docs: R-189, R-188 and R-186 closed (agent v0.122.0); R-185 stays open
gates / gates (push) Successful in 8s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 8s
- OPEN-ITEMS: all three rows closed with their measurements. R-189 records the migration consequence seen live (a pre-R-189 record has no tier and is not reportable, so upgrading does not retroactively make an old proof visible). R-188 records both directions demonstrated and the fixture cleaned up. R-186 carries the before/after sha values including the CGO_ENABLED discrepancy. The priority list states explicitly that R-185 is the one left open from that group and that this session did not touch it. - capability map: the restore-proof row now says the evidence path itself had a gap — the proof reached the hub only because no restart intervened — and what closed it. - CONTEXT: S-19 (a proof is durable and reportable, a failure is neither, and why) and S-20 (the release ordering, what each step protects, and how a binary is verified). - STATUS: rewritten for the operator, back to one screen.
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| Escrow ceremony: customer-facing wizard, one-shot R claim, operator zero-knowledge | controller v0.127, agent v0.88/0.89 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM, endpoint-exact) | agent v0.88.0 REPORT (ceremony ~4s, one-shot claim 200→410, R absent from every payload); `SPIKE-controller-escrow-2026-07-13` | **Customer-facing browser wizard FIRST LIVE FIRING 2026-07-18** (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`, S6): customer zero drove the wizard on the reborn box — ceremony started 16:56:29, recovery code claimed one-shot 16:56:39 (absent from logs by design), hub-verified and `EscrowState` auto-confirmed 16:56:41, **offsite runs enabled 12 s after the ceremony began**; the v0.138.0 „megerősítésre vár, legfeljebb 15 perc" awaiting card rendered and flipped on the ACK (operator screenshots: Viktor's set). Honest caveat: at a 12-second confirm the awaiting window is so short that catching *both* states on screen is luck, not procedure. Prior: endpoints driven on the drill VM. **agent v0.89.0:** `/escrow/preflight` `pbs_storage_id` row now live-reloads (reads current agent.json) — a pbsdr convergence that seeds the id flips it green with NO service restart. **hub v0.60.0 (data-first retention):** a re-escrow with a DIFFERENT sealed passphrase no longer destroys the old blob — the hub RETAINS it (`host_escrow_superseded`), so a previous passphrase stays recoverable with its recovery code (turns the reinstall-orphan incident from "history destroyed" into "history recoverable"). Guided-recovery flow = R-26. Red-proof `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded`. **hub v0.60.1 — custody survives the host lifecycle:** host deletion (with the escrow ack) DEMOTES the current blob to retained custody (moved into `host_escrow_superseded`, never destroyed; existing superseded rows spared); the customer Danger-zone Delete is the one true purge point (cascades both escrow tables incl. already-deleted hosts). No operator path through host lifecycle can lose a blob. Red-proofs `TestDeleteHost_DemotesEscrowNeverDestroys` + `TestDeleteCustomer_PurgesEscrowCustody`. **agent v0.93.0 (2026-07-21) — recovery codes can no longer contain a hyphenated word.** The EFF large list holds exactly four entries containing the hyphen the words are joined with (`drop-down`, `felt-tip`, `t-shirt`, `yo-yo`); drawing one produced a code that reads as 11 words instead of 10 — ambiguous to transcribe in exactly the situation R exists for. They are now excluded **from GENERATION only**: the draw space goes 7776 → 7772 and a 10-word code 129.248 → 129.241 bits, still well clear of the 128-bit floor. **Every code already issued remains valid** — R is verified as a whole passphrase by the PBS scrypt KDF and is never re-split, so no customer needs to re-run a ceremony. This also retired the long-standing ~1/5 `TestGenerateRecoveryCode_EntropyAndFormat` flake, which was this defect and not a flaky test |
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| DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21) | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 | Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected.) **⚠ The candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE is WITHDRAWN — the 2026-07-18 rehearsal produced a live counter-example (R-39).** On the reborn N100 the descriptor auto-provisioned and the agent reported `converged state=applied` (16:45:53), yet **the storage is dead**: `pvesm status` → `felhom-pbs: error fetching datastores - 401 Unauthorized` / `inactive`, and a direct probe with the stored credential returns **401 on every endpoint including `/version`** while the WG transport is healthy (handshake 9 s, 27.9 ms RTT) — i.e. authentication failure, not ACL scope. Root cause in the evidence: **the hub minted a SECOND token secret at 16:47:52, two minutes after the agent had applied the first, and `consumed_at` is still NULL**; the converged state machine will not re-apply, and the agent's 15-minute verify loop **cannot even read the credential to notice** (`open /etc/pve/priv/storage/felhom-pbs.pw: permission denied` — non-root agent reading a file it writes through a root wrapper). A tier that reports `applied` while silently unable to authenticate is exactly the shape that must not carry a PROVEN-LIVE badge. See `tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` F2 and `pbs-dr-state.txt`. **agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17:** the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick `pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, `pvesm status felhom-offsite`=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot `pveum` grant **2026-07-21 — the R-39 fleet fix SHIPPED (hub v0.68.0 + agent v0.91.2), closing the self-heal chain end to end.