Upload watch: spike, design (08 section 9, proposed), live proofs on 9202; rows R-1244..R-1248 (register 189 -> 194); STATUS D41/D42 + the Monday list

Spike: per-app normal levels on three boxes (19-31 days), the off-site push as a line measure (a lower bound),
qBittorrent/Transmission/Plex explainers measured on 9202, a tc ceiling measured (not built). Live on 9202 with
0.342.0-rc.1: limit set; real seed explained; CPU burner and the hidden flood alarmed once each and cleared once;
the household's limit left alone. Teardown: apps removed, 9202 back on 0.341.0, receiver 9471 destroyed.

documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md

@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
 | **R-1094** | Storage & devices | P4 | **The whole-disk format refusal tells the household to format the free part — which is refused while the other part is in use.** SEEN 2026-10-16 (controller 0.318.0): 409 „Ezen a lemezen egy használatban lévő meghajtó van, ezért a teljes lemez nem formázható. Csak a szabad részét formázhatod." — since agent 0.158.1 a part next to a mounted part can only be USED (the root wrapper trusts no „Felhom's own" claim). Evidence: `audits/storage-identity-buildB-2026-10-15/live/14-samedisk-refusal-offer.txt`. | READY | — | Reword `err.web.meghajto_hasznalatban_formazas` (hu + en): „… nem formázható. A szabad részét használatba veheted." Next controller release; the copy gates run. | CC |
 | **R-1213** | Storage & devices | P4 | **Operator detail still on two household pages:** the registered drive card's `ext4 · /dev/sdb1 · Model` line (`templates/storage.html`; W14 hid only the agent drive cards), and the heading „Távoli mentés (3. mentés) — titkosított, offsite" with the English „offsite". Found by the night helper 2026-10-21 (W11/W14 follow-up). | OPEN | — | Move the line behind „Részletek"; „…titkosított, házon kívüli" | CC |
 
-## Security & access — 22 rows (P1 2, P2 3, P3 11, P4 6)
+## Security & access — 23 rows (P1 2, P2 3, P3 12, P4 6)
 
 | ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
 | **R-1054** | Security & access | P3 | **The hub's operator/global API key is still one bearer that can do everything on `/api/v1`, including reading every box's break-glass root password (`GET /admin/hosts/{id}/recovery-credential`).** Hub v0.152.0 gave the web surface scoped tokens (`05` §17) but tokens are refused on `/api/v1` by design. Who uses the global key today is not listed in one place. Fix: list its consumers; move each operator use to a scoped token on the web side (or a token class on the API), and keep the global key only where a box path needs it — or retire it. | OPEN — filed 2026-10-15 by the token build | — | List the global key's consumers (pod env, scripts, runbooks) | CC |
 | **R-1194** | Security & access | P3 | **On a fresh box the operator's break-glass SSH door was broken from the first minute: `oob_degraded` „felhom-sshd config invalid (sshd -t fails)".** Rehearsal 2026-10-20, Tester4-816e21, mail at 12:03 UTC (one minute after the host record was created): details `active:false, config_invalid:true, felhom_sshd_port:0, operator_key_configured:false, operator_key_reported:true, reachable:false`. Possibly the shape of a customer with no operator key set (Tester4 is a test customer) — then the alarm is a false one on every such box; or a real config defect. Not diagnosed (no shell). Checked the same day: the only `oob_degraded` in the operator mailbox in 30 days, and no recovery mail followed; the report says port 0. Two candidate mechanisms in the agent (`internal/felhomsshd/health.go:63-66`): `sshd -t -f <conf>` run by the NON-root agent fails on unreadable host keys, or a config rendered before the desired state arrived (port 0). **CAUSE FOUND AND FIXED 2026-10-21 night** (`audits/night-2026-10-21/P5-checks/`): reproduced on a fresh box from the public ISO — `oob_degraded` mailed 20:34 CEST while felhom-sshd was applied 0.4 s after the check and is healthy (port 8822 listening, `sshd -t` passes as the agent's user through its sudo grant — so the non-root theory is FALSE; without sudo it fails on the host key, which the agent never does). The first host report runs before the felhom-sshd loop's first pass and reads a config never rendered. Fix: agent `0da792e` — no OOB stanza until the first pass has run (the hub does not evaluate a missing one; a failed pass counts). `TestR1194_NoOOBStanzaBeforeTheFirstPass` red-proved. | WATCHING — released in agent v0.162.0 (2026-10-22, operator yes; on the 3 test boxes); the false alarm comes only on a FRESH box's first report | the next fresh install with agent ≥ 0.162.0 | At the next fresh install read the hub's events for `oob_degraded` in the first hour (none expected); then close | CC |
 | **R-1237** | Security & access | P3 | **The nightly CC-secrets sweep found stored one-time codes in a session record dated 2026-10-23: 14 names in one file (bind tokens and setup codes of test boxes — NIGHT_2026_10_23_*, FIXES_2026_10_21_*, NIGHT_2026_10_21_*, REHEARSAL_2026_10_20_* — and R_DEMO_FELHOM in a file of 2026-10-20).** Mail „[DooPlex CC secrets] 2 secret name(s) found in old session records", 2026-10-23 01:57 UTC, read in the day session (names only). One file holding all of them suggests one command printed many stored values at once (a listing or a dump) in the night session. All but R_DEMO_FELHOM are one-time install codes of test boxes; NIGHT_2026_10_23_* die when Tester4-16fdef is deleted (the operator's do list). | OPEN | — | CC: find the file and the command by the sweep's own report (names only), add a hook shape for that command if it is not one; R_DEMO_FELHOM (demo-felhom's recovery code) — the operator decides whether to rotate it | CC |
+| **R-1248** | Security & access | P3 | **An app's own numbers can lie: an attacker with code inside an app's container can answer the app's API with whatever matches its flood, and the upload watch (R-1244) would then call it explained.** Measured remedy, not built: a per-container upload ceiling with `tc` from a helper container in the app's network namespace — on scratch 9202 (unprivileged) a flood was held at 19.9–20.1 Mbit/s and the app kept answering (`audits/SPIKE-upload-watch-2026-10-23.md` §5). Costs: a helper image with `tc` (a new external image, or `tc` in the controller image), `NET_ADMIN` for that helper, re-applied after each app restart. | OPEN | an operator decision (the new image / capability) | Decide; if yes, CC builds the ceiling for the download and media apps first | operator |
 
 ## Box system & updates — 12 rows (P2 1, P3 7, P4 4)
 
@@ -262,12 +263,13 @@ stopping line that lies.
 | **R-1061** | Box system & updates | P4 | **A per-customer floor reached Tester 1 only at its next 15-minute report, not in seconds.** Set 2026-10-15 12:55:51 UTC for tester-1, demo-hp and demo-felhom together (hub 0.153.0, CC's token): demo-hp and demo-felhom ran 0.314.0 within 13 s (the hub's wake); Tester 1 moved at 13:09:35, its regular report (`audits/gate-restore-2026-10-15/release/03-boxes-move.txt`). It had restarted at 12:54:29 onto rc.1 and logged „hub wait channel active". Why the wake did not reach it is not read (the wake line is DEBUG). No harm: the floor arrived. | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-15 | — | Read Tester 1's DEBUG ring at the next floor change; compare with the hub's bump log | CC |
 
 
-## Monitoring & notifications — 20 rows (P2 1, P3 13, P4 6)
+## Monitoring & notifications — 23 rows (P2 2, P3 14, P4 7)
 
 | ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | **R-1020** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **`app_repaired_after_crash` reports a duration of 0 s, and the controller log says „in 0s".** `RunAfterUncleanBoot` sets `res.Duration` in a deferred func after the result is already returned (no named result), so the caller sees 0; the `app.yaml` record is right (10,172 ms on demo-hp 2026-10-14, `audits/immich-repair-2026-10-14/D/`). Small, but the controller release for this session is spent (v0.311.0). | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-14 | — | CC: a named result (or set the duration before return), with a test on the returned value; ride the next controller release | CC |
 | **R-528** | Monitoring & notifications | P2 | **[P2-MEDIUM] Docker does not report an OOM kill inside a Felhom LXC guest: `OOMKilled` stays false and no `oom` event fires, so the v0.243.0 OOM line is not proven live.** MEASURED 2026-09-15 on scratch 9202 (Docker 29.8.0): Paperless capped at 128M restarted 11 times with `OOMKilled=false` and zero `docker events --filter event=oom`; a memory hog inside the running container was killed (rc 137) with the same silence (`E2-oom-signal-measure-9202.txt`). BIGNIGHT VM 333 did read `oomkilled=true`, so the shape differs by case. **Fix shape:** the agent reads the guest container cgroups' `memory.events oom_kill` counters (host-side, reliable), or the controller alarms on a restart-count trend **RE-MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the DRILL box (fresh install, nested VM 334, Docker in an LXC guest, controller 0.243.0), so the finding is not a property of one machine:** the Paperless webserver was capped at 128 M with `docker update --memory`; it restarted 9-10 times, and all three signals stayed silent - `OOMKilled=false` on every inspect, `docker events --filter event=oom` EMPTY for the whole window, the container's cgroup not visible from inside the guest, and `dmesg` unreadable there. Identical to scratch 9202. So the v0.243.0 OOM line cannot fire on ANY Felhom box as shipped, on either host. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-0243-2026-09-16/phase2-m1-oom.txt`. | **WATCHING** — **2026-10-12: the built part is released** (agent v0.150.0 carries the Docker-approval memory-kill check; the boxes run 0.154.0; hub 0.140.0+ requires a passing `oom_check` before a Docker set is approved). Per decision 157 nothing else is built; the row watches for a box whose Docker reports a false OOM flag. Dated look: 2026-11-12. **READY — rank P2-MEDIUM; owner: CC** **2026-09-17 (chaos night): an OOM WAS detected on a fresh box, and named precisely.** On `tester-1-022354` (controller 0.245.0, guest 9201, 6 GB RAM) immich’s Postgres was killed by the memory limit during its reverse-geocoding import, and the controller pushed `app_oom` (warning, operator-only): „Alkalmazás memóriája elfogyott: immich (immich-postgres) — egy folyamatát a memóriakorlát leállította” — naming the app AND the exact container. The visible consequence was `write CONNECTION_CLOSED immich-postgres:5432` and twelve restarts of immich-server. So on THIS box the OOM scan works and was the fastest route to the diagnosis; recorded here rather than filed as a new row. Evidence: `audits/evidence-chaos-night-2026-09-17/round-2.txt`. **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): a one-page design proposal (no code) is in `audits/night-burndown-2026-10-05/design-R-528.md`** — for the operator. **2026-10-06: STOPPED BEFORE ANY CODE — the measurement contradicted the design** (decision 155 said A then C). On scratch 9202, Docker 29.8.2, the `OOMKilled` flag was TRUE in all four shapes tried: a child process killed while the container kept running (`oom_kill` 0 → 3, flag true) and three main-process kills (exit 137, flag true); an `oom` event each time. The false flags of 2026-09-15 were on Docker 29.8.0. Cost read for the record: one exec read of 21 containers on demo-hp = 1.6 s. `audits/design-build-2026-10-06/`C/. **2026-10-06 18:24: operator ruling, option A (decision 157):** nothing is built; the row stays open as a WATCH for a box whose Docker reports a false flag. **Added:** a Docker engine set may not be approved until it reports a memory kill correctly on the boxes that ran it (built in this row's next session). **2026-10-06 (night): the Docker-approval memory-kill check is BUILT** — hub v0.140.0 (LIVE: the approval waits for a passing `oom_check` on every ring-0 box; a failed, errored or missing one blocks) and the agent's wrapper (`felhom-agent` `acccb66`, unreleased — ships as v0.150.0 after the 2026-10-07 read-back). Proven by hand on demo-hp's guest: `OOMKilled=true`, exit 137, the `oom` event — seen only with an events window ending after the run (the wrapper waits 2 s). `audits/readback-2026-10-07/`F/. | — | 2026-11-12: read the hub for any failed `oom_check` or an `app_oom` with no restart reason since 2026-10-12; none → close | CC |
+| **R-1244** | Monitoring & notifications | P2 | **The upload and CPU watch is built and not released: until it is, a hacked app on a household box can send hundreds of GB or mine for weeks and nobody is told.** Operator ruling 2026-10-23 19:22; built 2026-10-23 night — controller v0.342.0 (`internal/upwatch`) + hub v0.169.0 (the four operator-only events), both committed, NOT released; proven on scratch 9202 with `0.342.0-rc.1` (`audits/SPIKE-upload-watch-2026-10-23.md` §7; `08` §9 [DESIGN — proposed]). | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR | the operator's yes; R-1245 and R-1246 | Operator: yes → build hub 0.169.0 + deploy, then the controller through the normal release path (Tester 1, demo-hp, demo-felhom, box walk) | operator |
