R-50 SHIPPED: fleet migrated to the island; Phase 5 docs

- B2 demo-hp + B3 demo-felhom migrated to the island (agent 0.96.0), apps
  served throughout (0 container restarts), island /storage 200, LAN DNS pinned
  to the LAN IP, hub reports 0.96.0. No rollback.
- capability-map 'site/network change' row PARTIAL -> PROVEN-LIVE
- ROADMAP R-50 -> SHIPPED (fleet-migrated); add R-74 (island on Peti's cluster)
- nodes.md: both boxes island-bound, agent 0.96.0
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| R-35 | **Config-apply should not end the customer's session.** The offsite config push bumped `config_version` 10→11 at 16:54:58 and the controller self-restarted (container `StartedAt` 16:54:59Z, back up 16:55:02); in-memory sessions died with it and **customer zero was force-logged-out mid-flow**. | S | idea | Direction: **hot-apply the offbox target** (no restart for a config the running process can adopt), or **persist sessions** across restart. The restart itself is by design — the collateral is not. Evidence `controller-log-full.txt` |
| R-36 | **Post-RESET re-enroll leaves offsite "enabled but unprovisioned" — silently.** The hub knows the state and says nothing on the customer page. | S | **SHIPPED (hub v0.67.0, 2026-07-18)** | Both halves delivered. **(1) The warning:** the customer page now names the state and the fix — enabled-but-unprovisioned raises an amber banner saying provisioning is *Save*-triggered (press Save once, then verify), reusing the exact `enabled && type == ""` predicate the offsite re-issue handler already refuses on. **(2) The related sub-item, also done:** the self-bind link is now **auto-minted at customer creation AND at RESET completion**, so the console banner's „e-mailben kapott link" is already true instead of true-once-the-operator-remembers. Extracting the shared `mintAndSendSelfBindLink` core keeps the button and the auto-mint callers on the same F1/F2 honesty rules, and the auto-mint never fails the operation it rides on. **Gap found and closed while wiring it:** `PurgeCustomerResetDBState` does NOT clear `selfbind_tokens`, so a link minted BEFORE a reset would have stayed live across it — the skip paths now clear stale tokens, giving the invariant "after auto-mint, the only live link is one we just issued, or none". Tests assert the banner is ABSENT in all three nominal cases too; red-proofed. — Original analysis: Source-cited behaviour, confirmed live in the rehearsal: **provisioning is Save-triggered** (`configs.go` `applyOffsite`) — which also answers S6's open question — and the re-enroll auto-re-issue **correctly** skips unprovisioned targets (`handler.go`). So nothing is broken; the gap is that nobody is told. Direction: flash it on the customer page. **Interim: an R-3 step.** **Related sub-item:** auto-mint the **self-bind link on customer create/RESET**, so the console banner's „e-mailben kapott link" is always already true instead of true-once-the-operator-remembers |
| R-27c | **Customer self-bind, slice 2 — console-passphrase bind.** Viktor's direction: bind using a passphrase shown on the box console, alongside (not instead of) the emailed capability link. | M | idea | **Security constraints from the session ruling, all load-bearing:** passphrase **issued at customer creation**; the global-lookup endpoint must be **spray-hardened** — per-appliance **and** per-IP caps, constant-time comparison, a **single generic failure** (no oracle), alerting on abuse; an **accent-free wordlist** (console keymaps are not Hungarian); the **web capability-link path is RETAINED**; **claim-by-email is RETAINED** as the delivery-channel proof. **Also under this item:** the self-bind email gains the **public universal-ISO download link + two-line instructions** (the DIY case). **Secret-bearing per-customer ISOs are ruled OUT.** Sibling of R-27b (second-box flow) — different axis, both build on the same `/bind/` page |
| R-50 | **[P2-HIGH] Island-bridge control plane — make controller↔agent independent of the LAN.** The agent's `localapi` binds a **LAN literal** (`listen_addr`) and the guest dials that same literal from `bootstrap.json`. Move both onto a **host-internal bridge with a fixed, private address** that no router, DHCP lease, or site move can invalidate, so the control plane is location-independent and golden-image-stable. | M | **SPIKED → GO 2026-07-25 (probes P1–P8 PASS live)** | **GO (2026-07-25 PM, `audits/SPIKE-island-bridge-2026-07-25.md`): validated end-to-end on a real nested-PVE drill (`drill-r50`, qm300 on the t740, installed via the v1.25.0 ISO through the actual day-0).