night 2026-10-04/05: morning note, accidents, decision 78 proven, R-867..R-869; STATUS
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
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| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
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| **R-867** | Backup & restore | P2 | **The off-site clean-up's fake-snapshot guard refuses honest 7-day retention: every weekly window on a box with more than 7 nightly snapshots refuses, deletes nothing, and mails the operator an error.** MEASURED 2026-10-05 02:15 UTC on demo-felhom (controller v0.293.0): `clean-up window 3: the fake-snapshot guard REFUSED — nothing deleted: the policy would remove snapshot 343d57a5 from 2026-09-28T02:15:05Z — younger than 8 days and not superseded the same day, which honest retention never does (R-822)`; operator mail `offsite_prune_guard_refused` (error) sent. The snapshot was 7 days + 5 s old — exactly the one a keep-7-dailies policy drops at the same hour each night. So the guard's 8-day line sits inside honest retention: pruning never happens (the repository only grows) and a true-looking error mail arrives every window — the cry-wolf shape R-824 closed for same-day copies. Fix direction: the guard's age line must exceed the policy's own keep-window (e.g. keep-daily N → refuse only younger than N days minus a margin, derived from the same constant), pinned by a test that runs the real policy over 8 nightly snapshots. `audits/night-2026-10-04/night/n4-demo-felhom-prune-guard.txt` | **READY — owner: CC** | — | fix + the 8-night test | CC |
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| **R-32** | Backup & restore | P2 | **[P2-HIGH] RESET must purge the customer base dir; the orphan card must stay honest; unattributed bytes must be visible.** The rehearsal's S7 said in advance that an orphan card would BE a finding — and one appeared (16:58:14). Cause: RESET's `"hetzner":"ok"` leg destroys the sub-account, but **a Hetzner sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object** — its directory survives, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext, encrypted under a key that same RESET had destroyed. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-21, size M, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | **Ruling from the run (three parts, deliberately separate):** (1) because RESET destroys custody, the ciphertext it leaves behind is unrecoverable **BY DESIGN** → RESET gains a **main-account purge of the customer base dir** (the existing operator ack already covers it); (2) the **move-aside guard STAYS** for reinstall-*without*-RESET — there custody survives and the card's "history recoverable" promise is true (R-26 depends on exactly that); (3) the operator **Restic tab shows per-customer directory bytes vs attributed snapshot bytes**, so dead data cannot hide. Measured on the pool box that night: **49 M attributed** (2 snapshots, 48.717 MiB) against **1.4 G + 3.0 M unattributed** across TWO `.orphaned-*` dirs. Evidence `restic-and-pool.txt` | CC |
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| **R-95** | Backup & restore | P2 | restic offsite credential **can delete** (`readonly=False`, `forget --prune` runs from the box); SFTP cannot express append-only | **NARROWED — the box can no longer delete (2026-10-03); weekly windows ON since 2026-10-04 with the fixed guard; LEFT: one window that actually removes snapshots, expected from ~2026-10-11 when the first candidates are older than 8 days** **DATED CHECK 2026-10-12 (DUE-CHECKS block), what to look at, on both demo boxes:** (1) the controller's window lines since 2026-10-10 — `pct exec 9201 -- docker logs felhom-controller 2>&1 | grep 'clean-up window'` on demo-hp (`ssh demo-hp`) and demo-felhom (`ssh felhom-pve`): a `clean-up window <id> (...): N of M planned snapshot(s) removed, A -> B` line with N > 0 and no `guard REFUSED`; (2) the snapshot count before and after — that line's `A -> B`, matching the hub's `offsite_windows` row (`count_before`, `count_after`, `box_result pruned`); (3) the hub's count check quiet — no `offsite_window_drop`, `offsite_prune_guard_refused` or `offsite_window_failed` event for either box since 2026-10-10; (4) the key file clean — operator `POST /offsite/key-audit` reads 0 findings for both. **All four hold → close R-95. Any one fails → the reason is a new row, and R-95 stays.