 | **R-1193** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **When the box froze (R-1192), the operator heard only „no report for 45 m" — 28 minutes in — and the household heard nothing at all.** Measured 2026-10-20 against the operator mailbox (the second channel): the freeze began ~13:05 UTC; the hub page read ONLINE / OK at 13:22 (correct inside the 45-minute threshold, R-549); `host_stale` at 13:33, `app_oom` at 13:34 (immich-machine-learning killed by its memory limit), `host_crash_restart` at 14:26 and 16:29 (the two plug pulls), `node_stale` 15:59 / `node_recovered` 16:03. No mail or banner tells the household that its box is not answering, and no operator mail says „the box answers ping but not its dashboard". CORRECTED the same day: the first version of this row said the hub showed OK „throughout" and „nobody was told" — that read only the hub page, not the mailbox. Evidence `audits/rehearsal-2026-10-20/journal.md`. | OPEN | — | Design note (2026-10-21, after R-1192's diagnosis): the freeze's signature is cheap to see from the HOST side — the guest cgroup's memory PSI „full" above ~50 % for a minute, or its `memory.events max` climbing, while the host still reports; the agent could raise `guest_memory_thrash` (operator mail in its own words, not „no report for 45 m") and the household banner „A dobozod most nagyon lassú…". With the swap fix (R-1192) the measured thrash ends within a minute, so this alarm should be built only if a freeze is seen again after the agent release; until then it stays a design. Decide whether a dashboard that does not answer for N minutes while the host still reports should alarm sooner and in its own words (guest-side liveness), and whether the household is told | CC |
 | **R-1202** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A box whose clock is behind blames the hub and stops an app without telling anyone.** Rehearsal 2026-10-20 B6 #8: RTC set 2 years back (the OS raised it to 2026-04-13): the dashboard shows only „Hub nem elérhető" while the log says „x509: certificate … not yet valid: current time 2026-04-13…"; Paperless crash-looped and the box stopped it with a restore hold; the `app_stopped_unhealthy` event failed (hub unreachable), so neither the household nor the operator heard. After the real time came back the app stayed stopped until a Start (clear sentence, 1 min). | **OPEN** | — | say „the box's clock is wrong (it says <date>)" when TLS fails with not-yet-valid/expired against a hub that answers; keep the stop event queued until the hub is reachable | CC |
 | **R-340** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **The new reachability check does not touch the surface that actually failed.** R-339 reports when the hub cannot READ ep0 — but the read it performs is the `usage` op, which is `proxmox-backup-manager` plus `df` over SSH, and therefore rides the **local API daemon**. The 2026-08-18 incident explicitly CLEARED that daemon: `proxmox-backup.service` was healthy throughout, and it was the **HTTPS proxy on 8007** that was wedged with a full accept queue. **So R-339's check would have returned green for all 9 h 37 m of that outage.** It closes the case where ep0 is unreachable *as a host*; it does not close the case that actually happened. This is not a defect in R-339 — it is the honest boundary of what it watches, recorded so a future reader does not mistake a green box gauge for a working off-site tier | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-18** | a tenantsync endpoint-script version bump (the op is added on ep0, so it needs the same version-gated rollout `ErrUsageUnsupported` already models) | Add a **health op** to `scripts/felhom-tenantsync.sh` that probes `https://127.0.0.1:8007/` on ep0 and reports the proxy's fd count and listen-queue depth, then surface it as a third signal. **Overlaps the connections spike (R-336's remaining half): both want the same observations from ep0, so whichever runs SECOND must reuse the first's evidence rather than re-measuring a protected machine twice**  **REUSE, per this row's own instruction — the connections spike ran FIRST (2026-08-20) and already produced most of what the health op wants; do not re-measure a protected machine a third time.** Available in `audits/evidence-ep0-established-connections-2026-08-20/`: the proxy **fd count** and its type breakdown (`lsof` + `/proc/<pid>/fd`), the **listen-queue depth** (`ss -lnt` — `Recv-Q 0`, `Send-Q 1024`), the **ESTAB/CLOSE-WAIT split**, the **per-peer** connection histogram, a **31-minute persistence diff** of full 4-tuples, and a **46.18 h** slope with Poisson bounds. What the health op would still add beyond these: a loopback `GET https://127.0.0.1:8007/` probe — the observation that distinguished "process problem" from "network problem" on 2026-08-18 and the one thing this spike did NOT take, because it is the surface R-339 cannot see. **And this spike sharpens what the op should report:** a rising **ESTAB** count is the live signal (CLOSE-WAIT was **0**, not merely flat), and per **R-344** the fd ceiling that matters may be the **agent's**, not only ep0's. | CC |
@@ -283,8 +285,11 @@ stopping line that lies.
