docs: R-55 PROVEN LIVE, new R-57 (app lifecycle), R-56 plumbing note, capability map
R-55's reboot leg ran operator-present on 9201: immich UI-stopped -> stayed stopped across pct reboot, calibre-web recreated, zero alerts, ~15s. R-57 records the lifecycle mechanism with the operator's abandoned-app requirements verbatim and plant-it as the motivating case, including why the retired/ directory move was wrong and the v0.158.1 pointer-receiver defect.
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| R-51 | **Dead-primary alerting — a multi-container app whose MAIN container is dead must alert.** Aggregation currently classifies such a stack `unhealthy`, and `IsDownState` deliberately excludes `unhealthy`, so nothing fires. | S | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.156.0** | Origin: `AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` (F4). Observed live: `immich-server` was `Exited` for **18 h** with the app 100 % unreachable, and the box produced **no** dead-app banner and **no** `app_start_failed` hub event — while single-container Calibre-Web, down for the same reason, alerted correctly within 90 s. **Constraint (load-bearing): do NOT simply fold `unhealthy` into down.** That exclusion is deliberate (`stacks/manager.go` fix-3, `downstate_test.go`) and reverting it reintroduces the flapping it was added to stop. Direction: distinguish *member-container-exited* from *healthcheck-failing* in the aggregation, and treat a dead primary as down | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 (controller v0.156.0).** **The diagnosis in this row was WRONG at the source and is corrected here:** aggregation did NOT classify the stack `unhealthy`. `aggregateState`'s final branch returned `StateRunning` for any mix of running and stopped members — the comment said "report as running (partial)" — so the stack read as RUNNING and `IsDownState` had nothing to fire on. The `unhealthy` exclusion was never involved, and the constraint it protects was therefore never in tension with the fix. New `StateDegraded`: a DOWN member whose docker restart policy is `always`/`unless-stopped` means docker was supposed to be keeping it up, so the stack is degraded (a down state, alerting through the EXISTING banner + `app_start_failed` path, unchanged); `no`/`on-failure` is a finished one-shot init/migrate container and stays benign. An UNREADABLE policy counts as supervised — fail-CLOSED, deliberately the opposite of `IsDownState`'s fail-open, because there the *state* is ambiguous while here a member is known dead and only the excuse is missing (P2 census 2026-07-21: all 53 catalog templates / 78 services are `unless-stopped`, zero one-shot containers exist today). `IsDownState` gained `degraded` and NOTHING else — the `unhealthy`/`restarting`/`paused`/`unknown` exclusions are byte-identical and `downstate_test.go` is untouched and green. Red-proof: the mix branch reverted to `return StateRunning` makes the immich fixture and both production-path tests fail with `"running"`. Live leg (STOP-1) pending. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21) **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-21 (STOP-1, operator-present).** On guest 9201, `docker stop immich-server` at **12:50:40 CEST** (policy `unless-stopped`, three helpers left running — the exact F4 shape). **12:50:53 — 13 seconds later — the stack read `degraded`** where it read `running` for 18 hours on 2026-07-20. `10:51:11Z` **exactly ONE** `app_start_failed (warn) — Telepített alkalmazás nem fut: Immich` (single-fire verified by count, not by eye). Dashboard rendered the banner *Telepített alkalmazás nem fut: Immich (degraded)* plus the new „Részlegesen leállt" state label. `docker start` at 12:51:37 → `running` by 12:51:52 and the banner **self-cleared** (state-based, as designed). Note the banner appends the raw state in English — `(degraded)` — which is pre-existing behaviour, not introduced here, but now more visible |
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| R-52 | **Boot desired-state reconciliation — a `deployed: true` app should be running after boot.** The controller *reports* deployed-but-stopped apps (30 s `deadapp-check`) but never starts them, so an app that misses its boot start stays down until a human notices. | M | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.156.0** | Origin: `AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` (F5). Observed live: the pre-transport shutdown left `immich-server` and `calibre-web` `Exited`; **10 sibling containers came back and those two did not**, and they were still down ~18 h later. **Includes root-causing why `restart: unless-stopped` did not resurrect them** — both were stopped ~25 s before power-off, so Docker most likely recorded them as user-stopped; that hypothesis is untested because the guest journal is volatile and the controller's own logs were rotated by the container recreate. Direction: a bounded start-once reconciliation (N attempts, reusing the existing boot grace), never a restart loop. Pairs with R-51 — that one is the *alarm*, this one is the *recovery* | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 (controller v0.156.0), `internal/bootrecon`.