diff --git a/REPORT.md b/REPORT.md index 76efacf..0b4b400 100644 --- a/REPORT.md +++ b/REPORT.md @@ -1,316 +1,147 @@ -# REPORT — R-80 → R-85: from a false alarm to an audible DR tier (2026-07-26 → 27) +# REPORT — closing the backup arc: seam sweep + live outage validation (2026-07-27) -One long session. It began as a diagnostic into a nightly alarm and ended with the offsite DR tier -being **restore-proven unattended, with its failure audible**. Five roadmap items, four artifacts. +**Overwritten** per the standing rule. **No version shipped** — the sweep found no defect, so the +witnesses are compile-time-only source changes riding the next release. Agent `9842c52`→`0236553`, +controller `ca013c8`→`8f46495`. Live fleet unchanged: hub v0.79.0, agent v0.105.0, controller v0.178.0. -| Repo | From → To | +## Part 1 — the seam table + +Every optional-capability type assertion across all four repos. `StackDataProvider`, `BackupReporter` +and `RestoreTestReporter` are **not** in this table: they are interface-typed struct *fields*, which +the compiler already enforces at assignment. The dangerous shape is `x.(Interface)`. + +| Interface | Asserted at | On failure | Silent? | Witness now | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| `quiesce.TieredBackend` | `tiers.go:109` (`resolveDueTiers`) | falls back to the untargeted single-tier path | **SILENT** | ✅ moved to production | +| `quiesce.TieredBackend` | `quiesce.go:375` (`allTiersForManualRun`) | manual run covers only the untargeted tier | **SILENT** | ✅ same witness | +| `quiesce.TieredBackend` | `tiers.go:191`, `:199` | **unchecked — would panic** | no (loud) | ✅ same witness | +| `localapi.BackupArchiveLister` | `server.go:1155` (`newestArchiveOn`) | degrades to `archiveAbsent` = pre-R-84 in-memory-only | **SILENT** | ✅ added | +| `agentapi.AgentVersionReporter` | `features.go:157` | version gate → live probe | silent, benign (both decide correctly) | ✅ added | +| anonymous `GuestMemory` iface | `features.go:86` | returns `errNoMemoryProbe` → `SupportUnknown` | **no** — distinct error | n/a (anonymous) | + +**Was `TieredBackend` the only one, or the first one? It was the first one.** +`BackupArchiveLister` has the identical shape and a worse blast radius: a silent degrade to +`archiveAbsent` is the R-84 bug returning — a cold store after a restart reading as "no backup ever" — +with nothing in any log. It had **no witness of any kind**, and in fact **zero compile-time witnesses +existed in production code anywhere in either repo** before today. + +**No defect found.** Every implementation satisfies its interface today, so per the task's rule there +is no version bump and no deploy. What was missing was the *guard*, not the behaviour. + +**The guard is proven, not assumed.** Breaking `BackupRunner.NewestArchiveTime`'s signature now fails +`go build`: + +``` +cmd/felhom-agent/seam_witnesses.go:28:38: *backup.BackupRunner does not implement + localapi.BackupArchiveLister (wrong type for method NewestArchiveTime) +``` + +Before the witness, that same break compiled and vetted clean. The controller's witness also **moved +out of a `_test.go` file** — a test-file witness fires on `go test`/`go vet` but not on `go build` +alone, which is exactly the path the R-88 Part 2 near-miss would have taken. + +## Part 2 — the live outage + +Pre-flight cleared: 0 tasks in flight on ep0, 0 backup/restore processes on either box (counted by +`COMM`, since `pgrep -f` self-matches and gave a false `1` first), 0 scratch guests, no quiesce marker. + +### The headline — `age_state=unknown` on real hardware, first ever + +```json +{"vmid":9201,"due":true, + "reason":"backup storage unreadable and no in-memory record — age UNKNOWN, treating as due", + "target":"felhom-pbs","age_state":"unknown"} +``` + +Identical on both boxes. The transition is timestamped on demo-felhom: + +``` +18:35:30 felhom-pbs/content 200 ← before power-off +18:39:26 felhom-pbs/content 500 ← after +18:39:11 local/content 200 ← local tier, same window, unaffected +``` + +Agent journal, both boxes: `could not read the backup storage for the due-check … target=felhom-pbs` +— the degrade path genuinely executed. **Positive observables throughout**, per standing rule 3: an +empty quiesce log alone would have been equally consistent with a dead loop. + +### The behaviour it gates + +demo-felhom's `local` tier was **genuinely due** (25.8 h) for the whole window, so the due set was +`[local(known), felhom-pbs(unknown)]` → `oldestAge` nil → `valveLicensed` false → **defer**. This is +the 09:02 incident's exact condition replayed with the fix in place. + +| | demo-felhom | demo-hp | +|---|---|---| +| App containers running | **10**, unchanged | **3**, unchanged | +| Quiesce cycles | **0** | **0** | +| Quiesce marker | absent | absent | +| vzdump attempted | none since 07:13 | none since 09:37 | + +**Not one app stack was stopped.