 | **R-1211** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **The household's `backup_failed` mail says only „A biztonsági mentés sikertelen! Kérjük, ellenőrizd a rendszert." — no app named, no next step, and the formal „Kérjük".** Rehearsal 2026-10-20 (the one alarm the household got, `audits/rehearsal-2026-10-20/B9-words/words.md` W25); the box's own page now says which app and that the box retries the next night (controller `5776d54`, W25), but the mail is the hub's `customerMessages` entry. Found by the night helper 2026-10-21. | OPEN | — | Hub: build the household mail from the event's app names and the classifier's class, in the te-form, with „a doboz a következő éjjel újra próbálkozik"; mail golden | CC |
 | **R-1222** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A household that sets an EVENING backup time gets a false „database dump missed” error every morning.** REAL in code (night 2026-10-22; split from R-1189 (e)): the hub's 05:00 check wants a dump since Budapest midnight (`hub/internal/monitor/deadline.go:416-419, 555-565`), so an evening dump (the banner suggests evening times) is always „yesterday”; on 2026-10-25 the check also runs at 04:00 (R-1183). Evidence `audits/night-2026-10-22/P3-candidates/analysis.md`. | OPEN | — | Fix: the check wants a dump within the last 26 h (or since the box's own scheduled time); a hub test with an evening schedule; rides a hub deploy | CC |
 | **R-1223** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **After a reboot, a box whose tunnel ep0 refuses is invisible: the future stamp is gone, so neither the D30 re-key nor the hub's alarm sees it.** Fresh review 2026-10-23 night (`REPORT-night-2026-10-23.md`, A8 + H1): the kernel forgets `latest-handshake` when the interface restarts (0 = never); the agent then sends neither `last_handshake_age_s` nor `handshake_future_s`, and `checkWGTunnel` (`hub/internal/api/host_tunnel.go`) does not judge a registered, active tunnel with no handshake at all. Shape: the clock ran ahead, was corrected, the box rebooted (some households switch off at night), ep0 still holds the future stamp and starts nothing. | OPEN | — | Agent: report `tunnel_up_s` (how long the unit has been active) with no handshake; hub: a registered, active tunnel with no handshake for > 30 min while reporting → `wg_tunnel_stale`; the agent re-keys the same way after 30 min with no handshake. Tests both sides; rides an agent release + a hub deploy | CC |
+| **R-1245** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **DECIDE: how large is qBittorrent's default upload limit?** The box sets it from the measured line and never over the household's own limit. CC's pick: **50 % of the measured upload** (the family keeps half the line; a seeding qBittorrent measured 131 Mbit/s on the bench — the whole line). Other: 30 % (gentler on the family, slower seeding) or none (only the alarm). `audits/SPIKE-upload-watch-2026-10-23.md` §4, §6.6. | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR | — | Operator: say a percentage (or none) | operator |
+| **R-1246** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **DECIDE: who is told when the box limits or flags something?** CC's pick: the family only about the qBittorrent limit (one line on its page; they can change it); the unexplained-upload and unexplained-CPU alarms reach the operator only (R-388: the household can do nothing about a hacked app but wait for support). Other: tell the family too (that support was told). `audits/SPIKE-upload-watch-2026-10-23.md` §6.4. | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR | — | Operator: pick | operator |
 | **R-1224** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **The operator's 1-hour mail cooldown for `wg_tunnel_stale` is per customer, not per host, and `wg_tunnel_ok` does not end it.** Fresh review 2026-10-23 night (`REPORT-night-2026-10-23.md`, H3): `notify/dispatcher.go:620` keys the cooldown `customerID:eventType`. Two hosts of one household going stale within an hour, or stale → ok → stale, store a second event row but mail once (the suppression is in `notification_log`). | OPEN | — | Key the cooldown by `host_id` from the details for host-scoped operator events, and let the matching ok event end it; a dispatcher test with two hosts; rides a hub deploy | CC |
 | **R-1233** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **`[ERROR] [stacks] execCommand failed: exit status 1` names no command.** Seen once a night (2026-10-21 00:30:49 and 2026-10-23 02:17:14 UTC, each right after an app stopped for its dump); the command and stderr go only into the returned error, which the caller may drop (`internal/stacks/manager.go:1757`). An ERROR nobody can judge. | OPEN | — | Log the command's first two words (`docker inspect`, never the arguments — `docker exec … psql` can carry a password) and the stderr's first line; find the caller of the nightly one | CC |
+| **R-1247** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **The box's upload line is only a lower bound, learnt from its own off-site push; most nights the push is too small to say anything.** Measured: at a one-minute sample the push exceeded 2 Mbit/s on 3 of 81 box-nights; a one-second sample during the push is now built (a night counts when its best 10 s moved ≥ 10 MB). An ACTIVE test (a timed upload to the box's own Storage Box sub-account, or to ep0) would give the real line — not built: a design for the test file beside the restic repository, a quiet hour outside 02:30–05:30, ~125 MB per test at 100 Mbit/s. `audits/SPIKE-upload-watch-2026-10-23.md` §2, §3. | OPEN | an operator decision (data cost, where the test writes) | Decide whether an active test is wanted; if yes, CC designs it | operator |
 
