hub v0.66.0 + ISO v1.20.0: customer self-bind (R-27 slice 1)

Let a customer bind their own freshly-installed appliance without the
operator: operator "Send self-bind link" mints a 7-day tokenized
capability link, emailed (Hungarian, sibling sender) to the customer, who
opens a public /bind/<token> page and proves two factors — the console
pairing code shown on the box screen + their retrieval passphrase — and
the hub stages the bind via the same BindAppliance (provenance
customer_selfbind). The box's ~30s appliance poll delivers.

Viktor's three rulings verbatim: console pairing code (no appliance list
ever rendered), operator-sent tokenized link, 5-attempt lockout ->
"call support". Wrong code == wrong passphrase (one generic failure, no
oracle, both factors compared unconditionally); expiry falls back to
operator-bind unchanged.

THE TRAP: one public prefix /bind/, exempt from auth+CSRF at both /login
gate sites via a single isPublicBindPath predicate (tight trailing-slash
match; ServeMux ..-cleans; handler rejects '/' in token). 9 tests
(Scenarios A-F + F1/F2); 4 red-proofs verified red-then-green (lockout,
oracle, widened-prefix, single-active). GC verdict: no appliance GC ->
the 7-day TTL stands alone. Controller/agent untouched; R-27b deferred.

Green: full hub build/vet/test (17 ok) + bash -n + hub confirm gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017qDiBqKKQ5vPB5fXBqu7Kp

CONTEXT.md

@@ -3,6 +3,27 @@
 > Created with the REUSE.md rollout (2026-07-03). Authoritative history: `hub/CHANGELOG.md` (hub),
 > `website/CHANGELOG.md`, `scripts/CHANGELOG.md`; end-of-task detail in `REPORT.md`.
 
+- **2026-07-17 — CUSTOMER SELF-BIND shipped (hub v0.66.0 + ISO scripts v1.20.0, R-27 slice 1).** A
+  customer binds their OWN freshly-installed appliance without the operator. Operator clicks **"Send
+  self-bind link"** on the customer Setup tab → hub mints a **7-day tokenized capability link** →
+  emails it (Hungarian, sibling sender, NOT via the claim engine) → customer opens the **public,
+  Hungarian `/bind/<token>`** page (no login — the URL token IS the auth) → enters the **console
+  pairing code** (shown on the box screen) + their **retrieval passphrase** → hub stages the bind via
+  the same `BindAppliance` (provenance `customer_selfbind`) → the box's ~30 s appliance poll delivers.
+  **Viktor's three rulings, verbatim:** (a) *"only their own visible"* → console pairing code, **no
+  appliance list ever rendered**; (b) *first-box entry* → operator-sent tokenized capability link over
+  Hungarian email; (c) *lockout after 5 failed attempts* → token locks, "call support". Wrong code and
+  wrong passphrase = **one identical generic failure** (no oracle; both factors compared
+  unconditionally); expiry falls back to operator-bind unchanged. **THE TRAP (§9.2):** one public
+  prefix `/bind/`, exempted from auth+CSRF at both `/login` gate sites via a single `isPublicBindPath`
+  predicate (tight trailing-slash match; ServeMux `..`-cleans; handler rejects `/` in the token) — 4
+  red-proofs verified red-then-green (lockout→C1, oracle→B, widened-prefix→E, single-active→C4).
+  **GC verdict:** no appliance-staleness GC exists (`applianceStaleAfter` is a display badge only) → the
+  7-day token TTL stands alone, single-active-per-customer, no reaper needed. **Controller/agent
+  untouched; R-27b (controller second-box dismissable prompt) DEFERRED, mechanism sketched.** Green:
+  full hub `build/vet/test` (17 ok, +9 self-bind tests) + `bash -n`. **LIVE validation pending deploy
+  (this session).** See REPORT.md.
+
 - **2026-07-17 — PBS DR STORAGE VISIBILITY + Offsite tab split + dual gauges shipped (hub v0.65.0 +
   tenantsync v1.2.0, R-5), LIVE.** Scoping correction (Viktor): "restic box" and "PBS box" are NOT two
   Hetzner Storage Boxes — restic = subaccounts on the shared Hetzner box (Hetzner API, v0.64.0); **PBS DR =

REPORT.md

@@ -2,119 +2,79 @@
 
 > **Overwrite** this file with a summary of the most recent task only (uniform with the other repos; not cumulative). The cumulative hub history lives in [hub/CHANGELOG.md](hub/CHANGELOG.md); the scripts history lives in [scripts/CHANGELOG.md](scripts/CHANGELOG.md).
 
-## Hub v0.65.0 — PBS DR storage visibility (ep0 `usage` op) + Offsite tab split (Restic / PBS DR) + dual dashboard gauges (R-5) — 2026-07-17
+## Hub v0.66.0 — Customer self-bind (R-27 slice 1) — 2026-07-17
 
-### 1. Baselines used
+A customer can now bind their **own** freshly-installed appliance without the operator. The operator
+sends a **7-day tokenized capability link** by email; the customer opens a **public, Hungarian**
+`/bind/<token>` page (no login — the URL token IS the capability), enters the **console pairing code**
+shown on the box screen plus their **retrieval passphrase**, and the hub stages the bind through the
+same `BindAppliance` the operator uses. The box's ~30 s appliance poll then delivers credentials and
+day-0 install proceeds. The controller and agent are **untouched**.
 
-- **felhom.eu** @ `3588a31` (v0.64.0 REPORT), clean on `main`, local == origin re-confirmed.
+Viktor's three rulings, honoured verbatim:
-- **Hub** v0.64.0 → **v0.65.0**. Manifest `felhom-hub:0.64.0` → `:0.65.0`.
+1. **"Only their own visible"** → possession is proven by the console pairing code; **no appliance
-- **`scripts/felhom-tenantsync.sh`** v1.1.0 → **v1.2.0** (adds the read-only `usage` op).
+   list is ever rendered** on any public surface.
-- READ-ONLY against ep0 and Hetzner throughout (no mutation, no admin token; the usage op is a pure `df`).
+2. **First-box entry** → an operator-sent tokenized capability link over Hungarian email (claim-engine
+   delivery pattern, a **sibling** sender in `web/`+`notify/` — deliberately NOT routed through the
+   claim engine).
+3. **Lockout after 5 failed attempts** → the token locks; the page says *call support*.
 
-### 2. Phase-0 probe (the gate — PASSED)
+### Components
 
-On ep0 (`felhom-hetzner`, root SSH, PBS **4.2.3**): `proxmox-backup-manager datastore usage` does not exist
+| Part | Area | What |
-in PBS 4.2, so `df` on the datastore path is the authoritative read-only source. `datastore list
+|---|---|---|
---output-format json` → `felhom-offsite` path `/srv/pbs-felhom`; `df -B1 --output=size,used,avail /srv/pbs-felhom`:
+| 1 | store + api + bootstrap | `pairing_code` on `appliance_registrations`; additive `pairing_code` in the register response; stable across idempotent re-register; console banner (`felhom-bootstrap.sh`, ISO **v1.20.0**) |
+| 2 | store + notify + web | `selfbind_tokens` table (sha256-at-rest, single-active/customer, 5-attempt lock, one-shot); operator **"Send self-bind link"** button; Hungarian email (sibling sender); F1/F2 honesty |
+| 3 | web | public `/bind/<token>` page; **THE TRAP** auth+CSRF exemption via one `isPublicBindPath` predicate; two-factor unconditional compare; provenance event `customer_selfbind`; own rate limiter |
+| 4 | tests | Scenarios A–F + F1/F2 (9 tests) + **4 red-proofs** |
+| 5 | docs + deploy | this REPORT, CHANGELOGs, CONTEXT, capability-map, ROADMAP; build 0.66.0, manifest bump, sync; live validation |
 
-```
+### Security properties (spec §9)
-  1B-blocks       Used       Avail
-39990112256 7628091392 30686175232
-```
 
-All **bytes** (total 37.2 GiB / used 7.1 GiB → ~19%), read-only, in the existing sudo context, no admin
+- **THE TRAP (§9.2):** exactly one new public prefix `/bind/`, exempted from operator auth and CSRF at
-token. Gate PASSED → the op was built (Option A). The v1.2.0 op emits exactly these as
+  the two gate sites `/login` occupies, through a **single** `isPublicBindPath` definition. Matched
-`{"status":"ok","total","used","avail"}` — verified against the real ep0 before writing the harness.
+  tightly — trailing slash (no `/bindsecret` sibling), the `http.ServeMux` `..`-cleans before the
+  handler sees the path, and the handler rejects any token containing `/`. Scenario E asserts a public
+  link renders logged-out while `/`, `/hosts`, `/customers/…`, `/configuration`, `/offsite` still
+  redirect to `/login`; Scenario D is its companion.
+- **No oracle:** an unknown token folds into "expired" (no *was-this-real* signal); wrong code and
+  wrong passphrase yield one byte-identical generic failure (both factors compared unconditionally
+  before deciding); the page renders no appliance data in any state.
+- **Custody:** `sha256(token)` at rest, prefix-only in logs, raw token never in logs/events; the
+  passphrase is never logged/echoed/persisted; only attempt COUNTS are logged (`attempt N/5 … <8hex>…`).
+- **No customer-login system** was built; the capability link is the whole auth model. A cross-site
+  POST without both secrets only burns attempts (accepted + documented).
 
-### 3. Files created / modified
+### GC verdict (spec §3)
 
-**Code + script + runbook (commit `7f11cfb`):**
+There is **no appliance-staleness garbage collection** in the hub — `applianceStaleAfter` (7 d) is a
-- `scripts/felhom-tenantsync.sh` → v1.2.0 (read-only `usage` op) `+ scripts/tenantsync-usage-harness.sh` (new Group-A test).
+DISPLAY badge only; `pruneAll` and `PurgeExpiredLogBundles` touch host reports and log bundles, not
-- `hub/internal/tenantsync/client.go` — `Usage()` + `BoxUsage` + `ErrUsageUnsupported` + response fields `+ client_test.go`.
+appliances or self-bind tokens. The **7-day token TTL stands alone** and needs no reaper: single-active
-- `hub/internal/monitor/pbsdr_box.go` (new) `+ _test.go` — `PBSDRBoxChecker` (usageReader seam, throttle, 3 states, bands).
+per customer means at most one row per customer, a re-mint deletes the prior row, and an expired row
-- `hub/internal/notify/dispatcher_test.go` — the pbsdr-box operator-only test.
+simply reads as expired (no security or storage pressure).
-- `hub/cmd/hub/main.go` — `Alerting.PBSDRBoxFill*` config; checker construction with the tenantsync client; 60 s sweep; `SetPBSDRBox`.
-- `hub/internal/web/{server.go,offsite.go,pbsdr_box.go(new),pbsdr_box_render_test.go(new),offsite_box_render_test.go,render_test.go}` — PBS view/tile, tab wiring, two-gauge payload, render tests.
-- `hub/internal/web/templates/{offsite.html,dashboard.html,style.css}` — Restic/PBS-DR tabs, two gauges, gauge container CSS.
-- `documentation/runbooks/offsite-endpoint.md` §10 — v1.2.0 install steps (no sudoers/authorized_keys change).
-- `hub/CHANGELOG.md`.
 
-**Docs (commit `a9cd308`):** REPORT (this), CONTEXT, capability-map, ROADMAP.
+### Verification
-**Manifest (commit `ab91e49`):** `manifests/hub.yaml` → `:0.65.0`.
 
-### 4. Test results + red-proof outcomes
+- **Green gate:** `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` — all hub packages pass (17 ok),
+  including 9 new self-bind tests. `bash -n` clean on both ISO scripts. Hub confirm gate OK.
+- **Red-proofs (all confirmed red-then-green):**
+  - lockout removed (`locked = false`) → **C1** red.
+  - oracle introduced (distinct state on wrong code) → **B** red.
+  - `/bind/` prefix widened (drop the slash) → **E** red (`/bindsecret` leaks past auth).
+  - single-active DELETE dropped → **C4** red (the prior link still resolves).
+- **D2 regression evidence:** with an operator password configured, `/`, `/hosts`, `/customers/acme`,
+  `/configuration`, `/offsite` all `302 → /login` through `RequireAuth`, while `/bind/<token>` renders
+  `200` — proving the exemption is tight (`TestSelfBind_D_AuthGateIntact`, `TestSelfBind_E_TheTrap`).
 
