Space list (pilot of the gap review): 45 places, eight questions each
gates / gates (push) Successful in 1m58s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 1m58s
Read-only measurement on demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1, two readings. Audit folder documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/ (README, TABLE, MATRIX, evidence, tools). 360 answers: A 294, D 0, K 19, N 47. Register 225 -> 230: R-1368 (host places that only grow: kernels, agent binaries), R-1369 (no written way out of a full disk), R-1370 (no space budget for the host disk), R-1371 (no space alarm; host-disk mail goes to the household), R-1372 (small guest places). A dated line on nine existing rows. Section headings set to the real counts; R-1268 and R-1312 moved to their category's section. STATUS: new Updated paragraph, decisions D67-D70. N100 diary line. Two stale facts corrected in 05-hub-architecture.md and 11-os-updates.md. Nothing was changed on any machine. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
a6705ceb04
commit
47e372a5f4
56 files changed
+7631
-20
No files matched your search
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-494** | Install & onboarding | P4 | **NARROWED 2026-09-14 by operator ruling → [P3-LOW] the hub COULD create the tunnel at customer creation, for a domain already on Cloudflare. Not blocking: every customer has their own domain and the operator creates the tunnel per day-0 A.1 (`architecture/01-topology-and-trust.md`).** *Original finding, kept:* **[P1-HIGH] A new customer's dashboard has NO reachable address unless the operator hand-makes a Cloudflare tunnel — the link in the setup-code mail is dead.** MEASURED 2026-09-14 on a fresh install from the public ISO (drill intervention **I1**): the claim mail points at `https://felhom.drill0242.felhom.eu`; that name has **no A and no AAAA** record (`dig @1.1.1.1`, control `felhom.enkisfelhom.hu` resolves); the hub has **no tunnel- or DNS-creation code** (`hub/internal/cloudflare/` holds only geo-rule removal; `cf_tunnel_token` is a pasted, optional form field, `configs.go:1478`) — day-0 runbook A.1 makes it a manual Cloudflare-dashboard step that nothing on the customer-create page asks for; the box's own split-horizon resolver on the appliance LAN IP answered `google.com` but not the dashboard name at 13:27:39Z; the agent applied the record at **13:27:44Z** (`lanresolver: applied split-horizon record … ip=192.168.0.158`, 3 m 46 s after the controller started), so the box CAN answer the name — **but only to a device that uses the box as its DNS server, and no document, screen or mail tells a household to do that**; the router and the installer-offered DNS answer nothing. The page was reachable only at the guest's LAN address with the name forced (`curl --resolve …:443:192.168.0.158`). **A volunteer could not have done that.** **What it needs:** an operator ruling — the hub creates the tunnel and DNS at customer creation, or the product gives a household a LAN address that works with no DNS change. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: operator-side automation; the operator creates the tunnel by hand per the day-0 runbook.** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-504** | Install & onboarding | P4 | **[P3-LOW] `iso.felhom.eu` cannot show an index page on its own — its root returns 404, and the download page lives on the website instead.** MEASURED 2026-09-14: `https://iso.felhom.eu/` and `/index.html` → 404; only named objects answer. The host is an R2 bucket behind a custom domain; whether R2 would serve an uploaded `index.html` at `/` was **not measured** (uploading anything to the public bucket is a publication). The ISO v1.27.0 task puts the Hungarian download page at `felhom.eu/letoltes` (published with the ISO, after the operator's yes). **Remaining:** a redirect from `iso.felhom.eu/` to that page needs a Cloudflare rule the session has no credential for. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (Cloudflare rule)** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: households are sent to the website's download page; the bare address is cosmetic.** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
|
||||
## Apps & catalog — 27 rows (P2 1, P3 13, P4 13)
|
||||
## Apps & catalog — 24 rows (P2 1, P3 10, P4 13)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -141,21 +141,21 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-76** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **FileBrowser-created folders break the setgid chain, and a drop-zone's mode is not stable** **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-26, size S, roadmap state `idea (surfaced by the R-75 spike, 2026-07-26)`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **2026-10-06 night: not a catalog fix** — the setgid chain is set by the controller's FileBrowser setup; a controller row. | — | Two related findings from `audits/SPIKE-catalog-data-paths-2026-07-26.md` P3/P5, both **pre-existing** and deliberately left alone by that spike. **(a)** FileBrowser Quantum 1.3.3 creates files `0644` and folders `0755` and does **not** propagate the setgid bit — even though the entrypoint wrapper's `umask 002` really is in effect (`/proc/1/status` `Umask: 0002`). Group inheritance itself works (a file uploaded into a 2775 group-100 dir landed group 100, not the process gid 1000), so the convention's *group* half holds and only its *mode* half is lost. The consequence is proven with a control: inside a UI-created `0755` folder a gid-1000 process's file landed group **1000**, while the identical write into the 2775 parent landed group **100**. So **any folder a customer creates through FileBrowser breaks the shared-group chain one level down.** Latent today — every userdata-touching catalog app that declares an identity declares uid/gid **1000**, the same uid FileBrowser runs as, so owner permissions mask it; it bites the day a content app runs as a different non-root uid with gid 1000. The comment at `infra/infra.go:156` is right that the image ignores `-e UMASK` but does not say t | CC |
|
||||
| **R-707** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **[P2] 37 apps still start with a login a stranger can take (`09` §3 decision 45).** Audit of all 53 apps: `app-catalog-felhom.eu/FIRST-ADMIN.md` (class, fix route, status, measured or read). Open: **3 hard-coded defaults** — calibre-web (`admin / admin123`, measured working on demo-hp and 9202; its own `cps.py -s` route needs a generated password WITH a special character — our generator is letters+digits, a controller change), mealie (`changeme@example.com / MyPassword`), wger (`admin / adminadmin`); **34 open first-run screens** (the first visitor creates the admin: actualbudget, adventurelog, audiobookshelf, calcom, docmost, emby, ghost, gitea, gramps-web, home-assistant, homebox, immich, jellyfin, komga, n8n, navidrome, opengist, outline, papra, plant-it, radarr, rallly, recipe-importer, romm, seerr, sonarr, sparkyfitness, tandoor, termix, uptime-kuma, vikunja, wanderer, wishlist, zipline). **Stale notes:** romm's `default_creds` `admin / admin` answers 401 on demo-hp (like a wrong password) — the page now warns with a login that does not exist; zipline's looks stale too. **Measured on demo-hp 2026-09-28 (read-only):** bookstack's default still logs in on the INSTALLED app (the fix is for new installs; the page now warns). Each fix: route (a) env or (b) the app's own CLI/API via `after_install:`, proven on 9202 with the default failing and the generated password working; route (c) a page sentence. Several sessions (operator, 2026-09-28). **2026-09-29 (controller v0.280.0, catalog `d0e7e2e`):** every class-3 app fixed — mealie, wger, calibre-web by `after_install` (calibre-web with the new `password:24:special`), proven on 9202 fresh installs (`audits/login-gate-2026-09-29/D/`); the setup gate (decision 46, spike PASSED) built and live on immich, n8n, audiobookshelf (probes measured) and uptime-kuma (button) (`…/C/`); romm's and zipline's stale notes removed. **Left: 30 class-4 apps** — gate each (probe measured on 9202 where one exists — 11 upstream candidates listed in `…/B/B-VERDICT.md` §3; the button otherwise). **2026-09-29 afternoon (controller v0.281.0, catalog `6faf432`):** 28 more class-4 apps gated — 32 of 34 — each proven on 9202 (`audits/gate-rollout-2026-09-29/`B): stranger → gate page / 401, household reached the first-setup screen, the gate opened (9 by a measured probe, the rest by the press), the app answered after. seerr, outline, rallly: gated, their opening needs a media server / e-mail (not proven). **Left:** wanderer (R-714); plant-it is not installable. | **NARROWED** (2026-10-03 triage: the row's verdict was finished, but it names open work no other row carries — seerr, outline and rallly are gated, but the gate OPENING is not proven (needs a media server / e-mail)) — **CLOSED — 2026-09-29 (the rest → R-714)** | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-905** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **wger's collected style files (283 MB) go into every wger backup, though the app rebuilds them at every start.** Since R-762's fix (`DJANGO_DEBUG=False` + `collectstatic`, catalog `cf1ed43`) the static files sit in a named volume that the backup legs copy like data (measured 283 MB, `audits/design-build-2026-10-06/`); `collectstatic` regenerates them, so they are rebuildable bytes in every Tier-1 unit, Tier-2 copy and off-site snapshot. wger is `lifecycle: hidden` and no box runs it (hub read 2026-10-08). Options to weigh: a non-backed-up volume class for regenerable data, or an anonymous volume. Found by the R-762 helpers 2026-10-08. | **OPEN — needs a design before wger is shown** | — | Design the „regenerable volume" exclusion (catalog + controller backup legs) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-995** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **Removing an app through the product can leave unnamed Docker volumes and an empty import folder behind.** MEASURED 2026-10-13 on demo-felhom after 61 removals (`documentation/audits/sizing-2026-10-13/METHOD.md` „Teardown”, `evidence/leftover-volumes-after-bench.txt`): 8 unnamed volumes (4–72 KB; immich 1, romm 2, privatebin 3, onlyoffice 2 — volumes the images declare themselves) and `userdata/import/{paperless,calibre,grimmory}` (empty, created by the deploy). The removal answered 200 and its own leftover check was clean, because it looks only at labelled volumes. No data risk; disk and tidiness only. Removed by name on the bench. | **READY** — filed 2026-10-13 | — | Make the removal account for the containers' unnamed volumes (and an empty import folder it created), with a test that deploys an image that declares a VOLUME | CC |
|
||||
| **R-995** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **Removing an app through the product can leave unnamed Docker volumes and an empty import folder behind.** MEASURED 2026-10-13 on demo-felhom after 61 removals (`documentation/audits/sizing-2026-10-13/METHOD.md` „Teardown”, `evidence/leftover-volumes-after-bench.txt`): 8 unnamed volumes (4–72 KB; immich 1, romm 2, privatebin 3, onlyoffice 2 — volumes the images declare themselves) and `userdata/import/{paperless,calibre,grimmory}` (empty, created by the deploy). The removal answered 200 and its own leftover check was clean, because it looks only at labelled volumes. No data risk; disk and tidiness only. Removed by name on the bench. | **READY** — filed 2026-10-13 **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** places G8, D8: the unnamed volumes are counted under R-1267's line; no new measurement of the import folder. | — | Make the removal account for the containers' unnamed volumes (and an empty import folder it created), with a test that deploys an image that declares a VOLUME | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1067** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **The catalog still carries `pi_compatible:` on every template, and nothing reads it any more.** controller v0.315.0 removed the „Pi kompatibilis" badge and the „csak x86" tag from every page (Raspberry Pi is no longer supported, so one was noise and the other was a warning on almost every app). The `ResourceHints.PiCompatible` struct field and the catalog key were deliberately LEFT: a box still on 0.314.0 reads the key, and removing it would make that box show „csak x86" on every app. **Gated on the floor:** once the fleet floor is at or above 0.315.0, drop `pi_compatible:` from the templates and the field from `stacks.ResourceHints` in the same pair of commits. Harmless until then — an unread key costs nothing. | **BLOCKED** — filed 2026-10-15. Checked 2026-10-16 (apps burndown): the floor is 0.321.0 and demo-hp, Tester 1 and the N100 run 0.321.0, but **Tester-2 still reports 0.292.0** (its newest report 2026-10-04; hub DB with WAL) — so nothing removed. | every box on ≥ 0.315.0 — today Tester-2 | Drop the catalog key and the struct field; grep the hub and the website for Pi wording at the same time (none found 2026-10-15) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1043** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **Sonarr, Radarr and Prowlarr build their login redirect as an absolute `http://` URL.** They trust forwarded headers only from their „Trusted networks” (the household set `192.168.0.0/24`; traefik is `172.18.x`), so they ignore `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` and answer `Location: http://<name>/login` to an https visitor. Since controller v0.312.0 that hop is sent back to https by traefik (a GET, no password), so it is cosmetic; a template could seed traefik's network as trusted. (`audits/https-only-2026-10-14/``1A-3-4.txt`) | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-14 | — | Seed the docker network as a trusted proxy in the *arr templates (with the R-1030 seed), measure the redirect | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1099** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **The N100 may hold RomM games in the old upload place, now shown under a fake „roms” platform.** Until 2026-10-16 RomM's own upload wrote to the drive's `roms/roms/<platform>/`; after the mapping fix (catalog `fb18471`, R-1089) those files are at RomM's `library/roms/roms/…`. Measured on 9201: such a game showed as missing in its platform and again under a platform „roms” (`audits/romm-ghost-2026-10-16/B/b-after.txt`). Files put in with the file manager are not affected — they are now found. The N100 runs RomM (hub `/apps/romm`); CC does not log in to the lived-in box. | OPEN — filed 2026-10-16 | Operator: look at `roms/roms/` on the N100's drive in the file manager | If it holds platform folders: move them up one level into `roms/`, then run „Scan” in RomM; if it is empty, close | Operator |
