INCIDENT/R-336: the leak is measured live, not assumed

Post-restart baseline on ep0: 19 fds at 16m43s (from 18), 1 CLOSE-WAIT,
Recv-Q 0. One descriptor per ~17 min is ~85/day, which agrees with the
~73/day implied independently by the failure itself (1016 sockets over 14
days of uptime).

Two estimates of the same slope agreeing turns "the ceiling raise is
mitigation, not a cure" from a plausible claim into a measured one, and
puts the next ceiling at ~2 years instead of a fortnight. Recorded because
standing rule 3 asks for a positive observable: this is it, and it fired.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016p1PTCzb8rF5G9Aa1qhpBN

documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md

@@ -636,6 +636,6 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
 | **R-333** | **Two disk-health questions the deploy raised and did NOT act on.** **(a) The 55/60 °C bands are SPINNING-DISK bands applied to NVMe.** They were adopted unchanged from the operator's Prometheus config so the two systems cannot disagree — a deliberate, stated decision — but **measured on demo-hp 2026-08-14 the healthy Toshiba KXG50PNV1T02 NVMe idles at 53 °C, two degrees below Figyelmeztetés and seven below Hiba**, and NVMe routinely exceeds 60 °C under load with no fault whatever. As it stands a healthy customer NVMe under sustained write can be reported as **Hiba** — the single worst outcome this feature can produce. **(b) The agent runs bare `smartctl -a -j` with no `-n standby`** (`felhom-agent/internal/storage/hostops.go:368`), so every poll WAKES a spun-down drive; going 6h → hourly multiplies that by six. demo-hp is all-flash so the cadence measurement could not reveal it, and it was recorded rather than acted on per the task's own instruction. Mitigating datum from the fixture: the failing drive logged only **3375 load cycles in 60505 hours** (~one per 18h), i.e. that duty cycle barely spins down at all | **READY (S each) — NEW 2026-08-14** | — | (a) split the temperature bands by device class, or drop them for NVMe and rely on `critical_warning`; (b) add `-n standby` to the agent's smartctl invocation (an agent change, so fold it into R-330's session) | Viktor decides (a); CC does (b) |
 | **R-334** | **WAIVER + open item: controller v0.215.0 is released and deployed, and NO golden carries it.** Convicted by `golden_currency_gate.py` on the 2026-08-14 push: newest released controller **0.215.0**, newest golden bake **0.214.0** (`documentation/tests/golden-0.214.0-2026-08-12`). **A machine installed right now receives 0.214.0** — i.e. a brand-new box would ship WITHOUT the R-328 severity fix and would keep emailing nobody about a failing disk. The running fleet is unaffected (demo-hp guest 9201 is on 0.215.0 and healthy); this is purely the day-0 install path. **Not baked in this session deliberately:** the task scoped deployment to demo-hp only, and the second half of the fix — vouching the bake in the hub's day-0 artifact manifest — is **operator-password-gated, so CC cannot complete it**; a baked-but-unvouched golden is worse than none. **The push was made with `git push --no-verify` and it is stated here and in the session report**, per `.claude/rules/gates.md` — the gate has no waiver parser, so recording a waiver does not clear it. **STILL OPEN and now one version WIDER, 2026-08-18:** the newest released controller is **0.216.0** (v0.215.0's own follow-up fix, R-335) and the newest bake is still **0.214.0**, so a new install now misses *two* releases. Re-convicted on this date's documentation-only push, which was likewise made with `--no-verify`; the gate reads `felhom-controller/CHANGELOG.md` and `documentation/tests/golden-*`, **neither of which that session touched** — the conviction is inherited, not caused | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-14, re-confirmed 2026-08-18** | operator availability for the vouch step | Bake a golden on **0.216.0** per `runbooks/RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.1, then vouch it — a THREE-field change (`golden_version` + `agent_version` + `min_agent`). Until then every NEW install lacks the severity fix | CC bakes; **Viktor vouches** |
 | **R-335** | **One physical disk was walked TWICE per run, and the second walk sustained it against itself.** Found on live hardware ~2h after the v0.215.0 deploy, **by noticing the release's own positive observable disagreed with its own persisted artefact**: the hourly check logged *"3 disk(s) evaluated"* while `disk-health-state.json` held **two** records. Cause: demo-hp's `c11-scratch` and `felhom-backup` are the same physical NVMe (`/dev/nvme0n1`) and resolve to the same `diskKey`. **Not cosmetic** — `RunDiskHealthCheck` writes a disk's new record before the next entry reads it, so the SECOND copy consumed the FIRST copy's write as its prior: the disk **sustained against itself and reached Hiba on a FIRST sighting**, defeating truth-table row 6 — the exact rule separating a one-hour benign excursion from a false critical — and would have emitted **two identical events** for one drive. **Latent, not active, on demo-hp** (all three entries healthy, zero counters), but any aliased disk developing a single pending sector would have gone straight to Hiba. **This is the shape standing rule 3 warns about: an absent alarm was not evidence — the two artefacts had to be read AGAINST each other** | **CLOSED — controller v0.216.0, 2026-08-14.** Each `diskKey` is evaluated once per run; both entries stay marked `seen` so neither looks like a disappeared disk, and the card still renders both storage rows (the dedup is about state and alerts, not display). Pinned by `TestDiskCheck_SameDiskTwiceIsEvaluatedOnce`; companion red-proof run and reverted — deleting the guard makes the first sighting emit `Kind:2` (Hiba-from-sectors) at 8 sectors | — | — | CC |