-10 Go tests + a bash harness, all green:
+### Live validation
 
-| Test | Group | Asserts |
+Filled in after deploy — see the CONTEXT.md live-state note.
-|------|-------|---------|
-| `TestUsage_Op` | B | usage op parses total/used/avail (bytes) |
-| `TestUsage_UnknownOpTypedUnsupported` | B | ep0 ≤ v1.1.0 `unknown op` → typed `ErrUsageUnsupported` |
-| `TestPBSDRBox_Throttle` | C1 | ≈4 usage calls over an hour of 60 s sweeps (not ≈60) |
-| `TestPBSDRBox_FillBands` | C2/C3 | 75→no; 82→warn; 85 in-band→no re-emit; 92→crit; 70→re-arm; re-breach→emit; scope "pbsdr-box" |
-| `TestPBSDRBox_Unavailable` | C4 | ErrUsageUnsupported → "unavailable" state, NO alert, no band |
-| `TestPBSDRBox_DegradedKeepsLast` | C5 | exec error → degraded, keeps last values, no band transition, no emit |
-| `TestProcessEvent_PBSDRBoxScopeOperatorOnly` | C3 | a pbsdr-box event → operator channel ONLY |
-| `TestPBSDRPanel_OK` / `_Unavailable` / `_NotConfigured` | D | panel renders ok / the pending-update message / not-configured |
-| `tenantsync-usage-harness.sh` | A | usage JSON + exit 0 + **zero mutation** (stub-logged) + provision regression |
 
-**Red-proofs (run-fail-restore), all confirmed red then restored:**
+### Not in this slice (deferred)
 
-| # | Removed / broken | Test | Result |
+- **R-27b** — the controller's second-box flow (a dismissable "bind another box" prompt + bind-later
-|---|------------------|------|--------|
+  under settings). Mechanism sketched; not built. The controller/agent were not touched.
-| A | the usage op emits a mutation (`acl update`) | harness | FAILED ("usage ran mutations: … acl update …") → restored |
+- **Multi-box per link** — one link binds one box (single-active, one-shot). Binding several boxes for
-| C-esc | the escalation-only guard | `PBSDRBox_FillBands` | FAILED ("same-band must NOT re-emit, got 2") → restored |
+  one customer = repeated operator sends. Noted on the ROADMAP.
-| C-unavail | unavailable drives a fill band | `PBSDRBox_Unavailable` | FAILED ("must yield 'unavailable', got State:ok … critical") → restored |
+- Attaching the appliance's stored SSH host key to the host record on bind (no clean hand-off surface
-
+  today — same open item as slice C).
-Full suite: `go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` (17 packages) + `bash -n` + hub confirm gate —
-all green. Test count: +10 Go (+2 tenantsync, +4 monitor, +1 notify, +3 web) + 1 bash harness.
-
-### 5. Deploy verification
-
-Built `felhom-hub:0.65.0` on 180 (source `7f11cfb`). **ep0 updated to tenantsync v1.2.0 THIS session** (root
-SSH, `.bak-1.1.0` kept; `tr -d '\r'` → `bash -n` OK → `install -m0755`; NO sudoers/authorized_keys change).
-On-box verify: `echo '{"op":"usage"}' | /usr/local/bin/felhom-tenantsync` →
-`{"status":"ok","total":39990112256,"used":7628349440,"avail":30685917184}`; `fingerprint` regression OK.
-Manifest bump (`ab91e49`) → ArgoCD hard-refresh → sync → rollout succeeded; image `:0.65.0`. Startup log:
-
-```
-[INFO] felhom-hub 0.65.0 starting
-[INFO] PBS DR tenantsync enabled (endpoint 167.233.158.164:22, user felhom-peersync; …)
-[INFO] PBS-DR box checker initialized: fill warn=80% crit=90%, refresh 15m0s
-```
-
-### 6. Live-rendered values (the PROVEN-LIVE evidence)
-
-Because ep0 was updated to v1.2.0, the PBS gauge shows **real** numbers. The hub UI is operator-password-gated
-(CC can't screenshot), so the in-cluster checker's first live poll is the proof — the exact numbers the PBS
-panel + gauge render:
-
-```
-[INFO] PBS-DR box refreshed: 19.1% full (7.1 GB of 37.2 GB)
-```
-
-Live-confirmed end-to-end (hub checker → tenantsync `usage` op → ep0 `df` → snapshot): **7.1 GB of 37.2 GB,
-19.1%** — matching the Phase-0 probe. The restic gauge (v0.64.0) continues to render its own live numbers.
-Both tabs (Restic / PBS DR) and both dashboard gauges are live; the panel-render is UNIT-verified
-(`TestPBSDRPanel_*`), the data proven live.
-
-### 7. NOT yet live-validated
-
-- **The UI render** (tabs + gauges) could not be screenshotted (hub UI password-gated). It is unit-verified
-  (render tests) and the data behind both gauges is proven live (§6).
-- **The PBS fill alert leg** (`pbsdr_box_fill` operator email) is NOT fired live: the datastore is nominal
-  (19.1%, far from 80/90%). Unit + red-proof verified; a live-fire would email Viktor (offered on demand).
-- **The graceful "unavailable" state** was exercised in unit tests, not live — ep0 was updated straight to
-  v1.2.0, so the hub never saw the old-script path in production (the hub-independence property is verified
-  by construction + `TestUsage_UnknownOpTypedUnsupported` + `TestPBSDRBox_Unavailable`).
-
-### 8. Observations
-
-- **Separate PBS threshold pair:** shipped as `Alerting.PBSDRBoxFill{Warn,Crit}Percent` defaulting to the
-  same 80/90 as restic — independently tunable later without touching the restic policy. Whether Viktor
-  wants a different PBS pair is his call (one-liner). No oversubscription concept for PBS (namespaces, not
-  quotas) — fill only, as ruled.
-- **Dashboard decimal:** the gauges use `%.0f` (e.g. "19%"), so a near-empty box shows "0%" not "0.2%" —
-  matches the restic tile's existing rounding. The panels show the finer detail.
-- The `usage` op is `df`-based because PBS 4.2 has no native `datastore usage` command; if a future PBS adds
-  one with dedup-aware logical sizing, the op can switch source with no hub/client change (same JSON shape).

documentation/architecture/00-capability-map.md

@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@
 |---|---|---|---|---|
 | Appliance day-0 install: golden image → first boot → auto-confirm (zero clicks) → claimable box | installer, agent, hub, golden | **PROVEN-LIVE** (nested VM) | `DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12`, `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` | First firing on real customer hardware pending → R-1 |
 | BYO install: `--mode byo`, mandatory caps, host-mutation disclosure, coexistence guards | installer v1.15+, agent | **PARTIAL** | `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` (demo box); GL-8 coexistence fixes | Peti clean-slate reinstall on proxmox2 is the first real BYO run of the current path → R-1 |
-| Bare-metal Felhom ISO (blank hardware → zero-touch auto-install → first-boot `host-install`); selectable UEFI loader; **universal secret-free / operator-bind** mode | scripts v1.19.0 (`scripts/iso/`) + hub v0.62.0 + assistant container | **PARTIAL** (nested VM 310/311; live endpoints) | slice A `SPIKE-baremetal-iso-2026-07-16` (build gate, disk-filter fail-safe, stub→host-install fetch); slice B RUNBOOK-B (shim boots+installs OVMF SB-enforcing + SeaBIOS; `--loader mkimage` boots+installs SB-off; mkimage SB-enforcing **FAILS** `Access Denied`; surgery byte-identical); **slice C (2026-07-17): the GENERIC secret-free ISO** — box self-registers as an unclaimed appliance (`POST /api/v1/appliance/register`, one-shot poll delivery, 404-no-oracle — all live-verified through the public ingress), operator binds on the Hosts page, hub delivers credentials once; bootstrap harness proves direct(zero-appliance-calls)/pairing/delivery; artifact proven secret-free (baked env = hub URL only) | **F1 loader caveat:** `--loader mkimage` fixes cheap AMI firmware that can't USB-boot the stock GRUB — UNSIGNED → **Secure Boot must be OFF**; default `shim` keeps SB. **Slice C bind is operator-password-gated** (CC stages, Viktor binds) → the live boot→register→bind→day-0 composition + physical N100 boot fold into the supervised rehearsal (R-1). Customer-facing **self-bind page** = future item (registered) |
+| Bare-metal Felhom ISO (blank hardware → zero-touch auto-install → first-boot `host-install`); selectable UEFI loader; **universal secret-free / operator-bind** mode | scripts v1.19.0 (`scripts/iso/`) + hub v0.62.0 + assistant container | **PARTIAL** (nested VM 310/311; live endpoints) | slice A `SPIKE-baremetal-iso-2026-07-16` (build gate, disk-filter fail-safe, stub→host-install fetch); slice B RUNBOOK-B (shim boots+installs OVMF SB-enforcing + SeaBIOS; `--loader mkimage` boots+installs SB-off; mkimage SB-enforcing **FAILS** `Access Denied`; surgery byte-identical); **slice C (2026-07-17): the GENERIC secret-free ISO** — box self-registers as an unclaimed appliance (`POST /api/v1/appliance/register`, one-shot poll delivery, 404-no-oracle — all live-verified through the public ingress), operator binds on the Hosts page, hub delivers credentials once; bootstrap harness proves direct(zero-appliance-calls)/pairing/delivery; artifact proven secret-free (baked env = hub URL only) | **F1 loader caveat:** `--loader mkimage` fixes cheap AMI firmware that can't USB-boot the stock GRUB — UNSIGNED → **Secure Boot must be OFF**; default `shim` keeps SB. **Slice C bind is operator-password-gated** (CC stages, Viktor binds) → the live boot→register→bind→day-0 composition + physical N100 boot fold into the supervised rehearsal (R-1). Customer-facing **self-bind page = R-27 slice 1 SHIPPED (hub v0.66.0, 2026-07-17)** — see the dedicated self-bind row |
 | Customer claim: one-time emailed code → customer sets own password (bcrypt, operator never sees it) | controller v0.122, hub v0.50 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM) | `DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12` §10/F-4 (gate ON via real edge; claimed, code consumed) | Never executed by a non-Viktor human → R-3. (Dropped mis-cited `CAMPAIGN-4` F-C — that is the escrow-claim 502, not password claim) |
+| Customer binds their own appliance (self-service): operator-sent 7-day tokenized capability link → public two-factor `/bind/<token>` (console pairing code + retrieval passphrase) → hub stages the bind, no operator | hub v0.66.0 + ISO scripts v1.20.0 | **IMPLEMENTED** | hub v0.66.0 (`web/selfbind.go`, `store/selfbind.go`; Scenarios A–F + F1/F2; 4 red-proofs verified red — THE TRAP `/bind/` exemption, no-oracle, lockout, single-active); GC verdict §3 (no appliance GC → TTL stands alone) | R-27 **slice 1**. No appliance list ever rendered; wrong code == wrong passphrase (one generic failure); 5-attempt lockout → call support; expiry falls back to operator-bind. **Live first-run + new-ISO console banner pending** (folds into the supervised rehearsal R-1). **R-27b** (controller second-box dismissable prompt) deferred; **multi-box-per-link** = repeated operator sends |
 | Escrow ceremony: customer-facing wizard, one-shot R claim, operator zero-knowledge | controller v0.127, agent v0.88/0.89 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM, endpoint-exact) | agent v0.88.0 REPORT (ceremony ~4s, one-shot claim 200→410, R absent from every payload); `SPIKE-controller-escrow-2026-07-13` | Endpoints driven on the drill VM; customer-facing **browser wizard** leg not yet live-validated. First supervised ceremony with a real customer pending → R-1. **agent v0.89.0:** `/escrow/preflight` `pbs_storage_id` row now live-reloads (reads current agent.json) — a pbsdr convergence that seeds the id flips it green with NO service restart. **hub v0.60.0 (data-first retention):** a re-escrow with a DIFFERENT sealed passphrase no longer destroys the old blob — the hub RETAINS it (`host_escrow_superseded`), so a previous passphrase stays recoverable with its recovery code (turns the reinstall-orphan incident from "history destroyed" into "history recoverable"). Guided-recovery flow = R-26. Red-proof `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded`. **hub v0.60.1 — custody survives the host lifecycle:** host deletion (with the escrow ack) DEMOTES the current blob to retained custody (moved into `host_escrow_superseded`, never destroyed; existing superseded rows spared); the customer Danger-zone Delete is the one true purge point (cascades both escrow tables incl. already-deleted hosts). No operator path through host lifecycle can lose a blob. Red-proofs `TestDeleteHost_DemotesEscrowNeverDestroys` + `TestDeleteCustomer_PurgesEscrowCustody` |
 | DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | **IMPLEMENTED** | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 | Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected. Candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE — see REPORT.) **agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17:** the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick `pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, `pvesm status felhom-offsite`=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot `pveum` grant |
 | Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier: host delete < RESET < customer Delete): one operator action → pre-first-install; all operational state destroyed, identity + basic config survive | hub v0.61.0, felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (external teardown)** | hub v0.61.0 REPORT; **ep0 live drill 2026-07-17** (throwaway `drill-reset-01` with a real backup: deprovision `deleted:true` destroyed the namespace + backup group + token, idempotent re-run `deleted:false`, all 3 real tenants + shared user survived); red-proofs (ack-gate, partial-failure resumability) + orchestration/store/offsite/render tests | External teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST, every leg idempotent; refuses while any host row exists; separate escrow-custody ack; clears claim (fresh code next onboarding); keeps the offsite tier CHOICE, drops provisioned fields. **Not live-clicked:** the web POST is password-gated (CC verifies via render + httptest orchestration tests); the Hetzner sub-account delete is unit-tested + a faithful mirror of the live-proven `ReissueCredentials`. **Consistency gap → R-25b:** the Danger-zone DELETE leaves host rows and doesn't run this teardown |

documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md

@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@
 | ID | Item | Size | Status | Notes |
 |----|------|------|--------|-------|
 | R-26 | **Guided old-history recovery via a retained superseded escrow + the recovery code.** Enabled by hub v0.60.0 (Part B) which now RETAINS superseded escrow blobs (`host_escrow_superseded`, `ListSupersededEscrow`). Build the flow that, given the customer's recovery code, unwraps a retained old blob → recovers the old repo passphrase → mounts/reads the moved-aside `.orphaned-<date>` repo for restore. | M | idea (enabled by v0.60.0) | Turns "history recoverable in principle" into a real customer-drivable path; pairs with the controller v0.142.0 orphaned-repo move-aside. Origin `DIAGNOSE-offbox-repo-orphaned-2026-07-17` |
-| R-27 | **Customer-facing self-bind page (R-21 slice C follow-on).** Today an unclaimed appliance is bound by the OPERATOR on the Hosts page (hub v0.62.0). Build the customer-facing flow so a customer can claim/bind their own freshly-installed box (e.g. enter a claim code / the appliance's displayed pairing id → the hub binds it to their account → delivery proceeds). Turns "operator binds every box" into true self-service onboarding. | M | idea | Origin: hub v0.62.0 slice C (operator-bind ruling; self-bind deliberately deferred). Reuses the appliance_registrations + one-shot delivery machinery; adds a customer-auth surface + a pairing-id/claim-code channel. Pairs with the claim engine |
+| R-27 | **Customer-facing self-bind page (R-21 slice C follow-on).** Today an unclaimed appliance is bound by the OPERATOR on the Hosts page (hub v0.62.0). Build the customer-facing flow so a customer can claim/bind their own freshly-installed box. | M | **SHIPPED (slice 1, hub v0.66.0, 2026-07-17)** | **Slice 1 = the FIRST-box flow, DONE:** operator "Send self-bind link" → 7-day tokenized capability link over Hungarian email → public two-factor `/bind/<token>` (console pairing code shown on the box screen + retrieval passphrase) → hub stages the bind via the same `BindAppliance`, no operator. Viktor's 3 rulings verbatim (console code not a list; operator-sent link; 5-attempt lockout→call support). No oracle; expiry falls back to operator-bind; THE TRAP `/bind/` exemption tight (single predicate, 4 red-proofs). GC verdict §3 (no appliance GC → the 7-day TTL stands alone). **Live first-run + new-ISO console banner fold into the supervised rehearsal (R-1).** Reused the appliance_registrations + one-shot delivery machinery; the capability link is the whole customer-auth surface (no login system built). Controller/agent untouched. See hub v0.66.0 REPORT. **Multi-box per link is out of scope by design** (single-active, one-shot → binding several boxes = repeated operator sends) |
+| R-27b | **Customer self-bind, second-box flow (controller side).** For a customer who ALREADY has a bound box and installs another, the controller shows a dismissable "bind another box" prompt (and a bind-later entry under settings) that walks to the hub `/bind/` page — so a returning customer isn't emailed a fresh operator-sent link for every box. Mechanism sketched in the hub v0.66.0 REPORT; NOT built (R-27 slice 1 deliberately did not touch the controller). | M | idea (minted by hub v0.66.0) | Origin: hub v0.66.0 slice-1 ship (first-box only). Reuses the same `/bind/` public page + tokenized-link machinery; adds a controller-side entry point + the operator "mint a link for an existing customer" affordance |
 | R-25b | **Customer DELETE ↔ RESET consistency.** The middle-tier Customer RESET (hub v0.61.0) runs the full external teardown (Hetzner sub-account/box + PBS namespace/groups/token) and refuses while any host row exists. The Danger-zone DELETE still (a) leaves host rows and (b) does NOT run that teardown — it purges escrow custody + drops the config only. Decide the model: DELETE requires a prior RESET, or DELETE subsumes RESET's teardown, or they stay orthogonal (RESET = recycle-in-place, DELETE = escrow-purge). | S | idea | Origin: hub v0.61.0 RESET ship. Flips a future "customer fully offboarded (external resources released)" map row. Cheap once the model is chosen |
 | R-25 | **Device-node TOCTOU hardening (drive init).** Graduate the controller v0.141.0 Observation: the `format → resolveEnrollUUID(path) → AssignDisk(uuid)` sequence has a narrow /dev-re-enumeration window (agent-guarded on the destructive format via anti-retarget durable-id; benign fs-UUID mount). Bind resolve+assign to the format's durable-id so the mount can't target a moved node. | S | idea | From the v0.141.0 F6 commit's security-review finding (`felhom-controller` REPORT). Low real risk (single-operator, agent-guarded), but cheap to close |
 | R-24 | **Guest RAM resize (live) — SHIPPED (agent v0.90.0 + controller v0.143.0, 2026-07-17).** The customer right-sizes the guest's memory from the controller's Rendszer page; the agent enforces every bound fresh + applies via PVE `SetConfig` (live cgroup, no reboot, Phase-0 proven). **Framing note:** the original hub-desired-state framing is SUPERSEDED by Viktor's controller-direct ruling (2026-07-17) — the resize is controller→agent local-API, never through the hub. Memory only (cores stay observation). Deployed + live-validated on the demo (refusals render Hungarian end-to-end); a successful grow on a normal-sized box folds into the rehearsal. **Cores/live-resize as hub desired-state is NOT built** (deferred, low demand). | M | **SHIPPED** | See felhom-agent + felhom-controller REPORTs; capability-map row "customer right-sizes guest RAM". |

hub/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,58 @@
 # Felhom Hub — Changelog
 
+## v0.66.0 — Customer self-bind (R-27 slice 1): tokenized capability link + public two-factor `/bind/` page (2026-07-17)
+
+Lets a customer bind their OWN freshly-installed appliance without the operator. Until now every
+box booted from the universal secret-free ISO (R-21 slice C) had to be bound by the operator on the
+Hosts page; this adds the self-service path. **Viktor's three rulings, each honoured verbatim:**
+(a) *"only their own visible"* → the customer proves possession with the **console pairing code**
+shown on the box screen — **no appliance list is ever rendered** on any public surface; (b) *first-box
+entry* → an **operator-sent 7-day tokenized capability link** over Hungarian email (the claim-engine
+delivery pattern, a sibling sender — NOT routed through the claim engine); (c) **lockout after 5
+failed attempts** → the token locks and the page says *"call support"*. Wrong code and wrong
+passphrase produce **one identical generic failure** (no oracle); an expired link falls back to
+operator-bind, unchanged. Does **not** touch the controller or agent. Green: `go build/vet/test`
+(full hub suite + 9 new self-bind tests), all 4 red-proofs verified red-then-green, hub confirm gate.
+
+- **Pairing code (Part 1).** `POST /api/v1/appliance/register` now returns an additive `pairing_code`
+  (6 chars, ambiguity-free alphabet, `ABC-234` display) minted once at first registration and stable
+  across the idempotent re-register/upsert (backfilled if a pre-existing row had none). Persisted on
+  `appliance_registrations.pairing_code`; shown in the operator Hosts "Unclaimed appliances" table.
+  The bootstrap (`felhom-bootstrap.sh`, ISO v1.20.0) parses it and prints a Hungarian **console
+  banner** to `/dev/console` so the customer can read it off the screen. Old ISOs ignore the field;
+  an old hub omits it and the banner prints nothing — additive both ways.
+- **Capability token (Part 2).** New `selfbind_tokens` table: `sha256(token)` at rest (never the
+  token), **single-active per customer** (a re-mint deletes the prior row in one tx — an old link dies
+  the instant a new one is sent), `attempts` locking at 5, one-shot `consumed_at`, `emailed_at`
+  honesty. Operator **"Send self-bind link"** button on the customer Setup tab
+  (`POST /customers/{id}/selfbind-link`) mints a 256-bit token and emails
+  `https://hub.felhom.eu/bind/<token>` (Hungarian, adult tone, no emoji, names both factors + the
+  7-day + 5-attempt limits). **F1** (no registered email → nothing minted, LOUD flash) and **F2**
+  (email send fails → the just-minted token is deleted, not left silently live) are both honest.
+- **Public bind page (Part 3) — THE TRAP (§9.2).** One new public prefix `/bind/`, exempted from
+  operator auth AND CSRF at the two gate sites the `/login` exemption occupies, via a **single**
+  predicate `isPublicBindPath` (matched tightly: trailing slash → no sibling like `/bindsecret`; the
+  ServeMux `..`-cleans before we see the path → no traversal reach; the handler also rejects a token
+  containing `/`). `GET` renders form/consumed/locked/expired; `POST` normalizes both inputs, compares
+  **both factors unconditionally** (constant-time passphrase vs the customer's retrieval passphrase;
+  the ONE bindable appliance carrying the console code), then decides — identical generic failure
+  either way. On success: the **same `BindAppliance`** the operator uses, a provenance event with
+  source `customer_selfbind`, one-shot consume, and *"A doboz kb. egy percen belül folytatja a
+  telepítést."* The box's ~30 s appliance poll picks up the delivery. Own per-IP rate limiter; the
+  page is self-contained (it cannot link `/style.css`, which is itself operator-gated). No hub
+  customer-login/session was built — the URL capability token IS the auth model; a cross-site POST
+  without both secrets only burns attempts (accepted + documented).
+- **Tests + red-proofs (Part 4).** Scenarios A–F + F1/F2 (9 tests). The **4 red-proofs** were each
+  applied and confirmed to turn exactly their scenario red, then reverted green: lockout removed → C1;
+  oracle introduced → B; `/bind/` prefix widened (drop the slash) → E (and D); single-active DELETE
+  dropped → C4. The passphrase is never logged/echoed/persisted; only attempt COUNTS are logged
+  (`self-bind attempt N/5 … token <8hex>…`); the raw link token never enters logs or events.
+- **GC verdict (spec §3):** there is **no appliance-staleness GC** in the hub (`applianceStaleAfter`
+  is a DISPLAY badge only; `pruneAll`/`PurgeExpiredLogBundles` touch reports/log-bundles, not
+  appliances or selfbind tokens). The 7-day token TTL therefore stands alone and needs no reaper —
+  single-active-per-customer means at most one row per customer, superseded rows are deleted on
+  re-mint, and an expired row simply reads as expired (no security or storage pressure).
+
 ## v0.65.0 — PBS DR storage visibility (ep0 `usage` op) + Offsite tab split (Restic / PBS DR) + dual dashboard gauges (R-5) (2026-07-17)
 
 Makes the **PBS DR** storage visible like the restic pool box already is (v0.64.0), the two clearly

hub/cmd/hub/main.go

@@ -290,7 +290,8 @@ func main() {
 	webServer := web.New(dataStore, cfg.Auth.PasswordHash, cfg.API.ReportAPIKey, Version, staleThreshold, logger)
 	webServer.SetTemplateFetcher(templateFetcher)
 	webServer.SetAssetManager(assetsMgr)
-	webServer.SetClaimEngine(claimEngine) // v0.50.0 — Setup-tab claim chip + resend button
+	webServer.SetClaimEngine(claimEngine)      // v0.50.0 — Setup-tab claim chip + resend button
+	webServer.SetSelfBindMailer(dispatcher)    // v0.66.0 (R-27) — customer self-bind link button (sibling of claim mailer)
 	// Day-0 artifact version dropdowns: let the operator pick a version and have the hub derive the
 	// sha256 from Gitea (no hand-copied checksums). Reuses the registry creds; degrades to manual text
 	// entry when they're absent.

hub/internal/api/appliance.go

@@ -140,7 +140,15 @@ func (h *Handler) handleApplianceRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
 		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
-	isNew, err := h.store.RegisterAppliance(uuid, macSet, sshKeys, hwSummary, sha256hex(token))
+	// v0.66.0 (R-27): a stable 6-char pairing code the box prints on its console + the customer types
+	// into the self-bind page. The candidate is used only on first insert; a re-register keeps the code.
+	candidateCode, err := configgen.RandomPairingCode()
+	if err != nil {
+		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] appliance register: pairing-code mint: %v", err)
+		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	isNew, pairingCode, err := h.store.RegisterAppliance(uuid, macSet, sshKeys, hwSummary, sha256hex(token), candidateCode)
 	if err != nil {
 		h.logger.Printf("[ERROR] appliance register (uuid=%s): %v", uuid, err)
 		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -153,7 +161,10 @@ func (h *Handler) handleApplianceRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
 	}
 	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"appliance_token": token, "poll_interval_sec": 30})
+	// pairing_code is additive — a pre-v0.66.0 bootstrap ignores it and stays operator-bind-only.
+	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+		"appliance_token": token, "poll_interval_sec": 30, "pairing_code": configgen.FormatPairingCode(pairingCode),
+	})
 }
 