** Per-tier isolation demonstrated on the same box in the same +minute: `local` → 200 with a real age, `felhom-pbs` → 500 → unknown. + +### Item 4 — conditions did not arise, and that is confirmed, not assumed + +`felhom-pbs` was not due on either box (28 h / 7 h against a 168 h cadence), so no backup ran, nothing +failed, **the R-88 breaker did not arm**, and **no `whole_guest_backup_failed` travelled**. I did not +force one. Confirmed positively: the newest hub event is `16:10:33`, *before* the window opened at +16:24, and 0 events exist in the window. + +## Part 2.2 — post-boot + +| Check | Result | |---|---| -| felhom-agent | v0.96.0 → **v0.104.0** | -| felhom-controller | v0.173.0 → **v0.175.0** | -| felhom.eu hub | v0.74.0 → **v0.77.0** | -| host-install | 1.19.0 → **1.20.0** | +| Mount | `/mnt/pbs-datastore ext4 rw,relatime,discard` — **relatime present, `noatime` ABSENT** ✅ | +| Swap | `/swapfile 4G` back — **survived its first reboot** (it was added and verified without one) ✅ | +| PBS services | `proxmox-backup` + `proxmox-backup-proxy` both active ✅ | +| Datastore | `felhom-offsite → /mnt/pbs-datastore`, online ✅ | +| Snapshots | demo-felhom **2**, demo-hp **3** — **exact match**, same timestamps ✅ | +| Schedules | `gc-schedule sun 04:30`, `verify-new 1`, 2 prune jobs ✅ | +| Filesystem | `EXT4-fs (sda): recovery complete` — journal replayed after the unclean power-off, then mounted r/w; **0** I/O or EXT4 errors ✅ | -All live on demo-felhom and demo-hp. - ---- - -## 1. The arc, in one line each - -| Item | What it was | -|---|---| -| **R-80** | Diagnose `expected_backup_missed` firing on three boxes. **The premise was wrong on both counts** — it fired ONCE, not nightly, and no real external customer was notified | -| **R-81** | Fix the CLASS behind it: absence of a signal treated as evidence of failure. Third instance | -| **R-82** | The backup target split — "local daily + PBS weekly" was **not expressible at all**, which is why the DR tier was `applied` and empty | -| **R-84** | An agent restart no longer triggers a redundant backup | -| **R-85** | The DR tier is restore-tested **unattended**, and its failure is **heard** | - ---- - -## 2. R-80 — the diagnosis, and what it actually found - -The alarm fired at 2026-07-26 03:00 UTC on demo-felhom, demo-hp and drill-r50. The brief described it -as nightly, on three customers, one reaching a customer channel with a 7.3-day staleness claim. - -**It fired exactly once.** The check ran and was correctly silent on every prior night. The one -customer-channel mail went to the operator's own mailbox; `peti-felhom` — the only real external -customer — did not fire at all. And the 7.3 days was the age of the **PBS** snapshot, reached only as -a fallback: the local tier had run on 07-24, 07-25 and 07-26. - -**Root cause:** the agent's backup store is in-memory (`"lost on restart; the cadence re-populates"`). -The R-50 fleet restart at 12:44 UTC emptied `backups[]`; the next backup landed at 07:03 the following -morning; the 03:00 check fell in that ~18 h blind window and read empty as *no backup exists*. - -**One real finding stood:** the PBS/offsite tier had **no schedule at all**. demo-felhom held one -snapshot from a healing artifact; demo-hp held **zero, ever**, while reporting `applied` since 07-21. - ---- - -## 3. R-81 — fixing the class, not the instance - -`assessBackupFreshness` collapsed *absence of records* into *failure*. It now returns -**OK / UNKNOWN / MISSED**: absence is UNKNOWN until it outlives a window anchored at first contact. - -The anchor was **free** — a Phase-0 probe found the hub already retains 90 days of host-reports, so -`GetHostReportsSince` + `newestBackupEvidence` answer *"when did I last SEE evidence of a backup?"