** One bounded start-once sweep at controller startup: every deployed, non-protected, not-mid-deploy stack that still HAS containers and is down gets `StartStack`, at most **2 attempts 30 s apart**, then it stops and the alarm owns the problem. Never a restart loop. The whole sweep (5 s settle + one 30 s gap) fits inside the existing 90 s `deadAppBootGrace`, so a successful recovery never alerts and a failed one alerts honestly — asserted by a test rather than left to a comment. **The safety argument is the container gate:** the UI's Stop is `compose down`, which REMOVES the containers, while an interrupted boot leaves them behind as `Exited` — so "deployed, has containers, and they are down" is exactly the boot-orphan signature, and a zero-container stack is never touched. Red-proof: dropping that gate makes the user-stopped app get started, which is the one thing this must never do. **P1 (the `unless-stopped` root-cause probe) is deliberately NOT what this shipped on** — the reconciliation is correct whether or not Docker recorded those two containers as user-stopped, and the probe is recorded as an open question rather than a blocker. Live leg (STOP-1) pending. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21) **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-21 (STOP-1, operator-present), and it answered P1 for free.** Fixture on 9201: `docker stop` on bookstack (2 containers, left in place) + calibre-web, and a UI Stop on immich (`compose down` → 0 containers); then `pct reboot 9201`. Result: `10:53:22Z [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: 1 boot-orphaned app(s) found: [bookstack] — up to 2 attempt(s)` → `10:53:28Z attempt 1/2: started "bookstack" (took 6.0s)` → `complete: 1 app(s) recovered in 1 attempt(s)`, and **ZERO `app_start_failed`** — a successful recovery inside the boot grace is silent, exactly as designed. **P1 IS NOW ANSWERED, and the F5 hypothesis is CONFIRMED:** bookstack carries `restart=unless-stopped`, the Docker daemon came up at ~10:53:15Z, and the container's `StartedAt` is **`10:53:28.05Z` — the exact moment `bootrecon`'s `StartStack` returned**. Docker's own restart policy did NOT resurrect it; a container stopped before shutdown is recorded user-stopped and stays down. Only R-52 brought it back. **BUT the end-to-end "a deliberate Stop survives a reboot" property is NOT true today, for a reason outside R-52 — see R-55.** R-52's own gate is correct and was observed to be: immich (0 containers) was never a candidate |
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| R-54 | **[P2-HIGH] The guest's DHCP client is unsupervised — its death takes the box off the internet 1-2 hours later, invisibly.** ifupdown starts `dhclient` once at guest boot and nothing restarts it. | S-M | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — agent v0.92.1** | Origin: `audits/INCIDENT-guest-dhclient-killed-2026-07-20.md` §5 "OPEN RISK" — this row closes it. On 2026-07-20 a cleanup step killed guest 9201's dhclient (visible in the HOST's pid namespace; §4's `/proc/<pid>/cgroup` rule exists because of it). **The guest then kept working for another ~80 minutes on its unexpired lease**; only at expiry did the address and default route vanish, taking the Cloudflare tunnel, hub reports, catalog sync and the controller→agent channel with them — 1h15m outage, and every observable signal said healthy for the first 80 minutes. **The design consequence: liveness of the DHCP client is itself a probe.** `internal/guestnet` flags a DHCP guest unhealthy on `pgrep -x dhclient` alone, while the lease is still live — waiting for the IP to disappear is waiting out precisely that silent window (red-proof: reverting to IP-presence-only makes the July-20 fixture report **healthy** with zero heals). Four fixed-shape `pct exec` probes (address / default route / `/etc/network/interfaces` mode / client liveness, parsers pinned to output captured live from 9201), the incident's restored invocation as the heal, verbatim, and dampers throughout: two CONSECUTIVE bad probes, ≥10 min between heals per guest, ≤3/hour, observe-only while guest or agent uptime < 3 min. Refuses to act on a static guest (dhclient must never fight a static config — reported loudly and left to **R-50**, which is where option 2 of the incident's three choices belongs), on an unknown mode, on an unprobeable guest, or on an ownership-unproven guest list (source is `ListLXC` ∩ the felhom pool, audit A1). Host-tier by necessity: a guest with no default route cannot repair its own default route. **A live finding