 // handleAppliancePoll — GET /api/v1/appliance/poll (Bearer appliance-token). One-shot delivery:

hub/internal/configgen/configgen.go

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
@@ -126,3 +128,55 @@ func RandomHex(n int) (string, error) {
 	}
 	return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
 }
+
+// pairingAlphabet excludes visually ambiguous characters (0/O, 1/I/L) so a customer can read the code
+// off the box's console banner and type it into the self-bind page without confusion.
+const pairingAlphabet = "ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789"
+
+// RandomPairingCode returns a 6-char appliance pairing code from the unambiguous alphabet (rendered
+// "ABC-DEF" for display; stored/compared without the dash). It is NOT a secret on its own — the
+// self-bind flow also requires the customer's retrieval passphrase.
+func RandomPairingCode() (string, error) {
+	b := make([]byte, 6)
+	max := big.NewInt(int64(len(pairingAlphabet)))
+	for i := range b {
+		idx, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, max)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		b[i] = pairingAlphabet[idx.Int64()]
+	}
+	return string(b), nil
+}
+
+// FormatPairingCode renders a stored 6-char code as "ABC-DEF" for the console banner + the operator UI.
+func FormatPairingCode(code string) string {
+	if len(code) == 6 {
+		return code[:3] + "-" + code[3:]
+	}
+	return code
+}
+
+// NormalizePairingCode strips separators/whitespace and upper-cases (the customer may type "abc-def",
+// "abc def", or "ABCDEF") so the compare is against a canonical form.
+func NormalizePairingCode(s string) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	for _, r := range strings.ToUpper(s) {
+		if (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') {
+			b.WriteRune(r)
+		}
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+// NormalizePassphrase canonicalizes a diceware passphrase for the constant-time compare: trim,
+// lower-case, and collapse any run of dashes/whitespace to a single dash. The WORDS themselves are
+// compared exactly (no accent-folding — the Hungarian wordlist is the source of truth), so a mistyped
+// word fails.
+func NormalizePassphrase(s string) string {
+	s = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s))
+	fields := strings.FieldsFunc(s, func(r rune) bool {
+		return r == '-' || r == ' ' || r == '\t' || r == '\n' || r == '\r'
+	})
+	return strings.Join(fields, "-")
+}

hub/internal/notify/dispatcher.go

@@ -245,3 +245,24 @@ func (d *Dispatcher) SendClaimEmail(kind, customerID, email, domain, code string
 	d.store.LogNotification(customerID, eventType, "info", subject, "sent", "", "customer")
 	return nil
 }
+
+// SendSelfBindEmail delivers the customer self-bind capability link (v0.66.0, R-27 slice 1) to the
+// REGISTERED customer address. Sibling of SendClaimEmail — NOT routed through the claim engine. The
+// link is the capability; it is logged only via the notification_log subject (which carries no
+// token), never the raw link. On failure the caller (web) invalidates the just-minted token so it is
+// not left silently live.
+func (d *Dispatcher) SendSelfBindEmail(customerID, email, link string) error {
+	if d.resendAPIKey == "" {
+		d.logger.Printf("[ERROR] self-bind link email for %s NOT sent: no Resend API key configured", customerID)
+		return fmt.Errorf("notify: no resend api key")
+	}
+	subject, body := FormatSelfBindEmail(customerID, link)
+	if err := d.sendEmailFn(email, subject, body); err != nil {
+		d.logger.Printf("[ERROR] self-bind link email to customer %s failed: %v", customerID, err)
+		d.store.LogNotification(customerID, "selfbind_link", "info", subject, "failed", err.Error(), "customer")
+		return err
+	}
+	d.logger.Printf("[INFO] self-bind link emailed to the registered address of %s", customerID)
+	d.store.LogNotification(customerID, "selfbind_link", "info", subject, "sent", "", "customer")
+	return nil
+}

hub/internal/notify/templates.go

@@ -230,3 +230,32 @@ Felhom.eu`, code, dashboardURL)
 		return subject, body
 	}
 }
+
+// FormatSelfBindEmail builds the customer-facing Hungarian email carrying the self-bind capability
+// link (v0.66.0, R-27 slice 1). The link is the ONLY secret here — the passphrase is never in the
+// mail (the customer already holds it), and the console pairing code is read off the box screen. The
+// copy tells the customer they will need both factors on the page. Adult tone, no emoji.
+func FormatSelfBindEmail(customerID, link string) (string, string) {
+	subject := "[Felhom] Kösd össze a Felhom dobozodat"
+	body := fmt.Sprintf(`Kedves Ügyfél!
+
+Elkészült a Felhom dobozod, és készen áll az összekötésre. Az alábbi hivatkozáson
+tudod te magad összekötni a fiókoddal — nincs szükség bejelentkezésre:
+
+%s
+
+A hivatkozás megnyitása után két adatot kell megadnod:
+
+  1. A párosító kódot, amely a doboz képernyőjén (a monitoron) látható.
+  2. A visszaállító jelszavadat (az 5 szóból álló kifejezést), amelyet a
+     beállításkor kaptál.
+
+A hivatkozás 7 napig érvényes. Biztonsági okból 5 sikertelen próbálkozás után
+zárolódik — ilyenkor vedd fel a kapcsolatot az ügyfélszolgálattal.
+
+Ha nem te kérted ezt, hagyd figyelmen kívül ezt az e-mailt.
+
+Üdvözlettel,
+Felhom.eu`, link)
+	return subject, body
+}

hub/internal/store/appliance.go

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ type ApplianceRegistration struct {
 	CustomerID     string // set at bind
 	InstallMode    string // staged at bind (appliance|byo)
 	ExtraArgs      string // staged at bind
+	PairingCode    string // v0.66.0 (R-27): stable 6-char code shown on the box console + the self-bind page
 	FirstSeen      time.Time
 	LastSeen       time.Time
 	BoundAt        *time.Time
@@ -46,57 +47,65 @@ type ApplianceRegistration struct {
 // token yet, so it is genuinely starting over; the operator re-binds. isNew is true only on first
 // insert (so the caller can log the first sighting). The token itself is never passed in — only its
 // hash.
-func (s *Store) RegisterAppliance(uuid, macSet, sshKeys, hwSummary, tokenHash string) (isNew bool, err error) {
+// v0.66.0 (R-27 slice 1): the caller passes a candidateCode (minted via configgen — store must not
+// import configgen, an import cycle); it is used ONLY on the first insert and stays STABLE across the
+// idempotent re-register. The effective stored code is returned so the register response can carry it.
+func (s *Store) RegisterAppliance(uuid, macSet, sshKeys, hwSummary, tokenHash, candidateCode string) (isNew bool, pairingCode string, err error) {
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
-		return false, err
+		return false, "", err
 	}
 	defer tx.Rollback()
 
 	var id int64
-	var status string
+	var status, existingCode string
-	row := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT id, status FROM appliance_registrations WHERE uuid = ? AND mac_set = ?`, uuid, macSet)
+	row := tx.QueryRow(`SELECT id, status, COALESCE(pairing_code,'') FROM appliance_registrations WHERE uuid = ? AND mac_set = ?`, uuid, macSet)
-	switch err := row.Scan(&id, &status); err {
+	switch err := row.Scan(&id, &status, &existingCode); err {
 	case sql.ErrNoRows:
 		if _, err := tx.Exec(`
-			INSERT INTO appliance_registrations (uuid, mac_set, ssh_host_pubkeys, hw_summary, token_hash, status)
+			INSERT INTO appliance_registrations (uuid, mac_set, ssh_host_pubkeys, hw_summary, token_hash, status, pairing_code)
-			VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'registered')`, uuid, macSet, sshKeys, hwSummary, tokenHash); err != nil {
+			VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'registered', ?)`, uuid, macSet, sshKeys, hwSummary, tokenHash, candidateCode); err != nil {
-			return false, fmt.Errorf("register appliance insert: %w", err)
+			return false, "", fmt.Errorf("register appliance insert: %w", err)
 		}
 		if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
-			return false, err
+			return false, "", err
 		}
-		return true, nil
+		return true, candidateCode, nil
 	case nil:
+		// The code stays STABLE across re-register; a pre-v0.66.0 row (empty code) is backfilled once.
+		effectiveCode := existingCode
+		if effectiveCode == "" {
+			effectiveCode = candidateCode
+		}
 		// Existing record: refresh last_seen + identity + the token. Sticky-discard keeps its status;
 		// everything else resets to registered (a re-registering box is starting over).
 		if status == ApplianceDiscarded {
 			if _, err := tx.Exec(`UPDATE appliance_registrations
-				SET token_hash = ?, ssh_host_pubkeys = ?, hw_summary = ?, last_seen = datetime('now')
+				SET token_hash = ?, ssh_host_pubkeys = ?, hw_summary = ?, pairing_code = ?, last_seen = datetime('now')
-				WHERE id = ?`, tokenHash, sshKeys, hwSummary, id); err != nil {
+				WHERE id = ?`, tokenHash, sshKeys, hwSummary, effectiveCode, id); err != nil {
-				return false, fmt.Errorf("register appliance (discarded) update: %w", err)
+				return false, "", fmt.Errorf("register appliance (discarded) update: %w", err)
 			}
 		} else {
 			if _, err := tx.Exec(`UPDATE appliance_registrations
-				SET token_hash = ?, ssh_host_pubkeys = ?, hw_summary = ?, status = 'registered',
+				SET token_hash = ?, ssh_host_pubkeys = ?, hw_summary = ?, pairing_code = ?, status = 'registered',
 				    customer_id = NULL, install_mode = NULL, extra_args = NULL,
 				    bound_at = NULL, delivered_at = NULL, last_seen = datetime('now')
-				WHERE id = ?`, tokenHash, sshKeys, hwSummary, id); err != nil {
+				WHERE id = ?`, tokenHash, sshKeys, hwSummary, effectiveCode, id); err != nil {
-				return false, fmt.Errorf("register appliance update: %w", err)
+				return false, "", fmt.Errorf("register appliance update: %w", err)
 			}
 		}
 		if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
-			return false, err
+			return false, "", err
 		}
-		return false, nil
+		return false, effectiveCode, nil
 	default:
-		return false, fmt.Errorf("register appliance lookup: %w", err)
+		return false, "", fmt.Errorf("register appliance lookup: %w", err)
 	}
 }
 
 // scanAppliance scans a full appliance row (column order fixed by applianceCols).
 const applianceCols = `id, uuid, mac_set, ssh_host_pubkeys, hw_summary, status,
-	COALESCE(customer_id,''), COALESCE(install_mode,''), COALESCE(extra_args,''),
+	COALESCE(customer_id,''), COALESCE(install_mode,''), COALESCE(extra_args,''), COALESCE(pairing_code,''),
 	first_seen, last_seen, bound_at, delivered_at, discarded_at`
 
 func scanAppliance(sc interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (*ApplianceRegistration, error) {
@@ -104,7 +113,7 @@ func scanAppliance(sc interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (*ApplianceRegistration,
 	var firstSeen, lastSeen string
 	var boundAt, deliveredAt, discardedAt sql.NullString
 	if err := sc.Scan(&a.ID, &a.UUID, &a.MACSet, &a.SSHHostPubkeys, &a.HWSummary, &a.Status,
-		&a.CustomerID, &a.InstallMode, &a.ExtraArgs,
+		&a.CustomerID, &a.InstallMode, &a.ExtraArgs, &a.PairingCode,
 		&firstSeen, &lastSeen, &boundAt, &deliveredAt, &discardedAt); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -138,6 +147,41 @@ func (s *Store) ApplianceByToken(tokenHash string) (*ApplianceRegistration, erro
 	return a, err
 }
 
+// ApplianceByPairingCode resolves a console pairing code to the ONE bindable (registered, not yet
+// bound/delivered/discarded) appliance carrying it — the customer-self-bind factor-1 lookup (v0.66.0,
+// R-27). Returns (nil, nil) when zero OR more than one registered appliance matches (an ambiguous
+// code binds nothing — the public handler maps that to the same generic failure as a wrong code, no
+// oracle). code is the RAW stored form (uppercased, no separator); the caller normalizes first.
+func (s *Store) ApplianceByPairingCode(code string) (*ApplianceRegistration, error) {
+	if code == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	rows, err := s.db.Query(`SELECT `+applianceCols+` FROM appliance_registrations
+		WHERE pairing_code = ? AND status = 'registered'`, code)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	var matches []*ApplianceRegistration
+	for rows.Next() {
+		a, err := scanAppliance(rows)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		matches = append(matches, a)
+		if len(matches) > 1 {
+			return nil, nil // ambiguous — bind nothing
+		}
+	}
+	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if len(matches) != 1 {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return matches[0], nil
+}
+
 // GetAppliance fetches by row id (operator UI actions).
 func (s *Store) GetAppliance(id int64) (*ApplianceRegistration, error) {
 	a, err := scanAppliance(s.db.QueryRow(`SELECT `+applianceCols+` FROM appliance_registrations WHERE id = ?`, id))