* -rather than *"what does the latest report say?"*. No agent change, no new state. - -**Not silence.** A genuinely dead box must still alarm — that is the half the naive fix breaks, and -`TestBackupFreshness_NoEvidenceBeyondAnchor_Alarms` is what makes the suppression safe. - -The invariant is now written at the head of the function naming all three instances (v0.12.0, -v0.73.0, R-81), pinned by a boundary test whose name says what it protects. - ---- - -## 4. R-82 — the target split - -`BackupTarget()` returned ONE string and `BackupCadence()` ONE 24 h window. - -**Phase 0 gates:** weekly CONFIRMED (the only 7-day-exposed state is the non-SMB half of -`settings.json`; `encryption.key` and the offbox credentials are **stable files unchanged since first -boot**, so a week-old copy is byte-identical). The `pvesm status` 0/0/0 anomaly resolved as a -namespace-scoped-token reporting artifact. Capacity raised a **STOP**, which the operator ruled past. - -**Measured, not bracketed:** the second weekly snapshot cost **+2.7 GB** against 14.46 GB logical -(~81 % dedup). Weekly top-ups are cheap; **first** snapshots are not. Per-tenant encryption means -**no cross-customer dedup**, so the 80 % warn arrives at roughly the first additional customer. - -**Shipped:** per-tier cadence/retention/wait-bound (agent); **one quiesce window for both tiers** -(controller — two cycles would mean two app outages for one night's work); per-tier thresholds -(hub, host 26 h / offsite 8 d); fresh-install default (installer). - -### Four defects found by RUNNING it, not reviewing it - -1. **v0.98.0** — a 41-minute backup recorded `success:false` at 30 minutes **while still running**, - then completed `TASK OK`. Worse than "didn't happen": the tier stays due and the retry hits the - guest lock. -2. **v0.100.0** — the restore tier read from the configured target, not the archive. **A silent - regression of the S4.1 fix** — the mechanism was never removed; its *input* changed when - `local_backup_target` was retargeted to `local`. -3. **v0.101.0** — a leaked scratch kept `onboot: 1`; a host reboot would have started a clone of the - live guest. -4. **v0.102.0** — a tier fired at a storage that does not exist yet. - ---- - -## 5. R-84 — ground truth instead of memory - -Three redundant local backups ran in one afternoon of deploys, because a restart empties the store. -On the offsite tier that is a wasted multi-hour upload after **every** agent deploy. - -Fixed by **asking the storage**, not persisting the record: a pruned archive correctly stops counting, -where a persisted record would keep claiming a backup that no longer exists. Proven live on both -boxes with the store cold. - ---- - -## 6. R-85 — unattended, and audible - -Three defects, each verified at source: the scheduler only ever saw `BackupTarget()`; the spec was -**frozen at daemon start** (an immediately-invoked function — also a latent staleness bug); and a -failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with **no event, no notification, no gauge** — true for the -local tier that *was* being tested. - -**Ruling (operator): oldest-first.** Never-proven sorts first, which is where the offsite tier starts. -Rotation credit **only on success**, or a permanently failing tier looks freshly proven and stops -being retried. State persisted — unlike R-84 there is no ground truth, because a restore-test destroys -its scratch and leaves no artifact. - -**`backup.InFlight`** — a host-wide one-heavy-operation gate. Not a lock concern (the scratch VMID -never touches the live guest's vzdump lock) but a **LINK** one: an offsite restore PULLS multi-GB over -the tunnel a backup PUSHES one. Callers **defer**; they never cancel. - -**Two hub signals, never merged:** `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` -(*unverified*, not known-broken). Anchored on R-81, operator-tier only. - ---- - -## 7. Live evidence - -**The restore round-trip PASSED** (demo-hp, manual): -``` -source_tier: pbs pass: true verified: boot+running mount_parity: ok 4m5s, clean teardown -``` -`mount_parity` is the non-hollow half — a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume. - -**The multi-tier quiesce ran** through the real UI endpoint (authed + CSRF): -exactly **ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it**, app quiesced through the non-last tier, -early resume on the last tier's snapshot. **Downtime 1m27s for both tiers.