demo-felhom is protected again, and the authorised recovery could never have worked
gates / gates (push) Failing after 10m40s
gates / gates (push) Failing after 10m40s
Checked before acting, and the check is the finding. The box's local key and the hub's sealed escrow key hash to the SAME value (c60c8bc737a6b7c6...), and that key answers "wrong password or no key found" against its own repository. Running the recovery would have returned a key the box already held and which was already proven not to open the store. The store was written under 48741892f0ef4d59... -- host_escrow_superseded id=4, superseded 2026-08-04 07:20:08, identity_blob NULL. The restic password lives only in the identity bundle (escrow/identity.go:39, read by recover.go:91), so it is unrecoverable by construction; the surviving K-escrow payload is 64 bytes, a wrapped key, far too small to carry it. Same shape the register already records for demo-hp, four hours the wrong side of the retention fix. Took the operator's stated fallback instead: the orphan reset through the customer's own card. Old store moved aside, never deleted, to /home/felhom-repo.orphaned-20260810 (1.2 GB); fresh repository under the current key; offbox_repo_reset audited hub-side. Then PROVEN rather than assumed -- last_status ok, 10s, and the snapshot's CONTENTS listed: opengist compose files, manifest.json and volume-dumps/opengist_opengist_data.tar. Not an empty backup calling itself successful. R-202 gains hard evidence: the orphan card promises those set-aside backups may be restorable later with their recovery code. For these 1.2 GB that is false and unfixable, and it is said to the customers most likely to read it.
This commit is contained in:
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
Reference in New Issue
Block a user