hub/internal/store/selfbind.go

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// selfbind.go — the customer self-bind capability-token store (v0.66.0, R-27 slice 1).
+//
+// The operator mints one token per customer and the hub emails a 7-day tokenized capability link.
+// The customer opens it (public, no login — the token IS the capability), enters the box's console
+// pairing code + their retrieval passphrase, and the hub stages the bind. Only sha256(token) is
+// stored here (never the token); attempts lock at 5 (Viktor's ruling: "call support"); consumed_at
+// is the one-shot flip. There is NO appliance data on this table — the two-factor check happens at
+// bind time in web/selfbind.go, so a leaked token row reveals nothing about any box.
+//
+// Custody rules honoured here: single-active per customer (a re-mint deletes the prior row, so an old
+// link dies the moment a new one is sent), and the token hash is the only representation at rest.
+
+// SelfBindMaxAttempts is the lockout threshold: the 5th failed factor-check locks the token and the
+// customer is told to call support. Distinct from the controller's claim lockout — this is the
+// hub-side public-surface guard against online guessing of the pairing code + passphrase.
+const SelfBindMaxAttempts = 5
+
+// SelfBindToken is a minted capability link's state.
+type SelfBindToken struct {
+	ID         int64
+	CustomerID string
+	Attempts   int
+	Locked     bool
+	CreatedAt  time.Time
+	ExpiresAt  time.Time
+	EmailedAt  *time.Time
+	ConsumedAt *time.Time
+}
+
+// Expired reports whether the link is past its TTL (falls back to operator-bind, unchanged).
+func (t *SelfBindToken) Expired(now time.Time) bool { return now.After(t.ExpiresAt) }
+
+// Consumed reports whether the link was already used (one-shot).
+func (t *SelfBindToken) Consumed() bool { return t.ConsumedAt != nil }
+
+// Usable reports whether a POST may attempt a factor-check: not locked, not consumed, not expired.
+func (t *SelfBindToken) Usable(now time.Time) bool {
+	return !t.Locked && !t.Consumed() && !t.Expired(now)
+}
+
+const selfBindCols = `id, customer_id, attempts, locked, created_at, expires_at, emailed_at, consumed_at`
+
+func scanSelfBindToken(sc interface{ Scan(...any) error }) (*SelfBindToken, error) {
+	var t SelfBindToken
+	var locked int
+	var createdAt, expiresAt string
+	var emailedAt, consumedAt sql.NullString
+	if err := sc.Scan(&t.ID, &t.CustomerID, &t.Attempts, &locked, &createdAt, &expiresAt, &emailedAt, &consumedAt); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	t.Locked = locked != 0
+	t.CreatedAt = parseSQLiteTime(createdAt)
+	t.ExpiresAt = parseSQLiteTime(expiresAt)
+	if emailedAt.Valid && emailedAt.String != "" {
+		e := parseSQLiteTime(emailedAt.String)
+		t.EmailedAt = &e
+	}
+	if consumedAt.Valid && consumedAt.String != "" {
+		c := parseSQLiteTime(consumedAt.String)
+		t.ConsumedAt = &c
+	}
+	return &t, nil
+}
+
+// MintSelfBindToken creates a fresh capability token for the customer, single-active: any prior token
+// for the same customer is DELETED in the same transaction, so an earlier link stops working the
+// instant a new one is minted (no parallel-link enumeration). tokenHash is sha256(token) — the
+// plaintext token exists only inside the email send. The token is valid for ttl from now.
+func (s *Store) MintSelfBindToken(customerID, tokenHash string, ttl time.Duration) error {
+	if customerID == "" || tokenHash == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("selfbind: customer_id and token hash are required")
+	}
+	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(`DELETE FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE customer_id = ?`, customerID); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	expiresAt := time.Now().Add(ttl).UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(`INSERT INTO selfbind_tokens (customer_id, token_hash, expires_at)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?)`, customerID, tokenHash, expiresAt); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return tx.Commit()
+}
+
+// DeleteSelfBindTokens removes every self-bind token for a customer. Used on the email-failure path
+// (F2): a minted token whose delivery failed is not left silently live — the plaintext link is gone
+// from memory, so the row is unusable dead weight; deleting it keeps the operator page honest (no
+// stale "active link" with no delivery). Idempotent.
+func (s *Store) DeleteSelfBindTokens(customerID string) error {
+	_, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE customer_id = ?`, customerID)
+	return err
+}
+
+// SelfBindTokenByHash resolves sha256(token) to its row, or (nil, nil) when unknown — the public GET
+// maps that to the same generic "invalid link" as an expired one: no oracle for "was this ever real".
+func (s *Store) SelfBindTokenByHash(tokenHash string) (*SelfBindToken, error) {
+	if tokenHash == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	t, err := scanSelfBindToken(s.db.QueryRow(`SELECT `+selfBindCols+` FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?`, tokenHash))
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return t, err
+}
+
+// MarkSelfBindEmailed records that the capability link was delivered (operator "emailed_at" honesty
+// on the customer page). Best-effort: a failure to record does not un-send the mail.
+func (s *Store) MarkSelfBindEmailed(tokenHash string) error {
+	_, err := s.db.Exec(`UPDATE selfbind_tokens SET emailed_at = datetime('now') WHERE token_hash = ?`, tokenHash)
+	return err
+}
+
+// RecordSelfBindAttempt increments the failed-attempt counter for a token and locks it at the 5th
+// failure. Called on EVERY failed factor-check (wrong code OR wrong passphrase — indistinguishable).
+// Returns the post-increment attempt count and whether the token is now locked. A missing/consumed
+// token is a no-op that reports locked=true (the caller already refuses those; belt-and-suspenders).
+func (s *Store) RecordSelfBindAttempt(tokenHash string) (attempts int, locked bool, err error) {
+	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, false, err
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+	t, err := scanSelfBindToken(tx.QueryRow(`SELECT `+selfBindCols+` FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE token_hash = ?`, tokenHash))
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return SelfBindMaxAttempts, true, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, false, err
+	}
+	attempts = t.Attempts + 1
+	locked = attempts >= SelfBindMaxAttempts
+	lockedInt := 0
+	if locked {
+		lockedInt = 1
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(`UPDATE selfbind_tokens SET attempts = ?, locked = ? WHERE id = ?`, attempts, lockedInt, t.ID); err != nil {
+		return 0, false, err
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return 0, false, err
+	}
+	return attempts, locked, nil
+}
+
+// ConsumeSelfBindToken flips consumed_at EXACTLY ONCE on a successful bind. ok=true for the single
+// winning caller; ok=false for a replay or a lost race (already consumed). The two-factor check has
+// already passed when this is called — this is the one-shot gate against a double-bind. It refuses a
+// locked or expired token defensively (WHERE guards), though the handler checks Usable() first.
+func (s *Store) ConsumeSelfBindToken(tokenHash string) (ok bool, err error) {
+	res, err := s.db.Exec(`UPDATE selfbind_tokens
+		SET consumed_at = datetime('now')
+		WHERE token_hash = ? AND consumed_at IS NULL AND locked = 0 AND expires_at > datetime('now')`, tokenHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
+	return n == 1, nil
+}

hub/internal/store/store.go

@@ -637,15 +637,37 @@ func (s *Store) migrate() error {
 			bound_at         DATETIME,
 			delivered_at     DATETIME,
 			discarded_at     DATETIME,
+			pairing_code     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
 			UNIQUE(uuid, mac_set)
 		);
 		CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_appliance_status ON appliance_registrations(status, last_seen DESC);
 		CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_appliance_token ON appliance_registrations(token_hash);
+
+		-- selfbind_tokens (v0.66.0, R-27 slice 1 — customer self-bind): the 7-day tokenized capability
+		-- link the operator emails. token_hash is sha256 at rest (never the token). Single-active per
+		-- customer (delete-then-insert on re-mint). attempts lock at 5 (Viktor's ruling); consumed_at is
+		-- the one-shot flip. NO appliance data here — the code+passphrase check happens at bind time.
+		CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS selfbind_tokens (
+			id          INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+			customer_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+			token_hash  TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+			attempts    INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+			locked      INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+			created_at  DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
+			expires_at  DATETIME NOT NULL,
+			emailed_at  DATETIME,
+			consumed_at DATETIME
+		);
+		CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_selfbind_token ON selfbind_tokens(token_hash);
 	`)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
+	// v0.66.0 (R-27 slice 1): pairing_code on pre-existing appliance rows (idempotent — errors if the
+	// column already exists, which is fine on a fresh DB where the CREATE above already added it).
+	s.db.Exec("ALTER TABLE appliance_registrations ADD COLUMN pairing_code TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''")
+
 	// v0.51.0 dr_tier one-time legacy backfill — see the ALTER above; runs last so every table
 	// it touches (hosts, customer_configs) exists on a fresh DB too (where it finds nothing).
 	if drTierAlterErr == nil {

hub/internal/web/appliances.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/configgen"
 	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
 )
 
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ type applianceRow struct {
 	CPU             string
 	MemGB           string
 	SSHFingerprints []string
+	PairingCode     string // v0.66.0 (R-27): the code the customer reads off the box console + types on /bind
 	FirstSeen       *time.Time
 	LastSeen        *time.Time
 	Stale           bool
@@ -61,9 +63,10 @@ func sshFingerprint(line string) string {
 // applianceToRow builds the view model (parses hw_summary + computes SSH fingerprints).
 func applianceToRow(a store.ApplianceRegistration, now time.Time, customerName func(string) string) applianceRow {
 	row := applianceRow{
-		ID:    a.ID,
+		ID:          a.ID,
-		UUID:  a.UUID,
+		UUID:        a.UUID,
-		Bound: a.Status == store.ApplianceBound,
+		PairingCode: configgen.FormatPairingCode(a.PairingCode),
+		Bound:       a.Status == store.ApplianceBound,
 	}
 	if a.MACSet != "" {
 		row.MACs = strings.Split(a.MACSet, ",")

hub/internal/web/appliances_test.go

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ func seedAppliance(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, uuid, macSet string) int64 {
 	// a real ed25519 host key line so the fingerprint helper has something to parse
 	sshKey := "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIHVBv+9slP74+1/vNhiI0OJDrXQ2nvb8iwmIxMfUZn36 host"
 	hw := `{"product":"Intel N100 mini","cpu":"Intel(R) N100","mem_kb":16150372}`
-	if _, err := st.RegisterAppliance(uuid, macSet, sshKey, hw, "hash-"+uuid); err != nil {
+	if _, _, err := st.RegisterAppliance(uuid, macSet, sshKey, hw, "hash-"+uuid, "ABCDEF"); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("register appliance: %v", err)
 	}
 	list, err := st.ListUnclaimedAppliances()