** - -**Rotation proven unattended** (demo-hp): -``` -tier selected (oldest-proven first) target=felhom-pbs ← never-proven sorted first -scheduled restore-test passed duration_s=194.8 -tier selected (oldest-proven first) target=local ← rotated -``` - -**The signal fired on its first sweep — on real faults:** -``` -[ERROR] drill-r50 Restore-test FAILED on the local tier … HTTP 403 missing privilege VM.Backup -[WARN] demo-felhom pbs tier: NEVER restore-proven in 205h (limit 168h) — unverified, not known-broken -[INFO] demo-hp pbs tier: watching 133h of a 168h grace — newborn, not a fault -``` -The first two are genuine, previously-invisible failures. All notifications went to the **operator** -channel; the DB confirms no customer routing. - -**demo-hp's first ever offsite backup landed** — 4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace. - ---- - -## 8. Mistakes I made, and what they cost - -Recorded because the pattern matters more than any one of them. - -1. **I claimed the restore-test would break the control plane** by booting a network-conflicting - clone. **Wrong** — it link-downs every NIC before boot, and that is unit-tested. I read a config - artifact and inferred behaviour without reading the code that consumes it, *then escalated before - finishing the check*. I also disabled a safety mechanism on that basis; it is re-enabled. -2. **I pushed one commit red** — read `packages ok: 28` and missed `rc=1` in the same command. Five - of my own tests were failing. -3. **I planted a time bomb in Slice C** — a test hard-coded the incident timestamp - `2026-07-18T18:31:06Z` while comparing against the real clock. It passed all day and began failing - at exactly 18:31 UTC, 8 days later. A test that passes at commit time and fails hours later is - worse than one that fails immediately. -4. **I left `REPORT.md` claiming "not deployed"** 26 minutes before deploying, and did not update it. -5. **Two bad observables** while verifying the controller: read a UTC timestamp as host time, then - checked for log lines the agent does not emit at INFO. Both produced confident wrong readings. -6. **I told the operator blocking would not silence the new alerts.** Wrong — blocked customers are - excluded by `GetActiveCustomerIDs` already. -7. **My own spec's §5.3 was wrong** — it said to force a failure with `--selftest`, but the selftest - runs in a separate process and never reaches a host-report. - -The recurring shape: **inferring behaviour from an artifact instead of reading the code path that -consumes it**, and **reading a result without reading its exit code**. The host=CEST / -component=UTC mismatch caught me twice in one session. - ---- - -## 9. State at close - -| | | -|---|---| -| Backups | local daily + offsite weekly, both boxes | -| Offsite retention | 2 weeks (`keep_last=2`) | -| Restore-test | **rotating both tiers, unattended**; interim cadence 3.5 d → each tier ~weekly | -| Signals | failure + staleness, operator-only | -| drill-r50 | VM 300 **stopped**, `onboot=0`. Operator will block the customer | - -### demo-felhom's offsite restore-test — PASSED, and my estimate was wrong +### The unplanned finding: the volume changed device name ``` -tier selected (oldest-proven first) target=felhom-pbs archive=…2026-07-26T12:21:48Z (14.46 GB) -scheduled restore-test passed duration_s=635.07 ← 10m35s -tier selected (oldest-proven first) target=local ← rotated +before: volume=/dev/sdb root=/dev/sda1 +after: volume=/dev/sda root=/dev/sdb1 ``` -**Rotation is now proven unattended on BOTH boxes**, and the persisted state confirms it: -`{"felhom-pbs": "2026-07-27T06:14:42Z"}` — credit recorded, so the next cycle picks the other tier. +The kernel enumerated the disks in the opposite order across the reboot. The mount survived only +because fstab uses `/dev/disk/by-id/scsi-0HC_Volume_106469259`. **A `/dev/sdb` entry would have failed +to mount — or mounted the root disk's device node.** That choice was load-bearing and had never been +tested; this reboot tested it. -**Correction worth carrying forward: I estimated ~2 hours for this restore and it took 10m35s.