** Since hub v0.129.0 a window refused only by the count cap after a gap can be cleared with one raised-cap grant (R-833). **MEASURED 2026-10-03 (R-436 CLOSED) — append-only HOLDS for a pinned key; it is NOT yet protection.** On the provider (`u629488-sub4`, scratch repo, removed): a key pinned to `command="rclone serve restic --stdio --append-only <dir>",restrict` backs up, restores (bytes identical) and checks; `forget <id> --prune`, `forget --keep-last 1` and a real `prune` are refused with `blob not removed, server response: 403 Forbidden (403)`; the unpinned control deletes. **What still defeats it:** the sub-account PASSWORD logs in on ports 22 and 23 and rewrote `authorized_keys` in this session, and a box can obtain that password from the hub at will (R-820). **Also found:** an add-only key can plant future-dated snapshots that make the box's own retention policy select every real snapshot (R-822); the hub holds every sub-account password in the clear (R-821); FOUR box features need a deleting login, not two — both `forget` sites, the orphan move-aside (`mv`) and the abandonment (`rm -rf`). **PROPOSAL (operator decides — STATUS):** the hub becomes the key registrar so the box never sees the password; switch boxes to the pinned key with no box-side retention first (quota headroom is months); then a weekly hub-opened clean-up window with a poisoning guard. `audits/offsite-append-only-2026-10-03/DESIGN.md`. The rank stays the operator's. **BUILT 2026-10-03 (decisions 68–69).** Both demo boxes migrated to a hub-pinned append-only key with history kept (11→13, 91→100); a delete from each box is refused (403); the old password endpoint answers 410 to demo-hp's own key; the daily key check is live; the clean-up window opened, refused by the guard and closed live on demo-hp. Left: R-824 (the guard refuses after any manual run, so no real prune has run), R-822 residual, R-823. `audits/offsite-lock-build-2026-10-03/` | — | Root exposure still open. Mitigation now ARMED — split prune off-box or move to REST `--append-only` **-- UNBLOCKED 2026-09-22, not closed.** The premise in this row's own title - *SFTP cannot express append-only* - is answered by Hetzner (ticket #2026090103040671, recorded in R-433 and R-436): on a Storage Box the `rclone serve restic --stdio --append-only` backend can be pinned to an SSH key as a FORCED COMMAND, so append-only IS expressible without a new machine. **The row stays open because nothing has been measured**: no forced-command key exists on `u629488`, no `forget --prune` has been refused through one, and the protection only holds if EVERY key that can reach the repository carries the prefix. The next step is R-436's, and it is small. | CC **SPIKE 2026-09-01 — `audits/SPIKE-r95-offsite-delete-2026-09-01.md`. THE WORD "ARMED" ABOVE IS NOT SUPPORTED AND IS WITHDRAWN PENDING R-429:** no `.snapshots` is visible to either box's sub-account (measured, both machines, with controls), so the seven-day bound is unverified and unverifiable from the product side. **Q3 (documented, `hub/internal/hetznerapi/hetznerapi.go:38-45`): the sub-account API has ONE permission axis, `readonly` — there is no append-only, so the PBS shape does NOT transfer** (PBS is a server that can refuse; a Storage Box is a filesystem that runs nothing). **Q5 (measured): withdrawing delete does NOT wedge the store** — restic treats a dead owner's lock as stale and proceeds — so the constraint everyone feared is not the blocker; but `unlock --remove-all` lies about success (R-430), and the crash-lock window is UNKNOWN. **Q6 (measured): restic 0.14.0 DOES speak `rest:`** (control: `banana:` → invalid backend), anLine truncated