 
 ## Hub & operator — 12 rows (P3 5, P4 7)

documentation/backlog/STATUS-HISTORY.md

@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ Moved here byte for byte on 2026-10-14 (night session), newest first, so that `S
 
 **Updated 2026-10-13 (night): demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1 run agent 0.155.0; demo-felhom runs controller 0.310.0, the other two 0.309.0 until the floor is raised. The open-items list is at 127. Reports: `REPORT-poweroff.md`, `REPORT-plugmeter.md`, `REPORT-usenet-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-newapps-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-disk-evening-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-answers-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-m3-2026-10-11.md`, `REPORT-redesign-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-testers-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-register-shrink-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-new-apps-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-release-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-break-the-circle-2026-10-09.md`, `REPORT-dooplex-survival-2026-10-09.md`, `REPORT-day4-2026-10-09.md`.**
 
+## Moved from STATUS on 2026-10-23 (night)
+
+**Updated 2026-10-23 (evening).** The Plex attack on DooPlex did NOT reach Felhom's secrets: the two open doors to them (a shared backup folder and Longhorn's page) were not used in the attack days. The backup folder is now closed to the home network (your yes); it is still open to every app on DooPlex, so a hacked app there could read the hub's backups (R-1241, the homelab session's fix).
+
 ## Moved from STATUS on 2026-10-23 (evening)
 
 **Updated 2026-10-23 (afternoon).** Your D39 = B is built and live: an app with a public security hole can now get its fix at night on every box, after one test on the test box — controller 0.341.0 is the floor since 13:24 (your yes). The test: Plex moved by itself at night on the test box, and an older controller safely waited for a hand press. Nothing needs you.