** All probes PASS: `vmbr9` portless island bridge (vmbr0 untouched); guest island NIC `eth1 169.254.253.2/30` hot-added (LAN leg undisturbed); **F1 replay = the money shot** — LAN moved `.176→.200` with `listen_addr` on the island → agent stays `active`, control plane HTTP 200; the LAN-literal contrast reproduced the 2026-07-20 bug verbatim (`localapi: bind 192.168.0.176:8443` → daemon exit 1); **dnsmasq trap CONFIRMED LIVE and its `lan_resolver.host_ip=LAN IP` fix PROVEN**; **pin address-independent** (served leaf SHA-256 unchanged, HTTP 200 over the island — no cert re-issue); **survival matrix** (agent restart / guest reboot / host COLD reboot) all return the control plane on the island with zero intervention. **Method caveat:** probes drove the runtime chain via manual config edits — the *provisioning* path (host-install writing the island config + golden-bake bootstrap template) is the impl task, now de-risked. **Next: write the Phase A/B/C production spec (drill-proven → demo → Peti SDN).** — Prior (superseded): **2026-07-25 spike: the drill environment (qm300 / `demo-vm-felhom-2f4b00`) is GONE** (`qm list` empty; only guest 9201 remains), so per the hard drill-only rule the empirical probes (bridge create / NIC hot-add / island bind / **F1 replay** / survival) were NOT run — production was left untouched, **no live GO/NO-GO**. The **source-grounded** half IS done: recommend **link-local `169.254.253.1/30`↔`.2/30`** (structurally uncollidable vs LAN); the F1 literal is baked in TWO places to move atomically (`config.go:229` + `felhom-host-install.sh:2226` for the bind, `provision/backhalf.go:129`/`bootstrap.json` for the guest dial); **NEW dnsmasq trap CONFIRMED in source** — `LANResolverConfig.WithDefaults` (`config.go:208–210`) derives the DNS listen-addr from `listen_addr`, so moving the bind to the island silently kills LAN DNS → the spec MUST set `lan_resolver.host_ip = LAN IP` explicitly; pin is leaf-DER-based (address-independent → no cert re-issue expected); provisioning inventory + cluster-parity (SDN on Peti's 2 nodes) + an implementation skeleton recorded. **Empirical attempt 2 (2026-07-25 PM, on the t740 per the operator's drill-host ruling): STILL BLOCKED — there is NO drill VM on the t740** (`qm list` empty; it is a real demo node running only its own guest 9201). The only drill artifact is a stale golden-bake `drill.qcow2` on the production DooPlex node (off, nested guest purged). The ruling ("drill+build VMs on the HP from now on") is forward-looking and not yet realized. **Operator decision: they will provision a nested-PVE drill VM on the t740 (agent + nested guest); this spike re-runs then.** GO/NO-GO PENDING. **Remaining: a provisioned t740 drill VM to validate probes P2–P7 before the production spec.** Origin: `audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` (F1), where this failed for real. The demo box moved to a remote site, DHCP handed it `.147` instead of `.162`, and the agent then **could not start at all** — `bind: cannot assign requested address`, systemd gave up after 4 retries — taking storage, PBS backup, quiesce, restore-test and DR down for as long as nobody noticed. Mitigated for that window by pinning `vmbr0` static back to `.162`; that is a **window mitigation, not the fix** — it still depends on the site's subnet being `192.168.0.0/24` and free at that address. **Spike-first is mandatory:** validate end-to-end on the drill environment (agent bind + guest dial + TLS SAN/pin + reinstall/golden survival + the bootstrap-config migration for already-deployed boxes) BEFORE any production spec. **Pin fact (verified 2026-07-20, `agentapi/client.go` L105-129 — supersedes the earlier "the SAN set must cover the new address" note in this entry, which was wrong):** the controller-to-agent leg sets `InsecureSkipVerify: true` and replaces chain verification with a custom `VerifyPeerCertificate` that does a raw **SHA-256 match on the leaf DER** against the bootstrap fingerprint. Hostname/SAN therefore never enters verification on this leg, so moving the agent listen address most likely needs **no cert re-issuance** - only the endpoint the guest dials. The spike must still confirm this empirically rather than trust the read. Flips a future "box survives a sLine truncated
| R-50 | **[P2-HIGH] Island-bridge control plane — make controller↔agent independent of the LAN.** The agent's `localapi` binds a **LAN literal** (`listen_addr`) and the guest dials that same literal from `bootstrap.json`. Move both onto a **host-internal bridge with a fixed, private address** that no router, DHCP lease, or site move can invalidate, so the control plane is location-independent and golden-image-stable. | M | **SHIPPED 2026-07-25 — fleet-migrated (agent v0.96.0 + host-install v1.19.0)** | **DONE (2026-07-25). Both demo boxes migrated to the island, apps served throughout (0 container restarts); island `/storage` HTTP 200, LAN DNS pinned to the LAN IP (Finding-1), hub reports 0.96.0.