exactly the shape the workspace's standing rule 2 forbids — and every later drill would have been designed around a limit that does not exist. **What it needs:** one line in the operations notes saying which endpoint to use, and (optional, operator) a token scoped for the job so the migrate route is not load-bearing. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/03-drill-repo.txt`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (docs)** |
| **R-618** | **[P1-HIGH] THREE apps are presented to the household as UNHEALTHY while they are working perfectly — and because the guarded Update waits on that same probe, a SUCCESSFUL update ends by STOPPING the working app and sending the household to a restore they do not need.** **RANK RAISED FROM P2 TO P1 BY A LIVE MEASUREMENT taken the same night, and the escalation is the whole point:** tandoor's Update 2.6.13 → 2.6.15 was pressed at 21:16:47 and entered `verifying` at 21:17:46. At **21:18:28** the NEW version was `Up 25 seconds` and answering **HTTP 200** on `/accounts/login/` through the household's own front door — while the controller, probing port 8080 where nothing listens, could not see it. `verifying` therefore cannot pass, the full `update.health_timeout` is spent, `Manager.failAndHold` runs `compose down`, and the app is STOPPED. **Nothing is lost** — the data is in the volumes and the restore works — **but one wrong port number in a template converts every successful update of that app into an outage plus an unnecessary restore, for every household running it.** Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/14-tandoor-serving-while-verifying.txt`. MEASURED 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 (controller v0.261.0, catalog `f5f6a152b513`). Two shapes, one class: **(a) `tandoor` — the WRONG PORT.** `.felhom.yml` probes `port: 8080`; the container listens on **80 and nothing else** (`ss -ltn` inside it), the compose's own traefik label routes to 80, its own docker healthcheck reads `healthy`, and `/accounts/login/` answers **200** through the household's real front door. `GET /api/stacks/tandoor` nevertheless reads `state: "unhealthy"`. **(b) `zipline` — the WRONG PATH.** `.felhom.yml` probes `/api/health`, which zipline 4.6.1 answers **404 `Route GET:/api/health not found`**; **the compose healthcheck in the very same file uses `/api/healthcheck` and is correct and green.** `/dashboard` answers 200. The controller reads `unhealthy`. **This is the MIRROR of R-613** — that is a probe that passes on a broken app (a false GREEN, which no alarm catches); this is a probe that fails on a working app (a false RED). **IT DOES NOT ALARM, AND THAT SETS THE RANK:** `08-alarm-ladder.md` §4 puts `unhealthy` deliberately in the NOT-down set, so no dead-app event and no customer mail follows — the damage is what the household READS, plus anything that gates on `state`. **IT ALREADY COST A MEASUREMENT TONIGHT:** this drill's harness waited for `state == "running"` and hung for its full budget on tandoor, an app that was up the whole time. An instrument waiting for a wrong answer looks exactly like a slow app. **THE GATE THIS WANTS IS CHEAP AND STATIC, AND THAT IS THE FINDING'S REAL VALUE.** Both halves of the answer live in the same template: compare the `.felhom.yml` probe's port and path against the compose's **own** `healthcheck: test:` URL. A sweep of all 53 templates on that rule was run tonight and returns **five** disagreements: `tandoor` (PORT — **CONFIRMED live**), `zipline` (PATH — **CONFIRMED live**), `wger` (PORT, probe 80 vs compose 8000 — **CONFIRMED live the same night**), `home-assistant` (PATH, `/api/` vs `/manifest.json` — **NOT MEASURED**), and `adventurelog` (a FALSE POSITIVE of the sweep's own regex — it reads `running` live). **So the rule finds both real defects, with two candidates and one false positive out of 53** — a good enough signal for a fast gate, provided it reports candidates rather than convictions and a person or a runtime check resolves them. The earlier, cruder rule (probe port vs the *traefik* port) is strictly worse: it clears zipline and convicts adventurelog. **AND A SECOND FIX SHAPE, ON THE CONTROLLER SIDE, WORTH CONSIDERING BESIDE THE CATALOG ONE:** in both confirmed cases the container's OWN docker healthcheck was **green** the whole time. A `verifying` phase that is about to stop a working app could ask that too — if the compose declares a healthcheck and docker reports `healthy`, the app is alive whatever our probe thinks. That does not excuse a wrong probe, but it turns this failure direction from an outage into a wrong label. It is a design question, not a defect, and is raised here rather than decided. **Needs:** fix tandoor's port (80), zipline's path (`/api/healthcheck`) and wger's port (8000) — **all three are now CONFIRMED live, none is a guess**; add the static gate with a decoy each way (R-421) — a template whose probe agrees must not read as a disagreement, and vice versa. **THE GATE'S RULE WAS THEN SHARPENED BY READING `healthprobe.go` RATHER THAN ASSUMING IT, and the sharpening REMOVED a false conviction.** `type: http` treats **any** response as healthy (`healthprobe.go:258-261`), and `type: api` with **no** `expect` block does the same (`:265-268`); only `type: api` WITH `expect.status` cares about the path or the code. So a PATH difference is a candidate only for the third shape, while a PORT difference is a candidate for alLine truncated