|
||||
| **R-1215** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **One Immich photo upload hung 10 minutes with no answer and was not stored, while the box was healthy.** Night soak 2026-10-21 (`audits/night-2026-10-21/P1-soak/08-load/proof.log`): cycle 36, `IMG_20120021.jpg` sent 19:38:30 UTC, the uploader gave up at its 600 s read limit; Immich's database holds 302 photos for that user, the other cycles 303 (`P1-soak/09-immich-cycle36.txt`). At that moment memory „full" pressure was 3.9 % and `/api/health` answered in 0.26 s. 1 of about 26 000 uploads that night. Not diagnosed: Immich restarted at 02:16 for the off-site dump, so its log of 19:38 is gone. The Immich phone app retries a failed upload. | WATCHING — **2026-10-22 night:** not reproducible tonight; the Immich server log of 19:38 is gone (Immich restarted at 02:16 for the off-site dump). What the household sees: the upload fails after 10 minutes and the Immich phone app sends it again. | — | Watch the next long upload run with the Immich server log saved; file upstream only with a log | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1267** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **Every recreate of Immich leaves one empty anonymous Docker volume behind: the image declares `VOLUME /data`, the template does not map it.** Found 2026-10-24 (review round 2, while putting 9202 back): 9202 holds 296 empty anonymous volumes; each night chain's recreate of `immich-server` made a new one (12:58, 13:00, 13:01 — the three test runs; the two dangling ones this session made were removed by name, nothing pruned). The photos are NOT affected: Immich picks `/usr/src/app/upload` whenever both folders exist (`detectMediaLocation` in the image's `server/dist/services/storage.service.js:28-39`), and the template binds that folder (`templates/immich/docker-compose.yml:49`) — NOT-A-FINDING for data placement. **Seen again 2026-10-24 night on Tester 1:** privatebin's image declares `/run`, `/tmp` and `/var/lib/nginx/tmp` as volumes — each recreate (the night dump's stop/start) leaves three empty anonymous volumes; the same class as Immich's `/data` (`audits/restore-holes-2026-10-24/P1-tester1/42-anon-volumes.txt`). | OPEN **2026-10-24 (catalog sweep):** the same class for OnlyOffice and RomM (RomM's image volume `/romm` holds only the empty mount points of its binds); after every catalog app had been removed WITH data, the sweep box still held 52 such volumes (PrivateBin 21, OnlyOffice 8, RomM 8, Immich 3, and 12 from 12:50–12:52 before the batch, holding the same nginx folders as PrivateBin's) — remove-with-data does not see them (no compose project label). All small (4–72 KB), no household data (`audits/catalog-sweep-2026-10-24/_box/anon-volumes.txt`). | — | declare the image's VOLUME paths as tmpfs or named volumes in the catalog (Immich, privatebin), or remove the dangling ones a recreate leaves, by name | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1268** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Remove with „remove backups” leaves a restore's undo copy on the drive (`backups/restore-undo/<app>/`).** Seen 2026-10-24 night on Tester 1 (restore-holes Part 1, run 1): MeTube was held for support after a failed crash put-back, then removed with `remove_backups=true` — the 1.5 GB copy stayed (the removal deletes `backups/primary` and the second-drive mirror, not `restore-undo`), and nothing lists it (`audits/restore-holes-2026-10-24/P1-tester1/14-run1-teardown.txt`; removed by hand, CC's own test data). The copy is kept on purpose while a hold exists; after the app is gone it is orphaned. | OPEN | — | Remove with `remove_backups` also deletes the app's `restore-undo` folder (under the same path guard), or lists it as a kept copy | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1267** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **Every recreate of Immich leaves one empty anonymous Docker volume behind: the image declares `VOLUME /data`, the template does not map it.** Found 2026-10-24 (review round 2, while putting 9202 back): 9202 holds 296 empty anonymous volumes; each night chain's recreate of `immich-server` made a new one (12:58, 13:00, 13:01 — the three test runs; the two dangling ones this session made were removed by name, nothing pruned). The photos are NOT affected: Immich picks `/usr/src/app/upload` whenever both folders exist (`detectMediaLocation` in the image's `server/dist/services/storage.service.js:28-39`), and the template binds that folder (`templates/immich/docker-compose.yml:49`) — NOT-A-FINDING for data placement. **Seen again 2026-10-24 night on Tester 1:** privatebin's image declares `/run`, `/tmp` and `/var/lib/nginx/tmp` as volumes — each recreate (the night dump's stop/start) leaves three empty anonymous volumes; the same class as Immich's `/data` (`audits/restore-holes-2026-10-24/P1-tester1/42-anon-volumes.txt`). | OPEN **2026-10-24 (catalog sweep):** the same class for OnlyOffice and RomM (RomM's image volume `/romm` holds only the empty mount points of its binds); after every catalog app had been removed WITH data, the sweep box still held 52 such volumes (PrivateBin 21, OnlyOffice 8, RomM 8, Immich 3, and 12 from 12:50–12:52 before the batch, holding the same nginx folders as PrivateBin's) — remove-with-data does not see them (no compose project label). All small (4–72 KB), no household data (`audits/catalog-sweep-2026-10-24/_box/anon-volumes.txt`). **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place G8: demo-hp holds 1,887 unnamed volumes (1,885 unused; 1,157 on 2026-10-15 — about 29 more each day), Tester 1 holds 380 (132 on 10-15 — about 10 a day), the N100 holds 1. Nobody measured what many thousands do to Docker. | — | declare the image's VOLUME paths as tmpfs or named volumes in the catalog (Immich, privatebin), or remove the dangling ones a recreate leaves, by name | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1329** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **cal.com runs on Node.js 20, which gets no security fixes any more** — v6.2.0 carries Node 20.20.0 (no fixed release on the 20 line for CVE-2026-111497) and Debian 12's unpatched `libbrotli1` 1.0.9-2+b6 (fixed: 1.0.9-2+deb12u1); the same image runs in the catalog and on DooPlex. Read from the image 2026-10-27; 2026-10-28: v6.2.0 is still the newest tag, no Node 22/24 image (`audits/runtime-fixes-2026-10-28/TABLE.md`). | OPEN **2026-11-02:** v6.2.0 is still the newest; its image still holds Node 20.20.0. | — | a cal.com release on Node 22/24 (a big step: its own walk); until then the watch lists it nightly | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1330** | Apps & catalog | P2 | **RomM's newest release (5.4.1) still ships Node.js 24.18.1 (CVE-2026-111497, fixed 24.22.1)** — no newer RomM exists (tags read 2026-10-27). Exposure: Node is IN the image but no Node process runs (RomM serves through Python gunicorn/rq and nginx — `ps` on demo-hp 9201), and RomM sits behind the setup gate. | OPEN — **RULED D61 = keep RomM offered** (operator 2026-10-28, starting the day brief; `09` §3 decision 277): the first RomM release with Node ≥ 24.22.1 is a lane step. 2026-10-28: 5.4.1 is still the newest tag (read from the registry). Earlier: CC's pick 2026-10-27 night **2026-11-02:** 5.4.1 is still the newest tag; its image still holds Node 24.18.1. | — | the watch flags it nightly (R-1327); the step when RomM ships | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1337** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **Calibre-Web (v4.0.8, the newest) loads a bad Brotli decoder: its `cps.py` maps Python Brotli 1.2.0 (fixed 1.2.1), Pillow's libbrotlidec 1.2.0 and Debian's libbrotlidec 1.1.0** — read from the process's maps on demo-hp 9201 (`audits/runtime-fixes-2026-10-28/calibre-web-brotli.txt`). Exposure: the Python decoder is urllib3's, for replies to the app's own outbound calls (book metadata), not for what a visitor sends — the Paperless shape (R-1331). No fixed release exists. `audits/runtime-fixes-2026-10-28/TABLE.md` | OPEN — filed 2026-10-28 (runtime fixes) **2026-11-02:** v4.0.8 is still the newest; its image still holds Brotli 1.2.0. | upstream: an image with Brotli ≥ 1.2.1 | take that release as a lane step; Debian's libbrotli1 fixed version is not known (R-1327's table has no Debian line) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1357** | Apps & catalog | P3 | **PrivateBin 2.1.0 has two public notices fixed in 2.1.1 (`GHSA-hw9p` comment replay by anyone who knows a paste id; `GHSA-c4gc` 2.1.0's XSS fix is ineffective), but no 2.1.1 exists: no release on GitHub and no `privatebin/pdo` tag (read 2026-11-02).** Public by design on a box; Tester 1 runs it. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 | upstream: a 2.1.1 image | the watch keeps it open; take the release as a lane step | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1360** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **Meilisearch v1.36.0 (Wanderer) and v1.41.0 (Karakeep) are 15–20 versions behind releases with „important security fixes" (v1.55.1, v1.56.1: long filters, rustls).** The search engine sits on the app's private network, so a stranger cannot reach it; its data needs a dump migration across such a jump: a big step. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 | — | a big step when one of the two apps is next moved | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1372** | Apps & catalog | P4 | **Four small places in the guest that nobody described: no limit, no cleaner or no check.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` places G6, G10, G15, D3). (1) **Helper images.** The product runs its helper jobs in `alpine` with no tag (seven call sites, e.g. `internal/backup/backup.go:988`); the bake pulls `hello-world`. None of the three image rules (decisions 53, 56, 285) can delete or refresh a helper image, so a box keeps the `alpine` of its first pull (4 months old on two boxes). (2) **Copies fetched from the off-site store** (`backups/offsite-restore/<app>`) have no age limit: the N100 holds 1.65 GB of two apps that are not installed any more. (3) **Container log caps** (10 MB × 3 files) are written once when the template is baked and never checked again on a running box. (4) **The guest's system log lives in memory** and is empty after each guest restart — a default nobody chose. **Members (answers marked N):** G6-3, G6-4, G10-7, G15-3, D3-3. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) | — | Controller: pin the helper image by tag in one place; delete an off-site restore copy when its app is removed with „delete backups too” or after N days. Docs: say in `11-os-updates.md` whether the guest log in memory is wanted. | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## App updates — 9 rows (P3 9)
|
||||