** Fresh appliance installs are born on the island (host-install v1.19.0 default; agent auto-attaches `net1` — A4 proven live). Migration procedure: `runbooks/RUNBOOK-island-migration.md`. **One-host fleet only; the 2-node cluster (Peti) is R-74 (SDN/bridge parity), a separate supervised runbook.** ── Spike/impl detail (superseded, kept for provenance): **GO (2026-07-25 PM, `audits/SPIKE-island-bridge-2026-07-25.md`): validated end-to-end on a real nested-PVE drill (`drill-r50`, qm300 on the t740, installed via the v1.25.0 ISO through the actual day-0).** All probes PASS: `vmbr9` portless island bridge (vmbr0 untouched); guest island NIC `eth1 169.254.253.2/30` hot-added (LAN leg undisturbed); **F1 replay = the money shot** — LAN moved `.176→.200` with `listen_addr` on the island → agent stays `active`, control plane HTTP 200; the LAN-literal contrast reproduced the 2026-07-20 bug verbatim (`localapi: bind 192.168.0.176:8443` → daemon exit 1); **dnsmasq trap CONFIRMED LIVE and its `lan_resolver.host_ip=LAN IP` fix PROVEN**; **pin address-independent** (served leaf SHA-256 unchanged, HTTP 200 over the island — no cert re-issue); **survival matrix** (agent restart / guest reboot / host COLD reboot) all return the control plane on the island with zero intervention. **Method caveat:** probes drove the runtime chain via manual config edits — the *provisioning* path (host-install writing the island config + golden-bake bootstrap template) is the impl task, now de-risked. **Next: write the Phase A/B/C production spec (drill-proven → demo → Peti SDN).** — Prior (superseded): **2026-07-25 spike: the drill environment (qm300 / `demo-vm-felhom-2f4b00`) is GONE** (`qm list` empty; only guest 9201 remains), so per the hard drill-only rule the empirical probes (bridge create / NIC hot-add / island bind / **F1 replay** / survival) were NOT run — production was left untouched, **no live GO/NO-GO**. The **source-grounded** half IS done: recommend **link-local `169.254.253.1/30`↔`.2/30`** (structurally uncollidable vs LAN); the F1 literal is baked in TWO places to move atomically (`config.go:229` + `felhom-host-install.sh:2226` for the bind, `provision/backhalf.go:129`/`bootstrap.json` for the guest dial); **NEW dnsmasq trap CONFIRMED in source** — `LANResolverConfig.WithDefaults` (`config.go:208–210`) derives the DNS listen-addr from `listen_addr`, so moving the bind to the island silently kills LAN DNS → the spec MUST set `lan_resolver.host_ip = LAN IP` explicitly; pin is leaf-DER-based (address-independent → no cert re-issue expected); provisioning inventory + cluster-parity (SDN on Peti's 2 nodes) + an implementation skeleton recorded. **Empirical attempt 2 (2026-07-25 PM, on the t740 per the operator's drill-host ruling): STILL BLOCKED — there is NO drill VM on the t740** (`qm list` empty; it is a real demo node running only its own guest 9201). The only drill artifact is a stale golden-bake `drill.qcow2` on the production DooPlex node (off, nested guest purged). The ruling ("drill+build VMs on the HP from now on") is forward-looking and not yet realized. **Operator decision: they will provision a nested-PVE drill VM on the t740 (agent + nested guest); this spike re-runs then.** GO/NO-GO PENDING. **Remaining: a provisioned t740 drill VM to validate probes P2–P7 before the production spec.** Origin: `audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` (F1), where this failed for real. The demo box moved to a remote site, DHCP handed it `.147` instead of `.162`, and the agent then **could not start at all** — `bind: cannot assign requested address`, systemd gave up after 4 retries — taking storage, PBS backup, quiesce, restore-test and DR down for as long as nobody noticed. Mitigated for that window by pinning `vmbr0` static back to `.162`; that is a **window mitigation, not the fix** — it still depends on the site's subnet being `192.168.0.0/24` and free at that address. **Spike-first is mandatory:** validate end-to-end on the drill environment (agent bind + guest dial + TLS SAN/pin + reinstall/golden survival + the bootstrap-config migration for already-deployed boxes) BEFORE any production spec. **Pin fact (verified 2026-07-20, `agentapi/client.go` L105-129 — supersedes the eaLine truncated