hub/internal/web/selfbind.go

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+package web
+
+import (
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"html/template"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/configgen"
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
+)
+
+// selfbind.go — the CUSTOMER side of self-bind (v0.66.0, R-27 slice 1): the PUBLIC /bind/<token> page.
+// A logged-out customer opens the emailed capability link and binds their own freshly-installed
+// appliance by proving TWO factors — the console pairing code (physical possession of the box) and
+// their retrieval passphrase (customer identity). No hub login exists; the URL token IS the auth.
+//
+// THE TRAP (spec §9.2): /bind/ is the ONE new public prefix, exempted from operator auth + CSRF at
+// the two gate sites the /login exemption occupies. isPublicBindPath is the SINGLE definition of that
+// prefix — both gate sites and the route dispatch call it, so widening it is one visible change (and
+// the red-proof targets exactly this function). It is matched TIGHTLY (trailing slash → no sibling
+// prefix like /bindsecret; the ServeMux cleans .. before we see the path → no traversal reach).
+//
+// No-oracle rules on this surface: the page NEVER renders/enumerates any appliance data; a wrong code
+// and a wrong passphrase produce ONE identical generic failure; both factors are compared
+// unconditionally before the decision; and only attempt COUNTS are logged (never the secrets, never
+// the raw token — a hash prefix at most).
+
+// isPublicBindPath reports whether a path is the public customer self-bind surface. THE single
+// definition of the /bind/ public prefix (THE TRAP §9.2) — do not inline a second copy anywhere.
+func isPublicBindPath(path string) bool {
+	return strings.HasPrefix(path, "/bind/")
+}
+
+// --- per-IP rate limiter (web-package sibling of api.ipRateLimiter; the type there is unexported) ---
+
+type bindBucket struct {
+	tokens float64
+	last   time.Time
+}
+
+type bindRateLimiter struct {
+	mu        sync.Mutex
+	perMinute float64
+	buckets   map[string]*bindBucket
+	now       func() time.Time
+}
+
+func newBindRateLimiter(perMinute int) *bindRateLimiter {
+	if perMinute <= 0 {
+		perMinute = 30
+	}
+	return &bindRateLimiter{perMinute: float64(perMinute), buckets: make(map[string]*bindBucket), now: time.Now}
+}
+
+func (rl *bindRateLimiter) allow(ip string) bool {
+	rl.mu.Lock()
+	defer rl.mu.Unlock()
+	now := rl.now()
+	b, ok := rl.buckets[ip]
+	if !ok {
+		rl.buckets[ip] = &bindBucket{tokens: rl.perMinute - 1, last: now}
+		return true
+	}
+	b.tokens += now.Sub(b.last).Seconds() * (rl.perMinute / 60.0)
+	if b.tokens > rl.perMinute {
+		b.tokens = rl.perMinute
+	}
+	b.last = now
+	if b.tokens < 1 {
+		return false
+	}
+	b.tokens--
+	return true
+}
+
+// bindClientIP extracts the client IP behind the ingress (first XFF hop, else RemoteAddr) — buckets
+// only; the ingress geo-gate is the real access control.
+func bindClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
+	if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
+		if i := strings.IndexByte(xff, ','); i > 0 {
+			return strings.TrimSpace(xff[:i])
+		}
+		return strings.TrimSpace(xff)
+	}
+	if i := strings.LastIndexByte(r.RemoteAddr, ':'); i > 0 {
+		return r.RemoteAddr[:i]
+	}
+	return r.RemoteAddr
+}
+
+// --- the page ---
+
+type bindPageData struct {
+	State  string // "form" | "success" | "expired" | "consumed" | "locked"
+	Token  string // echoed into the form action (the capability itself; already in the URL)
+	Failed bool   // generic factor-check failure (form state only)
+}
+
+var bindTemplate = template.Must(template.New("bind").Parse(bindPageHTML))
+
+func (s *Server) renderBind(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, data bindPageData) {
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+	w.WriteHeader(status)
+	if err := bindTemplate.Execute(w, data); err != nil {
+		s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] rendering /bind page: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// handleBind serves the public self-bind page. GET renders the current link state; POST validates
+// both factors and, on success, stages the bind (same BindAppliance the operator uses; provenance =
+// customer self-bind). Reached only via isPublicBindPath — auth + CSRF exempt at the gate sites.
+func (s *Server) handleBind(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if s.bindLimiter != nil && !s.bindLimiter.allow(bindClientIP(r)) {
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, bindPageData{State: "expired"})
+		return
+	}
+	token := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/bind/")
+	// A trailing segment only — reject anything with further path structure (defence in depth atop
+	// the ServeMux path-clean; the token is a flat hex string).
+	if token == "" || strings.Contains(token, "/") {
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusNotFound, bindPageData{State: "expired"})
+		return
+	}
+	hash := selfBindHash(token)
+	tok, err := s.store.SelfBindTokenByHash(hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] /bind lookup failed: %v", err)
+		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	now := time.Now()
+
+	// Terminal link states — identical for GET and POST, no factor check attempted. An unknown token
+	// (nil) is folded into "expired": no oracle for "was this link ever real".
+	switch {
+	case tok == nil || tok.Expired(now):
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "expired"})
+		return
+	case tok.Consumed():
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "consumed"})
+		return
+	case tok.Locked:
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "locked"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "form", Token: token})
+		return
+	}
+
+	// --- POST: validate BOTH factors unconditionally, then decide (no oracle) ---
+	normCode := configgen.NormalizePairingCode(r.FormValue("pairing_code"))
+	normPass := configgen.NormalizePassphrase(r.FormValue("passphrase"))
+
+	// Factor 2 (passphrase) — the customer's retrieval passphrase, constant-time compared. Computed
+	// even when the customer/appliance is absent so the two paths are indistinguishable by timing.
+	var storedPass string
+	if cc, cerr := s.store.GetCustomerConfig(tok.CustomerID); cerr == nil && cc != nil {
+		storedPass = configgen.NormalizePassphrase(cc.RetrievalPassword)
+	}
+	passOK := storedPass != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(normPass), []byte(storedPass)) == 1
+
+	// Factor 1 (pairing code) — the ONE bindable appliance carrying that console code.
+	appliance, aerr := s.store.ApplianceByPairingCode(normCode)
+	if aerr != nil {
+		s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] /bind appliance lookup failed: %v", aerr)
+		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	codeOK := appliance != nil
+
+	if !codeOK || !passOK {
+		attempts, locked, rerr := s.store.RecordSelfBindAttempt(hash)
+		if rerr != nil {
+			s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] /bind recording attempt: %v", rerr)
+		}
+		// COUNTS only — never which factor failed, never the secrets, never the raw token.
+		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] self-bind attempt %d/%d failed for token %s… (customer %s)", attempts, store.SelfBindMaxAttempts, hash[:8], tok.CustomerID)
+		if locked {
+			s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "locked"})
+			return
+		}
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "form", Token: token, Failed: true})
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Both factors passed. Consume one-shot FIRST (atomic gate against a double-bind race).
+	consumed, cerr := s.store.ConsumeSelfBindToken(hash)
+	if cerr != nil {
+		s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] /bind consuming token: %v", cerr)
+		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	if !consumed {
+		// Lost the race (a concurrent request consumed it) — it is already being bound.
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "consumed"})
+		return
+	}
+	if err := s.store.BindAppliance(appliance.ID, tok.CustomerID, "appliance", ""); err != nil {
+		// Rare: the appliance became unbindable (operator discarded it) between lookup and bind. The
+		// token is spent; surface a neutral generic failure rather than an appliance-state oracle.
+		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] self-bind: BindAppliance %d → %s failed after factor match: %v", appliance.ID, tok.CustomerID, err)
+		s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "form", Failed: true})
+		return
+	}
+	if _, err := s.store.SaveEvent(tok.CustomerID, "appliance_bound", "info",
+		"Az ügyfél saját maga kötötte össze az új eszközt (bare-metal telepítés); a hozzáférést a doboz a következő lekérdezéskor megkapja.", "", "customer_selfbind"); err != nil {
+		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] self-bind: save event for %s: %v", tok.CustomerID, err)
+	}
+	s.logger.Printf("[INFO] self-bind SUCCESS: appliance %d bound to customer %s by customer self-service (token %s…)", appliance.ID, tok.CustomerID, hash[:8])
+	s.renderBind(w, http.StatusOK, bindPageData{State: "success"})
+}
+
+// bindPageHTML is the self-contained public page. It CANNOT link /style.css (that route is
+// operator-auth gated), so all styling is inline — mirroring the login page. Design tokens: navy
+// surface, 2px radius, hairline rules, exception color for the failure banner. Hungarian, adult tone,
+// no emoji. It renders NO appliance data in any state.
+const bindPageHTML = `<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="hu">
+<head>
+<meta charset="UTF-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
+<meta name="robots" content="noindex, nofollow">
+<title>Felhom — Doboz összekötése</title>
+<style>
+  :root { --navy:#0A2540; --ink:#0A2540; --muted:#5b6b7d; --line:#d8e0e8; --brand:#0083D8; --exc:#c0392b; --bg:#f4f7fa; }
+  * { box-sizing: border-box; }
+  body { margin:0; font-family:-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Roboto,sans-serif; background:var(--bg); color:var(--ink); line-height:1.5; }
+  .wrap { max-width:460px; margin:3rem auto; padding:0 1rem; }
+  .card { background:#fff; border:1px solid var(--line); border-radius:2px; padding:1.75rem; }
+  h1 { font-size:1.25rem; margin:0 0 .25rem; color:var(--navy); }
+  h1 span { color:var(--brand); }
+  .lead { color:var(--muted); font-size:.92rem; margin:.25rem 0 1.25rem; }
+  label { display:block; font-weight:600; font-size:.9rem; margin:1rem 0 .35rem; }
+  .hint { color:var(--muted); font-size:.8rem; margin:.15rem 0 0; }
+  input[type=text] { width:100%; padding:.6rem .7rem; border:1px solid var(--line); border-radius:2px; font-size:1rem; }
+  input.code { text-transform:uppercase; letter-spacing:.12em; font-family:ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace; }
+  button { margin-top:1.5rem; width:100%; padding:.7rem; background:var(--brand); color:#fff; border:none; border-radius:2px; font-size:1rem; cursor:pointer; }
+  button:hover { background:#006cb0; }
+  .banner { border:1px solid var(--exc); color:var(--exc); background:#fbeae8; border-radius:2px; padding:.6rem .75rem; font-size:.88rem; margin:0 0 1rem; }
+  .note { border-top:1px solid var(--line); margin-top:1.5rem; padding-top:1rem; color:var(--muted); font-size:.82rem; }
+  .foot { text-align:center; color:var(--muted); font-size:.75rem; margin-top:1.25rem; }
+  .ok { color:#1e7e34; }
+</style>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div class="wrap">
+  <div class="card">
+    <h1>Felhom <span>doboz</span> összekötése</h1>
+    {{if eq .State "form"}}
+      <p class="lead">Kösd össze a most telepített Felhom dobozodat a fiókoddal. Add meg a doboz képernyőjén látható párosító kódot és a visszaállító jelszavadat.</p>
+      {{if .Failed}}<div class="banner">A megadott adatok nem megfelelőek. Ellenőrizd a párosító kódot és a jelszót, majd próbáld újra.</div>{{end}}
+      <form method="POST" action="/bind/{{.Token}}">
+        <label for="pairing_code">Párosító kód</label>
+        <input class="code" type="text" id="pairing_code" name="pairing_code" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="characters" spellcheck="false" required autofocus placeholder="ABC-234">
+        <p class="hint">A doboz monitorán jelenik meg, a telepítés után.</p>
+        <label for="passphrase">Visszaállító jelszó</label>
+        <input type="text" id="passphrase" name="passphrase" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false" required placeholder="öt szó, kötőjellel vagy szóközzel">
+        <p class="hint">Az öt szóból álló kifejezés, amelyet a beállításkor kaptál.</p>
+        <button type="submit">Összekötés</button>
+      </form>
+      <p class="note">Biztonsági okból 5 sikertelen próbálkozás után a hivatkozás zárolódik. Ilyenkor vedd fel a kapcsolatot az ügyfélszolgálattal.</p>
+    {{else if eq .State "success"}}
+      <p class="lead ok">Sikeres összekötés.</p>
+      <p>A doboz kb. egy percen belül folytatja a telepítést. Ezt az oldalt bezárhatod — a beállítás a háttérben befejeződik, és a vezérlőpultod hamarosan elérhető lesz.</p>
+    {{else if eq .State "consumed"}}
+      <p class="lead">Ez a hivatkozás már fel lett használva.</p>
+      <p>A doboz összekötése megtörtént. Ha úgy gondolod, hogy ez tévedés, vedd fel a kapcsolatot az ügyfélszolgálattal.</p>
+    {{else if eq .State "locked"}}
+      <p class="lead">Ez a hivatkozás zárolva van.</p>
+      <p>Túl sok sikertelen próbálkozás történt. Biztonsági okból a hivatkozás zárolódott — kérjük, vedd fel a kapcsolatot az ügyfélszolgálattal a doboz összekötéséhez.</p>
+    {{else}}
+      <p class="lead">Ez a hivatkozás érvénytelen vagy lejárt.</p>
+      <p>A hivatkozás 7 napig érvényes. Ha lejárt, kérj újat az ügyfélszolgálattól, vagy az összekötést az üzemeltető is elvégezheti.</p>
+    {{end}}
+  </div>
+  <p class="foot">Felhom.eu</p>
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>`

hub/internal/web/selfbind_mint.go

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+package web
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/configgen"
+)
+
+// selfbind_mint.go — the OPERATOR side of customer self-bind (v0.66.0, R-27 slice 1): the "Send
+// self-bind link" button on the customer page mints a 7-day capability token and emails the customer
+// a public bind link. The customer side (the public /bind/ page) lives in selfbind.go. No hub
+// customer-login exists — the emailed link IS the auth model.
+
+// selfBindTTL is the capability link's lifetime. After it, self-bind falls back to operator-bind
+// unchanged (the token simply reads as expired; nothing else regresses).
+const selfBindTTL = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
+
+// selfBindBaseURL is the hub's public origin, matching the hardcoded origin used elsewhere
+// (configgen). The link is https://hub.felhom.eu/bind/<token>.
+const selfBindBaseURL = "https://hub.felhom.eu"
+
+// SelfBindMailer delivers the self-bind capability link to the registered customer address. The
+// notify.Dispatcher implements it (a sibling of the claim mailer — NOT routed through claim). The
+// signature takes plain strings so the implementation needs no import of this package.
+type SelfBindMailer interface {
+	SendSelfBindEmail(customerID, email, link string) error
+}
+
+// SetSelfBindMailer wires the self-bind link sender (v0.66.0). Absent → the button returns 502.
+func (s *Server) SetSelfBindMailer(m SelfBindMailer) { s.selfBindMailer = m }
+
+func selfBindHash(token string) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+}
+
+// handleSelfBindLinkSend — POST /customers/{id}/selfbind-link. Mints a single-active capability token
+// for the customer and emails the public bind link. Honesty rules:
+//   - F1: no registered email → nothing is minted, LOUD flash (a link no one can receive is useless).
+//   - F2: email send fails → the just-minted token is deleted (not left silently live), LOUD flash.
+//
+// The plaintext token exists only between minting and the send; it is never logged (only an 8-char
+// hash prefix) and never persisted (only its sha256).
+func (s *Server) handleSelfBindLinkSend(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, customerID string) {
+	if s.selfBindMailer == nil {
+		http.Error(w, "Self-bind mailer is not configured on this hub", http.StatusBadGateway)
+		return
+	}
+	cfg, err := s.store.GetCustomerConfig(customerID)
+	if err != nil || cfg == nil {
+		http.NotFound(w, r)
+		return
+	}
+	// F1: refuse to mint a link that cannot be delivered.
+	if cfg.Email == "" {
+		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] self-bind link for %s NOT sent: customer has no registered email", customerID)
+		http.Redirect(w, r, "/customers/"+customerID+"?flash=selfbind-no-email#tab=setup", http.StatusSeeOther)
+		return
+	}
+
+	token, err := configgen.RandomHex(32) // 256-bit capability token
+	if err != nil {
+		s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] self-bind link for %s: token generation: %v", customerID, err)
+		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	hash := selfBindHash(token)
+	if err := s.store.MintSelfBindToken(customerID, hash, selfBindTTL); err != nil {
+		s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] self-bind link for %s: minting token: %v", customerID, err)
+		http.Error(w, "Internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	link := selfBindBaseURL + "/bind/" + token
+	if err := s.selfBindMailer.SendSelfBindEmail(customerID, cfg.Email, link); err != nil {
+		// F2: delivery failed — do not leave a live capability token behind (the plaintext link is
+		// already gone from memory, so nobody could ever use it; delete it and surface the failure).
+		if derr := s.store.DeleteSelfBindTokens(customerID); derr != nil {
+			s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] self-bind link for %s: send failed AND cleanup failed: send=%v cleanup=%v", customerID, err, derr)
+		} else {
+			s.logger.Printf("[ERROR] self-bind link for %s: email send failed, token invalidated (hash %s…): %v", customerID, hash[:8], err)
+		}
+		http.Redirect(w, r, "/customers/"+customerID+"?flash=selfbind-send-failed#tab=setup", http.StatusSeeOther)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := s.store.MarkSelfBindEmailed(hash); err != nil {
+		s.logger.Printf("[WARN] self-bind link sent to %s but emailed_at not recorded: %v", customerID, err)
+	}
+	s.logger.Printf("[INFO] self-bind link (hash %s…, valid 7 days) emailed to the registered address of %s", hash[:8], customerID)
+	http.Redirect(w, r, "/customers/"+customerID+"?flash=selfbind-sent#tab=setup", http.StatusSeeOther)
+}