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| **R-105** | Backup & restore | P2 | **Three hub-held DR records are empty on the entire live fleet.** `hosts.dr_record_json` = `{}` on all 3 hosts; `host_escrow.directive_json` = `{}` on both escrowed hosts; `dr_recipe.host_half.drives` = `[]` on every customer **including two with enrolled data drives** (916 GB USB on demo-felhom, 938 GB NVMe on demo-hp) **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-28, size M, roadmap state `READY — 2026-07-28`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. ****PARTLY FIXED BY ITS OWN UPDATE.** The `drives` third was traced and populated on both demo boxes on 2026-07-28 (the enrolled drives were never PVE storages, so `isUserDataDrive` never saw them). The other two thirds — `hosts.dr_record_json` and `host_escrow.directive_json` — were NOT re-verified this session and are carried as written.** | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | These are exactly the fields a host-loss recovery reads: `05-hub-architecture.md:175-176,186` names the slim DR record as one of four durable sources; `06-offsite-connectivity.md:148-150` says the escrow upload carried the DR directive; `felhom-agent/internal/dr/plan.go:34-35` makes `PlannedDrive` the re-attach-by-`durable_id` wrong-disk guard. **The three may have different causes** — `isUserDataDrive` (`internal/hub/dr_recipe.go:129-136`) requires type `usb`/`local-dir` **and** a non-empty `DurableID` **and** `MountPath`, and which of the three fails was not traced. Evidence: `architecture/_recovery-inventory-2026-07-28.md` Part D2.3. **UPDATE 2026-07-28 (vzdump-target move): the `drives` third is TRACED and now POPULATED on both demo boxes.** Cause: the enrolled data drives were never PVE storages at all — only agent-generated systemd mounts — so they never entered `report.StorageTargets` and `isUserDataDrive` never saw them. Giving each drive a `dir` storage at its own mountpoint supplied all three required fields at once (type `local-dir`, fs-UUID durable id, mount path), and the recipe now emits `uuid:91d2dc2d-…`/`/mnt/nvme-1tb` on demo-hp and `uuid:47a3361a-…`/`/mnt/hdd_1` o | CC |
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| **R-698** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] A backup stores the image's NAME, not the image — a restore of a version its maker has deleted cannot start.** `RecoveryManifest.image_pins` ("image NOT stored — re-pulled on restore"); since controller v0.275.0 each data file also records its running `ref@digest`, and a restore brings the data back AT ITS OWN VERSION (`07` §6.6) — so a restore asks for exactly the old image. **Measured 2026-09-26** (`audits/version-travel-2026-09-26/A7/`, registry HEADs, no pulls): the catalog's 42 ladder `ref@digest` pairs all resolve (200); an invented digest answers 404 on Docker Hub and ghcr.io (negative control). Not measured: the digests recorded on boxes (older than any ladder entry), how often makers delete versions, the catalog's 66 digest-less compose lines. **Options (decide nothing yet):** (a) keep — a restore of a deleted version fails at the pull and the household uses the next copy or a newer version; (b) mirror every INSTALLED image into the DooPlex registry, restore falls back to it — storage + bandwidth on DooPlex, a new part on the recovery path; (c) mirror only ladder-named versions — bounded, misses pre-ladder boxes; (d) `docker save` into the unit — hundreds of MB per app per copy on every tier. **-- 2026-09-30 late (decision 53):** a box now keeps only an app's running and previous image; a restore to an older version re-pulls it — as every restore already did. The limit above is unchanged. | **OPEN — P3; owner: operator (a decision), CC measures** | — | — | CC + operator |
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| **R-706** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Removing an app "with its backups" leaves its off-site verification copy on the drive.** Measured 2026-09-28 on demo-hp: after a full off-site restore of nextcloud (which leaves the downloaded copy in `backups/offsite-restore/nextcloud`, ~1 GB, by design, for the household to inspect), `POST /api/stacks/nextcloud/remove` with `remove_backups: true` removed the unit and listed `backup_paths_removed` WITHOUT the verification copy; it stayed until the restore page's own delete (`POST /backup/offbox/verify-copy/delete`, 302 `scratch_deleted`). A household that removes an app to free space keeps 1 GB it cannot see on the app list. **Fix direction:** the removal with backups also deletes the app's verification copy (the same `DeleteOffsiteRestoreCopy`). Evidence: `audits/kept-offsite-2026-09-28/E/E9-teardown.txt`. **-- 2026-09-28 evening: FIXED in controller v0.279.0** — a removal with its backups also deletes the verification copy and lists it among the removed paths (`TestR706_…`, red-proofed RP7). Not yet seen live (needs a full off-site restore then a removal). | **WATCHING — P3; owner: CC (live)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-729** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] An off-site target, once saved on the page, cannot be removed through the product.