during deployment:** the first sweep on felhom-pve logged `dhclient liveness probe failed: sudo: a password is required` and reported `state=unknown` — fail-safe, but blind. TASK-D assumed no sudoers change was needed; three of the four probes had no grant. `FELHOM_GUESTNET` + four `guestnet-*` capability rows shipped in v0.92.1 (v0.92.0 superseded, do not vouch). **Healthy cycle PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-21** on felhom-pve: caps `68/68 ok, degraded=0` and `level=DEBUG guestnet: guest network healthy vmid=9201 mode=dhcp has_route=true dhclient_alive=true`. The HEAL leg (STOP-2, a deliberate replay of the incident) is operator-present and pending. Note the guest and the host still differ (host static since the F1 mitigation, guest DHCP) — choosing one for both remains **R-50**'s call, not this row's. Evidence: `felhom-agent/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21) **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-21 (STOP-2, operator-present) — a deliberate replay of the incident.** `kill -9` on guest 9201's dhclient at **12:43:18 CEST** (pid 336708, `cgroup=0::/lxc/9201/ns/.lxc` verified BEFORE the kill — the incident's own §4 rule, applied). **12:44:15 — 57 seconds later — detected on process liveness alone**, with the address and default route still perfectly present and 83 minutes of lease remaining: `unhealthy (first bad probe — not acting yet) bad_probes=1 required=2`. **12:45:15** second consecutive bad probe → `healing`, `cmd="pct exec 9201 -- dhclient -pf /run/dhclient.eth0.pid -lf /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient.eth0.leases eth0"` (the incident's invocation, logged verbatim before it ran) → **12:45:18 `guest network healed` ip=192.168.0.104 has_route=true dhclient_alive=true heals_last_hour=1**. Healed **120 s** after the kill — ~80 minutes before the outage would have begun. **The strongest evidence is what did not happen:** `cloudflared` stayed `Up 29 hours`, DNS resolved, the hub answered 302 in 0.16 s and the public URL 302 in 0.25 s. The 2026-07-20 outage was prevented, not merely detected. Exactly ONE heal, zero re-heals. **The damper then proved itself against a REAL transient, unplanned:** the STOP-1 guest reboot at 12:53:16 produced `unhealthy … no IPv4 address on eth0 bad_probes=1` — **no action** — then `guest network recovered` on the next cycle. A single blip really is not a diagnosis, and a booting guest is not injected with a dhclient. **Negative leg run in full:** 12:45:18 → 13:16:15 = **30 healthy Debug cycles, 0 heals, 0 WARN, 0 ERROR**. **Confirmed HUB-SIDE (read-only query of the hub store, after STOP-3):** the `guest_net` stanza arrives complete, and the report history traces the whole session — `10:30:27Z` agent 0.92.0 `state=unknown` (the sudoers-blind window, reported honestly rather than as a false healthy — independent proof that superseding 0.92.0 was right), then `10:48:12Z` 0.92.1 `healthy` carrying `last_heal_at=10:45:12Z heals_last_hour=1`. **Known limitation:** the damping state is IN-MEMORY, so an agent restart resets the heal cLine truncated
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| R-55 | **[P2] A customer's deliberate Stop does NOT survive a guest reboot for any drive-backed app** — the boot bind gate recreated and started it unconditionally. | S | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.157.0** | Surfaced by STOP-1's R-52 leg, which was designed to prove the opposite property and instead proved it is not true end to end. `internal/web/intermediary.go`'s boot gate (`[gate] boot <id>: live bind confirmed — recreating drive-backed app <x>`) selects on `cfg.Deployed && HDD_PATH` alone and then runs `StopStack` + **`StartStack`** on every match; the stack's `state` is passed in for the log line and is never consulted. So after `pct reboot 9201`, calibre-web and immich came back **running** at `10:53:18Z` even though immich had been stopped from the UI seconds earlier (`compose down`, 0 containers) — while bookstack, which is NOT drive-backed, correctly fell through to R-52. **R-52 is not implicated:** its own gate behaved exactly as specified (immich, with zero containers, was never a candidate), and this behaviour predates it. Two consequences worth ruling on: (a) a customer who stops a drive-backed app finds it running again after any reboot, which is the same class of dishonesty as offering a control that cannot work; (b) **R-52's practical scope on a real box is narrower than the brief assumed** — the gate reaches every drive-backed app first, so the boot-orphan sweep only ever sees the rest. Likely shape: the gate should recreate only apps that were RUNNING (or `deploying`) at shutdown, which is the same running/stopped distinction R-52 already draws, rather than every deployed app. Needs a ruling, not a drive-by change — the gate exists to fix a real bind-ordering bug and must keep doing that | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.157.0, deployed to 9201.