F-LEAK: record all three attempts; the ACL fix is consumed by use, the fenced destroy is the fix

2026-07-28 11:32:45 +02:00
parent cba48293f1
commit 5ffdcecb2d
2 changed files with 50 additions and 19 deletions
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ State: `BLOCKED` · `READY` · `WAITING-ON-OPERATOR` · `WATCHING`. Every row ha
 | **F-A1** | ~~A restore-test in flight made a healthy backup report as FAILED (HTTP 409 read as a tier failure): breaker armed + operator emailed, on both boxes~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (controller v0.179.0, 2026-07-28) | — | 409 → contention: tier stays DUE, dropped before anything stops (15m), and BLOCKED alarm if contention outlives the agent's 120m ceiling (3h). Hub DB: 409 → **0** operator emails, real failure → **1** | — |
 | **R-100** | **A restic offsite tier that fails every night never goes stale on the hub.** `isStale()` reads only `LastRun` (`hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go:120,127,131`) and the controller writes `LastRun` **unconditionally**, outside the error branch (`controller/internal/backup/offbox.go:716`, with `LastStatus="error"` set at :725). So a tier failing nightly keeps a fresh clock, `isStale` is permanently false, and the operator's fleet-wide alarm plane is silent. `LastStatus` reaches the hub and is **only logged** (`offsite.go:270`) — it drives no checker and no notification | READY (S) | — | **This is F-CRIT-2's defect class on the hub, for the restic tier**: a failed run resetting the freshness clock. Gate staleness on the last *successful* run, not the last attempt. Found by Part 4 investigation 2026-07-28; NOT fixed (investigation-only scope) | CC |
 | **F-REBOOT** | ~~A guest rebooted during its backup does not come back — shutdown completes, start never happens, no self-heal; 9m47s total appliance outage with every alarm silent~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (agent v0.107.0, 2026-07-28) | — | 60 s guest-power watchdog; `onboot` is the deliberate-stop discriminator (already the stale-lock path's, and what `pve-guests` consults), retry bounded 3x/1m-2m-4m then escalates once. Live on demo-hp: **120 s unattended** vs the incident's 587 s with a human; Scenario B proven (an `onboot:0` guest left stopped) | — |
-| **F-LEAK** | ~~A failed restore-test cannot destroy its own scratch guest (403 `VM.Allocate`); the 10-slot VMID band shrinks silently~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (host-install v1.21.0, 2026-07-28) | — | `FelhomAgentGuest` granted per-path at `/vms/990000..990009`. Cause was structural: the role is granted at `/pool/felhom` and a guest joins the pool only when its restore **completes**. Live A/B on demo-hp, same guest minutes apart: grant removed → `403 (/vms/990000, VM.Allocate)`; granted → `200 UPID:...vzdestroy`. `/vms/100` and `/vms/990010` still **403** (PVE checks permission before existence, so these are real refusals) | — |
+| **F-LEAK** | ~~A failed restore-test cannot destroy its own scratch guest (403 `VM.Allocate`); the 10-slot VMID band shrinks silently~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (agent v0.110.0 + host-install v1.21.0, 2026-07-28) | — | **Three attempts, two refuted live.** (1) Pool adoption: `PUT /pools/{pool}` also needs `VM.Allocate` on the VM — membership cannot bootstrap its own authority. (2) Per-path `/vms/990000..990009` ACLs: work, but PVE's destroy calls `remove_vm_access` (`LXC.pm:906`) which deletes every ACL at `/vms/<vmid>` — **consumed by the op it authorises**, one use per slot. (3) SHIPPED: 4th root-fenced exception, band enforced in sudoers **literally** (`pct destroy 99000[0-9] --purge`) + in code + at the caller; API destroy still tried first. Live: band PERMITTED, `9201`/`9100`/`9999`/`990010`/`1` REFUSED, and `pct start 990000` REFUSED too | — |
 | **F-OBS** | ~~`deadapp-check` leaves NO positive observable on a default (info-level) box — "no alarms" was indistinguishable from "never ran"~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (controller v0.180.0 + agent v0.109.0, 2026-07-28) | — | INFO summary every 20th scan carrying scans/evaluated/down. **Agent v0.109.0 fixes the same shape in the guest-power watchdog shipped hours earlier in v0.107.0** — it logged only at startup and when it acted, so its health could be read only from absence | — |
 | **R-89** | Retention as a per-customer **commercial** policy on the hub | READY (increment 2) | — | Policy object + reconciler → ep0 prune job; keep box tokens write-only | CC |
 | **R-92** | Hub PBS-DR gauge is 0.1 GB-granular — small deltas unverifiable | READY (XS) | — | Widen precision when retention becomes customer-visible | CC |