## App updates — 8 rows (P3 8)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -180,12 +180,14 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-401** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Revisit the off-site integrity depth when a real store is LARGE — the default rests on ONE measurement, on ONE 134 MB store.** Controller v0.228.0 (R-399) made `--read-data-subset=100%` the default for every box. The whole justification is a single data point: `demo-hp`, 2026-08-30, 140 829 678 B / 2 651 blobs / 67 snapshots, structure 35.0 s vs 100% **39.2 s** — four seconds. Re-proven live 2026-08-31 at 38.7 s. **It does not extrapolate, and the reason is structural: the structure check's cost tracks the INDEX, a read-data run's tracks the DATA.** A 50 GB store is ~370x the data and this curve says nothing about it. **Nothing was invented from that one point** — no rotation schedule, no size threshold, no bandwidth budget — because four production designs in this project were specced against unvalidated mechanisms and all four were wrong. **`readDataSubsetRe` already accepts `n/m`**, so a rotating schedule (`1/7` on a different seventh each week) needs no parser work when the time comes; the missing input is a measurement on a large store, not code. **THE TRIGGER IS AN EVENT, NOT A DATE:** the slow-check WARN from v0.228.0 firing on any box (`integritySlowNoticeThreshold`, 5 min) — that line names the duration, the depth and this row. **WHAT HAPPENS IF NOBODY ACTS:** every box re-reads its entire store every week, however large it grows, and the first person to notice is a customer whose upload is saturated. **Whoever acts must also revisit `integrityCheckTimeout` (30 min)**, which is now the number a large store meets first. | **OPEN — WATCHING** | — | When the WARN fires: measure the curve on that store, then choose between a rotation (`n/m`), a size-conditional default, or leaving it. Do NOT choose from this row's numbers — they are the small-store case. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-409** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Nothing in the product can vouch for the bytes of a restored recovery unit — the only hash record covers 0.002 % of it.** MEASURED on demo-hp 2026-08-31 against kimai's restored unit: `manifest.json`'s `checksums` object carries sha256 for `.felhom.yml` (2 235 B), `app.yaml` (488 B) and `docker-compose.yml` (2 195 B) — **4 918 bytes of a 213 231 242-byte unit**. The database dump (48 217 B) and the two named-volume tars (160 331 776 B + 52 845 056 B) — the recoverable data, 99.998 % of the bytes — have no recorded hash anywhere. **And nothing else supplies one:** restic 0.14.0's `restore --verify` is a size-and-mtime reconciliation (a size-and-mtime-preserving one-byte corruption of a 160 MB tar passed clean, red-proofed), and `restic ls --json` file nodes in 0.14.0 carry name, size, mode, uid/gid and three timestamps and **no content hash**. **So "the restore produced correct files" is currently unanswerable by any automated means.** **What is NOT claimed here:** `restic check --read-data-subset=100%` already proves the STORE's packs, and the config files that ARE hashed are the ones a wrong-content failure would be hardest to spot in. | **OPEN — MEDIUM** | R-87, R-361 | Cheapest fix, and it is already half-built: extend the capture's `checksums` to cover `db_dumps` and `volume_dumps` — R-361 already computes a canonical dump sha256 to prove itself, so the value exists at capture time. Then a restore-test has a real reference and R-87's narrow version becomes a content check rather than a completeness one. Evidence: `audits/SPIKE-restic-restore-test-2026-08-31.md` §Q2, §Q3. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-433** | Backup & restore | P3 | **A sub-account cannot reach ANY Storage Box snapshot, by any name — so clause (b) of the 2026-09-01 R-95 re-scope ("the rest is recoverable file by file") is NOT SUPPORTED.** MEASURED 2026-09-01 on `demo-hp` over the credential the box already holds, read-only, no delete verb issued. **The sweep:** a batched `stat -c %n` over Hetzner's port-23 restricted shell (500–600 paths per round trip, stdout carrying only paths that exist) tried **777,600** names of the vendor form `YYYY-MM-DDTHH-MM-SS` across nine full days at second granularity, and 126 alternative shapes — **zero resolved.** **The control is what makes the zero mean anything:** the identical 600-name batch with one real path appended returned it in 6 of 6 batches. **The structural cause:** `/home` (the customer data, `u629488-sub3`) is **st_dev 0,82**; `/.zfs/snapshot` is **st_dev 0,276**; `/home/.zfs` does not exist. A snapshot under `/.zfs/snapshot` belongs to a different dataset than the one holding `felhom-repo`. **What still stands:** clause (a) — the box can delete its live repository but cannot WRITE into `/.zfs/snapshot` — is unchanged and re-confirmed. **What is now open again:** the only routes to the older copy are a panel rollback of the WHOLE Storage Box (deletes newer snapshots, hits every customer on it) and the provider API (fenced by §11-D, and `hub/internal/hetznerapi/hetznerapi.go` has **no snapshot method at all**, so it needs new code regardless). **NOT ESTABLISHED, and it is the question that decides whether per-file recovery exists for anyone:** whether the MAIN account can see the snapshots. No main-account credential exists in this project. **The ranking is Viktor's; I am not re-ranking R-95 — but the argument that moved it down is the argument this drill removed.** `audits/evidence-drill-r95-recovery-2026-09-01/` **BLOCKED-ON-PROVIDER 2026-09-01.** The one question that can move this is drafted and ready to send: **Question 1** of `documentation/runbooks/provider-questions-2026-09-01.md` — *can the MAIN account retrieve individual files from a snapshot, without a whole-box restore?* **Neither answer leaves this row where it is:** "yes" makes per-file recovery real but permanently operator-only, and closes this; "no, full restore only" means the snapshots do not bound a single customer's exposure at all, because using them costs every other customer on the box their newer snapshots — **and R-95 becomes urgent.** Nothing here can progress without it, and it is not CC's to send (§11-D). Tracked by a dated check in the DUE-CHECKS block. **⚠ A TRAP ON THE WAY TO THIS ANSWER, found by the operator 2026-09-01 and armed against in the questions file: HETZNER HAS TWO SIMILARLY-NAMED PRODUCTS WHOSE DOCS SAY OPPOSITE THINGS.** **Storage SHARE** (a managed Nextcloud, NOT us) documents *"Currently, we only support restores for the full backup ZFS snapshot to a specific point in time"* (`docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-share/faq/backup-snapshot/`). **Storage BOX** (ours) documents the opposite — *"You can download individual files or entire directories as usual"* (`docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-box/snapshots/`). **A web search for the obvious phrasing surfaces the SHARE page, and it reads like a definitive NO.** Tell them apart by the giveaways: the Share page talks about *Nextcloud's data cache*, a *database dump* and the *konsoleH* interface, and never mentions Storage Box. **Why this is filed and not left as trivia: a support agent could answer Question 1 from the wrong page, and that answer would push this row to the top of the register for no reason.** Question 1 now names the product, quotes the Storage Box line, and says explicitly that we know what the Share FAQ says. **If an answer cites full-snapshot-only, check WHICH PRODUCT it is about before acting on it.** **Nothing in this repository ever leaned on the Share claim** — verified by grep at the time; the only vendor line we cite is the Storage Box one. **RE-DATED 2026-09-15 → 2026-09-22 (due-checks gate):** the operator mailbox read through the Gmail connector (`(from:hetzner OR subject:hetzner OR "Storage Box") after:2026/09/01`) holds no Hetzner reply — one match, our own `offsite_snapshots_dropped` alarm. Whether the two tickets were ever sent is not visible to CC; if they were not, sending them is the operator's act. **-- ANSWERED. Hetzner replied on ticket #2026090103040671; the operator supplied the thread on 2026-09-22 after this session searched for it and WRONGLY reported no answer (see the instrument note below and R-628).** **Q1 - can the MAIN account read individual files and directories out of a specific snapshot, without restoring the whole box?** Hetzner: *"With the main account it should be possible to download files and directories from the snapshot as it is stated in the documentation"*, citing `docs.hetzner.com/storage/storage-box/snapshots#access-to-snapshots`; and separately *"A restLine truncated
|
||||
| **R-540** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The hub knows exactly ONE off-site pool box, so there is no rule for what happens when it fills.** Read from source 2026-09-16 while making off-site the default: `HETZNER_POOL_BOX_ID` is a single value, and every shared customer becomes a sub-account on that box. With off-site now ON for every new customer (hub v0.116.0) the box fills faster, and the fill warning (80%/90% of the box, `monitor/offsite.go`) tells the operator it is filling but nothing says which box a new customer should land on. **Needs a selection rule** (least-full, or explicit per-customer), not a bigger box. No customer is at risk today: the pool box read 0.3% full (2.7 GB of 1 TB), Σ shared quota 150 GB, oversub 0.15x. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub)** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN (and money).** A selection rule needs a multi-box configuration and a second box. Next: an operator pick of the rule and its trigger (e.g. add box 2 at 70 %). | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-548** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The whole-guest backup’s LOCAL tier cannot fit on a small-system-disk box, and will retry on that tier for ever.** MEASURED 2026-09-17 (chaos night) on `tester-1-022354`: a whole-guest backup wrote a **~29 GB source** (`mp0` = `local-lvm:vm-9201-disk-1`, 70 G provisioned, 40.58 % used, `backup=1`) into `pve-root`, which on a 32 GB system disk is **14 GB total with ~4.9 GB free**. Two samples thirty seconds apart showed the archive growing ~497 MB while free space fell ~475 MB — **~16 MB/s, i.e. under four minutes to a full `/`** on the nested PVE. **The product’s behaviour is correct and legible throughout:** it failed the tier and said which one — `whole_guest_backup_failed` (error, operator-only): „Whole-guest backup FAILED on the local tier — retrying with backoff (next attempt in 15m0s)” — its status surface agreed (`target_id:"local"`, `success:false`, `size_bytes:0`), and the **off-site tier then ran from the same snapshot and succeeded in ~8½ minutes, encrypted to ep0, consuming no local disk at all**. So the data still left the house. What is filed is the loop: on a box shaped like this the local tier can **never** succeed, and it keeps retrying on a backoff for ever, burning I/O and risking `/` each time. **Honest caveat:** the 32 GB system disk is this drill’s fixture choice, so the row is conditional on disk size — but nothing in the product checks whether the local target could ever hold the source before trying. **Fix shape:** compare the source size against the target’s free space before starting the local tier and skip it with a clear reason, rather than discovering it at ~16 MB/s. Evidence: `audits/evidence-chaos-night-2026-09-17/round-6.txt`. **-- 2026-09-30, the class on a real box: demo-hp's whole-guest LOCAL tier was refused by the space preflight (R-685) 10 times since 2026-09-27** („local has 12.1 GiB free; the last archive of guest 9201 was 8.9 GiB, so a new one needs about 12.1 GiB") — its newest local archive was 2026-09-29 04:42, 30 h old at the day's read (the weekly PBS tier, last 2026-09-24, is its whole copy meanwhile). The refusal is correct and named; what is missing is that nothing gives the box the room back (the host's `local` holds the 8.9 GiB archive of the only guest plus templates on a 39 GB root). `audits/pg-last-six-2026-09-30/C/`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **2026-10-23 night (demo-hp, read only):** the local tier was refused 4 times (00:59–02:39 UTC) by the space preflight — `local has 8.5 GiB free; the last archive of guest 9201 was 6.5 GiB, so a new one needs about 9.2 GiB` — and the controller stopped 11 apps for about a minute before each refused try (then backed off 30 m → 2 h). The 2026-10-22 run had fit; `local` now also holds 6.4 GB of installer ISOs (1.27.1–1.30.0, the newest uploaded for yesterday's proof installs). Two halves: the box (free space on demo-hp: remove the superseded ISOs — a demo-hp housekeeping step, not done tonight) and the product (ask the agent's preflight BEFORE stopping the apps — R-921's shape for the local tier). **2026-10-23 day — the box half DONE:** the three superseded installer ISOs (1.27.1, 1.28.0, 1.29.0; no guest referenced them) removed from demo-hp's `local` by name (`pvesm free`); `/` 8.5 GB → 14 GB free (`df` before/after, `audits/day-2026-10-23/09-demohp-space.txt`), above the 9.2 GiB the preflight asks. 1.30.0 stays. **The product half — the proposed fix (R-921's pattern):** the agent already computes the space verdict (R-685: free vs the last archive × the margin); it serves it per guest on `GET /backup/status` next to `host_busy` — e.g. `local_space: {fits, need_bytes, free_bytes}` — and the controller reads it before any stop: when the local tier cannot fit, it stops no app, records the tier as skipped for space (the same contention record as R-921, one alarm after the ceiling), and still runs the other due tiers. An agent without the field keeps the old order. Tests to write first and red-prove: agent `TestBackupStatus_R548_LocalSpace`, controller `TestR548_NoStopWhenTheLocalTierCannotFit`. Rides the next agent + controller pair. **2026-11-03: demo-hp reached it too.** Its local tier has refused every try since 2026-10-30 („local has 9.4 GiB free; the last archive of guest 9201 was 9.1 GiB"; the disk is 39 GB, the newest archive 10-29), every 15 minutes: the mails `whole_guest_backup_failed` (08:11 CET, 2026-11-03) and `expected_backup_missed` (05:00 CET, „newest backup is 120h old"). PBS and off-site are not this tier. Not caused by the release. **2026-11-07 — the box half again (operator's yes):** still refused every ~4 h („local has 9.4 GiB free … needs about 12.4 GiB"), `expected_backup_missed` daily to 216 h, and the OS updates held behind it (`os_update_stale`). The journal had grown to 3.8 GB (journald's default cap on a 39 GB root); shrunk to 500 MB (`journalctl --vacuum-size=500M`, tLine truncated
|
||||
| **R-540** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The hub knows exactly ONE off-site pool box, so there is no rule for what happens when it fills.** Read from source 2026-09-16 while making off-site the default: `HETZNER_POOL_BOX_ID` is a single value, and every shared customer becomes a sub-account on that box. With off-site now ON for every new customer (hub v0.116.0) the box fills faster, and the fill warning (80%/90% of the box, `monitor/offsite.go`) tells the operator it is filling but nothing says which box a new customer should land on. **Needs a selection rule** (least-full, or explicit per-customer), not a bigger box. No customer is at risk today: the pool box read 0.3% full (2.7 GB of 1 TB), Σ shared quota 150 GB, oversub 0.15x. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC (hub)** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A DESIGN (and money).** A selection rule needs a multi-box configuration and a second box. Next: an operator pick of the rule and its trigger (e.g. add box 2 at 70 %). **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place O1, listed from documents only (the off-site box was not read in this run — second pass). | — | — | CC |