hub/internal/web/selfbind_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+package web
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
+
+	"gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub/internal/store"
+)
+
+// selfbind_test.go — customer self-bind (v0.66.0, R-27 slice 1), Scenarios A–F.
+//
+// Each red-proof below names the ONE line to break to turn a scenario red — the guard that the test
+// actually pins. If a red-proof does NOT turn its scenario red, the test is hollow.
+
+const (
+	testPass    = "alpha beta gamma delta epsilon" // the customer retrieval passphrase (5 words)
+	testCode    = "ABC234"                          // an appliance console pairing code (raw stored form)
+	testCodeFmt = "abc-234"                         // as a human might type it (lowercased, separated)
+)
+
+// selfBindSetup seeds a customer (with passphrase + email) and one registered appliance carrying the
+// given console pairing code, and returns the appliance id. Distinct customers must use distinct
+// codes (a code shared by two registered appliances is ambiguous → binds nothing).
+func selfBindSetup(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, customerID, code string) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err := st.SaveCustomerConfig(&store.CustomerConfig{
+		CustomerID: customerID, CustomerName: customerID, APIKey: "k",
+		RetrievalPassword: testPass, Email: customerID + "@example.test",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	sshKey := "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIHVBv+9slP74+1/vNhiI0OJDrXQ2nvb8iwmIxMfUZn36 host"
+	if _, _, err := st.RegisterAppliance("uuid-"+customerID, "bc:24:11:98:10:0e", sshKey, `{"product":"N100"}`, "aphash-"+customerID, code); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	list, _ := st.ListUnclaimedAppliances()
+	for _, a := range list {
+		if a.UUID == "uuid-"+customerID {
+			return a.ID
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatal("seeded appliance not found")
+	return 0
+}
+
+// mintLink mints a self-bind token for the customer and returns the plaintext token (URL segment).
+// Each call uses a fresh nonce so distinct calls yield distinct tokens (single-active still applies —
+// the store deletes the prior row for the customer on each mint).
+var mintNonce int
+
+func mintLink(t *testing.T, st *store.Store, customerID string, ttl time.Duration) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	mintNonce++
+	token := "tok-" + customerID + "-" + string(rune('a'+mintNonce%26)) + strconv.Itoa(mintNonce)
+	if err := st.MintSelfBindToken(customerID, selfBindHash(token), ttl); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return token
+}
+
+func bindGET(t *testing.T, s *Server, token string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleBind(rr, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/bind/"+token, nil))
+	return rr
+}
+
+func bindPOST(t *testing.T, s *Server, token, code, pass string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	form := url.Values{"pairing_code": {code}, "passphrase": {pass}}
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/bind/"+token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleBind(rr, req)
+	return rr
+}
+
+// --- Scenario A: happy path (GET renders form; POST with both correct factors stages the bind) ---
+func TestSelfBind_A_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newTestServer(t)
+	id := selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme", testCode)
+	token := mintLink(t, st, "acme", selfBindTTL)
+
+	if body := bindGET(t, s, token).Body.String(); !strings.Contains(body, "Párosító kód") || !strings.Contains(body, "action=\"/bind/"+token+"\"") {
+		t.Fatalf("GET did not render the entry form")
+	}
+	// A human types the code lowercased + separated and the passphrase with odd spacing — normalization
+	// must accept both.
+	rr := bindPOST(t, s, token, testCodeFmt, "  Alpha  Beta gamma-delta epsilon ")
+	if rr.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), "egy percen belül") {
+		t.Fatalf("POST success page not rendered: code=%d body=%q", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
+	}
+	// The appliance is bound to the customer (same effect as an operator bind).
+	if a, _ := st.GetAppliance(id); a == nil || a.Status != store.ApplianceBound || a.CustomerID != "acme" {
+		t.Fatalf("appliance not bound: %+v", a)
+	}
+	// Provenance event is customer self-bind, not operator/hub.
+	ev, _ := st.GetLatestEventByType("acme", "appliance_bound")
+	if ev == nil || ev.Source != "customer_selfbind" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected customer_selfbind provenance event, got %+v", ev)
+	}
+	// One-shot: the token is now consumed; a second open shows the consumed state.
+	if body := bindGET(t, s, token).Body.String(); !strings.Contains(body, "már fel lett használva") {
+		t.Fatalf("token not consumed after success")
+	}
+	// Red-proof: drop the ConsumeSelfBindToken call (or make BindAppliance the only effect) → the
+	// token stays live and this consumed-state assertion goes red.
+}
+
+// --- Scenario B: NO ORACLE — wrong code and wrong passphrase yield the SAME generic failure ---
+func TestSelfBind_B_NoOracle(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newTestServer(t)
+	// Two customers with DISTINCT pairing codes so the single-active mint does not cross-invalidate,
+	// and each has one fresh (attempt-count 1) token — the only difference between the two failure
+	// pages is then the token in the form action, which we normalize out.
+	selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme", testCode)
+	selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme2", "XYZ789")
+
+	t1 := mintLink(t, st, "acme", selfBindTTL)   // wrong-code attempt (right passphrase)
+	t2 := mintLink(t, st, "acme2", selfBindTTL)  // wrong-passphrase attempt (right code)
+	wrongCode := strings.ReplaceAll(bindPOST(t, s, t1, "ZZZ999", testPass).Body.String(), t1, "TOKEN")
+	wrongPass := strings.ReplaceAll(bindPOST(t, s, t2, "xyz-789", "wrong words here now").Body.String(), t2, "TOKEN")
+
+	if wrongCode != wrongPass {
+		t.Fatalf("failure pages differ between wrong-code and wrong-passphrase — that is an oracle")
+	}
+	// The generic failure must not leak any appliance data.
+	if !strings.Contains(wrongCode, "nem megfelelőek") {
+		t.Fatalf("failure page missing the generic banner: %q", wrongCode)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(wrongCode, "uuid-") || strings.Contains(wrongCode, "N100") {
+		t.Fatalf("failure page leaked appliance data")
+	}
+	// Red-proof: give wrong-code and wrong-passphrase distinct messages/states (an oracle) → the
+	// wrongCode == wrongPass assertion goes red.
+}
+
+// --- Scenario C1: LOCKOUT after 5 failed attempts; a subsequent CORRECT attempt cannot bind ---
+func TestSelfBind_C1_Lockout(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newTestServer(t)
+	id := selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme", testCode)
+	token := mintLink(t, st, "acme", selfBindTTL)
+
+	for i := 1; i <= store.SelfBindMaxAttempts; i++ {
+		rr := bindPOST(t, s, token, "ZZZ999", "definitely wrong words indeed")
+		if i < store.SelfBindMaxAttempts && !strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), "nem megfelelőek") {
+			t.Fatalf("attempt %d should re-render the form with a failure, got %q", i, rr.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+	// The 5th failure locked it: even the CORRECT secrets now bind nothing.
+	rr := bindPOST(t, s, token, testCodeFmt, testPass)
+	if !strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), "zárolva") {
+		t.Fatalf("token not locked after %d failures: %q", store.SelfBindMaxAttempts, rr.Body.String())
+	}
+	if a, _ := st.GetAppliance(id); a.Status != store.ApplianceRegistered {
+		t.Fatalf("a locked link still bound the appliance: %+v", a)
+	}
+	// Red-proof: remove the `locked = attempts >= SelfBindMaxAttempts` lock (never lock) → the correct
+	// post-lockout POST binds and both the "zárolva" and still-registered assertions go red.
+}
+
+// --- Scenario C4: SINGLE-ACTIVE per customer — re-minting kills the prior link ---
+func TestSelfBind_C4_SingleActive(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newTestServer(t)
+	selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme", testCode)
+
+	first := mintLink(t, st, "acme", selfBindTTL)
+	second := mintLink(t, st, "acme", selfBindTTL) // re-mint for the SAME customer
+
+	if body := bindGET(t, s, first).Body.String(); !strings.Contains(body, "érvénytelen vagy lejárt") {
+		t.Fatalf("the first link still resolves after a re-mint (not single-active): %q", body)
+	}
+	if body := bindGET(t, s, second).Body.String(); !strings.Contains(body, "Párosító kód") {
+		t.Fatalf("the freshly-minted link does not render the form: %q", body)
+	}
+	// Red-proof: drop the `DELETE FROM selfbind_tokens WHERE customer_id` in MintSelfBindToken → the
+	// first link still resolves and the érvénytelen assertion goes red.
+}
+
+// --- Scenario D: the operator auth gate is intact — self-bind's exemption did NOT open other routes ---
+func TestSelfBind_D_AuthGateIntact(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthServer(t)
+	selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme", testCode)
+	h := s.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(s.ServeHTTP))
+
+	for _, path := range []string{"/", "/hosts", "/customers/acme", "/configuration", "/offsite"} {
+		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		h.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest("GET", path, nil))
+		if rr.Code != http.StatusFound || rr.Header().Get("Location") != "/login" {
+			t.Fatalf("gated route %s not redirected to /login: code=%d loc=%q", path, rr.Code, rr.Header().Get("Location"))
+		}
+	}
+	// Red-proof: this is the companion to Scenario E — widening isPublicBindPath turns THIS red too.
+}
+
+// --- Scenario E: THE TRAP — /bind/ is exempt from operator auth, matched TIGHTLY (no leak/traversal) ---
+func TestSelfBind_E_TheTrap(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newAuthServer(t)
+	selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme", testCode)
+	token := mintLink(t, st, "acme", selfBindTTL)
+	h := s.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(s.ServeHTTP))
+
+	// The public bind link renders WITHOUT a login (the exemption works).
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/bind/"+token, nil))
+	if rr.Code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), "Párosító kód") {
+		t.Fatalf("public /bind/ link was gated or not rendered: code=%d", rr.Code)
+	}
+
+	// A sibling prefix must NOT be exempt: /bindsecret is still gated (tight trailing-slash match).
+	rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/bindsecret", nil))
+	if rr.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("/bindsecret leaked through the exemption (prefix not tight): code=%d", rr.Code)
+	}
+
+	// Traversal through the exempt prefix must not reach a gated handler: it stays inside handleBind,
+	// which rejects a token containing '/', never touching /hosts.
+	rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/bind/../hosts", nil))
+	if strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), "Unclaimed appliances") || strings.Contains(rr.Body.String(), "No hosts enrolled") {
+		t.Fatalf("path traversal through /bind/ reached the hosts page")
+	}
+	// Red-proof: widen isPublicBindPath to strings.HasPrefix(path, "/bind") (drop the slash) → the
+	// /bindsecret gated assertion goes red; broaden it further and Scenario D goes red too.
+}
+
+// --- Scenario F: EXPIRY falls back — an expired link binds nothing, even with correct factors ---
+func TestSelfBind_F_ExpiryFallsBack(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newTestServer(t)
+	id := selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme", testCode)
+	token := mintLink(t, st, "acme", -1*time.Hour) // already expired
+
+	if body := bindGET(t, s, token).Body.String(); !strings.Contains(body, "érvénytelen vagy lejárt") {
+		t.Fatalf("expired link did not render the expired state")
+	}
+	// Even the CORRECT secrets on an expired link bind nothing (operator-bind fallback is unchanged).
+	bindPOST(t, s, token, testCodeFmt, testPass)
+	if a, _ := st.GetAppliance(id); a.Status != store.ApplianceRegistered {
+		t.Fatalf("an expired link still bound the appliance: %+v", a)
+	}
+	// Red-proof: drop the `expires_at > datetime('now')` guard in ConsumeSelfBindToken AND the
+	// tok.Expired() gate → the expired POST binds and the still-registered assertion goes red.
+}
+
+// --- Scenario (F1/F2): the operator MINT honesty paths ---
+
+// F1: a customer with no registered email → nothing minted, LOUD flash.
+func TestSelfBind_MintNoEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newTestServer(t)
+	if err := st.SaveCustomerConfig(&store.CustomerConfig{CustomerID: "noemail", APIKey: "k", RetrievalPassword: testPass}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.SetSelfBindMailer(&stubMailer{})
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/customers/noemail/selfbind-link", nil)
+	s.handleSelfBindLinkSend(rr, req, "noemail")
+	if rr.Code != http.StatusSeeOther || !strings.Contains(rr.Header().Get("Location"), "selfbind-no-email") {
+		t.Fatalf("no-email mint should redirect with selfbind-no-email: code=%d loc=%q", rr.Code, rr.Header().Get("Location"))
+	}
+	if tok, _ := st.SelfBindTokenByHash(selfBindHash("x")); tok != nil {
+		t.Fatal("a token was minted despite no email")
+	}
+}
+
+// F2: the email send fails → the just-minted token is deleted (not left silently live).
+func TestSelfBind_MintSendFailsCleansUp(t *testing.T) {
+	s, st := newTestServer(t)
+	selfBindSetup(t, st, "acme", testCode)
+	stub := &stubMailer{fail: true}
+	s.SetSelfBindMailer(stub)
+	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.handleSelfBindLinkSend(rr, httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/customers/acme/selfbind-link", nil), "acme")
+	if !strings.Contains(rr.Header().Get("Location"), "selfbind-send-failed") {
+		t.Fatalf("send failure should redirect with selfbind-send-failed: %q", rr.Header().Get("Location"))
+	}
+	// The token that was minted for the (failed) send is gone — not left silently live (F2 cleanup).
+	// Recover the token from the link the mailer was handed, and confirm it no longer resolves.
+	tokenFromLink := stub.link[strings.LastIndexByte(stub.link, '/')+1:]
+	if tokenFromLink == "" {
+		t.Fatal("mailer was never handed a link")
+	}
+	if tok, _ := st.SelfBindTokenByHash(selfBindHash(tokenFromLink)); tok != nil {
+		t.Fatal("a failed send left a live token behind")
+	}
+}
+
+// stubMailer records the last send and can be told to fail.
+type stubMailer struct {
+	fail bool
+	link string
+}
+
+func (m *stubMailer) SendSelfBindEmail(customerID, email, link string) error {
+	m.link = link
+	if m.fail {
+		return errStubSend
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+var errStubSend = &stubErr{}
+
+type stubErr struct{}
+
+func (*stubErr) Error() string { return "stub send failure" }
+
+// newAuthServer is newTestServer with an operator password configured, so RequireAuth is live.
+func newAuthServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *store.Store) {
+	t.Helper()
+	s, st := newTestServer(t)
+	h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("operator-pw"), bcrypt.MinCost)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	s.configPasswordHash = string(h)
+	return s, st
+}