| **R-618** | **[P1-HIGH] THREE apps are presented to the household as UNHEALTHY while they are working perfectly — and because the guarded Update waits on that same probe, a SUCCESSFUL update ends by STOPPING the working app and sending the household to a restore they do not need.** **RANK RAISED FROM P2 TO P1 BY A LIVE MEASUREMENT taken the same night, and the escalation is the whole point:** tandoor's Update 2.6.13 → 2.6.15 was pressed at 21:16:47 and entered `verifying` at 21:17:46. At **21:18:28** the NEW version was `Up 25 seconds` and answering **HTTP 200** on `/accounts/login/` through the household's own front door — while the controller, probing port 8080 where nothing listens, could not see it. `verifying` therefore cannot pass, the full `update.health_timeout` is spent, `Manager.failAndHold` runs `compose down`, and the app is STOPPED. **Nothing is lost** — the data is in the volumes and the restore works — **but one wrong port number in a template converts every successful update of that app into an outage plus an unnecessary restore, for every household running it.** Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/14-tandoor-serving-while-verifying.txt`. MEASURED 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 (controller v0.261.0, catalog `f5f6a152b513`). Two shapes, one class: **(a) `tandoor` — the WRONG PORT.** `.felhom.yml` probes `port: 8080`; the container listens on **80 and nothing else** (`ss -ltn` inside it), the compose's own traefik label routes to 80, its own docker healthcheck reads `healthy`, and `/accounts/login/` answers **200** through the household's real front door. `GET /api/stacks/tandoor` nevertheless reads `state: "unhealthy"`. **(b) `zipline` — the WRONG PATH.** `.felhom.yml` probes `/api/health`, which zipline 4.6.1 answers **404 `Route GET:/api/health not found`**; **the compose healthcheck in the very same file uses `/api/healthcheck` and is correct and green.** `/dashboard` answers 200. The controller reads `unhealthy`. **This is the MIRROR of R-613** — that is a probe that passes on a broken app (a false GREEN, which no alarm catches); this is a probe that fails on a working app (a false RED). **IT DOES NOT ALARM, AND THAT SETS THE RANK:** `08-alarm-ladder.md` §4 puts `unhealthy` deliberately in the NOT-down set, so no dead-app event and no customer mail follows — the damage is what the household READS, plus anything that gates on `state`. **IT ALREADY COST A MEASUREMENT TONIGHT:** this drill's harness waited for `state == "running"` and hung for its full budget on tandoor, an app that was up the whole time. An instrument waiting for a wrong answer looks exactly like a slow app. **THE GATE THIS WANTS IS CHEAP AND STATIC, AND THAT IS THE FINDING'S REAL VALUE.** Both halves of the answer live in the same template: compare the `.felhom.yml` probe's port and path against the compose's **own** `healthcheck: test:` URL. A sweep of all 53 templates on that rule was run tonight and returns **five** disagreements: `tandoor` (PORT — **CONFIRMED live**), `zipline` (PATH — **CONFIRMED live**), `wger` (PORT, probe 80 vs compose 8000 — **CONFIRMED live the same night**), `home-assistant` (PATH, `/api/` vs `/manifest.json` — **NOT MEASURED**), and `adventurelog` (a FALSE POSITIVE of the sweep's own regex — it reads `running` live). **So the rule finds both real defects, with two candidates and one false positive out of 53** — a good enough signal for a fast gate, provided it reports candidates rather than convictions and a person or a runtime check resolves them. The earlier, cruder rule (probe port vs the *traefik* port) is strictly worse: it clears zipline and convicts adventurelog. **AND A SECOND FIX SHAPE, ON THE CONTROLLER SIDE, WORTH CONSIDERING BESIDE THE CATALOG ONE:** in both confirmed cases the container's OWN docker healthcheck was **green** the whole time. A `verifying` phase that is about to stop a working app could ask that too — if the compose declares a healthcheck and docker reports `healthy`, the app is alive whatever our probe thinks. That does not excuse a wrong probe, but it turns this failure direction from an outage into a wrong label. It is a design question, not a defect, and is raised here rather than decided. **Needs:** fix tandoor's port (80), zipline's path (`/api/healthcheck`) and wger's port (8000) — **all three are now CONFIRMED live, none is a guess**; add the static gate with a decoy each way (R-421) — a template whose probe agrees must not read as a disagreement, and vice versa. **THE GATE'S RULE WAS THEN SHARPENED BY READING `healthprobe.go` RATHER THAN ASSUMING IT, and the sharpening REMOVED a false conviction.