|
||||
| **R-548** | Backup & restore | P3 | **[P3-LOW] The whole-guest backup’s LOCAL tier cannot fit on a small-system-disk box, and will retry on that tier for ever.** MEASURED 2026-09-17 (chaos night) on `tester-1-022354`: a whole-guest backup wrote a **~29 GB source** (`mp0` = `local-lvm:vm-9201-disk-1`, 70 G provisioned, 40.58 % used, `backup=1`) into `pve-root`, which on a 32 GB system disk is **14 GB total with ~4.9 GB free**. Two samples thirty seconds apart showed the archive growing ~497 MB while free space fell ~475 MB — **~16 MB/s, i.e. under four minutes to a full `/`** on the nested PVE. **The product’s behaviour is correct and legible throughout:** it failed the tier and said which one — `whole_guest_backup_failed` (error, operator-only): „Whole-guest backup FAILED on the local tier — retrying with backoff (next attempt in 15m0s)” — its status surface agreed (`target_id:"local"`, `success:false`, `size_bytes:0`), and the **off-site tier then ran from the same snapshot and succeeded in ~8½ minutes, encrypted to ep0, consuming no local disk at all**. So the data still left the house. What is filed is the loop: on a box shaped like this the local tier can **never** succeed, and it keeps retrying on a backoff for ever, burning I/O and risking `/` each time. **Honest caveat:** the 32 GB system disk is this drill’s fixture choice, so the row is conditional on disk size — but nothing in the product checks whether the local target could ever hold the source before trying. **Fix shape:** compare the source size against the target’s free space before starting the local tier and skip it with a clear reason, rather than discovering it at ~16 MB/s. Evidence: `audits/evidence-chaos-night-2026-09-17/round-6.txt`. **-- 2026-09-30, the class on a real box: demo-hp's whole-guest LOCAL tier was refused by the space preflight (R-685) 10 times since 2026-09-27** („local has 12.1 GiB free; the last archive of guest 9201 was 8.9 GiB, so a new one needs about 12.1 GiB") — its newest local archive was 2026-09-29 04:42, 30 h old at the day's read (the weekly PBS tier, last 2026-09-24, is its whole copy meanwhile). The refusal is correct and named; what is missing is that nothing gives the box the room back (the host's `local` holds the 8.9 GiB archive of the only guest plus templates on a 39 GB root). `audits/pg-last-six-2026-09-30/C/`. | **READY — rank P3-LOW; owner: CC** **2026-10-23 night (demo-hp, read only):** the local tier was refused 4 times (00:59–02:39 UTC) by the space preflight — `local has 8.5 GiB free; the last archive of guest 9201 was 6.5 GiB, so a new one needs about 9.2 GiB` — and the controller stopped 11 apps for about a minute before each refused try (then backed off 30 m → 2 h). The 2026-10-22 run had fit; `local` now also holds 6.4 GB of installer ISOs (1.27.1–1.30.0, the newest uploaded for yesterday's proof installs). Two halves: the box (free space on demo-hp: remove the superseded ISOs — a demo-hp housekeeping step, not done tonight) and the product (ask the agent's preflight BEFORE stopping the apps — R-921's shape for the local tier). **2026-10-23 day — the box half DONE:** the three superseded installer ISOs (1.27.1, 1.28.0, 1.29.0; no guest referenced them) removed from demo-hp's `local` by name (`pvesm free`); `/` 8.5 GB → 14 GB free (`df` before/after, `audits/day-2026-10-23/09-demohp-space.txt`), above the 9.2 GiB the preflight asks. 1.30.0 stays. **The product half — the proposed fix (R-921's pattern):** the agent already computes the space verdict (R-685: free vs the last archive × the margin); it serves it per guest on `GET /backup/status` next to `host_busy` — e.g. `local_space: {fits, need_bytes, free_bytes}` — and the controller reads it before any stop: when the local tier cannot fit, it stops no app, records the tier as skipped for space (the same contention record as R-921, one alarm after the ceiling), and still runs the other due tiers. An agent without the field keeps the old order. Tests to write first and red-prove: agent `TestBackupStatus_R548_LocalSpace`, controller `TestR548_NoStopWhenTheLocalTierCannotFit`. Rides the next agent + controller pair. **2026-11-03: demo-hp reached it too.** Its local tier has refused every try since 2026-10-30 („local has 9.4 GiB free; the last archive of guest 9201 was 9.1 GiB"; the disk is 39 GB, the newest archive 10-29), every 15 minutes: the mails `whole_guest_backup_failed` (08:11 CET, 2026-11-03) and `expected_backup_missed` (05:00 CET, „newest backup is 120h old"). PBS and off-site are not this tier. Not caused by the release. **2026-11-07 — the box half again (operator's yes):** still refused every ~4 h („local has 9.4 GiB free … needs about 12.4 GiB"), `expected_backup_missed` daily to 216 h, and the OS updates held behind it (`os_update_stale`). The journal had grown to 3.8 GB (journald's default cap on a 39 GB root); shrunk to 500 MB (`journalctl --vacuum-size=500M`, tLine truncated
|
||||
| **R-933** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Mirror the images of every catalog app we support into our own registry, before scale.** Operator, 2026-10-12 (S8, `09` §3 decision 203): *„Will need to mirror the apps we support later, just to be sure."* Today a restore re-pulls each image from its maker; a version the maker deleted cannot start (the accepted limit, `07` §6.6, R-698 closed). Size it first: the supported catalog's images (every ladder version a box can hold) × their size; then where the copy lives (the DooPlex registry is Tier 2, precious — the copy must not make DooPlex a single point of failure for every household's restore) and how a restore falls back to it. | **OPEN** — NEW 2026-10-12 | the size measurement | Measure the total size of the supported catalog's images; then a one-page design (where, how a restore falls back, cost) | CC (measure + design), operator (the go) |
|
||||
| **R-1259** | Backup & restore | P3 | **The DooPlex→ep0 copy jobs: three edges and tomorrow's clock change (review round 2, HUNT-2 H6–H8, HUNT-4 H1).** The release copy keeps the newest 5 agent versions whether vouched or not, so five unvouched releases drop the vouched one from ep0 (`scripts/release-copy/felhom-release-copy:199,218,237`); its `rsync --delete` removes old versions during the transfer and mirrors a shrinking registry as deletions (`:190,237`); the hub-DB push has no lower age bound (`scripts/hub-db-backup/felhom-hub-db-backup:41,49-50`). VERIFIED on DooPlex: on 2026-10-25 the 02:30 CEST push runs at 00:30Z (`systemd-analyze calendar`) and the hub's 02:00 slot at 01:00Z (Go takes the repeated hour's second pass), so the push re-sends the 20:00 snapshot and the off-site hub DB is ~13.5 h old until 08:30. Operator data only. | OPEN | — | always keep the vouched agent; prune after a verified copy; a future-age bound; the push slot after the hub's in UTC | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1274** | Backup & restore | P3 | **The restore refusal tells the household to „turn on remote backup, or connect a second drive” when the box has both and their first copy has not run yet.** Catalog sweep 2026-10-24, Grimmory and Calibre-Web: „Mentés most” makes the local copy only (`07` §8, by design), so the drive files had no copy yet; the refusal's sentence is `restore.refuse.files.none` (`felhom-controller/controller/internal/web/handlers.go:1835`) whatever the box has. The Hungarian sentence is frozen by `i18n_go_parity`, so the fix is a NEW key („the first copy is made in tonight's backup”) chosen when a tier is set up but holds nothing yet. | OPEN | — | The new key + the branch + a test | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1366** | Backup & restore | P3 | **The whole-guest copy carries every Docker image, so it is mostly programs we could download again.** MEASURED 2026-11-09 on demo-hp guest 9201 (`docker system df -v`): the 32 GB source holds 27.5 GB of images — 13.2 GB used by containers, 9.8 GB the apps' undo images (decision 53, on purpose), 3.5 GB old controller and infrastructure images (deleted by hand the same day; controller v0.351.0 deletes them by itself) — and about 1.5 GB of Docker volumes plus 1.3 GB `sys_drive`. Packed: 9.8 GB, on a 39 GB system disk (R-548). The N100's copy is 1.5 GB (few apps). A copy without the images would be about a tenth of the size, but a whole-guest restore is the disaster path and would then need every image pulled again — an upstream tag can be gone (R-933 is the mirror). This is a design choice about the disaster path, not a defect. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-09 | operator decision | Options to put to the operator: (a) keep the images in every tier and size the local target (a backup drive, or the local tier skipped when it cannot fit — R-548); (b) the LOCAL tier only leaves the images out (`vzdump --exclude-path` on Docker's `image/` and `overlay2/`) and its restore re-pulls, PBS and off-site keep them; (c) no tier keeps them, after R-933. Measure first on scratch 9202: a whole-guest restore of a copy without images, every app back and the time it took. Evidence: `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/demo-hp-images-2026-11-09/` (off-git, DooPlex) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1366** | Backup & restore | P3 | **The whole-guest copy carries every Docker image, so it is mostly programs we could download again.** MEASURED 2026-11-09 on demo-hp guest 9201 (`docker system df -v`): the 32 GB source holds 27.5 GB of images — 13.2 GB used by containers, 9.8 GB the apps' undo images (decision 53, on purpose), 3.5 GB old controller and infrastructure images (deleted by hand the same day; controller v0.351.0 deletes them by itself) — and about 1.5 GB of Docker volumes plus 1.3 GB `sys_drive`. Packed: 9.8 GB, on a 39 GB system disk (R-548). The N100's copy is 1.5 GB (few apps). A copy without the images would be about a tenth of the size, but a whole-guest restore is the disaster path and would then need every image pulled again — an upstream tag can be gone (R-933 is the mirror). This is a design choice about the disaster path, not a defect. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-09 **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place H3 (answer H3-2): no new measurement; the row is the only answer to „what makes the whole-guest copy grow”. | operator decision | Options to put to the operator: (a) keep the images in every tier and size the local target (a backup drive, or the local tier skipped when it cannot fit — R-548); (b) the LOCAL tier only leaves the images out (`vzdump --exclude-path` on Docker's `image/` and `overlay2/`) and its restore re-pulls, PBS and off-site keep them; (c) no tier keeps them, after R-933. Measure first on scratch 9202: a whole-guest restore of a copy without images, every app back and the time it took. Evidence: `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/demo-hp-images-2026-11-09/` (off-git, DooPlex) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1312** | Backup & restore | P3 | **The hub customer page's off-site switch did not reach the box: on Tester 1 (2026-10-27, operator-attended, ~14:00–14:12 UTC) the box's saved off-site target stayed `enabled` and its `controller.yaml` `offsite.enabled: true` (unchanged since 2026-10-04) while the hub showed off-site OFF.** So what the switch stops on the box side is not known: the controller reads `cfg.Offsite.Enabled` only at start (`cmd/controller/main.go:890`), and nothing rewrote the file. Either the switch is hub-side only by design (then the page must say so), or a box keeps pushing off-site while the operator believes it is off. Found by the R-1218 live attempt (R-1218 closed 2026-10-27 with its live proof waived by the operator). | OPEN | — | Read the hub handler behind the switch and what it changes (config, tenancy, storage access); then one attended run: switch off, watch the box's next off-site push (does it run, does it fail at the storage) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1268** | Backup & restore | P3 | **Remove with „remove backups” leaves a restore's undo copy on the drive (`backups/restore-undo/<app>/`).** Seen 2026-10-24 night on Tester 1 (restore-holes Part 1, run 1): MeTube was held for support after a failed crash put-back, then removed with `remove_backups=true` — the 1.5 GB copy stayed (the removal deletes `backups/primary` and the second-drive mirror, not `restore-undo`), and nothing lists it (`audits/restore-holes-2026-10-24/P1-tester1/14-run1-teardown.txt`; removed by hand, CC's own test data). The copy is kept on purpose while a hold exists; after the app is gone it is orphaned. | OPEN **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place D5 (answer D5-4): the folder does not exist on any of the three boxes today; nothing new measured. | — | Remove with `remove_backups` also deletes the app's `restore-undo` folder (under the same path guard), or lists it as a kept copy | CC |
|
||||