** The ruling that shaped it: an unconditional recreate could drown the node when apps were deliberately stopped to free resources for others — so honouring Stop is not only about honesty, it is about not fighting the customer's own capacity management. `shouldRecreateOnBoot` now additionally requires `len(Stack.Containers) > 0` — **R-52's `existing-Exited vs absent` predicate (`bootrecon.isBootOrphan`), translated to this gate**: a UI Stop is `compose down` and REMOVES the containers, while a guest that went down under a running app leaves them behind, and docker's records survive the reboot. **Spike-lite outcome: a truthful running-at-shutdown source already existed and nothing was invented** — `AppConfig` carries no run-state (`Deployed` is a deploy-lifecycle flag that stays true across a Stop), but container presence is durable, already collected via `docker ps -a`, and already trusted by R-52. **Container STATE is still deliberately NOT a filter** — that half of the original design is load-bearing (a `State != stopped` filter misses an app docker has not restarted yet, or one stuck `Exited` on a create-time bind failure with `RestartCount=0`, which is the bug the boot-id path exists to fix). `TestShouldRecreateOnBoot` now pins both axes at once; they pull in opposite directions, which is the difficulty of this gate. **Ordering trap handled:** the evidence is sampled into the snapshot BEFORE any recreate, because `recreate`'s own `StopStack` destroys it. **No regression to the drive-absent gate:** apps it stopped are also at zero containers and are now skipped here, correctly — they are restored by `ReconcileDriveGates`' `Return` branch from `StoragePath.StoppedStacks` on the same loop tick. Honoured Stops are counted and logged separately (INFO `left stopped …`) so an intended outcome never fires a WARN. **Red-proof:** dropping `hasContainers` makes `TestRecreateDriveBackedApps_HonoursCustomerStop` fail with `recreated=[romm immich]` — the live defect by name. **NO new privileged verb** — `StopStack`/`StartStack` are plain `docker compose` execs in the controller's own container; the boot path's only agent calls are read-only. **Live status: deployed and WIRED but the reboot leg is NOT yet run** — 0.157.0 is up and healthy on 9201 and the new log string is present in the running binary (checked, so this is not an inert seam), but proving it end to end needs a `pct reboot 9201` with a drive-backed app stopped first, and CC did not reboot a box at a remote site unprompted. That leg is one operator-present STOP away |
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| R-56 | **[P3] Apps do not say how technical they are, so a beginner can be ambushed by a config-heavy one.** The catalog presents every app as equally approachable — one Telepítés button, the same Hungarian copy — but they are not. Glance needs a hand-written `glance.yml` before it does anything; some apps need a reverse-proxy or API concept to configure; others genuinely are install-and-use. A tester who picks the wrong first app concludes the PRODUCT is broken, not that they picked an advanced app. | S | **idea (filed 2026-07-21)** | Origin: TASK-E Part 3 — **filed, deliberately not implemented**. Shape: a `difficulty:` field in `.felhom.yml` (`kezdő` / `haladó` / `technikás`) surfaced as a catalog-card badge and repeated on the deploy screen. Cheap and incremental: one optional metadata field plus a badge, classifiable app-by-app with no migration — an app with no `difficulty:` simply shows no badge. **This is the constructive half of the glance ruling**: glance STAYS in the catalog (operator ruling 2026-07-21 — it is a legitimate app, not a broken one; its missing seeded `glance.yml` is a known pre-existing finding), and the honest fix is to LABEL it rather than hide it. Pairs with R-41: that gate proves an app CAN still deploy; this field tells a customer whether THEY should be the one deploying it |
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| R-55 | **[P2] A customer's deliberate Stop does NOT survive a guest reboot for any drive-backed app** — the boot bind gate recreated and started it unconditionally. | S | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.157.0** | Surfaced by STOP-1's R-52 leg, which was designed to prove the opposite property and instead proved it is not true end to end. `internal/web/intermediary.go`'s boot gate (`[gate] boot <id>: live bind confirmed — recreating drive-backed app <x>`) selects on `cfg.Deployed && HDD_PATH` alone and then runs `StopStack` + **`StartStack`** on every match; the stack's `state` is passed in for the log line and is never consulted. So after `pct reboot 9201`, calibre-web and immich came back **running** at `10:53:18Z` even though immich had been stopped from the UI