Rehearsal: B6 #16 English pass, #9 two-at-once (as expected), #13 second drive (not offered as backup target), #4 drive pulled (handled well; last uploads 0 bytes → R-1196 P3); B9 W24-W29

documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
 | **R-1189** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Time and concurrency candidates from the data-loss hunt, not yet proven:** (a) a host clock ahead during one whole-guest backup silences that tier until real time passes it, and the hub reads the same clock (agent `localapi/server.go:1178-1192`, `backup/runner.go:607-629`, hub `monitor/deadline.go:243`; R-973 cap counts future runs `backup_cap.go:61`); (b) the whole-guest start creeps ~5 min/night until a night is skipped silently (`server.go:1184`, `quiesce.go:150, 807-818`); (c) the whole-guest quiesce stops apps mid-restore or mid-update (`quiesce.go:213-275, 565`); (d) CONFIRMED in code: the off-site proof and integrity check are plain daily jobs outside the catch-up (`nightchain.go` header: the catch-up runs only the three backup legs), so they never run on a box that is off at 05:30–06:00, while the comment at `cmd/controller/main.go:1575-1577` says the opposite; (e) CONFIRMED in code: the hub's 05:00 check wants a dump „since Budapest midnight" (`hub/internal/monitor/deadline.go:416-419, 556-565`), so an evening backup time (which the banner suggests) raises a false `expected_dbdump_missed` error every morning — and on 2026-10-25 the check also runs at 04:00 (R-1183); (f) the OS leg and kernel reboot follow a daytime valve backup (agent `server.go:982-986`, `kernel.go:101-114`) — design question; (g) spring forward 2027-03-28 fires dump and second copy together; (h) self-update busy check before the pull only (`updater.go:532-545, 764`); (i) a double-clicked restore shows failed while it runs (`web/handlers.go:1853-1874`). Evidence `audits/dataloss-hunt-2026-10-20/C1-time-concurrency-candidates.md`. | VERIFY | — | (a) is B6 #8's live test; (b) read the agent journal on demo-hp; the rest by unit tests | CC |
 | **R-1190** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Key and retention candidates from the data-loss hunt, not yet proven:** (a) a recovery ceremony while off-site is not configured seals a package with no repo password and supersedes the good one (`escrow_handlers.go:217`, agent `main.go:2975-2981`, hub `store.go:3392`); (b) the global „create your recovery code" bar links to the ceremony the backups page hides during a recovery offer (`escrow_banner.go:23-33` vs `backups_remote.html:144-160`); (c) after a reuse-path reinstall the new PBS key K is never escrowed and nothing compares fingerprints (`felhom-pbs-apply:99`, `escrow_confirm.go:182-205`); (d) whole-guest off-site copies run before any escrow exists (design question vs 07 §6.1's Tier-3 gate); (e) the escrow PUT is two statements; (f) the operator's off-site re-issue resets the provider password before saving it (hub `offsite.go:217-245`); (g) „Megőrzött adatok" can list a running app's live folder when its app.yaml is unreadable (`kept.go:220-235, 330-402`); (h) a unit restore can point an app back at an old drive and F5 then prunes the current drive's unit (`backup.go:1517-1574`). Evidence `audits/dataloss-hunt-2026-10-20/C1-keys-candidates.md`, `C1-delete-retention-candidates.md`. | VERIFY | — | Unit tests first for (a), (e), (g) | CC |
 
-## Storage & devices — 9 rows (P3 3, P4 6)
+## Storage & devices — 10 rows (P3 4, P4 6)
 
 | ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
 | **R-1064** | Storage & devices | P4 | **Removing a storage path does not mention the cross-drive backup copies it holds.** demo-hp 2026-10-15: `/mnt/sizing-bench` removed through `/settings/storage/remove` (302, „Adattároló eltávolítva") while calibre-web's and paperless-ngx's `cross_drive.destination_path` pointed at it; the copies stay on disk, the records still name the removed path. The in-use check counts HDD_PATH only (`appsUsingPath`). | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-15 | — | Read what tonight's tier-2 run (01:30) does with the two records; then: name the copies in the removal's confirmation (or count them as in use) | CC |
 | **R-330** | Storage & devices | P3 | **Disk health Phase 2 — the three SMART attributes the wire does not carry.** The failing drive's most telling counter was **187 `Reported_Uncorrect`**, sitting at normalized **1** against threshold **0** with a raw count of **1001** — one point from failing and structurally unable to get there. Also wanted: **199 `UDMA_CRC_Error_Count`** (cabling) and **188 `Command_Timeout`**. None are on the agent→controller wire today, so v0.215.0's ladder could not use them. Phase 2 also persists periodic SMART **samples** (the right home is `metrics.MetricsStore`, NOT the Phase-1 state file, which is one record per disk and must stay that way). **This is a declared WIRE change, so under the G-1 gate the hub must model the new fields in the SAME session** — that is precisely why it was kept out of Phase 1, where it would have turned a one-word severity fix into a three-repo change | **READY** — **2026-10-12: the wire half is CLOSED in this row** — released in agent v0.150.0 (boxes run 0.154.0), controller and hub decode 187/188/199. **Only open work:** the verdict slice (use the three counters in the disk verdict and the household's words) and persisting samples. **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-14** **2026-10-06 night: the wire half BUILT on main (unreleased):** the agent sends SMART 187 `reported_uncorrect`, 188 `command_timeout` (raw, vendor-packed on some drives — carried as reported), 199 `udma_crc_errors` (pointer + omitempty: unknown is absent, never 0); the controller decodes them and the hub's host-report mirror models them (G-1 wire gate green; it convicted the agent half alone). **Carried only** — no verdict, banner, mail or alarm reads them (`TestR330_CountersChangeNoVerdictYet`); using them changes what a household is told and is the next slice, with persisting samples. Red-proofs `audits/night-burndown-2026-10-06/r330/`. Ships with agent v0.150.0 and the next controller and hub releases. | R-328 (closed) | The verdict slice: 187/188/199 into the disk verdict with tests; then persist samples | CC |
 | **R-332** | Storage & devices | P3 | **The new Hiba-from-counters path has never fired on real hardware.** v0.215.0's whole point is a verdict the product could not previously reach, and it is proven only against the committed fixture's values in unit tests (12 scenario groups, 11 of 12 red-proofs failing as required). The live validation on demo-hp proved the **negative** — three healthy disks still read Rendben across the deploy, no false alert — and the **severity wire** end to end, but no live disk has actually reached Hiba. **This is the honest gap and it must not be closed by pointing at the fixture tests**: the drive that produced the fixture is in DooPlex, which is Tier 2 and never a drill target, and the demo boxes are all-flash and healthy | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-14, NARROWED same day.** One item originally in this gap is now PROVEN LIVE: the **persisted state surviving a controller restart**. The v0.215.0→v0.216.0 redeploy destroyed and rebuilt the container, and the new one read back a `changed_at` written by the PREVIOUS version (`2026-08-14T07:23:14.640216851Z`, still intact at 09:31:35Z) instead of re-baselining — Scenario L on real hardware, not just the production-path unit test. **What remains unproven is the verdict itself, plus the stronger restart half: an already-ALERTED disk not re-alerting** | a real degrading disk, or an injection harness | **Closing condition:** a live disk reaching Hiba from counters, OR a deliberate injection through the REAL pipeline (agent `/disks` → controller check → hub event), not a hand-set verdict | CC |
+| **R-1196** | Storage & devices | P3 | **When a data drive is pulled, the files the household uploaded in the last seconds before it are broken (0 bytes) or gone, although each upload was confirmed, and nothing tells the household.** Rehearsal 2026-10-20 (`audits/rehearsal-2026-10-20/B6-failures/s4-drive-pulled/`): uploads every 2 s to Nextcloud, the drive pulled at 17:56:26 → the box handled the drive itself well (absent in 42 s, apps stopped with a clear message, back by itself 62 s after the re-plug) — but uploads 1–6 (201 at 17:56:14–27) came back as four 0-byte files and two missing ones. The page's „Leválasztva" message and the „újra csatlakoztatva" event do not say that the last uploads may be damaged. The cause is the filesystem's delayed write (not a Felhom defect as such); the gap is the silence. | OPEN | — | Add one sentence to the drive-disconnected message („az utolsó percben mentett fájlok sérülhettek — ellenőrizd őket"); consider `commit=`/`sync` mount options for data drives | CC |
 | **R-331** | Storage & devices | P4 | **Disk health Phase 3 — growth-rate detection, and retiring the static 64.** The v0.215.0 count backstop (64 unreadable sectors → Hiba) is **a judgement from ONE drive**: the observed benign excursion peaked at 16 and cleared inside an hour, and the terminal run passed 64 at 13 Aug 11:28 and never came back. It is deliberately a backstop BEHIND the sustain rule, not the primary signal, but it is still a magic number tuned on a single sample and it will be wrong for some drive. With Phase 2's history the box can ask the question that actually matters — *is this count climbing, and how fast* — which distinguishes a drive with eight stable aging sectors from one adding forty a day, something no static threshold can do. Revisit 64 when that exists | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-14** | R-330 | Growth-rate rule over persisted samples; re-derive or delete the static 64 | CC |
 | **R-1076** | Storage & devices | P4 | **A cheap SSD reports a vendor-less WWN, so a WWN-first disk key may not be unique.** MEASURED 2026-10-15 on the N100's system SSD (AirDisk 512 GB): `ID_WWN=0x5000000123456f1f` — NAA-5 with OUI `000000`, a pattern that looks like a placeholder; its serial `QDF922W009654S30EX` looks real. The agent's wipe binding prefers `wwn-` links (A/internal/storage/durable_device.go:32). Not known whether two units share the WWN. Evidence: `audits/storage-identity-2026-10-15/B-n100.txt`. | OPEN | — | Check a second unit of the same model (or vendor data); if shared, make the agent skip OUI-000000 WWNs (the design already keys on model+serial, `architecture/16-storage-physical-identity.md` §3). | CC |
 | **R-1077** | Storage & devices | P4 | **No USB enclosure that hides or fakes a disk's serial has been measured.** The storage-identity spike (2026-10-15) had none at hand and found none in earlier evidence; the design's `usb_bridge` unknown rule (`architecture/16-storage-physical-identity.md` §3) is therefore an assumption. Cheap single- and dual-bay bridges are known to report one bridge serial for any disk. Evidence: `audits/storage-identity-2026-10-15/README.md` case 4b. | OPEN | — | Buy or borrow one cheap USB enclosure (single and dual bay), run `tools/physdisk_probe.py` against it, and set the rule from what it reports. | Operator (a device) then CC |