** -I derived the estimate from a download rate measured during the *failed* attempt, which was running -under contention; the real link does ~1.4 GB/min. I then used that wrong figure to raise a design -concern — that the heavy-operation gate would block backups for hours on this box. **At 10 minutes -that concern largely evaporates**, and the same correction applies to the SPEC's closing risk note. -An estimate extrapolated from a degraded measurement is not a measurement. +### Recovery -## 10. NOT done — explicitly +Both boxes returned to `age_state=known` on both tiers within ~60 s of boot; `felhom-pbs` on +demo-felhom back to `due=false, within cadence window, age_seconds=102102`. No breaker was armed, so +none needed clearing; no failure event fired, so no recovery event was expected — and none appeared. -1. **The restic (app-data offsite) tier is NEVER restore-tested** → **R-87**. R-85 covers whole-guest - vzdump tiers only. This is arguably the tier that matters most: the only one that survives losing - the box **and** carries the customer's app data (the whole-guest snapshot excludes the - bind-mounted drives). It is exactly the state PBS was in yesterday. -2. **Restore-tests are interval-scheduled, not backup-aligned** → **R-86** (operator ruling - 2026-07-27: ~1 day after that tier's own backup). -3. **Rotation observed on demo-hp only**, and under a compressed cadence. It proves the rotation - logic, not the production interval. -4. **The hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE**, not a reported cadence. No box is in the - wrong shape today. -5. **The installer-default fleet flip** awaits a full weekly cycle. -6. **`07-backup-architecture.md` is NOT ratified** — brought current with an honest staleness header; - ratification is Viktor's review of the §10 list. -7. **The customer-facing Hungarian copy still overstates scope** — unchanged since R-80 flagged it. -8. **Capacity:** the datastore still needs growing before the first real customer. +## Part 3 — CX33 ---- +**Not available even with the server powered off**, so the powered-on theory is settled: it is the +Cost-Optimized line's "Limited availability", not the power state. No rescale happened. R-90 stays +`BLOCKED`/`WATCHING` with the 4 GiB swap as the interim — now a *proven* interim, since it survived a +reboot. Escape hatch if 8 GB becomes urgent: the **Regular Performance (CPX)** / **General Purpose +(CCX)** lines carry no availability warning, at higher cost. Operator's call. -## 11. POST-SESSION — live state at hand-off (2026-07-27 ~07:10 UTC) +## Comes off the never-live-validated list -Recorded after §1–§10 were written. Two facts, both still true at hand-off. +- **`age_state=unknown` observed on real hardware** — the path R-88 Part 2 exists for. +- **The window gate refusing an unknown-driven valve, with a genuinely due tier present** — zero app + stacks stopped. +- **Per-tier isolation under a real offsite outage.** +- **The by-id mount surviving a reboot** (and surviving a device rename, which was not anticipated). +- **The 4 GiB swap surviving a reboot.** +- **Datastore integrity across an unclean power-off** — journal replay, exact snapshot match. -### 11.1 The offsite PBS outage — ~15 minutes, OOM-driven, RESOLVED +## Honestly cannot come off it -**Root cause established, on the box.** `felhom-hetzner` (167.233.158.164) did **not** reboot -(`up 18 days`). At **06:58:12 UTC a global OOM** fired: `proxmox-backup-proxy` had grown to a -**3.2 GB peak on a 3.8 GB box** (systemd's own accounting at the later restart: -`Consumed 42.395s CPU time, 3.2G memory peak`) and a concurrent root `rsync` at **1.9 GB RSS** tipped -it over. The kernel killed the rsync. PBS stopped serving from ~07:00 to **07:17:59 UTC**, then -recovered on its own — evidenced by the PVE API access log for the agent's ground-truth reads: -`500` at 09:02/09:07/09:12 CEST, `200` from 09:17:59 CEST onward, uninterrupted since. A **separate** -deliberate proxy restart at 07:52:52 UTC cleared unrelated `read fs info on "/srv/pbs-scratch" failed -- ENOENT` spam; it was not the recovery. - -**This session's restore-test is the most likely driver of the proxy's 3.2 GB peak** — it read -14.46 GB off that datastore 