** `type: http` treats **any** response as healthy (`healthprobe.go:258-261`), and `type: api` with **no** `expect` block does the same (`:265-268`); only `type: api` WITH `expect.status` cares about the path or the code. So a PATH difference is a candidate only for the third shape, while a PORT difference is a candidate for alLine truncated
| **R-619** | **[P3-LOW] A `type: password` deploy field is MANDATORY however `required` reads, and the `deploy-fields` contract says the opposite — so any caller that trusts it is refused.** MEASURED 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 while widening the update drill. `GET /api/stacks/grafana/deploy-fields` serves `{"env_var":"GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD","type":"password","generate":"password:16","required":false}`; a deploy carrying only the two `required:true` fields is refused **400** „a(z) „Admin jelszó" mező kitöltése kötelező — használja a Generálás gombot…". **The BEHAVIOUR is right and is a decision, not a bug:** `deploy.go:305-312` refuses a `password` field with no caller value on purpose — *"We never silently auto-generate — the user needs to know their password"* — which is the opposite of the `secret` case one branch above, where a generated value the customer never sees is exactly correct. **The defect is the CONTRACT.** `.felhom.yml` declares `required: false`, the API serves that verbatim, and nothing on the wire distinguishes "optional because the box will generate it" (`secret`) from "optional in the template and mandatory in the code" (`password`). A person using the deploy page never meets this because the page renders a Generálás button; **anything that is not that page does**, which now includes this drill harness and would include `09` §6.2's unattended caller the day it deploys anything. **Fix shape (smallest that keeps the decision):** serve `required: true` for `type: password` in the deploy-fields response — one place, derived rather than stored, so templates need no edit — and a test asserting a `password` field always reaches the wire as required. Alternatively state it in the field's `description`, which is weaker because it is prose. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/apps/grafana/log.txt` (the refusal) and `batchA.log`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** |
| **R-620** | **[P3-LOW] A disabled notifier drops every event with NO local trace, so a box whose hub configuration is absent or broken stops telling anyone anything and leaves nothing behind that says so.** FOUND 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 while trying to score the update night's alarm truth table. `hub.enabled: false` there, and `Notifier.Publish` returns at `notify/notifier.go:269` — **before** any log line — as do `NotifyHealthChange` (:359) and four more entry points. Startup says it once (`[INFO] Notifier disabled (hub not configured)`) and then every later event, of every severity up to `critical`, vanishes without a word. **The measurable consequence tonight:** the whole event-and-mail half of the drill was structurally unmeasurable on this venue, and the alarm truth table below covers only the app page, the dashboard and the box's own log. That is a cost this session paid and named; the next one would pay it again. **The consequence on a real box is smaller but not zero:** the fleet's boxes have the hub enabled, and total silence is already caught by the hub's dead-man's-switch (staleness from the LAST REPORT, proven in the 2026-07-22 power-outage audit). What is NOT caught is the in-between — a box that still reports but whose notifier was disabled by a bad config push would go on reporting healthy while dropping every alarm, and the only evidence would be a single INFO line at the last restart. **Fix shape:** one DEBUG (or WARN, once per event type) line on the disabled path naming the event that was dropped, so the absence is visible where it happens rather than inferable from a startup line. Cheap, and it converts an invisible failure into a greppable one — R-96 rule 3 in the place that produces it. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/11-notifier-disabled.txt`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** |