| **R-91** | Backup & restore | P4 | Old 13 GB datastore copy at `/srv/pbs-felhom` on ep0's root disk **Checked from source 2026-10-05 (burn-down round 2):** Gate is long past (row waits on demo-felhom's first post-migration PBS backup, migration 2026-07-27). Last positive record of the copy: audits/CAMPAIGN-9-restore-proof-2026-07-28.md:759 'ep0 : /srv/pbs-felhom rollback copy intact (13G)'; CONTEXT.md:3666 still says it is 13 G of dead weight awaiting R-91. No later record of deletion found (grep srv/pbs-felhom across felhom.eu). Deleting is on ep0 (protected) and needs an operator word. | WATCHING | demo-felhom's first **post-migration** PBS backup | Delete once it lands; fix `CONTEXT.md:1018` same commit | CC |
|
||||
| **R-164** | Backup & restore | P4 | **C2's chain: the DB volume tar cannot be dropped until a SOUND dump predicate exists.** The unit carries both a volume tar and a SQL dump; the restore uses **both** — the dump is authoritative and replayed *after* the tar so it WINS (F17), with only the DB service up (R-47) — `internal/backup/restore_unit.go:262-266`. Dropping the DB container's tar would halve DB-app units **and** close the R-127(b) initdb-skip password trap (restored PGDATA ⇒ `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` ignored). | **BLOCKED** — on the predicate | a dump-validity predicate that is not `accounts has rows` | **The obvious gate is DEAD, measured:** `ValidateDump` warns when the `accounts` table is empty, and that warning was **correct** — the live DB genuinely had 0 accounts, and seeding one stopped the warning and put the row in the dump. But **a fresh appliance legitimately has zero accounts**, so promoting that predicate to a gate would **block every new customer's first backup**. Order: (1) a sound predicate — dump vs **live** per-table counts, not an absolute expectation; (2) warn→gate; (3) tar-drop. **Until (1), the tar is load-bearing** — not because dumps are bad, but because nothing can yet prove one is good. Pairs with **R-127** | CC |
|
||||
| **R-213** | Backup & restore | P4 | **Putting files back in place — the half the recovery screen deliberately does not do.** The screen (R-193, controller v0.200.0) unlocks the repository and LISTS what is in it; restoring is per-app and lives in the backups area, and the operator ruled the two separate on 2026-08-05: *a screen that unlocks and then offers to overwrite is two decisions wearing one button*. What is missing is the step after the listing — a customer who can now SEE their files still has to work out, per app, which restore to choose. **The operator named its requirement: a live-versus-backup comparison** — the customer must be able to see what would change before anything is overwritten | **DEFERRED** — operator ruling 2026-10-12 (S18, `09` §3 decision 213): designed after the first customers. Stays P4; re-dated: look again when the first paying household has run 30 days. **OPEN — not started, deliberately** | the comparison design (nothing exists for it yet) | After the first customers | Operator + CC |
|
||||
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-832** | Backup & restore | P4 | **ep0's copy in a place outside both Hetzner and the operator's home (roadmap).** Today DooPlex (the operator's home) holds it (decision 71). A Hetzner Storage Box would share a provider with ep0 and with every household's file backups, and cannot run PBS, so the copy could not be verified or restored from directly. | **DEFERRED — later, if the product grows** | — | — | operator |
|
||||
| **R-878** | Backup & restore | P4 | **A catch-up (R-871) runs the database-dump leg in the DAY, and that leg stops an app with a volume for its copy — the household may notice the stop, and a large volume makes it longer.** MEASURED 2026-10-05 on demo-felhom: the catch-up at 08:25:02 stopped opengist, copied 182.5 KB, started it again — about 1 s, then a few seconds of `health: starting`; the night does exactly the same, unseen. Nothing measured for a large volume. Fix direction (if it matters): skip the volume copy of a running app in a DAYTIME catch-up and leave it to the next night, or warn. `audits/catchup-2026-10-05/partA/live-demo-felhom.txt` | **READY — owner: CC** **2026-10-05 (burn-down night): NEEDS A LIVE MEASUREMENT** — a timed catch-up on 9202 for an app with a multi-GB volume, then the skip-or-warn choice. | — | measure a large volume first | CC |
|
||||
| **R-32** | Backup & restore | P4 | **[P2-HIGH] RESET must purge the customer base dir; the orphan card must stay honest; unattributed bytes must be visible.** The rehearsal's S7 said in advance that an orphan card would BE a finding — and one appeared (16:58:14). Cause: RESET's `"hetzner":"ok"` leg destroys the sub-account, but **a Hetzner sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object** — its directory survives, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext, encrypted under a key that same RESET had destroyed. **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-21, size M, roadmap state `idea`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** **2026-10-06 night: design written** (`audits/night-burndown-2026-10-06/design-R-32.md`) — pick A: purge the repo + set-aside copies through the sub-account's own password login BEFORE deleting it (no main-account credential); the „repo data destroyed" comment at `hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go:276-280` is false for the shared tier; part (3) waits on a read-only measurement (`du` on port 23). Operator: agree to route A. **2026-10-07 07:58: `09` §3 decision 167 — option A yes, and delete the old RESET leftovers once.** **2026-10-07 (Part D step 2, read only):** the hub shows bx11 holding 3.3 GB of data while the four live customers account for ~0.6 GB → **~2.7 GB belongs to no live customer**; no live customer shows a set-aside folder, so the leftovers are in homes whose sub-account is gone, reachable only by the pool box's MAIN account. **The one-time clean-up is STOPPED:** no main-account login for bx11 is held on DooPlex (the API token in the credentials file sees no box). Needs: the main-account login, or the operator lists and deletes in the Hetzner console (`audits/day-2026-10-07/D/D2-listing-readonly.txt`). **2026-10-07: option A DELIVERED (hub 0.142.0):** RESET purges the repo and every `.orphaned-*` through the sub-account's own login before deleting it, and keeps the sub-account if the purge fails (red-proved, `audits/day-2026-10-07/D/`). Not yet seen live (no scratch RESET today). **The one-time clean-up of the ~2.7 GB of leftovers is STOPPED:** it needs the pool box's main-account login (see above). **2026-10-07 14:43 — `09` §3 decision 173: leave the ~2.7 GB of old leftovers for now; re-ranked P2 → P4.** Option A itself is delivered (hub 0.142.0). What stays open is ONLY the leftovers: they were computed (box total minus live customers), never listed, and deleting them needs the pool box's MAIN login, which reaches every customer's data. **Blocker: a safe main-account path.** **2026-10-22: Tester 2's planned RESET (operator ruling 2026-10-22 14:11, `pilot/TESTER2-handover.md`) will be the purge's first live run — CC reads its leg journal after.** **2026-10-22 12:56 UTC — the first live run (Tester 2's RESET, `audits/tester2-reset-2026-10-22/`): PASS for what it could show.** The hetzner leg logged in with the sub-account's own password, listed the folder, found NO repository (`purged … 0 path(s) []` — the box never ran an off-site backup; the hub never held a listing for it), re-listed, then deleted sub-account 322460; leg `ok`. The other customers' repositories are unchanged (each listed after the reset with its box's own key: demo-hp 303, tester-1 62, demo-felhom 43 = the hub's 05:10 listing; Tester4 has no box — the hub's own listing on 2026-10-23 05:10 compares it). **Not yet seen live: the removal of a folder that holds data** (the `rm -rf` branch) — the next RESET of a customer with off-site history shows it. Open as before: only the old leftovers. **Dated check 2026-10-23 (DUE-CHECKS):** read the hub's 05:10 UTC listing of Tester4 (72 entries on 2026-10-22) and its `offsite_snapshots_vanished` events — the one other customer whose folder CC could not re-list. **2026-10-23 dated check — DONE:** the hub's 05:10 UTC listing of Tester4 holds 80 snapshot files = the 72 of 2026-10-22 plus 8 new ones from the night's box (`8 new snapshot file(s), each inside a reported box run`), none vanished, no `offsite_snapshots_vanished` (hub log 07:10:03 CEST, `audits/night-2026-10-23/P4-testnight/`). Tester 2's RESET touched no other customer's folder. | — | **Ruling from the run (three parts, deliberately separate):** (1) because RESET destroys custody, the ciphertext it leaves behind is unrecoverable **BY DESIGN** → RESET gains a **main-account purge of the customer base dir** (the existing operator ack already covers it); (2) the **move-aside guard STAYS** for reinstall-*without*-RESET — there custody survives and the card's "history recoverable" promise is true (R-26 depends on exactly that); (3) the operator **Restic tab shows per-customer directory bytes vs attributed snapshot bytes**, so dead data cannot hide. Measured on theLine truncated
|
||||
| **R-1087** | Backup & restore | P4 | **Whole-box copies left on the OLD local target are never pruned after the target moves.** MEASURED 2026-10-15 (storage-identity build B space check): the N100's host root (`local`) holds three copies from 2026-07-28 (5.5–5.7 GB each, ≈ 16.8 GB); its agent's `local_backup_target` is now `felhom-backup` (the USB disk, retention 3), and retention prunes only the current target. On a small-root box such leftovers would starve the local copies (R-548). Evidence: `audits/storage-identity-buildB-2026-10-15/space/felhom-pve-9201.txt`. | OPEN | — | Decide whether the agent prunes its own `vzdump-lxc-<vmid>-*` files on a former target (after a newer copy exists on the new one), or the target move asks; until then, the N100's three July files can be removed by hand with the operator's word. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1087** | Backup & restore | P4 | **Whole-box copies left on the OLD local target are never pruned after the target moves.** MEASURED 2026-10-15 (storage-identity build B space check): the N100's host root (`local`) holds three copies from 2026-07-28 (5.5–5.7 GB each, ≈ 16.8 GB); its agent's `local_backup_target` is now `felhom-backup` (the USB disk, retention 3), and retention prunes only the current target. On a small-root box such leftovers would starve the local copies (R-548). Evidence: `audits/storage-identity-buildB-2026-10-15/space/felhom-pve-9201.txt`. | OPEN **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place H4: the N100 still holds the three copies of 2026-07-28 (17.59 GB with their logs). A second instance: demo-hp holds four copies of 2026-08-03…08-21 (5.10 GB) on `/mnt/hdd_1/dump`, its former target. | — | Decide whether the agent prunes its own `vzdump-lxc-<vmid>-*` files on a former target (after a newer copy exists on the new one), or the target move asks; until then, the N100's three July files can be removed by hand with the operator's word. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1171** | Backup & restore | P3 | **demo-hp's LOCAL whole-guest copy is never restore-tested: the box keeps one copy (keep-daily 1) and the restore test wants a copy 24 h old, so the only copy turns 24 h old exactly when the next night replaces it.** Read 2026-10-20 on demo-hp (agent journal): every 6-hourly evaluation since 2026-10-18 says `local: no settled archive yet — nothing to prove`; the local storage holds one 9201 archive; the last local proof was 2026-10-14 03:42 (`settle=24h`, `keep_last=1`, `prune=keep-daily=1`). The hub's `restore_test_stale` (168 h) will alarm from ~2026-10-21 03:42. A real household with retention 1 would be the same. | OPEN — filed 2026-10-20 **2026-11-02 read (journal):** demo-hp's local copy passed a scheduled restore-test on 2026-10-30 10:44 (`audits/security-2026-11-02/part4/restore-test-demo-hp.txt`), so „never” no longer holds; one pass, read once. Close after the next one. | demo-hp `journalctl -u felhom-agent` („restore-test evaluated"), the hub's host report `restore_tests` | Agent: a tier that keeps ONE copy proves its newest archive once it is older than the settle time measured from the BACKUP's end, not 24 h — or a settle below the cadence (e.g. 6 h) for a 1-copy tier; a test; then read the next evaluation | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1172** | Backup & restore | P4 | **After option A (R-893): a failed off-site restore that was PUT BACK is logged at ERROR, and an empty `backups/restore-undo/` folder stays on disk.** Measured on 9202 2026-10-20 (rc.1): the web handler logs `[ERROR] [web] off-box reconstitute rallly (async): … Nem változott semmi…` — good news at ERROR; the put-back removes the per-app folder but not the empty `restore-undo/` parent. Small; 0.336.0 was already pushed (a version is pushed once). | OPEN — filed 2026-10-20 | `audits/night2-2026-10-20/P2/live/11-controller-log-window.txt`, `12-after-failed-restore.txt` | Next controller release: the put-back outcome logged at WARN (its own sentence is the household's), the empty parent removed; a test | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1173** | Backup & restore | P3 | **R-921's consequence (no app stop for an off-site tier the agent will refuse) has not been seen live.** Agent 0.161.0 serves `host_busy` (proven live on demo-hp 2026-10-20 during a press: busy `backup:local`), and controller ≥ 0.335.0 reads it — but the case only arises on the night schedule (a manual press backs up the local tier only), so the no-stop branch is proven by its red-proved test alone. | OPEN — filed 2026-10-20 **2026-10-23 dated check — DONE (the other outcome):** demo-hp's off-site (PBS) tier ran 2026-10-22 20:42:53–20:49:48 UTC with nothing in flight (quiesce → started → snapshotted → early resume → done); no `host is busy` case arose, so the R-921 no-stop branch is still proven by its test alone. Tonight only the local tier was due (refused by space, R-548). Kept open; no new date — it reads itself the night a busy host meets a due off-site tier. | `audits/night2-2026-10-20/P1/1b-host-busy-poll.txt` | Read demo-hp's controller log after the night its off-site (pbs) tier is due (~2026-10-22): a `host is busy … no app is stopped (R-921)` line, or the off-site tier starting with nothing in flight | CC |