** MEASURED 2026-09-30 on 9202: `/backup/offbox/config` refuses an empty address and no route clears the target; the session removed its throwaway target from `settings.json` by hand, with the controller stopped (harness teardown on a scratch guest). A household that tries its own NAS and gives up keeps a disabled target forever. **Fix direction:** a „Távoli mentési cél törlése" press that clears the target (never the repository). | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (controller)** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-869** | Backup & restore | P4 | **The controller's log line for decision 78's move-aside prints an empty destination: `the hub set the orphaned repo aside: /home/felhom-repo -> (nothing deleted)`.** 2026-10-05 03:08 UTC, Tester 1 box (controller v0.293.0); the next line names it (`/home/felhom-repo.orphaned-20261005`). Cosmetic, but it is the one line an operator reads to find where the old history went. Fix direction: log the hub's returned path, or the name the controller computes. `audits/night-2026-10-04/tester1/t14-d78-offsite-run.txt` | **READY — owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-10** | Backup & restore | P4 | T-6E-1: DB-dump dir-fsync asymmetry (LOW, confirmed in 6E) **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-15, size XS, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. **T-6E-1, confirmed in CAMPAIGN-6E.** | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | One-line hardening; batch with the next controller task | CC |
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| **R-91** | Backup & restore | P4 | Old 13 GB datastore copy at `/srv/pbs-felhom` on ep0's root disk | WATCHING | demo-felhom's first **post-migration** PBS backup | Delete once it lands; fix `CONTEXT.md:1018` same commit | CC |
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| **R-99** | Backup & restore | P4 | Server-side prune **never removes** a phantom snapshot. Confirmed it does NOT count them toward `keep-last` (dry-run kept 2 real + the phantom) so there is **no retention/data-loss bug** — but one accumulates per aborted upload, forever | READY (S) | — | Decide a cleanup path. Deletion on a **customer** datastore is a separate ruling — detection shipped, removal deliberately not automated | CC |
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| **R-444** | Box system & updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Nothing runs `pct fstrim` on the fleet, and demo-hp's thin pool was carrying ~23.8 GB of blocks the guest had already freed.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 during this spike's teardown: the run itself added ~1.05 GiB that `local-lvm` did not reclaim on delete (68.97% -> 70.91%); `fstrim` INSIDE the unprivileged container is refused (`FITRIM ioctl failed: Operation not permitted`, all three mounts); `pct fstrim 9201` from the PVE host then trimmed **30.2 GiB + 57 GiB** and took `local-lvm` to **26.78%** — **23.8 GB BELOW this run's own starting point**, i.e. the surplus was long-standing, not ours. **Why it is not merely housekeeping:** a thin pool that only ever grows can reach 100% from DELETED data alone, and a full thin pool takes every guest on the host read-only. demo-hp had 16.4 GB free before the trim. **Not urgent, and the row says so** — but the appliance has no periodic trim and no operator surface reports the gap between guest-free and pool-used. Owner: **CC.** `audits/SPIKE-app-update-2026-09-01.md` | **OPEN — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-468** | Box system & updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] THE GOLDEN WAIVER — goldens on a cadence, not per release (operator ruling 2026-09-13).** 25 goldens in 26 days in August, almost one per release, because `golden_currency_gate.py` trips on every release by design and the only honest ways past it were a bake or a declared `--no-verify` (thirteen by 2026-09-01, R-404/R-417). **The ruling: bake WEEKLY, and always before any drill or fresh install.