** The three defects that let a box be `applied` and dead simultaneously are each addressed: the hub stamps a monotonic `secret_generation` into the descriptor so a credential re-key finally MOVES the content hash the agent re-applies on; the wrapper gains a narrow `read` verb so the non-root agent can read the credential it writes (it never could — `/etc/pve/priv` is 0700 root:www-data, which made the verify loop blind by construction); and `pbs.ProbeAuth` turns a 401 into a loud `auth_failed` that the existing `pbsdrheal` damper escalates to a fresh mint. Plus a consumed_at honesty gauge for the disagreement no single tier can see (box says `applied`, hub's staged secret never consumed). Proven live on felhom-pve: the agent read its credential through the wrapper (`rc=0`) and probed successfully (`credential probe OK storage=felhom-pbs`). **STOP-2 RAN 2026-07-21 AND THE CHAIN CLOSED — 13 SECONDS, operator click to converged.** The operator pressed **Re-issue PBS credentials**; the identical click on 2026-07-18 did nothing at all. Full chain (hub UTC / host CEST = UTC+2): `08:39:31Z` hub mints a fresh secret, **generation 0 → 1**, and the descriptor gains `"secret_generation": 1` — with `token_id` and `fingerprint` **byte-identical**, i.e. exactly the re-key shape that used to be invisible → `10:39:34` the agent READS its credential through the wrapper (leg b — the read that was impossible until v0.91.0) → `10:39:38` **`ERROR pbsdr: the DR endpoint REJECTED this box's credential — the tier is applied and DEAD` `previous_state=applied`** (leg c: the exact R-39 failure state, detected out loud for the first time ever) → `10:39:45` **`one-time token secret consumed`** `secret_len=36` (leg a: **NO short-circuit** — this is the line that never appeared on 2026-07-18) → `10:39:45` `felhom-pbs-apply reconcile` (the set-only wrapper, no `--server`) → `10:39:47` **`pbsdr: converged state=applied`**. Corroboration: the agent marker hash moved to `afbb3b41…` (it was byte-identical to the pre-reissue marker in the failure); `consumed_at` stamped `08:39:45Z`; the on-disk secret's mtime moved `2026-07-18 20:28:52` → `2026-07-21 10:39:45`; a live probe with the NEW credential returns **200**; three consecutive hub reports trace the whole state machine `applied → auth_failed → applied`; and **zero** `pbsdr_selfheal` escalations fired — the box healed through the descriptor path before the damper was ever needed, with exactly ONE mint and ONE consume and no `consumed-failed.json`. **Row upgraded to PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-21).** Evidence: `felhom-agent/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21). |
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| **Recurring offsite (PBS) whole-guest backups actually LAND, and RESTORE** — local daily + offsite weekly as scheduled work | agent v0.97–0.103, controller v0.174/0.175, hub v0.76.0, host-install 1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-26)** | `audits/SPIKE-r82-phase0-2026-07-26.md`; per-repo CHANGELOGs/REPORTs. **Restore round-trip on demo-hp:** `--selftest=restore-test` against `felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T15:42:42Z` → `pass:true`, `verified:"boot+running"`, **`mount_parity:"ok"`** (`mp0=/var/lib/docker 50G`, `mp1=/mnt/sys_drive 20G`, mp8/mp9 throwaway stand-ins for the archived binds), `source_tier:"pbs"`, 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, scratch band clean afterwards and the live guest untouched. | **This row is distinct from the DR-tier row above, which proves ACTIVATION, not ARRIVAL.** That tier was PROVEN-LIVE as `applied` since 2026-07-21 while demo-felhom held ONE snapshot (a healing artifact) and demo-hp held **zero, ever** — "applied and empty", the R-39 shape one level quieter. **What earns PROVEN-LIVE here:** (a) demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace); (b) it **restores into a bootable, mount-complete guest** — `mount_parity` is the non-hollow half, since a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume; (c) **the multi-tier quiesce ran through the real UI endpoint** (`POST /api/guest-backup/trigger`, authed+CSRF) and produced **exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it** — `quiescing 1 stack(s)` 17:01:39 → local done 17:02:56 *"next tier may start (app still quiesced)"* → felhom-pbs snapshotted 17:03:06 → `unquiescing` 17:03:06. **App downtime 1m27s for both tiers**, and the app came back healthy. **Known gaps, recorded not hidden:** the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the PRIMARY tier, so the offsite tier is never AUTOMATICALLY restore-tested (the manual/selftest path is proven, the unattended one is not); the hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE rather than a reported cadence; the installer-default fleet flip awaits a full weekly cycle. → **R-82** |