|
||||
@@ -215,10 +217,10 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-1231** | Backup & restore | P4 | **The recovery page says the box's host service is „older” when the controller only cannot tell.** Test night 2026-10-23 (`P4-testnight/07a-unlock-refused-fixture-version.txt`): with the agent's capability `unknown` (a version string it could not compare), the page read „…a hozzá tartozó házon belüli szolgáltatás régebbi… A gép magától frissül”. The same page is reached by a merely-down agent, for which „older” and „updates itself” are not true. | OPEN | — | A separate sentence for `unknown` („a gép most nem éri el a házon belüli szolgáltatást — próbáld újra pár perc múlva”); a render test per state; rides a controller release | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1235** | Backup & restore | P3 | **The release copy on ep0 (D33) is proven to load, not yet to restore a registry — and it follows the newest versions, not the ones the fleet needs.** Built 2026-10-23 (`scripts/release-copy/`, `audits/day-2026-10-23/08-release-copy-D33.txt`). (a) `total-loss-of-dooplex.md` „Restore the release copy” steps 2 (skopeo push back, same digest) and 3 (agent packages back) were never walked into a real new registry — only a `docker load` on 9202. (b) The copy keeps the newest 3 image tags and 5 agent versions; it does not ask the hub for the floor and the vouched agent and always include them — a vouch more than 5 releases behind would fall out. (c) The golden (`felhom-golden`, 637 MB for 0.331.0) is not copied: a new install after a DooPlex loss needs it (the brief named images + agent packages only; one golden fits under the 3 GB cap). | OPEN | — | (a) a throwaway registry on demo-hp, push one tag back, compare digests; (b) read `/configuration`'s floor + vouched agent; (c) the operator says whether the golden goes in | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1263** | Backup & restore | P4 | **Small items from review round 2:** a LOCAL restore's put-back mails the operator „its off-site restore FAILED” (`felhom-controller/controller/cmd/controller/main.go:1514-1518`, shared via `restore_unit.go:517-518`); Remove — even „keep my data” — deletes undeclared volumes labelled with the app's project, which no tier holds (`internal/stacks/delete.go:763-764`, R-1117); the capped copy's `--delete` reads the source in the daemon's mount view, the emptiness check in the controller's (`tier2.go:834` vs `:464`); stale comments — `felhom-agent/internal/localapi/backup_cap.go:15` („keep-last”) and `restore_crash_putback.go:32` (names a test file that does not exist); the qBittorrent password goes to whatever answers the DNS name `qbittorrent` (`upwatch/explain.go:94,108-113`); kept-copy Remove has a check-to-remove gap (`tier2_kept.go:92-111`); the release-copy restore check trusts hashes stored on ep0 (`runbooks/total-loss-of-dooplex.md`); rrsync without `-munge`/`-wo` (`audits/day-2026-10-23/08-release-copy-D33.txt:6`). | OPEN | — | fix in each repo's next attended pass | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1294** | Backup & restore | P3 | **demo-hp's weekly off-site clean-up was refused by its own guard on 2026-10-26 (window 16): the plan would remove 209 of 359 snapshots, above the week's cap (179) — nothing was deleted, and each refused week adds to the next plan.** Seen in the operator mailbox during the 2026-10-26 release run (03:17Z, `offsite_prune_guard_refused`, error; details `count_before 359, count_after 359, outcome guard-refused`). The cap refusal is kept on purpose (R-824, R-867 closed the false ones); the open question is whether a store that once exceeds the cap can ever prune again by itself, or refuses every week while it grows. demo-hp is the Tier-0 box with many hand-made backups (sweeps, probes). Earlier cap refusals: demo-hp 2026-10-03 (window 1), demo-felhom 2026-10-05 (window 3). | **OPEN — the grant is SET (D55 = 260, `09` §3 decision 268)**: 2026-10-26 19:10:31Z through the operator's one-purpose token `cc-d55-window`, read back `max:260`; it is used at demo-hp's next window request (after its nightly off-site run, ~03:15Z). Close when that window prunes; then the operator revokes the token. **Earlier:** WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — 2026-10-26 evening: CC could NOT set the D54 grant — `POST /offsite/window-grant/demo-hp` (`max_remove=220`) with CC's hub token answered **403 „missing scope offsite:write"** (the hub log shows the refusal; nothing granted). The plan also grows: restic's dry-run 2026-10-26 18:56Z still 359 copies / plan 209 / default cap 179 (before tonight's run); a simulation of the keep rule adds ~14 per night (14 of 18 groups back up nightly), so ~223 at the night of 10-27 and ~237 at 10-28 — a cap of 220 would be refused again. STATUS D55: the operator grants it, with the cap. The grant opens the box's NEXT window request, which comes after its next nightly off-site run. Ruled D54 = prune once (`09` §3 decision 266). **Earlier:** WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — 2026-10-26 (read only, `audits/r1294-offsite-cap-2026-10-26/`): the plan is HONEST (restic's own dry-run: keep 150, remove 209; every removal 7–30 days old; every app keeps ≥ 9 or its last copies; the bulk is one test day, 2026-10-16, 152 snapshots). It can NOT recover by itself: the cap is half the store and grows ~49/week while the plan grows ~84/week. Only demo-hp has this shape (demo-felhom and Tester 1 pruned normally 10-26). The pick is STATUS D54. **Earlier:** OPEN | — | read the guard's cap rule (controller off-site prune) against demo-hp's snapshot list: is the plan honest (old, superseded) or not; if honest, say how such a store gets back under the cap (an attended one-time prune, or a cap that follows the store) — a design question for the operator if it changes what a box may delete | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1294** | Backup & restore | P3 | **demo-hp's weekly off-site clean-up was refused by its own guard on 2026-10-26 (window 16): the plan would remove 209 of 359 snapshots, above the week's cap (179) — nothing was deleted, and each refused week adds to the next plan.** Seen in the operator mailbox during the 2026-10-26 release run (03:17Z, `offsite_prune_guard_refused`, error; details `count_before 359, count_after 359, outcome guard-refused`). The cap refusal is kept on purpose (R-824, R-867 closed the false ones); the open question is whether a store that once exceeds the cap can ever prune again by itself, or refuses every week while it grows. demo-hp is the Tier-0 box with many hand-made backups (sweeps, probes). Earlier cap refusals: demo-hp 2026-10-03 (window 1), demo-felhom 2026-10-05 (window 3). | **OPEN — the grant is SET (D55 = 260, `09` §3 decision 268)**: 2026-10-26 19:10:31Z through the operator's one-purpose token `cc-d55-window`, read back `max:260`; it is used at demo-hp's next window request (after its nightly off-site run, ~03:15Z). Close when that window prunes; then the operator revokes the token. **Earlier:** WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — 2026-10-26 evening: CC could NOT set the D54 grant — `POST /offsite/window-grant/demo-hp` (`max_remove=220`) with CC's hub token answered **403 „missing scope offsite:write"** (the hub log shows the refusal; nothing granted). The plan also grows: restic's dry-run 2026-10-26 18:56Z still 359 copies / plan 209 / default cap 179 (before tonight's run); a simulation of the keep rule adds ~14 per night (14 of 18 groups back up nightly), so ~223 at the night of 10-27 and ~237 at 10-28 — a cap of 220 would be refused again. STATUS D55: the operator grants it, with the cap. The grant opens the box's NEXT window request, which comes after its next nightly off-site run. Ruled D54 = prune once (`09` §3 decision 266). **Earlier:** WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — 2026-10-26 (read only, `audits/r1294-offsite-cap-2026-10-26/`): the plan is HONEST (restic's own dry-run: keep 150, remove 209; every removal 7–30 days old; every app keeps ≥ 9 or its last copies; the bulk is one test day, 2026-10-16, 152 snapshots). It can NOT recover by itself: the cap is half the store and grows ~49/week while the plan grows ~84/week. Only demo-hp has this shape (demo-felhom and Tester 1 pruned normally 10-26). The pick is STATUS D54. **Earlier:** OPEN **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place O1, listed from documents only (the off-site box was not read in this run — second pass). | — | read the guard's cap rule (controller off-site prune) against demo-hp's snapshot list: is the plan honest (old, superseded) or not; if honest, say how such a store gets back under the cap (an attended one-time prune, or a cap that follows the store) — a design question for the operator if it changes what a box may delete | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1362** | Backup & restore | P3 | **With the internet down, the Backups page takes over 2 minutes (135 s and 145 s measured; 5 s with only the hub down).** Walked 2026-11-03 on Tester 1: every other page answers at once on the home network. The page waits on something off-site inside its handler; a household that lost its line and opens exactly this page sees a hang. `audits/security-2026-11-02/part5/outage-wan.log` | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 | — | name the wait with a timing, then give it a short deadline and show „the off-site state could not be read" | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Storage & devices — 14 rows (P3 4, P4 10)
|
||||
## Storage & devices — 13 rows (P3 4, P4 9)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -236,7 +238,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-1275** | Storage & devices | P4 | **An English household sees the drive names in Hungarian** on the install page (and wherever a storage label shows): „Belső tárhely — 52.0 GB free (default)”, „Külső tárhely (hdd_1)” (catalog sweep 2026-10-24, `audits/catalog-sweep-2026-10-24/navidrome/page-install-en.txt`). The label is stored once, in Hungarian, when the drive is found (`felhom-controller/controller/internal/settings/settings.go` `InferStorageLabel`); a household may rename it. | OPEN | — | Render a label that still equals the inferred default in the reader's language; a test per language | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1276** | Storage & devices | P4 | **„Remove with data” leaves the app's empty parent folder** (`<drive>/appdata/<app>`) when the template binds a subfolder: Grimmory, RomM, Paperless-ngx (catalog sweep 2026-10-24; 4 KB each; the bound folders were removed). Harmless (empty, not counted as old data), untidy for a household that browses the drive. | OPEN | — | Remove the parent when it is empty after the bound folders go; a test | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Security & access — 30 rows (P1 2, P2 6, P3 15, P4 7)
|
||||
## Security & access — 28 rows (P1 2, P2 5, P3 14, P4 7)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -268,15 +270,17 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-1237** | Security & access | P3 | **The nightly CC-secrets sweep found stored one-time codes in a session record dated 2026-10-23: 14 names in one file (bind tokens and setup codes of test boxes — NIGHT_2026_10_23_*, FIXES_2026_10_21_*, NIGHT_2026_10_21_*, REHEARSAL_2026_10_20_* — and R_DEMO_FELHOM in a file of 2026-10-20).** Mail „[DooPlex CC secrets] 2 secret name(s) found in old session records", 2026-10-23 01:57 UTC, read in the day session (names only). One file holding all of them suggests one command printed many stored values at once (a listing or a dump) in the night session. All but R_DEMO_FELHOM are one-time install codes of test boxes; NIGHT_2026_10_23_* die when Tester4-16fdef is deleted (the operator's do list). | **OPEN** — 2026-10-27 (operator yes): the dead names were REMOVED from the store with `sec rm` (46, one commit each; `audits/r1299-window-button-2026-10-27/sec-rm.txt`, names only): every one-time code this row names is gone; R_DEMO_FELHOM stays (unsure). Consequence: the nightly sweep no longer watches for the removed values — they open nothing (their boxes are destroyed). The session transcripts themselves are unchanged — that question stays here. **Earlier:** OPEN | — | CC: find the file and the command by the sweep's own report (names only), add a hook shape for that command if it is not one; R_DEMO_FELHOM (demo-felhom's recovery code) — the operator decides whether to rotate it | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1248** | Security & access | P3 | **An app's own numbers can lie: an attacker with code inside an app's container can answer the app's API with whatever matches its flood, and the upload watch (R-1244) would then call it explained.** Measured remedy, not built: a per-container upload ceiling with `tc` from a helper container in the app's network namespace — on scratch 9202 (unprivileged) a flood was held at 19.9–20.1 Mbit/s and the app kept answering (`audits/SPIKE-upload-watch-2026-10-23.md` §5). Costs: a helper image with `tc` (a new external image, or `tc` in the controller image), `NET_ADMIN` for that helper, re-applied after each app restart. | OPEN | an operator decision (the new image / capability) | Decide; if yes, CC builds the ceiling for the download and media apps first | operator |
|