** Every release still raises the FLOOR, so both demo boxes keep getting each release in ~20 s; only the golden — which protects a fresh install and nothing else — moves to a cadence. **The mechanism (built 2026-09-13):** `documentation/tests/golden-waiver. **⚠ CORRECTED THE SAME DAY (R-472): between bakes the floor does NOT carry a release — the hub holds any floor above the vouched golden (publish-train rule 1), so releases between bakes reach the demo boxes only by hand-deploy.**yml`, four lines (`issued`, `expires`, `reason`, `register_row: R-468`), read by the gate. While valid, a golden BEHIND the record makes the gate print a loud ADVISORY and exit 0; when it expires the gate is red again until someone bakes or renews. **The 14-day cap is enforced by the gate, not the runbook** — a longer, undated, unparseable, reason-less or row-less waiver is INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2), never 0 and never silently ignored. **It never covers a golden that is UNRECORDED (R-385)** — that is not a cadence choice. **A dated waiver cannot be forgotten; it just expires** — the difference from R-242's original rule, which recurred the day after it was written. Tests: `scripts/test_golden_currency_gate.py` cases 5–15 (E/F/G/H, a 15-day, absent, unparseable, bad-row and empty-reason waiver each 2; the R-421 decoy — a file saying only `expires` — 2). **This is a PRE-CUSTOMER arrangement: the first external install retires it** (delete the file in that commit). Cadence written into `RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.2 and the `felhom.eu` end-of-session checklist. **Does NOT touch R-242's open half (nothing gates the VOUCH).** | **WATCHING — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (renew ≤ 14 days or bake); retire at the first external install** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-531** | Box system & updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] Three supervisor facts measured live and not pinned: restart timing during a deploy was not measured; restarts before the hub first sees the stanza produce no `controller_restarted_by_agent`; deliberate operator kills spend the crash-loop budget.** MEASURED 2026-09-15 on 9201: after 3 test restarts in 13 minutes the 4th kill tripped the 30-minute pause and the dashboard stayed down (the guard as designed, `A4-kill-middeploy-9201.txt`). The hub checker seeds silently on first sight, so the three restarts before the first v0.131.0 report emitted nothing (only the crash-loop did). **What it needs:** a deploy-kill timing on a fresh budget; the operator's view whether a restart after minutes of uptime should count toward the budget **MEASURED 2026-09-16 on the drill box, both halves.** (1) **Timing during a deploy (F9'):** the controller was killed 5 s into a deploy on an EMPTY budget; the agent saw it on the next sweep, confirmed on the one after, and the dashboard answered 200 again **37 s** after the kill; the interrupted app ended `not_deployed`, not stuck. (2) **The budget's shape (F9''):** three further kills at idle, 20 minutes apart, recovered in **61 s / 41 s / 61 s** - and NONE of them accumulated, because the window is 15 minutes. Four restarts this session, zero pauses, zero crash-loop events. **So the brake catches a FAST loop and is blind to a SLOW one:** a controller dying every 20 minutes is restarted forever and the only trace is an `info` event that mails nobody. That is a design question for the operator (leave it / add a longer second counter / raise the severity of the Nth restart in a day), and this session deliberately measured it without changing it. Evidence: `audits/evidence-drill-0243-2026-09-16/phase2-f9prime.txt` and `phase2-f9dprime.txt`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (measure) · operator (budget rule)** | — | — | CC + operator |