| **R-621** | **[P2-MEDIUM] A held update DESTROYS the evidence of why it failed: `failAndHold` runs `compose down`, the failing containers are removed, and their output is gone before anyone — household, operator or the next session — can read it.** MEASURED 2026-09-21 on guest 9202 on a REAL upstream edge: `adventurelog v0.12.1 → v0.13.0`. The new backend applied **nine Django migrations successfully** and then never listened; the update held after the full 5-minute health wait. **`Manager.failAndHold` (`stacks/update.go:723`) calls `updateCompose(dir, env, "down")`**, which removes the containers rather than stopping them, and nothing captures their logs first. Within seconds the box's own log recorded `Logs result for adventurelog: 0 bytes returned (empty)` and `docker ps -a` held nothing at all. **What survives is the WHAT and not the WHY:** the controller line `update adventurelog FAILED after the new version was started: not healthy: not healthy within 5m0s (last: state unhealthy)` and the household's sentence, both of which say the app did not come up and neither of which says the migrations ran and the server then failed to bind. **This is R-320 ("evidence off the machine before the teardown") as a PRODUCT behaviour rather than a session habit** — the teardown here is the product's own, it is correct to perform (a half-started new version must not keep running), and it happens before anyone can look. **Why it matters beyond a drill:** the hold sentence sends the household to a restore, and after the restore the only remaining question is *should I press Update again?* — which nobody can answer, because the one artefact that would say so no longer exists. It also makes every future held update unreportable to an upstream project. **Fix shape:** capture `compose logs --no-color --tail N` into the stack directory (beside `applied-compose.yml`, which already travels with the stack) IMMEDIATELY before the `down`, and surface it on the app page's hold panel or at least through the existing `/api/stacks/<n>/logs` fallback. Bounded size, written once per hold. A test that holds an app and asserts the captured file is non-empty — it fails today. Evidence: `audits/update-night-2026-09-21/apps/adventurelog/why-it-failed.txt`, `state-after-hold.txt`. | **READY — rank P2-MEDIUM; owner: CC (controller)** |
@@ -799,6 +799,9 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
| **R-628** | **[P2-MEDIUM] An empty search of a mailbox I do not control was turned into a claim about what a THIRD PARTY had done, and it went into the register as fact.** FOUND 2026-09-22; the operator caught it within minutes by producing the thread. The `due_checks_gate` fired R-433 (*have Hetzner answered?*). Two searches of the felhom catch-all came back empty, and the emptiness was written into R-433 as **"Hetzner has not answered"** and **"there is no evidence the tickets were ever opened"**. Both were false: ticket **#2026090103040671** had been opened and answered. **THE PRECISE FAULT IS THE INFERENCE, NOT THE QUERY — and that distinction is the whole value of this row.** Re-run afterwards WITH a positive control: `from:monitoring@felhom.eu` returns **201 threads**, `in:anywhere … includeTrash` reaches SENT, TRASH and mail back to January — **the instrument works.** And the exact ticket number, the exact subject `Storage Box issue`, and `from:hetzner` each still return **nothing**. So the literal finding — *this correspondence is not in this mailbox* — was CORRECT. What was invented was the step from there to *Hetzner has not answered* and *the tickets were never opened*. **A mailbox I can read is not the only place a reply can be**, and the operator's own account is exactly where a support ticket he opened would land. An absent record in ONE place can never answer a question about what SOMEONE ELSE did. **This is R-96 rule 3 in a new surface, one step further out than R-607**: there the instrument reported a stale value as current; here a correct observation was promoted to a conclusion it could not carry. **It is sharper still because the same session, the night before, gave every fixture a negative control and every gate a red-proof — and then reached for a search with neither.** **THE RULE, in one line:** *an empty search may be reported as "absent from the place I looked", never as "it did not happen" — and only after a control query that MUST hit has been seen to hit.* **Done:** the rule is written into the Gmail-access memory, where the next session meets it before it searches rather than after. | **CLOSED 2026-09-22 — rule recorded; R-433 corrected with the real answers** |