||||
| **R-1309** | Security & access | P4 | **What no automated source shows: a fix announced only by mail, forum or a blog we do not read; a security fix nobody calls one (cloudflared 2026.10.2's „bump distroless image"); closed-source apps (Plex, Emby).** The watch (R-1303) shows these only as BEHIND (weekly). The vendor mails the operator receives stay a source. `audits/security-watch-2026-10-26/SPIKE.md` | OPEN — filed 2026-10-26 (a stated limit) | — | none until a vendor offers a feed; add a vendor's feed to `security_watch.FEEDS` when one exists | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1312** | Backup & restore | P3 | **The hub customer page's off-site switch did not reach the box: on Tester 1 (2026-10-27, operator-attended, ~14:00–14:12 UTC) the box's saved off-site target stayed `enabled` and its `controller.yaml` `offsite.enabled: true` (unchanged since 2026-10-04) while the hub showed off-site OFF.** So what the switch stops on the box side is not known: the controller reads `cfg.Offsite.Enabled` only at start (`cmd/controller/main.go:890`), and nothing rewrote the file. Either the switch is hub-side only by design (then the page must say so), or a box keeps pushing off-site while the operator believes it is off. Found by the R-1218 live attempt (R-1218 closed 2026-10-27 with its live proof waived by the operator). | OPEN | — | Read the hub handler behind the switch and what it changes (config, tenancy, storage access); then one attended run: switch off, watch the box's next off-site push (does it run, does it fail at the storage) | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Box system & updates — 17 rows (P3 11, P4 6)
|
||||
## Box system & updates — 18 rows (P3 13, P4 5)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **R-1301** | Box system & updates | P3 | **The N100's Proxmox host keeps no time: `chrony` fails at every boot** („Fatal error : Could not send notification to $NOTIFY_SOCKET", seen 2026-10-16 and 2026-10-21 boots); measured 2026-10-26 20:06 UTC: the host clock 14 s behind DooPlex and demo-hp, `System clock synchronized: no`. demo-hp has the same package (4.8-4~bpo13+2) and `DAEMON_OPTS="-F 1"` and runs it. A drifting host clock feeds backup times (R-1206's class) and TLS. Found while timing the cloudflared update (R-1300). `audits/cloudflared-2026.10.3-2026-10-26/obs-n100-clock.txt` | OPEN — filed 2026-10-26 | — | find why the notify socket fails on this host only (compare the unit and `systemd-analyze` with demo-hp), fix it, and check whether a fresh install could hit it too | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1260** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Spring 2027 (2027-03-28): two clock-change effects in the controller's night (review round 2, HUNT-4 H2/H3).** The update leg's deadline is W + 5 h of REAL time while the full-system backup's gate counts wall-clock minutes, so a step can start after the gate stopped waiting (`felhom-controller/controller/internal/stacks/unattended.go:225`; `internal/quiesce/quiesce.go:922-933`); with W in 02:00–02:59 the DB dump and the second-drive copy start at the same instant (`internal/scheduler/scheduler.go:509`; VERIFIED: Go maps 2027-03-28 02:30 Europe/Budapest to 03:30 CEST). | OPEN | — | before 2027-03-28: one wall-clock basis for both, and a test at the spring date | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1367** | Box system & updates | P3 | **The host journal fills a small system disk: 61% of its lines are `pam_unix(sudo:session)` open/close pairs from the agent's sudo calls.** MEASURED 2026-11-09, one hour, same on demo-hp and the N100: ~14,000 journal lines, ~8,500 of them sudo session lines; the top commands are `smartctl -a` (1,074 per hour — one every ~3 s), `lxc-info -n` (662), `mkdir -p` (540), `lvs` (537), `pct exec` (~520). The journal grows by journald's default cap (10% of the filesystem, max 4 GB): the N100 sits at 4 GB, demo-hp was 3.8 GB on 2026-11-07 and reached 0.7 GB again two days after a vacuum to 500 MB. On a 39 GB root that space is what the whole-guest local copy needs (R-548). | OPEN — filed 2026-11-09 | — | Agent, through the signed config bundle: `Defaults:felhom-agent !pam_session` (and `!syslog` only if the command log has no reader — check the audit trail's needs first) in the sudoers file; a journald cap drop-in (e.g. `SystemMaxUse=500M`) on the host; and read why `smartctl -a` runs every ~3 s (the SMART poll's interval or a loop). Red-proof each in the agent's tests; measure the line rate after on demo-hp. Evidence: `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/demo-hp-images-2026-11-09/journal-noise.txt` (off-git) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1367** | Box system & updates | P3 | **The host journal fills a small system disk: 61% of its lines are `pam_unix(sudo:session)` open/close pairs from the agent's sudo calls.** MEASURED 2026-11-09, one hour, same on demo-hp and the N100: ~14,000 journal lines, ~8,500 of them sudo session lines; the top commands are `smartctl -a` (1,074 per hour — one every ~3 s), `lxc-info -n` (662), `mkdir -p` (540), `lvs` (537), `pct exec` (~520). The journal grows by journald's default cap (10% of the filesystem, max 4 GB): the N100 sits at 4 GB, demo-hp was 3.8 GB on 2026-11-07 and reached 0.7 GB again two days after a vacuum to 500 MB. On a 39 GB root that space is what the whole-guest local copy needs (R-548). | OPEN — filed 2026-11-09 **2026-11-10 (space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`):** place H7: the N100 (4.28 GB, 74 files) and Tester 1 (4.29 GB, 81 files) sit at the journal's own cap; Tester 1 writes about 150 MB a day. Lines written by `sudo` are 92 / 92 / 90 % of all lines in one hour — this counts three lines for each call (the command and the session pair), while this row's 61 % counts the session pair only: the same fact, counted two ways. No rank change is proposed: the journal stops at its own cap (about 4.3 GB), so it costs space and log history, not safety. | — | Agent, through the signed config bundle: `Defaults:felhom-agent !pam_session` (and `!syslog` only if the command log has no reader — check the audit trail's needs first) in the sudoers file; a journald cap drop-in (e.g. `SystemMaxUse=500M`) on the host; and read why `smartctl -a` runs every ~3 s (the SMART poll's interval or a loop). Red-proof each in the agent's tests; measure the line rate after on demo-hp. Evidence: `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/demo-hp-images-2026-11-09/journal-noise.txt` (off-git) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1368** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Five places on the host's system disk only grow: nothing deletes them and no rule says how many to keep.** MEASURED 2026-11-10 on demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` places H5, H6, H9, H12, H13). (1) **Old kernels** (`/lib/modules`, `/boot`): 8 / 8 / 3 kernels = 8.15 / 8.15 / 3.05 GB. The ring-0 boxes got 7 kernels in 37 days and no kernel was ever removed: the update wrapper refuses a plan that removes a package (`11-os-updates.md` rule R4), and nothing runs `apt autoremove` (searched: architecture folder, both registers, runbooks, three source trees — 0 hits). The N100's system disk grew 4.6 GiB in 26 days, about a kernel a week. (2) **The agent's self-update folder** `/var/lib/felhom-agent/selfupdate`: 49 / 48 / 33 binaries = 740 / 724 / 509 MB, one for each agent version the box ever got; no document names the folder. (3) **Guest template archives** `vzdump-lxc-9100-*` in `/var/lib/vz/dump`: 1 / 4 / 1 = 0.65 / 2.56 / 0.65 GB. (4) **Old agent binary copies** `/usr/local/bin/felhom-agent.bak-*`: 1 / 11 / 0 files, up to 155 MB. (5) **Logs of failed whole-guest backup runs** in the dump folder (small; 9 on demo-hp). **Members (answers marked N):** H5-3, H5-4, H6-3, H9-3, H9-4, H9-8, H12-3, H12-4, H13-3, H13-4. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) | the kernel part needs the operator's word (it changes what rule R4 allows) — STATUS D67 | Agent: after a good update keep the running kernel, the one before it and the newest, and remove the rest — ring 0 first; keep the newest N self-update binaries and `.bak` copies; keep one template archive. Each with a test that a kept item is never removed. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1369** | Box system & updates | P3 | **When a disk is full there is no written way out: no runbook and no self-repair, for the host system disk, the thin pool, the guest disks or a data drive.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`, question 7). One missing runbook, seen from 21 places; the search of the runbooks folder for a disk-full procedure gave 0 hits (`evidence/searches.txt` S6). The alarms exist (hub: 90 / 95 % host disk, 85 / 90 % thin pool; controller: 85 / 95 % on the data volume and each drive) but they end in a mail, not in a step. For three small places nobody wrote what fails when they are full (EFI partition, host and guest temp folders). **Members (answers marked N):** H1-7, H2-7, H5-7, H9-7, H10-5, H10-7, H12-7, H13-7, H15-5, G1-7, G2-7, G7-7, G12-7, G13-7, G14-7, G17-5, D1-7, D2-7, D3-7, D6-7, D7-7, D8-7, D9-7, D10-7. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) | — | Docs: one runbook „a disk is full” with one section per disk (host system disk, thin pool, guest root, data volume, data drive): what to look at first, what is safe to delete (the places of R-1368 and R-1367), what is never deleted by hand (household data, the kept-data rulings). Rehearse it once on demo-hp. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1370** | Box system & updates | P3 | **The host's system disk has no space budget: no document says how much the host's own files may take, and the installer's sizing rule covers the guest only.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` place H1, answer H1-3; search S5 — 0 hits). Today: demo-hp 58 % of 41 GB, N100 38 % of 101 GB, Tester 1 34 % of 63 GB — and the parts that grow are the journal (R-1367), old kernels and agent binaries (R-1368), old backup copies (R-1087) and the local whole-guest copy (R-548). Second half, known but with no row until now: on a small disk the guest's own guards read the guest's 70 GiB while the thin pool behind it holds 54 GiB (demo-hp: 102 GiB promised on a 53.9 GiB pool, 70.67 % used), so only the hub's thin-pool alarm stands before a full pool. **Member:** H1-3. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) | an operator pick: a written budget or not — STATUS D69 | Docs: a short „disk space” section in an architecture document: each part of the system disk with its limit and its cleaner, pointing at the audit table. Then the installer can refuse a disk that cannot hold the sum. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-984** | Box system & updates | P4 | **Host and agent hardening, low risk each: the backup-target route has no role check; the unsigned guest spec has no size bounds; signed ops have no maximum validity; the guarded mkfs does not refuse LVs, zvols or RAID devices; the local API is reachable from the LAN by a static route; a sudoers inspect pattern is wider than needed; install passes secrets on the command line; guest settings files are world-readable; the host offers rpcbind and DNS on the LAN.** Fix each in its own small change. Security review 2026-10-12 (`audits/security-review-2026-10-12/`); detail held off-git for the operator (`/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/security-review-2026-10-12-PRIVATE/`). | OPEN | — | Batch into hardening work | CC |
|
||||
| **R-979** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Controller updates are trusted by registry tag alone (no digest, no signature), and the Update button offers any newer tag, even an unvouched one; the built-in traefik, cloudflared and FileBrowser images are also pinned by tag only.** Whoever can push to the registry decides what runs. Fix: pin by digest from the hub's vouched list; offer only vouched versions. Security review 2026-10-12 (`audits/security-review-2026-10-12/`); detail held off-git for the operator (`/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/security-review-2026-10-12-PRIVATE/`). | OPEN — design-proposal | — | Design note, then build | CC |
|
||||
| **R-974** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A compromised host agent can likely become root on the host through the root wrapper that applies PBS settings: the wrapper accepts a folder path inside the agent's own writable tree and then acts on it as root.** Static (the symlink behaviour was reasoned, not run). Same class as R-861. Fix: a fixed root-owned folder, and refuse symlinks before any root action. Security review 2026-10-12 (`audits/security-review-2026-10-12/`); detail held off-git for the operator (`/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/evidence/security-review-2026-10-12-PRIVATE/`). | OPEN | — | Fix the wrapper with a test on a throwaway box | CC |
|
||||