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| **R-868** | Box system & updates | P4 | **An OS pass whose agent is killed mid-install still installs (the root wrapper runs on under sudo), but its report never reaches the hub.** MEASURED 2026-10-05 02:57 UTC on demo-hp (night drill A5): the debug pass and the daemon `kill -9`-ed while `apt-get` ran; the wrapper finished all 6 packages, dpkg clean, systemd restarted the daemon in < 20 s (`NRestarts` 1, no rollback). The hub never got that pass's `applied` report; the next pass said `nothing`. For a NIGHT leg the hub would therefore miss which packages a ring-0 box installed that night (the approval set is still read from the next inventory). Fix direction: the wrapper keeps its last report on disk; the agent sends an unsent one at start. `audits/night-2026-10-04/accidents/a5-kill.txt` | **READY — owner: CC** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-184** | Box system & updates | P4 | **Nothing prevents the hub from vouching an agent version that was never released.** The R-115 gate proves every RELEASED version is installable, but it works from git tags — so a hub artifact-manifest entry naming a version with no tag and no package is invisible to it. The installer would then die at step 5 on a virgin machine, as root | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-03** | — | **Filed BECAUSE the R-115 gate deliberately does not cover it, rather than leaving the gap unstated.** CI cannot check it: the hub's `/api/v1/artifacts/<customer>` answers **401** without a per-customer retrieval passphrase and Gitea's package **listing** api answers **401** without a token (both measured 2026-08-03, P-C), so a credential-free gate can ask *"is this version installable"* but never *"which version is vouched"*. **Two shapes, and the second is better:** (a) give CI a hub credential — expands what CI can reach, and is the operator's call not a gate author's; (b) **validate at vouch time, in the hub**: the operator UI's Day-0 artifact form refuses a version whose package is not downloadable. (b) fails closed at the moment of the decision, needs no new credential anywhere, and puts the check where the mistake is actually made. **Exposure is low and should be said so:** vouching is a deliberate operator action against a version they have just released, and R-115's release path now makes released-but-unpublished nearly impossible. This is the residue, not the main risk | CC |
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| **R-194** | Box system & updates | P4 | **PVE's permission cache delays every grant-state verdict by an unknown amount, so "the agent can read it" and "the ACL exists" are not the same measurement.** Observed twice while validating R-190's self-repair on demo-felhom 2026-08-04: both ACL rows for `/storage/felhom-backup` were deleted, and `GET /access/permissions` continued to report `Datastore.AllocateSpace` present — for **~40 s** in one run and **~16 minutes** in another. During that window the capability probe reads healthy and the self-repair does not fire | **OPEN** | — | **Why it matters beyond the delay:** it puts a floor under how fast a lost grant can be noticed, it makes any single permission read a lagging indicator, and — the interesting part — **it is a candidate contributor to R-190's own timeline**: a grant removed at an unknown moment could keep working until a cache expiry, which is exactly the shape of *worked at 04:44, refused at 09:24*. That does not explain what removed it, but it may explain when the refusal SURFACED, and the two have been treated as the same instant. **Not a defect in our code** — it is PVE behaviour, and the mitigation already tolerates it (the repair fires on the next probe after the cache clears). **What is worth deciding:** whether the store-grant probe should ALSO consult the storage content listing as a second signal, since that appeared to reflect the loss immediately (`{"data":[]}` while the permission read still said present) — two signals disagreeing is itself information, and today only one of them is read | CC |
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| **R-373** | Box system & updates | P4 | **`SysDataGrowGB` is the intended lever for the system-data volume, it works, and nothing sets it.** Written down 2026-08-02 in `audits/SPIKE-recovery-unit-space-2026-08-02.md:230-232`, under an explicit *"### Not filed"* heading: the 20 G / 50 G mismatch was ruled a tier-sizing decision rather than a defect, *"`SysDataGrowGB` is the intended lever and it works; nothing sets it."* A lever with no caller is the same shape as R-368's comment — a setting that names a behaviour nothing invokes. **Age when filed: 20 days.** | **OPEN — LOW** | R-368 (same shape) | Either wire it to something an operator can reach, or remove it and record the sizing decision where a reader will meet it. | CC |
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