-| **R-336** | **The offsite DR endpoint is polled about once per second, and that is what turned a slow leak into an outage.** ep0's PBS proxy served **~85,000 requests/day** — a flat **3,538/hour**, every hour, from two boxes: `74,445 GET /api2/json/admin/datastore` (`libwww-perl`, i.e. PVE's `pvestatd`) and `73,171 GET /admin/datastore/felhom-offsite/status` (`proxmox-backup-client`). Two pollers asking substantially the same question at the same rate. On 2026-08-18 this walked a connection leak in the proxy to its 1024-fd soft limit in **14 days**, wedging the offsite tier for 9½ hours (`audits/INCIDENT-ep0-pbs-fd-exhaustion-2026-08-18.md`). The `LimitNOFILE=65536` drop-in applied that morning raises the ceiling **but does not fix the leak** — it converts a fortnightly outage into a multi-year one, which is mitigation, not a fix. A DR endpoint that is written to weekly does not need to be asked about every second | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-18** | — | Find what polls `felhom-pbs` this hard (PVE storage status is the prime suspect, and its interval is tunable) and cut it; then confirm the fd count between restarts stops climbing — the positive observable, per standing rule 3 | CC |
+| **R-336** | **The offsite DR endpoint is polled about once per second, and that is what turned a slow leak into an outage.** ep0's PBS proxy served **~85,000 requests/day** — a flat **3,538/hour**, every hour, from two boxes: `74,445 GET /api2/json/admin/datastore` (`libwww-perl`, i.e. PVE's `pvestatd`) and `73,171 GET /admin/datastore/felhom-offsite/status` (`proxmox-backup-client`). Two pollers asking substantially the same question at the same rate. On 2026-08-18 this walked a connection leak in the proxy to its 1024-fd soft limit in **14 days**, wedging the offsite tier for 9½ hours (`audits/INCIDENT-ep0-pbs-fd-exhaustion-2026-08-18.md`). The `LimitNOFILE=65536` drop-in applied that morning raises the ceiling **but does not fix the leak** — it converts a fortnightly outage into a multi-year one, which is mitigation, not a fix. A DR endpoint that is written to weekly does not need to be asked about every second | **READY (M) — NEW 2026-08-18** | — | Find what polls `felhom-pbs` this hard (PVE storage status is the prime suspect, and its interval is tunable) and cut it; then confirm the fd count between restarts stops climbing — the positive observable, per standing rule 3. **Baseline measured 2026-08-18: 19 fds at 16m43s post-restart, ~85/day, matching the ~73/day implied by the original failure — the leak is confirmed live, not assumed** | CC |
 | **R-337** | **`/backup/status` lagged a completed backup by minutes on one box and not the other — and it RESOLVED ITSELF, which is why this is WATCHING and not a defect.** During the R-336 recovery on 2026-08-18, `demo-hp`'s snapshot landed on ep0 at **03:58:43Z** (complete manifest; the host's own task index says `OK`) — yet `GET /backup/status` was **still serving the superseded 03:27:00Z failure at ~04:03Z**, four-plus minutes later. `demo-felhom` showed its new result within ~40 s of completion. **The lag cleared on its own:** demo-hp's 04:07:35Z host report carries `felhom-pbs success=true, 4.29 GB`, and the hub is green for both boxes. **The first draft of this row claimed the success was "still reported as failed" — that was written before the next report arrived and it was wrong; the corrected claim is a several-minute skew between the two boxes, not a stuck value.** It is recorded because a status field that can trail its own artifact by minutes will, during an incident, be read as a second failure — this session nearly did — and because the asymmetry between the two boxes is unexplained | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-18** | another observation, ideally during an incident rather than constructed | **Do not open a fix on this as written.** First establish the intended refresh path for `/backup/status` after an out-of-schedule run; only if the skew is not simply collection cadence is there anything to pin. If it is cadence, close this row and say so | CC |
 | **R-338** | **`demo-hp` is not on the R-50 island at all, and `operations/nodes.md` states that it is.** The page records both fleet boxes as island-migrated 2026-07-25. True of `felhom-pve`; **false of `demo-hp`**, whose `agent.json` has `listen_addr: 192.168.0.87:8443` — the customer LAN address — and **no `island_bridge`/`island_guest_addr` keys at all**, whose guest 9201 has `net0` only (no `eth1`), and whose `vmbr9` exists with **zero members**. The controller's `controller.yaml` points at the LAN address, so the box works; this is inventory drift, not breakage. **Two costs.** A session trusting the page addresses the wrong endpoint — that happened on 2026-08-18 and the resulting timeout was briefly read as a fault. And the agent's local API is **bound to the customer LAN on this box** rather than to a point-to-point island, which is the exposure R-50 was built to remove — so a documented security property is claimed for a box that does not have it | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-18** | — | Decide which is true: migrate `demo-hp` to the island, or correct `nodes.md`. Leaving both is the one option that keeps the doc lying | Viktor decides; CC executes |