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| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **Known gap on this box, filed as R-185 and NOT caused by this change:** the agent's PVE token has no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, so the HOST tier's content listing returns empty and that tier is not restore-testable there — the offsite tier is what this row's live proof covers. Evidence: `felhom-agent/REPORT.md` |
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| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **R-189 (agent v0.122.0, 2026-08-03) closed the reporting half of this row, and it was a REAL gap in the evidence path:** the proof above reached the hub only because no restart intervened — `restore_tests[]` came solely from an in-memory store, so the 15:25:14 PASS was in fact LOST when the agent restarted 2 m 43 s later for a deploy (`0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports). Under per-archive due-ness the box would not have repeated the work for a week. The persisted per-tier proof (with the archive, and now the tier) is merged into the report, so a proof survives a restart — one entry per tier, newest wins, and a record that cannot be described honestly is not emitted. **Known gap on this box, filed as R-185 and NOT caused by this change:** the agent's PVE token has no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, so the HOST tier's content listing returns empty and that tier is not restore-testable there — the offsite tier is what this row's live proof covers. Evidence: `felhom-agent/REPORT.md` |
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| Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier: host delete < RESET < customer Delete): one operator action → pre-first-install; all operational state destroyed, identity + basic config survive | hub v0.61.0, felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (external teardown, incl. two real firings)** | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — two live firings, both host-delete-first, on two different customers** (`demo-vm-felhom` 15:49:57, `demo-felhom` 16:08:51): every leg `ok` (`claim`, `db_purge`, `descriptor`, `hetzner`, `pbs`), escrow acked separately, each completing in 8–9 s (`hub-state.txt` `customer_resets`). The **Hetzner sub-account destruction is now verified against the live pool box** — and produced the run's sharpest lesson: **a sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object.** Deleting it left its `/home` intact, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext under a key this same RESET had destroyed — which is why the orphan guard fired at 16:58:14 (**a finding by S7's own criterion**) and why RESET now needs a base-dir purge → **R-32**. Prior: hub v0.61.0 REPORT; **ep0 live drill 2026-07-17** (throwaway `drill-reset-01` with a real backup: deprovision `deleted:true` destroyed the namespace + backup group + token, idempotent re-run `deleted:false`, all 3 real tenants + shared user survived); red-proofs (ack-gate, partial-failure resumability) + orchestration/store/offsite/render tests | External teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST, every leg idempotent; refuses while any host row exists; separate escrow-custody ack; clears claim (fresh code next onboarding); keeps the offsite tier CHOICE, drops provisioned fields. **Live-clicked 2026-07-18** (twice, by Viktor) — this supersedes the earlier "not live-clicked / Hetzner delete unit-tested only" note. **R-25b CLOSED (hub v0.69.0, 2026-07-21):** the Danger-zone DELETE is now the guided full-teardown cascade that runs this very sequence as its middle leg — see the row below |
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| **Customer DELETE cascade** (top lifecycle tier): one guided operator action → `hosts → RESET → residue → purge`; host rows deleted (custody DEMOTED), full external teardown (Hetzner repo destroyed, PBS namespace/token revoked, tunnel + zone removed), then the customer record and ALL escrow ciphertext purged | hub v0.69.0 | **UNIT-PROVEN; live leg PENDING** | `hub/internal/web/customer_delete_test.go` — leg ORDER observed from inside leg 2 (hosts already gone, customer row still present, custody still retained); 9 fail-closed gate cases each asserting zero mutations + zero external calls + no journal row; resume-after-external-failure converges; `purgeEscrow` custody semantics; preview leaks no secret. **5 red-proofs** (ack gate, stale-preview gate, ONLINE-host gate, leg order inverted, `purgeEscrow=true`) | Three acknowledgements + typed customer-id + stale-preview check + ONLINE-host refusal, ALL before any write. Ruling-3 preserved BY CONSTRUCTION (leg 2 never sees a host row); custody purged EXACTLY ONCE, in leg 3. **Coupling:** hub-only — no agent/controller/catalog change; the cascade calls the same service paths as manual host-delete and standalone RESET, so their rules move together. **v0.70.0 (2026-07-21):** added the **residue** leg — `GetCustomers()` is REPORT-derived, so before it a fully deleted customer stayed on the Customers list and its report stream kept the staleness/offsite checkers alerting (live: `demo-vm-felhom` deleted 07-18, still emailing `offsite_stale` on 07-21). The leg also purges the credential-bearing `appliance_registrations` + `selfbind_tokens`. **Ghost customers (config row already gone) are now deletable** — 404 means "nothing here", not "no config row"; the Hetzner/descriptor legs record `skipped_no_config`. **Gap:** the end-to-end live leg on a scratch customer (external Hetzner teardown observed from outside) is not yet run |
