diff --git a/documentation/audits/CAMPAIGN-10-two-storage-soak-2026-07-31.md b/documentation/audits/CAMPAIGN-10-two-storage-soak-2026-07-31.md
index f1af43b..d87c128 100644
--- a/documentation/audits/CAMPAIGN-10-two-storage-soak-2026-07-31.md
+++ b/documentation/audits/CAMPAIGN-10-two-storage-soak-2026-07-31.md
@@ -292,8 +292,10 @@ when the run started.
 
 ### R-157 — bootrecon's start-ONCE sweep acts on an unsettled snapshot; the boot orphan survives
 
-**New. Register grepped: R-52 is the feature, nothing covers its timing.** Reproduced twice, in two
-independent runs, at the same cycle (seeded permutation). Full evidence:
+**New. Register grepped: R-52 is the feature, nothing covers its timing.** **INTERMITTENT — 3 of 6
+hard resets (~50%)** across two runs, with an identical signature each time. (An earlier draft called
+this deterministic because the failing cycle numbers matched; they matched only because the runner's
+RNG is seeded. Intermittency is what a race predicts and a wrong predicate does not.) Full evidence:
 `../tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md`.
 
 A `qm reset` mid-backup brought everything back **except the app half of the DB-backed stack**:
diff --git a/documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md b/documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md
index 71e8c24..91cedd0 100644
--- a/documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md
+++ b/documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md
@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
 # R-157 — bootrecon's start-ONCE sweep acts on an unsettled snapshot, so the boot orphan it exists to recover survives
 
-**Reproduced twice, in two independent runs, at the same cycle.** Controller **0.188.0**, agent 0.119.0.
+**INTERMITTENT — 3 failures in 6 hard resets (~50%), across two independent runs.** Controller
+**0.188.0**, agent 0.119.0.
+
+> **Correction to this document's first version.** It said the failure reproduced "at the same cycle
+> in both runs — deterministic, not a coincidence". That was wrong, and the correction matters because
+> it changes what kind of bug this is. The cycle numbers matched only because the runner's RNG is
+> seeded, so both runs drew the same permutation; the *failure* is a coin flip. Run 2b's four hard
+> resets went **PASS (c2) → FAIL (c10) → PASS (c18) → FAIL (c26)**, and run 2a went PASS (c2) →
+> FAIL (c10). **Intermittency is what a race predicts** — a wrong predicate would fail every time —
+> so this strengthens the root cause below rather than weakening it.
 
 R-52 built `internal/bootrecon` for exactly this failure (audit F5: `immich-server` and `calibre-web`
 left `Exited` after an interrupted boot, ten siblings back, those two **still down ~18 h later** —
@@ -79,8 +88,11 @@ The preceding two violations in this campaign **were** harness defects and are d
 - only the app half of a two-container stack is missing, while its database is healthy;
 - the fixed harness reported it through the check written for precisely this
   (*"apps did not return within 10 min — that IS the failure"*), not through a seed or canary path;
-- it reproduced at cycle 10 in **run 2a and run 2b**. The runner's RNG is seeded (`Random(20260801)`),
-  so both runs drew the same permutation — the reproduction is deterministic, not a coincidence.
+- it recurred **3 times out of 6 hard resets** with an identical signature every time: `rallly`
+  `Exited (255)` with `rallly-postgres` healthy, `bootrecon` reporting "no boot-orphaned apps" ~5 s
+  after start, and the container count still churning **after** the sweep. Third occurrence
+  (2026-08-02 01:05): `Status refresh` 8 → bootrecon at 01:05:13 → refresh 8 → **7** → 8 at
+  01:05:19-20.
 
 ## Shape of a fix — not applied (the fences forbid it, and a fix mid-run proves a version that did not exist)