06:44–06:58 UTC, finishing 9 seconds before the OOM. Not provable from -what is on the box, but the timing and the memory figure both point at it, and the rsync was the -*victim* rather than the cause. **This bears directly on R-86:** restore-testing a tier weekly means -putting a multi-GB read on a 4 GB offsite box *on a schedule*. Either the box needs more RAM before -that lands, or the restore-test needs to not run concurrently with whatever else touches that -datastore. See also the existing note on rsync over a PBS chunk store. - -**Access correction worth carrying:** root SSH to that box works **from DooPlex to the public IP** -(`root@167.233.158.164`), and **not** from felhom-pve to the tunnel IP `10.77.0.1`. I concluded "no -access exists" from the second failing and stopped diagnosing — the project memory recorded the -working path and I did not check it until later. The whole root cause above came from finally trying -the documented route. - -### 11.2 R-88 — an unreachable target takes the customer's apps down on a loop - -The agent restart that applied the reverted 3.5-day cadence exposed **R-88**: an unreachable target -reads as *no backup exists*, so the offsite tier is perpetually "due". Three full quiesce cycles ran -(07:02:57, 07:07:58, 07:12:57 UTC), each stopping and restarting all four app stacks for a backup -that could not succeed — ~19 s of app downtime per cycle, ~50 s per full cycle. - -**It stopped after three only because PBS recovered.** There is no limiter: `internal/quiesce` has no -failure counter, backoff, breaker or attempt budget, and the driver is a plain 5-minute ticker -(`quiesce.go:149`). Had the outage lasted, the loop would have continued indefinitely. - -**The amplifier found while verifying that:** the agent answers `AgeSecs: nil`, and -`scheduledRunAllowed` (`quiesce.go:466-480`) returns `true` whenever the age is nil — *"never -withhold the first one"*. So the same missing value that makes every poll due **also bypasses the -time-of-day gate**. The gate was `[04:30, 08:30)`; the cycles ran 09:02–09:12 Budapest, outside it. -A safety valve written for a genuine first-ever backup is being tripped by a failed storage read. - -**Operator ruling 2026-07-27: leave it running** (given while PBS was still down) — demo box, -contained impact, self-heals, and leaving it keeps the fault visible rather than masked. It has since -self-resolved; no action is outstanding on the box. - -**I got the severity wrong twice before measuring it.** First as "one spurious event per restart" -(it was a repeating loop), then as "three tries, so something limits it" (nothing does — the -condition ended). Both readings were asserted from the mechanism I had reasoned about rather than -from what the box and the code actually showed; the second was only caught by reading -`internal/quiesce` instead of inferring a breaker from three log lines. Same shape as the ~2-hour -estimate in §9. - -### 11.3 Verified clean at hand-off - -Agent `felhom-agent 0.104.0` active on demo-felhom, `restore-test scheduler starting cadence=84h0m0s`, -both tiers armed (`local` 24h / `felhom-pbs` 168h). The scratch guest leaked by the mid-test restart -was destroyed — **990000 band empty, zero leftover LVs**. `onboot: 0` held on that leaked scratch, -which is the **v0.101.0 fix working in exactly the scenario it was written for**. - ---- - -## 11. Observations - -- **drill-r50's 403** (`missing privilege VM.Backup at /vms/9100`) is real and was invisible. The box - is being retired, so it needs a decision — fix or accept — not silence. -- **A blocked customer is hidden from the Dashboard and from every checker**, and it is reversible - (`configs.go` sets status back to `active`, with a UI affordance). Blocking is a blunt instrument - though: it silences *everything*, which is why the operator is building per-alert silencing. -- **The PVE UI will permanently show `felhom-pbs` at 0 %** (namespace-scoped token). Read fill from - the hub's PBS-DR gauge. -- **demo-felhom's guest grew 9.74 → 14.46 GB logical in eight days.** Probably one-off from app - testing, but if it is a rate the capacity sizing changes quickly. -- **Three of the five items in this arc were the same bug class** — absence of a signal read as - evidence, or a correct mechanism whose input changed underneath it. Both are now written into the - code as invariants rather than left as lore. +- **The R-88 breaker has still never armed on real hardware.