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| Uninstall: KEPT-vs-WIPED statement, secret purge, enrolled-drive handling | installer | **PARTIAL** | `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` Phase 1/5 (KEPT-vs-WIPED printed verbatim; drive data intact ×3); GL-4 code | Secret purge (GL6-F1 `.bak` residue) fixed v1.12.0; enrolled-drive `mnt-*.mount` units survive (GL6-F2, open); cluster-aware `felhom_guests` guard + saferemove cost warning missing → R-9 |
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@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ State: `BLOCKED` · `READY` · `WAITING-ON-OPERATOR` · `WATCHING`. Every row ha
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| **R-86** | Restore-tests are interval-scheduled, not backup-aligned | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE 2026-08-03** (agent **v0.121.0**, hub **v0.91.0**) | — | **The rule that shipped:** *let A be the newest archive on a tier that has settled ≥24 h; the tier is DUE when A exists and A has not already been proven.* Daily tier → proved daily on yesterday's archive; weekly tier → weekly on its own; newborn → UNKNOWN. The daemon-start ticker survives only as the **evaluation interval**. **THE TRAP, recorded because it is the version a reasonable person writes:** the row's own wording implemented literally — *"due when the newest archive is ≥24 h old"* — is NEVER true on a **daily** tier, because a new archive resets the newest-archive age to zero long before it reaches the lag; it would have silently switched restore-testing OFF for the tier that matters most. Red-proved at **0 runs over 5 simulated days**. **The state now records WHICH archive was proven**, not when a tier last passed — a time cannot answer *have we proven this archive*. A pre-R-86 state file keeps its time (rotation ordering survives) and yields no proven archive, so each tier is due exactly once after the upgrade: the safe direction. **Two knobs replace one and the old one is not silently repurposed:** `restore_test_eval_interval_seconds` (6 h) and `restore_test_settle_seconds` (24 h); the deprecated `restore_test_cadence_seconds` keeps its DISABLE meaning verbatim, now seeds the settle lag, and the daemon WARNs once at start-up naming both. **6 h is bounded from both ends, not picked:** MEASURED cost of one evaluation on demo-felhom — local dir storage **18 ms**, PBS tier over the WAN to ep0 **392 ms**, both **430 ms** — so cost is irrelevant; the CEILING is that a FAILING tier stays due, making the evaluation interval its retry interval for a multi-GB restore. **Part 2 shipped WITH it and was not optional** — see the hub half in this row's sibling text and `07-backup-architecture.md` §3: `restoreProvenStaleAfter` was a flat 7 days derived from the very cadence this removed, and a healthy weekly tier's proof age reaches **exactly** 168 h against a 168 h window — it sat ON the line, so any ordinary delay tipped it into a nightly alarm about a working system. The window is now per tier from that tier's observed archive interval, ×4 generations, floored at the old 7 days and capped at 12 days (strictly inside the two-week offsite retention), falling back to the tier's DECLARED rhythm (26 h host / 8 d offsite — the backup-freshness checker's own thresholds) when history is too short to observe one. **A hollow test caught by its own red-proof:** the first Scenario-G fixture had no jitter and PASSED under the flat-window mutation, because a perfectly regular weekly tier sits exactly ON the line rather than over it. The jitter is what makes it a test. **Also fixed in passing:** the candidate picker now skips archives failing `archivePlausiblyComplete` (under per-archive due-ness an incomplete phantom would be picked forever, fail forever, never earn proof and leave the tier due at EVERY evaluation), and the due-check runs BEFORE the heavy-operation gate is taken (a frequent poll must not be able to make a starting backup record a failure — F-A1). **Live proof:** see `felhom-agent/REPORT.md` | CC |
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| **R-87** | The restic tier is never restore-tested | **READY — RE-RANKED UP 2026-08-03 (R-86 closed)** | — | Design a controller-side test (no scratch-guest analogue transfers). **Most of what this row needed now exists.** R-86 built the piece that was missing: a tier is proved **per archive generation**, on its own rhythm, with the proof recorded as *which archive* — which is exactly the shape a weekly-ish restic tier needs, and the reason this row could not simply reuse the whole-guest scheduler before. What remains is genuinely restic-specific and is NOT a scheduling problem: there is no scratch-guest analogue, so the test has to be a controller-side restore of a bounded sample into a throwaway path, with its own definition of "proved". **Two things to carry over rather than re-derive:** the proof must record the SNAPSHOT it proved (not a timestamp), and the hub's staleness window must learn this tier's rhythm the way `restoreProvenWindow` now does — a restic tier on a weekly cadence lands on the same false-alarm line the flat 7 days did. **And R-95 still applies:** that credential can delete, so a restic restore-test must never be able to write to the repo | CC |