seconds earlier (`compose down`, 0 containers) — while bookstack, which is NOT drive-backed, correctly fell through to R-52. **R-52 is not implicated:** its own gate behaved exactly as specified (immich, with zero containers, was never a candidate), and this behaviour predates it. Two consequences worth ruling on: (a) a customer who stops a drive-backed app finds it running again after any reboot, which is the same class of dishonesty as offering a control that cannot work; (b) **R-52's practical scope on a real box is narrower than the brief assumed** — the gate reaches every drive-backed app first, so the boot-orphan sweep only ever sees the rest. Likely shape: the gate should recreate only apps that were RUNNING (or `deploying`) at shutdown, which is the same running/stopped distinction R-52 already draws, rather than every deployed app. Needs a ruling, not a drive-by change — the gate exists to fix a real bind-ordering bug and must keep doing that | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.157.0, deployed to 9201.** The ruling that shaped it: an unconditional recreate could drown the node when apps were deliberately stopped to free resources for others — so honouring Stop is not only about honesty, it is about not fighting the customer's own capacity management. `shouldRecreateOnBoot` now additionally requires `len(Stack.Containers) > 0` — **R-52's `existing-Exited vs absent` predicate (`bootrecon.isBootOrphan`), translated to this gate**: a UI Stop is `compose down` and REMOVES the containers, while a guest that went down under a running app leaves them behind, and docker's records survive the reboot. **Spike-lite outcome: a truthful running-at-shutdown source already existed and nothing was invented** — `AppConfig` carries no run-state (`Deployed` is a deploy-lifecycle flag that stays true across a Stop), but container presence is durable, already collected via `docker ps -a`, and already trusted by R-52. **Container STATE is still deliberately NOT a filter** — that half of the original design is load-bearing (a `State != stopped` filter misses an app docker has not restarted yet, or one stuck `Exited` on a create-time bind failure with `RestartCount=0`, which is the bug the boot-id path exists to fix). `TestShouldRecreateOnBoot` now pins both axes at once; they pull in opposite directions, which is the difficulty of this gate. **Ordering trap handled:** the evidence is sampled into the snapshot BEFORE any recreate, because `recreate`'s own `StopStack` destroys it. **No regression to the drive-absent gate:** apps it stopped are also at zero containers and are now skipped here, correctly — they are restored by `ReconcileDriveGates`' `Return` branch from `StoragePath.StoppedStacks` on the same loop tick. Honoured Stops are counted and logged separately (INFO `left stopped …`) so an intended outcome never fires a WARN. **Red-proof:** dropping `hasContainers` makes `TestRecreateDriveBackedApps_HonoursCustomerStop` fail with `recreated=[romm immich]` — the live defect by name. **NO new privileged verb** — `StopStack`/`StartStack` are plain `docker compose` execs in the controller's own container; the boot path's only agent calls are read-only. **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-21 (operator-present, TASK-F Part 3).** Fixture on 9201: immich (drive-backed, 4 containers) STOPPED through the real UI endpoint `POST /api/stacks/immich/stop` → `compose down` → **0 containers**; calibre-web (drive-backed) and bookstack (NOT drive-backed) left running. Then `pct reboot 9201` at 14:29:14Z. Result, from the gate's own log:
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> `14:29:28 [gate] boot 1784525102-11906045: live bind confirmed — recreating drive-backed app calibre-web (state=stopped) onto /mnt/felhom-drives/hdd_1`
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> `14:29:29 [gate] boot 1784525102-11906045: 1 drive-backed app(s) left stopped — zero containers means the customer stopped them on purpose`
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**immich is absent from the recreate list and came back STOPPED (0 containers)** — on 2026-07-21 before this fix, the identical fixture brought it back RUNNING. calibre-web recreated, bookstack back, `[bootrecon] no boot-orphaned apps` (consistent — nothing was left orphaned for it to adopt), **ZERO alerts**, whole convergence ~15 s from reboot to steady state. The `left stopped` INFO line fired in production for the first time, so the honoured path is observable rather than silent |