| **R-627** | **[P2-MEDIUM] Nothing checked that the register is a well-formed table, so an append that ate two rows' state cells went unnoticed until a person read the file — and one row had been broken the same way for 45 days.** FOUND 2026-09-22. The 2026-09-21 update night appended measured results to eight rows with a regex that matched each row's trailing state cell; on **R-446** and **R-458** it consumed the cell and did not restore it, the cell reappeared as a stray FOURTH cell on a DUPLICATED copy of **R-626** and **R-625**, and a blank line was left between each pair. The register then reported **317 rows for 315 findings**, two rows carried no state at all, and two findings existed twice with contradictory state cells. **Nothing caught it:** `one_register_gate.py` compares this file against ROADMAP and `closed_register_gate.py` forbids an id in BOTH files — neither asks whether the file is a well-formed table, and neither notices an id duplicated WITHIN it. **THE RED-PROOF THEN FOUND AN OLDER INSTANCE NOBODY HAD SEEN: R-254 lost its state cell on 2026-08-08 (commit `59527d0`) and had rendered without a State column for 45 days.** **Closed the same day:** `scripts/register_shape_gate.py`, registered in `repo_gates.py` as gate 14 and reached by the pre-push hook, refusing a row that does not end with `|` (an eaten state cell), a duplicated id, or a blank line splitting the table; four decoys in `test_gate_decoys.py` — three convicting on the exact damage shapes and one asserting a healthy register still passes. **TWO THINGS THE RED-PROOF CORRECTED IN THE GATE ITSELF, kept because they are the finding's real content:** a first draft counted CELLS and convicted **125 innocent rows** — register cells carry literal `|` inside prose and shell snippets (`owner: CC | …`), so a row cannot be split on `|`, and a count that cannot be computed is not a check; and it skipped malformed rows before counting ids, reporting **5 duplicates where there were 2**. **Repaired:** both state cells restored from the stray cells that carried them, the two duplicate rows deleted, R-254's verdict sentence given its cell back, and **15 blank lines that split the register into 12 separate markdown tables** removed — every row's text byte-identical afterwards, proven by diff. **And the gate immediately earned itself:** the very next row inserted in this session (R-628) left a blank line behind and the gate refused it. | **CLOSED 2026-09-22 — gate 14, four decoys, register repaired 317→315** |
| **R-629** | **[P2-MEDIUM] The drill catalog sent the operator 47 CI-failure alarms in one night, and the drill method that created it did not mention CI at all.** FOUND 2026-09-22 while checking a different mailbox question — which is the only reason it was found. `admin/app-catalog-drill` was created on 2026-09-21 by `POST /api/v1/repos/migrate` from the live catalog, and a migrated repo inherits `has_actions: true`. Every drill push therefore ran the catalog's CI workflow, which failed immediately (the drill repo carries the workflow but the run has no meaningful gate context), and **each failure mailed `admin@felhom.eu`**: *"[felhom CI] gates FAILED in admin/app-catalog-drill"*. **47 runs, 47 alarms, all overnight, all unread and flagged IMPORTANT.** **WHY THIS MATTERS MORE THAN THE NOISE:** that mailbox is the operator's alarm channel, and R-168 made CI mail the thing that notices a bypassed gate. A night of throwaway failures from a repo nobody must ever act on trains the reader to skim exactly the sender that must never be skimmed — and it did it on the night the same mailbox was also carrying real `offsite_snapshots_dropped` and `offsite_proof_empty` alarms. **The drill method wrote down the fences it needed** — private repo, no customer box may follow it, reset at teardown — **and said nothing about CI, because nobody had run a drill repo through a CI-enabled Gitea before.** **FIXED 2026-09-22:** `has_actions` set to **false** on the drill repo (verified by re-reading the repo: `has_actions: False, private: True`), and `09` §6.5 now carries it as a step of creating a drill repo rather than as a thing to notice afterwards. **What is NOT done:** the 47 mails are still in the operator's inbox, unread — deleting another person's mail is not mine to do, and they are named here so they can be cleared in one search: `subject:"gates FAILED in admin/app-catalog-drill"`. | **CLOSED 2026-09-22 — actions disabled, method updated; the 47 mails are the operator's to clear** |