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| **R-185** | **The agent cannot see the host backup tier's archives on demo-felhom — the PVE token has no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, so the content listing returns EMPTY where root sees three archives.** Found 2026-08-03 while live-validating R-86. `pveum acl list` grants `FelhomAgentStore` on `/storage/{local,local-lvm,felhom-pbs}` and **not** on `felhom-backup`, which is the box's actual `local_backup_target`. Verified three ways: `pvesh` as root lists 3 archives (6.1–6.3 GB, 08-01/02/03); the same endpoint with the agent's token returns `{"data":[]}`; and `local` — which HAS a grant — returns its archives through the same token | **OPEN — filed, not fixed** | — | **Pre-existing and independent of R-86** (it is a property of the ACL, and the R-85 rotation had the same blindness). **Consequences:** the host tier has never been restore-testable on that box, and R-85's *"an empty tier is skipped, not failed"* rule made that silent. **The part worth fixing is the silence, not only the grant:** a permission-blinded tier is today INDISTINGUISHABLE from a newborn one — both report *"no settled archive yet"* — which is this project's own absence-is-not-evidence rule failing in a new place. The agent already knows better: it RECORDS successful backups to that target, so *"I wrote archives here and the tier lists none"* is a contradiction it can detect and should say loudly. **Do not fix by widening the token blind:** decide whether the host-install ACL set should follow `local_backup_target` (it currently hardcodes `local`), which is where the drift began | CC |
|
||||
| **R-186** | **A released agent binary's sha256 cannot be reproduced from its tag.** `release-agent.sh` builds at step 3 and tags at step 4, so Go's VCS stamp records a PSEUDO-version (`v0.120.1-0.20260803130452-4d825910…`) in the published bytes, while any rebuild after the tag exists stamps `v0.121.0` — a different binary. Measured 2026-08-03 on v0.121.0: published `b2128f3c…` (14 081 336 B) vs rebuild-at-tag `8302e396…` (14 077 240 B), identical source, identical toolchain, 4 096 bytes apart | **OPEN** | — | **Why it matters:** the sha the operator vouches is the one thing tying a machine to a binary, and today nobody can independently rebuild it to check. **The build order is deliberate** (the script's own comment: a tag with no package is caught by `check-published-versions.py`, a package with no tag is invisible to it), so the fix is not to swap the steps blind. Candidates: `-buildvcs=false` or `-trimpath` for a version-stable stamp, or tag-then-build with the tag deleted on a failed publish. **Mitigation used this session:** the DEPLOYED binary is the PUBLISHED artifact, downloaded from Gitea — not a local rebuild — so the running bytes are the vouchable ones | CC |
|
||||
| **R-186** | **A released agent binary's sha256 cannot be reproduced from its tag.** `release-agent.sh` builds at step 3 and tags at step 4, so Go's VCS stamp records a PSEUDO-version (`v0.120.1-0.20260803130452-4d825910…`) in the published bytes, while any rebuild after the tag exists stamps `v0.121.0` — a different binary. Measured 2026-08-03 on v0.121.0: published `b2128f3c…` (14 081 336 B) vs rebuild-at-tag `8302e396…` (14 077 240 B), identical source, identical toolchain, 4 096 bytes apart | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + MEASURED 2026-08-03** (agent **v0.122.0**) | — | **Why it matters:** the sha the operator vouches is the one thing tying a machine to a binary, and today nobody can independently rebuild it to check. **The build order is deliberate** (the script's own comment: a tag with no package is caught by `check-published-versions.py`, a package with no tag is invisible to it), so the fix is not to swap the steps blind. Candidates: `-buildvcs=false` or `-trimpath` for a version-stable stamp, or tag-then-build with the tag deleted on a failed publish. **Mitigation used this session:** the DEPLOYED binary is the PUBLISHED artifact, downloaded from Gitea — not a local rebuild — so the running bytes are the vouchable ones **FIXED by removing the cause, not by sequencing around it.** `-buildvcs=false` drops the VCS stamp (nothing in the repo reads it — no `ReadBuildInfo` caller) and `-trimpath` removes absolute build paths, so the same source produces the same bytes whether or not the tag exists yet and regardless of checkout directory. **Measured before the change**, same source, same toolchain, one commit: default flags with no tag `18f4a495…` 14 085 464 B (mod `v0.121.2-0.2026…`) vs default flags tagged `4a38f394…` 14 085 440 B (mod `v0.121.99`) — different bytes; with the new flags, `7ffcdf1d…` 14 064 574 B **identical both ways**. **Measured after the change on the real release:** published `d5f294e5…` 14 076 649 B = rebuild-at-tag #1 = rebuild-at-tag #2, **all three identical**. **A second discrepancy fell out of it:** `publish-agent.sh`'s fallback build forced `CGO_ENABLED=0` and therefore produced a binary **74 KB smaller** (13 990 236 B vs 14 064 574 B) than the release path built for the same version — one version name, two binaries, decided by which entry point ran. Both paths now build identically, with a comment in each naming the other. **The operator can now check a published sha without being there:** the exact command is in `felhom-agent/CLAUDE.md`. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-187** | **R-115's one-command release had never actually run its publish leg — the first real use died there.** `scripts/publish-agent.sh` has been mode `0644` since it was created (2026-06-28), because every earlier caller invoked it as `bash scripts/publish-agent.sh`; `release-agent.sh` (written 2026-08-03) called it directly and got `Permission denied` on v0.121.0's release | **CLOSED — SHIPPED 2026-08-03** (`felhom-agent`) | — | **Fixed both ways in one commit:** the executable bit restored, and the caller changed to `bash "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/publish-agent.sh"` so the release no longer depends on a file mode — the kind of thing a checkout, an archive or a copy silently loses again. **The lesson is R-115's own, one level up:** the mechanism written to make a step unforgettable was itself never exercised end-to-end, so it failed the first time it mattered. A mechanism that has not been RUN is a note with better formatting | CC |
|
||||
| **R-188** | **Every agent release has a ~50 % chance of emailing the operator a CI failure for a release that is correct.** `on: [push]` fires the gates workflow on the **tag** push too, and `release-agent.sh` pushes the tag BEFORE publishing the package (deliberately — a tag with no package is caught by `check-published-versions.py`, a package with no tag is invisible to it). So CI can run the published-versions gate inside the seconds-long window where `v<ver>` exists and the package does not, and it correctly reports *"every released agent version must be INSTALLABLE"* — for a release that completes normally a moment later | **OPEN** | — | **MEASURED, 2026-08-03, across two releases in one session:** v0.121.0 → runs #12 (id 79) **success** and #13 (id 81) **failure** on the same sha `4618169`; v0.121.1 → #17 (id 88) **failure** and #18 (id 89) **success** on the same sha `cd1b087`; and v0.121.0's second pair (#14/#15, `4d82591`) both **success** — i.e. it is a race, not a rule. Local gate afterwards: all three versions verify. **Why it matters more than it looks:** R-168 made CI email the operator on failure precisely so a red gate cannot be missed. A signal that cries wolf on every second correct release is how that mail becomes something you archive unread — the R-29 failure mode one layer up, and R-100's corollary in a new place (an alarm whose text is true but whose trigger is not the thing you would act on). **Fix shapes, cheapest first:** have the workflow skip tag refs (`if: !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')` — the commit push already covers the content, and the tag adds no new code); or make `check-published-versions.py` tolerate a tag younger than ~2 minutes; or publish before tagging, which the release script's own comment argues against. **Do not "fix" it by quieting the alarm** | CC |
|
||||
| **R-189** | **A passing restore-test can be invisible to the hub forever — and R-86 made that window a week instead of a day.** The agent reports `restore_tests[]` from `internal/backup.Store`, which is **in-memory** (its own comment: *"lost on restart; the cadence re-populates"*), and the hub's report interval is 900 s. An agent restart inside that window drops the result. That used to self-heal within 24 h because the next cadence re-tested the same tier; **under per-archive due-ness the agent will NOT re-test a proven archive**, so the hub can stay ignorant of a proof until the NEXT archive generation — a week on the offsite tier. **Observed live, 2026-08-03:** the 15:25:14 PASS on `felhom-pbs` (a real 14.5 GB offsite restore) reached **no** host-report — the hub logged `0 restore-tests` at 15:28:00 and 15:32:14 — because the agent was restarted at 15:27:57 for the v0.121.1 deploy, 2 m 43 s after the run and before the next report | **OPEN** | — | **The persisted proof already exists and is not reported.** `RestoreTestState` (on disk, per tier, R-86: with the archive id) survives exactly this, and `RestoreTestState.Snapshot()` carries the doc comment *"for the host-report gauge"* — **and has no production caller at all** (grep, 2026-08-03). That is this project's own *seam built but never wired* class, fifth instance, and a comment asserting an invariant with no test pinning it, both in one method. **Severity is bounded, and worth stating so it is not over-ranked:** the hub scans its retained window, archives keep arriving, and R-86's per-tier window for the offsite tier is 12 days against a 7-day archive rhythm — so ONE lost report is tolerated. What is not tolerable is that the loss is **silent** and that the box will not repeat the work. **Fix shape:** report the persisted per-tier proof (target, archive, proven_at) alongside the in-memory latest run, and let the hub's `lastProvenPerTier` read it — a report-contract change, so it touches `internal/hub/report.go` + `contract_test.go` + the hub's checker, and it is a spec, not a one-liner | CC |
|
||||