@@ -291,7 +295,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-1285** | Box system & updates | P4 | **D43's removal of our SSH drop-in from a BYO host happens one bundle LATE: the bundle run that delivers agent 0.165.0 is planned by the box's OLD (0.164.0) wrapper, which writes the drop-in as before („same"), and only then replaces itself.** Measured 2026-10-25 on the BYO test host (VM 9371 on demo-hp, `Tester4-f967d4`; attended release run): 0.164.0 day-0 → signed `agent_update` + `agent_config_update` 0.165.0 → the planted drop-in still there; a second `agent_config_update` (same bundle) → `BUNDLE REMOVED … (ours, on a BYO host — D43)`, nothing written, `sshd -T` the owner's own `permitrootlogin yes` (`audits/release-2026-10-26/byo/byo-proof.txt`). No box is affected today (the fleet's only BYO host is this test host); a fresh BYO install on ≥ 0.165.0 runs the new wrapper from the start. | **VERIFY** — 2026-10-27: agent v0.167.0 RELEASED; in the NORMAL signed delivery the pass now runs right after the commit on all three boxes („running the bundle policy pass after the self-update commit (R-1285)” → `BUNDLE POLICY DONE install_mode=appliance removed=0`; `audits/release-2026-10-27/agent-0167-tester1-demofelhom.txt`). Not live: a BYO box coming FROM 0.164.0 (none in the fleet). **Earlier:** **VERIFY** — 2026-10-26: agent `b1bc63d` (unreleased) — the new agent runs the bundle-policy pass once right after its self-update commits (`selfupdate.SetOnCommitted`); test in the real order (commit, then one pass), red-proved. **Not live:** only a box coming FROM 0.164.0 discriminates (0.165.0's wrapper already applies D43), which needs a signed downgrade chain on a BYO box — the live proof rides the next agent release. **Earlier:** **OPEN** — 2026-10-26 (agent 0.166.0 released, attended run): the policy pass is wired, but in the normal delivery it does NOT run: the box gets `agent_update` and `agent_config_update` in ONE pass, and the bundle job runs in the OLD process (demo-hp: pid 1966780, agent 0.165.0, bundle 09:03:07–09:03:09 CET; the restart into 0.166.0 at 09:03:10) — no `bundle policy pass` line on any of the three boxes. So a BYO host coming from 0.164.0 still loses our drop-in one release late. The night proof (`audits/night-2026-10-25/rig/r1285-live.txt`) ran a bundle under an agent that was ALREADY 0.166.0-code, so it did not cover this order. No BYO host is in the fleet today. Fix options: the agent runs the pass once at start-up after `update committed`; or the release procedure sends the bundle job only after the commit. **Earlier state:** **VERIFY** — fixed on main 2026-10-25 night (agent `abcc1e6`), waits for the agent release + the vouch: the agent runs the wrapper's `bundle-policy` pass after every install (red-proved, `redproof-r1285.txt`). **Live on the rig in ONE signed run** (BYO host, staged as upgraded from 0.164.0: the new agent by hand, the old 0.164.0 wrapper on disk, our drop-in planted; one `agent_config_update` of a test bundle): the old wrapper installed the bundle and replaced itself, then „BUNDLE POLICY REMOVED … (ours, on a BYO host)", `sshd -T` the owner's own `permitrootlogin yes` (`rig/r1285-live.txt`); the test package deleted from the registry after. **Earlier state:** OPEN | — | either the wrapper plans again after it replaced itself (one agent change + a test that a 0.164.0→0.165.0 bundle on a BYO record removes our copy in ONE run, red first), or the release procedure sends a BYO box's config bundle twice; until then a BYO box upgraded from ≤ 0.164.0 keeps our drop-in until its next bundle | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Monitoring & notifications — 25 rows (P2 3, P3 14, P4 8)
|
||||
## Monitoring & notifications — 25 rows (P2 3, P3 15, P4 7)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -319,6 +323,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-1361** | Monitoring & notifications | P2 | **An event the box sends while the hub cannot be reached is lost: 3 tries over 9 s, then dropped.** Walked 2026-11-03 on Tester 1 (hub blackholed 13 min): the box ran normally, an app install worked, a crash loop stopped the app and held it, and `app_stopped_unhealthy` and `app_held` failed after 3 attempts (`notifier.go`). Afterwards NOTHING was re-sent: the hub's log shows no event from the outage, its „Held apps" had no row (`a row existed: false`), and the hold reporter had already recorded the app as reported (`holdreport.go`, the push is asynchronous) so only its periodic re-send can repair it. Any DooPlex restart (2026-11-01 was one) can swallow a household's and the operator's mails this way. `audits/security-2026-11-02/part5/outage-hub.log` | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 **2026-11-03, a second cost seen:** the walk's cut (01:17–01:39 UTC) covered Tester 1's 01:30 dump, its `db_dump_completed` was lost, and at 04:00 UTC the hub mailed `expected_dbdump_missed` „No DB dump completed or failed since midnight", while the box's own report read `last_db_dump` 03:15 UTC. A lost event becomes a false alarm. | — | a small on-disk outbox for events, sent in order when the hub answers (a design: which types, how long kept); the hold reporter marks „reported" only after a 2xx. Test red first | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1363** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A household's mail ends with raw JSON: `Megjegyzés: {"avail_gb":5.192043304443359,"band":"warning",...}`.** Seen in the walks of 2026-11-02 (`audits/security-2026-11-02/part5/mail-fill-household.txt`, `mail-crash-household.txt`). `api/handler.go` adds the details as the „Megjegyzés" line; a golden pins it (`mail_golden_test.go`), so it was once wanted. The sentence itself is right and Hungarian. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 | — | drop the line from a household's mail, or render known fields in words; the operator's mail keeps it | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1365** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A security-watch source that stays down mails once and never again; after that only one line of the Monday summary says so.** An open advisory reminds every 7 days, a failed source does not (`08` §11 [DESIGN], „once per streak"). The cost was seen 2026-10-28 → 11-02: one mail, then a week of silence. With the seven pins that can never be read now a stated GAP (R-1334), a streak means a real outage. | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — D66 | D66 | on yes: `plan()` mails a streak again every 7 days, with a test seen failing; `08` §11's line changes | operator (decision), CC (build) |
|
||||
| **R-1371** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **Seven places have no space alarm, and the host-disk alarm that does exist goes to the household.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`, question 6). (1) **The guest root disk has no watcher.** The controller watches `/` and the system data path, but inside its container both are the data volume (measured on all three boxes, `evidence/extra/controller-fs-view.txt`); the 32 GiB guest root disk, which holds `/opt/docker/stacks`, is not a target. Closed row R-521 says it is — true only before the two volumes were merged; capability-map row C13 („warned before a filesystem fills — per filesystem”) does not hold for this one filesystem (the map's status is not changed here). (2) **The same filesystem is two targets**, and warnings are de-duplicated by path, so two warnings for one full disk are expected (read from source, not proved live; the comment at `cmd/controller/main.go:2694-2707` says the opposite). (3) **`host_disk_critical` and `storage_fill_critical` are mailed to the household by default** (`hub/internal/claim/engine.go:229-243`), but only the operator can free a host disk; the seed list was chosen as „critical only” and the question „can this reader act on it” was not asked. No architecture document names the host-disk event (search S4; `08-alarm-ladder.md` names the thin-pool one). (4) Small places with no alarm: EFI partition, temp folders, guest system log, guest package cache. **Members (answers marked N):** H10-6, H15-6, G1-6, G13-6, G15-6, G16-6, G17-6. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) | part 3 needs an operator pick — STATUS D68 | Controller: add the guest root disk as a fill-watch target, de-duplicate targets by filesystem, correct the comment; red-proof with two paths on one filesystem. Hub: after the pick, route the two host-disk events. Docs: name the host-disk alarm and its reader in `08-alarm-ladder.md`. | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Hub & operator — 14 rows (P3 3, P4 11)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -358,7 +363,7 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-990** | Business & legal | P4 | **Operator: read `documentation/audits/forum-research-2026-10-12/FELHOM.md` §5 and rule on each recommendation.** READ-ONLY research 2026-10-12: three years (#7943–#11092, 2,908 posts, 195 people, 82 beginner threads) of the public PROHARDVER! topic „Home server / házi szerver építése”, tagged and counted by person (`FINDINGS.md`, method and spot-check in `METHOD.md`; no username or post text in git). Ten ranked recommendations, none acted on; the top three: a „which machine works” page (8 of 33 beginners who name their hardware own only a Synology, a router disk or a Raspberry Pi — the installer cannot run there; the same gap is R-989's first recommendation from a different source, and the shipped-page half is R-991), „you do not choose an operating system — we do” (the biggest beginner question, 20 of 82 threads), and „bring your old office PC” as the cheap entry. Catalog gap (≥ 3 people): a DLNA server (7), an ad/DNS blocker (5), a camera recorder (5). | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR** — filed 2026-10-12 | the operator's reading | Operator: rule on each of the ten (yes / no / later). If nothing is done: nothing changes; the research ages | operator |
|
||||
| **R-1035** | Business & legal | P4 | **Did the „felhő tárhely” page earn anything? Two dated checks.** **Baseline (reported by the operator from Search Console, 2026-10-14, last 3 months):** 1 click, 48 impressions, CTR 2.1 %, average position **73.6**; „felhő tárhely” 19 impressions, „felhőtárhely” 5, „felhő alapú tárhely” 3. CC measured separately that the phrase „felhő tárhely” appeared **0 times** on the home, FAQ and backup pages — Google was showing the home page for those queries by accident. `/sajat-felho-tarhely` + `/en/own-cloud-storage` published **2026-10-14**; full baseline, price sources and the power provenance in `audits/seo-2026-10-14/BASELINE.md`. **What to measure, both times:** impressions and average position for „felhő tárhely” and „saját felhő tárhely”, plus the new page's own impressions, clicks and position. **A null result at +4 weeks means nothing on its own** — a new page on a site at position 73.6 takes weeks to months to move, and „felhő tárhely” alone is held by Microsoft, Google and the big list sites; the page aims at the two longer phrases. That is why there are two checks and not one, and why neither should be read as a verdict on the copy. **There is no Search Console connector in this project, so CC cannot read these numbers** — the operator reads them, CC records and compares. **Blocked until the operator asks for indexing** (Search Console → URL-ellenőrzés → the URL → „Indexelés kérése”): until that happens, or Google finds the page itself, both checks read zero for a reason that is not the page. **This is a slow channel and does not replace talking to people.** | **WATCHING** | operator: request indexing, then supply the Search Console read | 2026-11-11: first read (+4 weeks); 2026-12-09: second (+8 weeks), compared with the first | operator + CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Process & tooling — 33 rows (P3 8, P4 25)
|
||||
## Process & tooling — 32 rows (P3 8, P4 24)
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Category | Sev | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ Moved here byte for byte on 2026-10-14 (night session), newest first, so that `S
|
||||
|
||||
**Updated 2026-10-13 (night): demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1 run agent 0.155.0; demo-felhom runs controller 0.310.0, the other two 0.309.0 until the floor is raised. The open-items list is at 127. Reports: `REPORT-poweroff.md`, `REPORT-plugmeter.md`, `REPORT-usenet-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-newapps-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-disk-evening-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-answers-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-m3-2026-10-11.md`, `REPORT-redesign-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-testers-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-register-shrink-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-new-apps-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-release-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-break-the-circle-2026-10-09.md`, `REPORT-dooplex-survival-2026-10-09.md`, `REPORT-day4-2026-10-09.md`.**
|
||||
|
||||
## Moved from STATUS on 2026-11-10
|
||||
|
||||
**Updated 2026-11-09.** demo-hp did not restart, because its local whole-box copy was refused for space again and the night update waited; CC freed space (old images, an old installer file), so tonight's copy fits. Controller 0.351.0 is released to every box (floor 12:18 UTC): it deletes old test builds and old system images by itself. Two new rows: the whole-box copy is mostly app programs (your decision, R-1366), and the host log noise (R-1367).
|
||||
|
||||
## Moved from STATUS on 2026-11-09
|
||||
|
||||
**Updated 2026-11-08.** The night went right: the N100 installed its Proxmox updates and a new kernel and restarted itself; demo-hp made its first local whole-box copy in 10 days. Hub 0.179.1 no longer says „needs a restart" for a box that has restarted; demo-hp still needs one (its kernel step, likely tonight).
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user