| **R-630** | **[P2-MEDIUM] `paperless-ngx`'s health probe has never run, on any box, and the badge can never go red.** FOUND 2026-09-22 by the new `probe-matches-compose` gate, which reported it as a WARNING while looking for something else. `findProbeContainer` (`controller/internal/stacks/healthprobe.go:297`) takes the container whose name EQUALS the stack name, else the first whose name has it as a PREFIX; paperless-ngx's containers are `paperless-webserver`, `paperless-postgres` and `paperless-redis`, and **none of them begins with `paperless-ngx`**. The function returns `""`, `:62` counts the stack in `skippedNoContainer` and `continue`s, and no probe is ever built for it. **WHY THIS IS WORSE THAN A WRONG PROBE, WHICH IS WHAT R-618 WAS:** a wrong probe is a FALSE RED — loud, visible, and it stopped an app, which is how it was found within one night. This is a SILENT ABSENCE. The app page shows whatever the container state alone says, nothing contradicts it, and **R-96 rule 3 is the exact shape: an absent alarm is equally consistent with `healthy` and with `never checked`.** **NOT MEASURED, and said so rather than assumed:** what the guarded update's `verifying` phase does for a stack with no probe target — whether it passes immediately or waits out `update.health_timeout` — has not been run. `paperless-ngx` IS installed on demo-hp, so it is answerable on a real box. **Two candidate fixes, neither taken here because both are product code and this session was forbidden it:** give the template a `container_name: paperless-ngx` on its webserver service (catalog-only, one line, but it renames a running container on every existing box); or let the probe fall back to the service the compose declares first, and SAY SO in the health detail. **What is safe to say today:** the gate names it on every push, so it cannot go back to being invisible. | **OPEN — P2; owner: CC; needs the `verifying` behaviour measured on demo-hp before a fix is chosen** |
| **R-631** | **[P3-LOW] Five templates cannot be judged by the probe gate at all, and one is correct only by accident.** FOUND 2026-09-22 when `check-probe-matches-compose.py` was run over all 53. The gate's oracle is the probed service's own compose `healthcheck.test`; where that dials no loopback URL the gate has nothing to compare and reports a WARNING rather than a pass. **`crafty-controller`, `mealie` and `uptime-kuma`** run their healthcheck through a python or script helper (`ssl._create_unverified_context()`, `socket.create_connection`, `extra/healthcheck`), so the port is inside code the gate does not execute. **`vikunja`** has no compose healthcheck on its probed service at all. **`home-assistant`** is the interesting one: its probe path `/api/` differs from the compose's `/manifest.json`, and it is healthy today **only because its check is `type: api` with no `expect` block, which `probeHTTP` treats as "any response is healthy"** — add `expect: {status: 200}` to that template, a change that looks like a tightening, and the app goes permanently unhealthy and every successful update of it starts stopping it. **The gate warns on it for exactly that reason and refuses to call it a pass.** **Needs:** a live probe reading for each of the five on a scratch guest — deploy, read `GET /api/stacks/<n>`, compare with the front door — which is one rotation night's work and closes the last gap R-618 left. | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC; five apps, one live reading each** |
| **R-632** | **[P3-LOW] Twenty-eight of the 53 templates have never been deployed by any update drill, so nothing is known about whether their updates work.** COUNTED 2026-09-22 against the 2026-09-21 sweep, which is the widest one ever run. **20 apps have a verdict record** (14 proven, 3 failed, 3 inconclusive, plus tandoor re-walked to proven on 2026-09-22); **4 more were deployed as props in the bad-days legs with no edge walked** (`bentopdf`, `glance`, `uptime-kuma`, `wishlist`); **1 was deployed only to measure its probe** (`wger`); and **28 have never been deployed at all**: `calcom`, `calibre-web`, `claper`, `code-server`, `crafty-controller`, `emby`, `ghost`, `gokapi`, `gramps-web`, `homebox`, `homepage`, `immich`, `jellyfin`, `kimai`, `komga`, `onlyoffice`, `outline`, `paperless-ngx`, `plant-it`, `plex`, `radarr`, `rallly`, `recipe-importer`, `seerr`, `sonarr`, `sparkyfitness`, `termix`, `wanderer`. **THIS IS NOT A COMPLAINT ABOUT THE SWEEP** — it took one app-catalog-wide night to go from 3 apps ever measured to 21, and a night is the unit available. It is a record of what the catalog's update promise currently rests on: **for 28 of 53 apps, nothing.** **The list is the nightly rotation's queue**, smallest and least stateful first; `paperless-ngx` should be early because R-630 needs a live reading from it anyway, and `crafty-controller`, `mealie` and `uptime-kuma` should be early because R-631 needs one from each. Machine-readable copy: `audits/probe-fix-2026-09-22/not-judged.json`. | **OPEN — P3; owner: CC; the rotation works this list, 28 apps** |
<!-- DUE-CHECKS-BEGIN — machine-readable. Parsed by scripts/due_checks_gate.py.
One row per dated check. The R-number must have a row above. Dates are UTC.
Clearing a row means the check was DONE and its result recorded in that R-row —