| **R-188** | **Every agent release has a ~50 % chance of emailing the operator a CI failure for a release that is correct.** `on: [push]` fires the gates workflow on the **tag** push too, and `release-agent.sh` pushes the tag BEFORE publishing the package (deliberately — a tag with no package is caught by `check-published-versions.py`, a package with no tag is invisible to it). So CI can run the published-versions gate inside the seconds-long window where `v<ver>` exists and the package does not, and it correctly reports *"every released agent version must be INSTALLABLE"* — for a release that completes normally a moment later | **CLOSED — SHIPPED 2026-08-03** (agent **v0.122.0**) | — | **MEASURED, 2026-08-03, across two releases in one session:** v0.121.0 → runs #12 (id 79) **success** and #13 (id 81) **failure** on the same sha `4618169`; v0.121.1 → #17 (id 88) **failure** and #18 (id 89) **success** on the same sha `cd1b087`; and v0.121.0's second pair (#14/#15, `4d82591`) both **success** — i.e. it is a race, not a rule. Local gate afterwards: all three versions verify. **Why it matters more than it looks:** R-168 made CI email the operator on failure precisely so a red gate cannot be missed. A signal that cries wolf on every second correct release is how that mail becomes something you archive unread — the R-29 failure mode one layer up, and R-100's corollary in a new place (an alarm whose text is true but whose trigger is not the thing you would act on). **Fix shapes, cheapest first:** have the workflow skip tag refs (`if: !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')` — the commit push already covers the content, and the tag adds no new code); or make `check-published-versions.py` tolerate a tag younger than ~2 minutes; or publish before tagging, which the release script's own comment argues against. **Do not "fix" it by quieting the alarm** **FIXED by moving ONLY the tag push** (build → tag locally → publish → push tag). The tag is still created before anything is published, so the build and the tag still describe the same commit; it becomes VISIBLE — to CI, and to any `raw/tag/…` fetch — only once the package is downloadable. **The invariant the old order protected was not traded away:** `check-published-versions.py` now asserts the converse directly — *no published version may be missing its tag* — as a BOUNDED probe of the frontier (where a failed tag push leaves an orphan) and of patch gaps, printing its probe set on every run because a check whose coverage is invisible reads as a guarantee it is not making. The package listing api still answers **401** without a token (re-measured 2026-08-03), so absence still cannot be enumerated and the script says so. **Both directions demonstrated:** a real published-but-untagged fixture (0.121.2, published then deleted — HTTP 201 then 204, absence re-verified by a 404) made the gate FAIL and print the one-line recovery; removing the converse block made it pass over that same orphan. A tag with no package still fails, shown against a local stand-in rather than by pushing a probe tag — pushing one would have emailed the operator a TRUE alarm about a fixture, which is the same attention cost this row removes. **A half-done release is now loud:** publish-succeeded-then-push-failed dies naming the exact recovery command, and a FAILED publish removes the local-only tag so the release can simply be retried instead of colliding with step 2's re-release guard. **Scenario E, live:** v0.122.0's own release produced CI runs **21 (task id 96)** and **22 (task id 97)** on the same sha — **both green**, where the same shape produced one red run on each of the two previous releases. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-189** | **A passing restore-test can be invisible to the hub forever — and R-86 made that window a week instead of a day.** The agent reports `restore_tests[]` from `internal/backup.Store`, which is **in-memory** (its own comment: *"lost on restart; the cadence re-populates"*), and the hub's report interval is 900 s. An agent restart inside that window drops the result. That used to self-heal within 24 h because the next cadence re-tested the same tier; **under per-archive due-ness the agent will NOT re-test a proven archive**, so the hub can stay ignorant of a proof until the NEXT archive generation — a week on the offsite tier. **Observed live, 2026-08-03:** the 15:25:14 PASS on `felhom-pbs` (a real 14.5 GB offsite restore) reached **no** host-report — the hub logged `0 restore-tests` at 15:28:00 and 15:32:14 — because the agent was restarted at 15:27:57 for the v0.121.1 deploy, 2 m 43 s after the run and before the next report | **CLOSED — SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE 2026-08-03** (agent **v0.122.0**) | — | **The persisted proof already exists and is not reported.** `RestoreTestState` (on disk, per tier, R-86: with the archive id) survives exactly this, and `RestoreTestState.Snapshot()` carries the doc comment *"for the host-report gauge"* — **and has no production caller at all** (grep, 2026-08-03). That is this project's own *seam built but never wired* class, fifth instance, and a comment asserting an invariant with no test pinning it, both in one method. **Severity is bounded, and worth stating so it is not over-ranked:** the hub scans its retained window, archives keep arriving, and R-86's per-tier window for the offsite tier is 12 days against a 7-day archive rhythm — so ONE lost report is tolerated. What is not tolerable is that the loss is **silent** and that the box will not repeat the work. **Fix shape:** report the persisted per-tier proof (target, archive, proven_at) alongside the in-memory latest run, and let the hub's `lastProvenPerTier` read it — a report-contract change, so it touches `internal/hub/report.go` + `contract_test.go` + the hub's checker, and it is a spec, not a one-liner **FIXED.