hub/internal/web/server.go

@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ type Server struct {
 	pbsdrBox        func() (monitor.PBSBoxSnapshot, bool) // optional (v0.65.0, R-5); the PBS-DR datastore fill snapshot accessor
 	tenantsync      tenancyProvisioner   // optional; enables PBS DR tier provisioning (web/pbsdr.go)
 	claimEngine     *claim.Engine        // optional; enables the customer-claim resend button (v0.50.0)
+	selfBindMailer  SelfBindMailer       // optional; enables the customer self-bind link button (v0.66.0, R-27)
+	bindLimiter     *bindRateLimiter     // per-IP throttle for the PUBLIC /bind/ surface (v0.66.0, R-27)
 	// intentHub (v0.58.0, Direction-2 immediate-sync) is Bumped by every operator-intent handler
 	// (config save/delete, claim resend, offsite re-issue/freeze, floor, block/unblock, log pull)
 	// so a box long-polling GET /api/v1/wait wakes in seconds. Shared with the API handler. nil =
@@ -129,6 +131,7 @@ func New(store *store.Store, passwordHash, apiKey, version string, staleThreshol
 		templates:      tmpl,
 		staleThreshold: staleThreshold,
 		sessions:       make(map[string]*hubSession),
+		bindLimiter:    newBindRateLimiter(30), // public /bind/ surface: 30 req/min/IP burst (R-27)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -253,7 +256,10 @@ func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// CSRF protection for all state-changing requests (web routes only).
 	// API routes (/api/v1/) are Bearer-token authenticated and exempt.
 	if r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Method != http.MethodHead && r.Method != http.MethodOptions {
-		if path != "/login" && s.effectivePasswordHash() != "" {
+		// /bind/ is the public customer self-bind surface (THE TRAP §9.2): no operator session to
+		// ride, so CSRF is exempt here exactly as it is for /login. The URL capability token is the
+		// authorization boundary; a cross-site POST without both secrets only burns attempts.
+		if path != "/login" && !isPublicBindPath(path) && s.effectivePasswordHash() != "" {
 			if !s.validateCSRF(r) {
 				s.logger.Printf("[WARN] CSRF rejected: %s %s from %s", r.Method, path, r.RemoteAddr)
 				http.Error(w, "CSRF token missing or invalid. Please reload the page.", http.StatusForbidden)
@@ -377,6 +383,10 @@ func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		s.handleHostDetail(w, r, hostID)
 	case path == "/login":
 		s.handleLogin(w, r)
+	case isPublicBindPath(path):
+		// PUBLIC customer self-bind (R-27 slice 1) — GET renders the form/state, POST validates the
+		// two factors. Auth + CSRF exempt above via the SAME isPublicBindPath predicate.
+		s.handleBind(w, r)
 	case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/block"):
 		customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
 		customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/block")
@@ -385,6 +395,15 @@ func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		} else {
 			http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
 		}
+	case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/selfbind-link"):
+		// R-27 slice 1: mint + email a customer self-bind capability link. POST only.
+		customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
+		customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/selfbind-link")
+		if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
+			s.handleSelfBindLinkSend(w, r, customerID)
+		} else {
+			http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+		}
 	case strings.HasPrefix(path, "/customers/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/unblock"):
 		customerID := strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/customers/")
 		customerID = strings.TrimSuffix(customerID, "/unblock")
@@ -561,8 +580,12 @@ func (s *Server) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Always allow the login page through (GET and POST)
+		// Always allow the login page through (GET and POST), and the PUBLIC customer self-bind
-		if r.URL.Path == "/login" {
+		// surface (THE TRAP §9.2): /bind/ is exempt from operator auth exactly as /login is — the
+		// emailed URL capability token IS the auth model there. isPublicBindPath is the SINGLE
+		// definition of the prefix (matched tightly: trailing slash, path already .. -cleaned by the
+		// ServeMux) so this exemption cannot reach any operator-gated route.
+		if r.URL.Path == "/login" || isPublicBindPath(r.URL.Path) {
 			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 			return
 		}

hub/internal/web/templates/customer_unified.html

@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
             {{else if eq .Flash "log_tail_requested"}}Log tail requested — the controller delivers it on its next report cycle (a few minutes). A customer-visible event line was recorded.
             {{else if eq .Flash "claim-resent"}}Code re-sent to the registered address. A kód a doboz következő jelentésekor (~15 percen belül) aktiválódik.
             {{else if eq .Flash "claim-resend-failed"}}Claim code resend FAILED — check the hub log (email delivery / send error).
+            {{else if eq .Flash "selfbind-sent"}}Self-bind link sent to the registered address — valid for 7 days. The customer enters the box's console pairing code + their retrieval passphrase; no operator bind needed.
+            {{else if eq .Flash "selfbind-no-email"}}Self-bind link NOT sent — this customer has no registered email address. Set one first, or bind the appliance manually from the Hosts page.
+            {{else if eq .Flash "selfbind-send-failed"}}Self-bind link send FAILED — the link was invalidated (not left live). Check the hub log (email delivery / send error).
             {{else if eq .Flash "reset_done"}}Customer RESET complete — every operational trace was destroyed (offsite repo, PBS namespace, DR recipe, claim state, retained escrow custody). Identity and basic config survive; the audit event stream records it.
             {{end}}
         </div>
@@ -454,6 +457,15 @@
                     <button type="submit" class="btn btn-outline btn-sm" data-confirm="Send a fresh code to the registered address? The previous code stops working immediately (the box activates it on its next report, ~15 min).">{{if .Claim.ClaimedAt}}Visszaállító kód küldése{{else}}Kód újraküldése{{end}}</button>
                 </form>
                 {{end}}
+
+                <div class="form-group" style="margin-top: 1rem; padding-top: 1rem; border-top: 1px solid var(--border);">
+                    <label class="form-label">Customer self-bind (R-27)</label>
+                    <span class="form-hint">Let the customer bind their own freshly-installed appliance — no operator bind needed. Sends a 7-day capability link to the registered address ({{.Email}}); the customer opens it and enters the box's <strong>console pairing code</strong> + their <strong>retrieval passphrase</strong>. Wrong entries lock the link after 5 attempts. If the link expires, bind the appliance manually from the Hosts page.</span>
+                    <form method="POST" action="/customers/{{.CustomerID}}/selfbind-link" style="margin-top: 0.5rem;">
+                        {{.CSRFField}}
+                        <button type="submit" class="btn btn-outline btn-sm" data-confirm="Email a self-bind link to the registered address? Any previous self-bind link for this customer stops working immediately.">Send self-bind link</button>
+                    </form>
+                </div>
             </div>
         </section>
 

hub/internal/web/templates/hosts.html

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
             <div style="overflow-x: auto;">
             <table class="data-table">
                 <thead>
-                    <tr><th>Appliance</th><th>MACs</th><th>Hardware</th><th>SSH host keys</th><th>Seen</th><th>Bind to customer</th><th></th></tr>
+                    <tr><th>Appliance</th><th>Pairing code</th><th>MACs</th><th>Hardware</th><th>SSH host keys</th><th>Seen</th><th>Bind to customer</th><th></th></tr>
                 </thead>
                 <tbody>
                     {{range .Unclaimed}}
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
                             {{if .Stale}}<br><span class="status-badge status-warn" title="No poll in over 7 days">stale</span>{{end}}
                             {{if .Bound}}<br><span class="status-badge status-ok" title="Bound — awaiting the box's next poll">bound → {{.BoundCustomer}}</span>{{end}}
                         </td>
+                        <td style="font-family: var(--font-mono); letter-spacing: 0.05em;">{{if .PairingCode}}<strong>{{.PairingCode}}</strong>{{else}}<span class="text-muted">—</span>{{end}}</td>
                         <td style="font-size: 0.78em; font-family: var(--font-mono)">{{range .MACs}}{{.}}<br>{{end}}</td>
                         <td style="font-size: 0.8em;">{{if .Product}}{{.Product}}<br>{{end}}{{if .CPU}}<span class="text-muted">{{.CPU}}</span><br>{{end}}{{if .MemGB}}<span class="text-muted">{{.MemGB}}</span>{{end}}</td>
                         <td style="font-size: 0.72em; font-family: var(--font-mono)">{{range .SSHFingerprints}}{{.}}<br>{{end}}</td>

scripts/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
 # Felhom scripts — Changelog
 
+## build-felhom-iso.sh v1.20.0 — console pairing-code banner for customer self-bind (R-27 slice 1) (2026-07-17)
+
+Supports the hub's customer self-bind flow (hub v0.66.0). In PAIRING mode, `felhom-bootstrap.sh` now
+reads the additive `pairing_code` from the `POST /api/v1/appliance/register` response, persists it at
+`/etc/felhom/appliance-pairing-code`, and prints a Hungarian **console banner** (to `/dev/console`,
+stdout fallback) each pairing cycle so the customer can read the code off the physical screen and type
+it — together with their retrieval passphrase — on the hub's public `/bind/<token>` page. The code is
+**non-secret** (possession proof only; the passphrase is the second factor), so it is safe on the
+console. **Graceful degradation both ways:** a hub older than v0.66.0 omits `pairing_code` → the banner
+prints nothing and register/poll are unchanged; an old ISO against a v0.66.0 hub simply ignores the new
+field. No change to DIRECT mode. Green: `bash -n` clean on both scripts.
+
 ## build-felhom-iso.sh v1.19.0 — the universal secret-free ISO: `--pairing` mode (R-21 slice C) (2026-07-17)
 
 The scripts half of the universal ISO. `felhom-bootstrap.sh` gains a PAIRING mode — **one unit, two

scripts/iso/build-felhom-iso.sh

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 #===============================================================================
 set -euo pipefail
 
-ISO_VERSION="1.19.0"   # Felhom release the ISO is tagged to (aligns with felhom-host-install SCRIPT_VERSION).
+ISO_VERSION="1.20.0"   # Felhom release the ISO is tagged to (aligns with felhom-host-install SCRIPT_VERSION).
 IMAGE="${FELHOM_ISO_ASSISTANT_IMAGE:-felhom-iso-assistant:trixie}"
 HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 

scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh

@@ -33,9 +33,26 @@ STATE_FILE=/var/lib/felhom-install/state.json
 PASS_FILE=/run/felhom-bootstrap-pass
 SCRIPT_TMP=/run/felhom-host-install.sh
 TOKEN_FILE=/etc/felhom/appliance-token   # PAIRING: the box's only pre-day-0 credential (0600, persists reboots)
+PAIRING_CODE_FILE=/etc/felhom/appliance-pairing-code  # R-27: non-secret pairing code shown on the console
 
 log() { echo "felhom-bootstrap: $*"; }
 
+# print_pairing_banner (R-27, v0.66.0) — show the pairing code prominently on the physical console while
+# the box waits to be bound, so the customer can read it into the self-bind page. Non-secret (the bind
+# still requires the customer's retrieval passphrase). A hub older than v0.66.0 sends no code → no banner
+# (the box stays operator-bind-only — graceful, no behavior change).
+print_pairing_banner() {
+    local code; code=$(cat "$PAIRING_CODE_FILE" 2>/dev/null)
+    [[ -n "$code" ]] || return 0
+    { printf '\n================================================\n'
+      printf '  Felhom — a doboz parositasra var / párosításra vár\n\n'
+      printf '  Párosító kód:  %s\n\n' "$code"
+      printf '  Nyisd meg az e-mailben kapott self-bind linket,\n'
+      printf '  és add meg ezt a kódot + a jelszavadat.\n'
+      printf '================================================\n\n'
+    } > /dev/console 2>/dev/null || printf 'Párosító kód: %s\n' "$code"
+}
+
 cleanup_pass() { [[ -e "$PASS_FILE" ]] && { shred -u "$PASS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$PASS_FILE"; }; return 0; }
 trap cleanup_pass EXIT
 
@@ -175,8 +192,14 @@ run_pairing() {
             exit 1
         fi
         ( umask 077; printf '%s' "$token" > "$TOKEN_FILE" )
-        log "registered — appliance token stored (0600); waiting for the operator to bind this box"
+        # R-27 (v0.66.0): persist the non-secret pairing code (absent on a pre-v0.66.0 hub — tolerated).
+        local pcode; pcode=$(printf '%s' "$resp" | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get("pairing_code",""))' 2>/dev/null)
+        if [[ -n "$pcode" ]]; then
+            printf '%s' "$pcode" > "$PAIRING_CODE_FILE"
+        fi
+        log "registered — appliance token stored (0600); waiting for the operator or a customer self-bind"
     fi
+    print_pairing_banner   # show the code on the console each pairing cycle
 
     # 2. ONE poll. RestartSec=30 is the poll interval.
     local token; token=$(cat "$TOKEN_FILE")