Plex2Shell impact on Felhom: verdict NOT REACHED; R-1241 (P1), R-1242 (P3) opened (register 186 -> 188)

Read-only audit of whether the hacked Plex pod on DooPlex (HM-040, 2026-10-17 -> 10-23) reached Felhom's
secrets. Two no-login doors existed (the Longhorn NFS export and the Longhorn API); neither was used:
nfsd accepted 0 new connections in the window (positive control), no off-schedule Longhorn backup or volume.
Evidence in documentation/audits/plex2shell-felhom-impact-2026-10-23/. The NFS export was narrowed from *
to 10.42.0.0/16 on the operator's yes (host change, not in git). 13-threat-model.md: attacker j and one
boundary row. STATUS: verdict, the P1, one do item.

documentation/architecture/13-threat-model.md

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ decision (R-925).
 | g | a compromised Gitea / registry / build | push to the catalog, the images and the installer tag |
 | h | a thief with the box | the disks |
 | i | Cloudflare | the plaintext of tunnel traffic — **accepted** (R-904) |
+| j | **added 2026-10-23:** a hacked homelab app pod on DooPlex (happened: Plex2Shell, HM-040) | the pod network with free egress: every cluster Service, the node's ports (NFS, kubelet, k3s API), the LAN masqueraded as DooPlex; no service-account token |
 
 ## 4. Entry points
 
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ OS packages (exact versions, apt-signed), the installer script (by tag, R-980).
 | **added:** LAN ↔ box | partly | root password SSH on the host from the LAN (R-982) |
 | **added:** hub ↔ box (inbound) | **does not hold** | `01` §4 says the box exposes no control endpoint; a hub-key route can replace the box's settings (R-970) |
 | **added:** catalog ↔ every box | **design gap** | a catalog push reaches every box with no check on the box (R-971) |
+| **added 2026-10-23 (R-1241):** a hacked app pod on DooPlex ↔ Felhom's secrets | **does not hold**; not used in the Plex2Shell window | two no-login doors: the Longhorn NFS export (the hub's unencrypted nightly copies with the unsealed tokens of R-975; by a published file-handle escape the whole sda1 disk, the operator signing keys included — not exercised) and the Longhorn API (backup a volume to any target). Plex2Shell, 2026-10-17 → 10-23: **NOT REACHED** — 0 new NFS connections in the window, no off-schedule backup or volume; the hub, the k8s API and the kubelet refuse a caller with no credential (measured). The export was narrowed to the pod network on 2026-10-23; the pod side stays open (`audits/plex2shell-felhom-impact-2026-10-23/`) |
 
 ## 6. What we accept (do not re-report)