** No backup was due, so none failed. +- **`whole_guest_backup_failed` has never travelled from a REAL failure** — only from the induced + POST on 2026-07-27 15:04:57. The quiesce→notify link remains unit-proven. +- **R-97b's app-alarm suppression has never fired live** — it needs a real quiesce cycle. +- **`age_state=absent` has never been observed live** — it needs a genuinely fresh tier. +- **The legacy-agent path (Scenario C) is now unobservable on this fleet** — both agents are v0.105.0. +- **The first in-window scheduled backup** lands 2026-07-28 at the earliest. diff --git a/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md b/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md index 49afd51..5addd8b 100644 --- a/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md +++ b/documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md @@ -9,14 +9,14 @@ State: `BLOCKED` · `READY` · `WAITING-ON-OPERATOR` · `WATCHING`. Every row ha | ID | What | State | Blocked on | Next action | Owner | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | **R-88a** | ~~Failing backup re-quiesces every 5 min, no backoff~~ | **SHIPPED** (controller v0.176.0, 2026-07-27) | — | Live on both boxes; breaker 15m→4h, per-tier, never permanent | — | -| **R-88b** | ~~`/backup/due` cannot say *unknown*~~ | **SHIPPED** (agent v0.105.0 + controller v0.178.0, 2026-07-27) | — | `age_state` known/absent/unknown; empty = legacy. MinAgent 0.105.0, met on both boxes | — | +| **R-88b** | ~~`/backup/due` cannot say *unknown*~~ | **SHIPPED + PROVEN-LIVE** (agent v0.105.0 + controller v0.178.0, 2026-07-27) | — | `age_state=unknown` captured on real hardware during a deliberate ep0 outage; controller deferred, **zero app stacks stopped** | — | | **R-95** | restic offsite credential **can delete** (`readonly=False`, `forget --prune` runs from the box); SFTP cannot express append-only | **READY #1** | — | Root exposure still open. Mitigation now ARMED — split prune off-box or move to REST `--append-only` | CC | | **R-94** | Hub hands out host-install `1.19.0`; `1.20.0` is what carries R-82's backup default | **READY #2** | — | Bump `configs.go:28`, and stop hand-syncing a version constant across repos | CC | | **R-86** | Restore-tests are interval-scheduled, not backup-aligned | **READY #3** | R-90 (ep0 headroom) informs cadence | Trigger a tier ~24 h after **its own** newest archive | CC | | **R-87** | The restic tier is never restore-tested | **READY #4** | — | Design a controller-side test (no scratch-guest analogue transfers) | CC | | — | Storage Box **snapshots** on `storage-box-pool-1` — plan SET (daily 00:00, keep 7) but **0 taken yet** | WATCHING | first run tonight 00:00 | Confirm `size_snapshots > 0` tomorrow; until then the mitigation is armed, not proven | CC | | — | `PBS-storage-1` (u629193, box 611421) still `status=active`, 19.9 MB | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR | operator console | Delete the box | operator | -| **R-90** | ep0 RAM headroom — **4 GiB swap added 2026-07-27** (persistent, verified without reboot); 3.8 GB RAM unchanged | **BLOCKED** (interim done) | Hetzner CX33 availability | Rescale when available; swap now covers Sunday's first GC | operator | +| **R-90** | ep0 RAM headroom — 4 GiB swap **survived its first reboot** 2026-07-27; 3.8 GB RAM unchanged | **BLOCKED** (interim proven) | Hetzner CX33 availability — **confirmed unavailable even powered OFF**, so it is the Cost-Optimized "Limited availability", not the power state | Re-check CX33; escape hatch if urgent = CPX/CCX lines (no availability warning, higher cost) | operator | | **R-91** | Old 13 GB datastore copy at `/srv/pbs-felhom` on ep0's root disk | WATCHING | demo-felhom's first **post-migration** PBS backup | Delete once it lands; fix `CONTEXT.md:1018` same commit | CC | | — | First-ever **GC** on `felhom-offsite` (armed today 13:11 UTC, never run) | WATCHING | schedule | **Sun 2026-08-02 04:30 UTC** — confirm it completes | CC | | — | demo-felhom's next weekly PBS backup (newest is 2026-07-26) | WATCHING | schedule | ~2026-08-02; also releases R-91 | CC |