** `RestoreTestState` now stores the **tier** and what was **verified** beside the archive (recorded at proof time, from the run's own result — deriving them later would need a storage lookup that can fail on the one path where failing means mislabelling a proof), exposes `ProvenRestoreTests`, and `Collector.SetProvenRestoreTests` merges it with the in-memory result. **Merge rule: one entry per tier, newest by `TestedAt` wins** — a fresh failure beats a stored success (the failure is the news and lives nowhere else), a stored success beats a stale in-memory entry after a restart, and a tier never appears twice (two entries would read at the hub as two tests). An unparseable timestamp counts as OLDER, so a malformed entry cannot displace a good one. **It refuses to lie:** a record missing the archive OR the tier produces NO entry, and run mechanics (scratch VMID, duration) are not re-invented — an absent duration is not a claim, a fabricated one would be. **The asymmetry is now written where it will be read:** only successes are persisted, because a success SUPPRESSES future work (a proven archive is never re-tested, so a lost proof leaves the box quietly less tested than it believes) while a failure CAUSES future work and heals itself at the next evaluation. **`Store`'s comment was corrected in place** — *"lost on restart; the cadence re-populates"* was true under a timer and became false the moment R-86 shipped; leaving it is how the next reader concludes this is handled. **The seam that had no caller is now pinned by an AST test** (`TestMainWiresTheDurableRestoreTestProof`), because `Snapshot()` claimed a *"host-report gauge"* in its doc comment for weeks with nothing calling it. **MIGRATION, stated because it is visible on the live box:** a pre-R-189 record carries an archive but no tier and is therefore NOT reportable — upgrading does not retroactively make an old proof visible to the hub; the tier's next real proof fills it in. Observed on demo-felhom immediately after the upgrade: still `0 restore-tests` until a fresh run. | CC |
|
||||
| — | Storage Box **snapshots** on `storage-box-pool-1` — plan SET (daily 00:00, keep 7) but **0 taken yet** | WATCHING | first run tonight 00:00 | Confirm `size_snapshots > 0` tomorrow; until then the mitigation is armed, not proven | CC |
|
||||
| — | `PBS-storage-1` (u629193, box 611421) still `status=active`, 19.9 MB | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR | operator console | Delete the box | operator |
|
||||
| **R-90** | ~~ep0 RAM headroom — 4 GiB swap survived its first reboot 2026-07-27; 3.8 GB RAM unchanged~~ | **CLOSED — the operator rescaled ep0 to a CX33 on 2026-08-03** | — | **MEASURED ON THE BOX, not read from an invoice:** `felhom-hetzner` reports `Mem: 7757` MB total (**8 GB**, was 3.8) and `nproc` **4**. **The interim lever survived and was checked rather than assumed** — a resize is a stop/start, so "the swapfile is still there" was an assumption until measured: `/swapfile`, 4 GiB, dated `Jul 27 14:40`, **active** (`swapon --show` → `/swapfile file 4G 0B -2`), 0 B in use on an idle box. **THE 40 GB LOCAL DISK DID NOT CHANGE** and must not be "corrected" alongside the RAM: `/` is 38 G, 58% used. This was a CPU/RAM resize only, so every disk figure in the runbooks still stands — the separate 98 G volume at `/mnt/pbs-datastore` (R-82 P0.3) is unaffected. **Why this was BLOCKED and no longer is:** the row recorded CX33 as *"confirmed unavailable even powered OFF"* — the Cost-Optimized line's limited availability, not a power-state problem. It became available and the operator took it. **Documentation corrected** (`RUNBOOK-ep0-datastore-volume`, `RUNBOOK-pbs-prune-serverside` ×2, `runbooks/offsite-endpoint.md` ×2, `runbooks/target-selection.md`) and **audit/evidence documents ANNOTATED, not revised** (`SPIKE-connectivity-wireguard-2026-07-03`, campaign-10 `phaseA-journal`) — they record what was true when written and that is their value. **Still open and still the operator's, deliberately untouched:** `target-selection.md`'s *"D-d did not name ep0 either way. Confirm it explicitly."* | — |
|
||||
@@ -142,9 +142,10 @@ there is one ranking to maintain rather than two.
|
||||
5. **R-185** — the agent is blind to demo-felhom's host backup tier (a missing storage ACL), and the
|
||||
blindness reads exactly like a newborn tier. Small to fix, and the *silence* is the part worth
|
||||
fixing, not just the grant.
|
||||
6. **R-189** — a passing restore-test can be invisible to the hub, and R-86 widened that window from a
|
||||
day to an archive generation. Observed live. The persisted proof already exists; it is simply not
|
||||
reported.
|
||||
6. ~~**R-189**~~ — **CLOSED 2026-08-03** with **R-188** and **R-186**, agent v0.122.0. The three
|
||||
reporting/release signals that misreported their own work are fixed; **R-185 is the one that
|
||||
remains open from that group** and is untouched by this — it is a missing storage ACL on
|
||||
demo-felhom, not a reporting defect.
|
||||
7. **R-110** — last **because it is not a READY row**: the ruling is the operator's, not CC's, and
|
||||
there is nothing for CC to build until it lands. Ranked here rather than omitted because it is the
|
||||
only item on this page about the *publish channel* of the most privileged artifact Felhom ships,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user