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| R-56 | **[P3] Apps do not say how technical they are, so a beginner can be ambushed by a config-heavy one.** The catalog presents every app as equally approachable — one Telepítés button, the same Hungarian copy — but they are not. Glance needs a hand-written `glance.yml` before it does anything; some apps need a reverse-proxy or API concept to configure; others genuinely are install-and-use. A tester who picks the wrong first app concludes the PRODUCT is broken, not that they picked an advanced app. | S | **idea (filed 2026-07-21)** | Origin: TASK-E Part 3 — **filed, deliberately not implemented**. Shape: a `difficulty:` field in `.felhom.yml` (`kezdő` / `haladó` / `technikás`) surfaced as a catalog-card badge and repeated on the deploy screen. Cheap and incremental: one optional metadata field plus a badge, classifiable app-by-app with no migration — an app with no `difficulty:` simply shows no badge. **This is the constructive half of the glance ruling**: glance STAYS in the catalog (operator ruling 2026-07-21 — it is a legitimate app, not a broken one; its missing seeded `glance.yml` is a known pre-existing finding), and the honest fix is to LABEL it rather than hide it. Pairs with R-41: that gate proves an app CAN still deploy; this field tells a customer whether THEY should be the one deploying it. **Badge plumbing is ALREADY BUILT (controller v0.158.0)** — `web.MetaBadge` + the `meta_badge` template partial + the `lifecycleBadge` funcmap entry were written generic for exactly this: a `difficultyBadge` funcmap function returning the same `*MetaBadge`, plus a `difficulty:` field on `stacks.Metadata`, is the whole remaining job. No new markup, no new CSS. Re-sized accordingly |
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| R-57 | **An app can be withdrawn from the catalog without orphaning the customers already running it** — `.felhom.yml` `lifecycle: available / hidden / abandoned`. | S | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.158.0 (+ v0.158.1 fix), LIVE-PROVEN** | **Motivating case: plant-it.** Earlier the same day it was withdrawn by moving its directory to `retired/` — which un-offers the app but ALSO makes the controller's orphan detector see the template as GONE for anyone running it, flagging their working install `Elavult` and offering a Törlés button. Withdrawing an app must never take a working app away from a customer, so the directory move was replaced by metadata. **Operator requirements, verbatim (ruling 2026-07-21):** states `available` / `hidden` / `abandoned`; abandoned apps are NOT offered to new installs (no badge-but-installable middle state); deployed instances of hidden/abandoned apps keep full function; an abandoned app shows a permanent notice that *„Az alkalmazás fejlesztője felhagyott a fejlesztéssel. A telepített verzió továbbra is használható, de frissítések és biztonsági javítások már nem érkeznek hozzá."* **Design points that matter beyond this feature:** (a) the deploy gate is server-side and fail-CLOSED before any mutation — hiding a button is not a gate, and a stale link or direct POST must be refused; (b) an unknown lifecycle value fails OPEN (→ available + one WARN), deliberately opposite, because a typo or a state from a newer catalog must never pull a working app out of every customer's list — both read the same `EffectiveLifecycle`, so they cannot disagree; (c) lifecycle NEVER reaches orphan detection, red-proofed. **LIVE-PROVEN 2026-07-21 on 9201** through the real endpoints: `lifecycle: abandoned` arrived via the normal catalog sync; plant-it renders **0 times** on the Alkalmazások page while the control app renders 10; a direct `POST /api/stacks/plant-it/deploy` returns **HTTP 409 `{"ok":false,"error":"Ez az alkalmazás jelenleg nem telepíthető."}`**; the app page carries the notice and no Telepítés button. **v0.158.1 is a shipped-and-caught defect worth remembering:** the three predicates were declared with POINTER receivers, and html/template cannot call those on the non-addressable value the handler passes — every `/apps/<slug>` returned 500, for every app, while compiling cleanly with a fully green suite, because no test rendered `app_info`. A template method call is only checked when the template runs. Follow-on: R-56's difficulty badge reuses this plumbing |
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| R-53 | **`app_export.html` substituted the CSRF token where the customer domain belongs** - the open-in-browser link was wrong for every app with a subdomain, and a session CSRF token landed in a URL. | XS | **SHIPPED (controller v0.150.0, 2026-07-20)** | One template token (`{{$.CSRFToken}}` -> `{{$.Domain}}`) plus the `Domain` key in `exportPageHandler`'s data map - that handler does not go through `baseData`, which is where every other page gets it, so the template had no domain to read. Render tests assert the joined `<sub>.<domain>` and that the token appears nowhere in that line; red-proofed against the pre-fix template. Origin: `audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` (F7) |
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## P3 — post-alpha
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