| R-50b | **[P2] A root-owned privileged host artifact is delivered unversioned from `main` — "which wrapper is on this host?" is unanswerable.** `configs/felhom-pbs-apply` installs to `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply` (0755 root:root) and is the pinned sudoers vector for `create\|reconcile\|grant` against `/etc/pve/priv/storage`. It is fetched by `felhom-host-install.sh:1914` via `fetch_raw`, which hits `raw/branch/main/<path>` — **no tag, no pin, no checksum, and no record in the Day-0 artifact manifest**, unlike the agent binary (sha256-vouched) and the golden image. Three consequences: (1) two hosts installed a week apart can carry different privileged wrapper code while both reporting the same agent version; (2) a host hotfixed in place (felhom-pve, 2026-07-18) is indistinguishable from one that fetched the same content — the fleet has no inventory of it; (3) an accidental push to `main` reaches the next install of every host with no review gate between commit and root-owned deployment. | S–M | **(a) SHIPPED 2026-07-21; (b)/(c) open** | **Surfaced 2026-07-21 while stopping the R-39 v0.90.1 publish** (`felhom-controller/REPORT.md` §5): the publish was cancelled precisely because the version number would have claimed to carry a fix that in fact rides this unversioned channel. Candidate shapes, in increasing cost: (a) record the wrapper's sha256 in the Day-0 artifact manifest beside the agent binary and have the agent report the installed file's hash, so drift is at least *visible*; (b) `fetch_raw` takes a pinned ref (tag or commit) supplied by the manifest rather than `main`; (c) the wrapper becomes a published generic-registry artifact with the same gate ladder as the agent binary. **(a) is the cheap honest first step and would have caught this class already.** Pairs with R-39 (whose remaining fleet half is specced separately) **(a) SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — hub v0.68.0 + agent v0.91.2.** `ArtifactManifest.WrapperSHA256` + an operator field; agents report the installed wrapper's sha256 each cycle and the host page surfaces a mismatch. **An unknown on EITHER side reads as quiet, never as drift** — lighting every host amber on rollout day is how a warning becomes background noise. Live confirmation of exactly the problem: felhom-pve's July-18 in-place hotfix hashed `2888f2ea…`, matching **no commit anyone could name**; it now reports `104db0a4…` against a vouchable manifest value. **(b)/(c) REMAIN OPEN:** the wrapper is still fetched unversioned from `raw/branch/main` — this makes drift *visible*, it does not fix the channel. Also recorded: the 0440 sudoers file is not agent-readable, so its drift stays invisible. |
| R-51 | **Dead-primary alerting — a multi-container app whose MAIN container is dead must alert.** Aggregation currently classifies such a stack `unhealthy`, and `IsDownState` deliberately excludes `unhealthy`, so nothing fires. | S | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.156.0** | Origin: `AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` (F4). Observed live: `immich-server` was `Exited` for **18 h** with the app 100 % unreachable, and the box produced **no** dead-app banner and **no** `app_start_failed` hub event — while single-container Calibre-Web, down for the same reason, alerted correctly within 90 s. **Constraint (load-bearing): do NOT simply fold `unhealthy` into down.** That exclusion is deliberate (`stacks/manager.go` fix-3, `downstate_test.go`) and reverting it reintroduces the flapping it was added to stop. Direction: distinguish *member-container-exited* from *healthcheck-failing* in the aggregation, and treat a dead primary as down | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 (controller v0.156.0).** **The diagnosis in this row was WRONG at the source and is corrected here:** aggregation did NOT classify the stack `unhealthy`. `aggregateState`'s final branch returned `StateRunning` for any mix of running and stopped members — the comment said "report as running (partial)" — so the stack read as RUNNING and `IsDownState` had nothing to fire on. The `unhealthy` exclusion was never involved, and the constraint it protects was therefore never in tension with the fix. New `StateDegraded`: a DOWN member whose docker restart policy is `always`/`unless-stopped` means docker was supposed to be keeping it up, so the stack is degraded (a down state, alerting through the EXISTING banner + `app_start_failed` path, unchanged); `no`/`on-failure` is a finished one-shot init/migrate container and stays benign. An UNREADABLE policy counts as supervised — fail-CLOSED, deliberately the opposite of `IsDownState`'s fail-open, because there the *state* is ambiguous while here a member is known dead and only the excuse is missing (P2 census 2026-07-21: all 53 catalog templates / 78 services are `unless-stopped`, zero one-shot containers exist today). `IsDownState` gained `degraded` and NOTHING else — the `unhealthy`/`restarting`/`paused`/`unknown` exclusions are byte-identical and `downstate_test.go` is untouched and green. Red-proof: the mix branch reverted to `return StateRunning` makes the immich fixture and both production-path tests fail with `"running"`. Live leg (STOP-1) pending. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21) **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-21 (STOP-1, operator-present).** On guest 9201, `docker stop immich-server` at **12:50:40 CEST** (policy `unless-stopped`, three helpers left running — the exact F4 shape). **12:50:53 — 13 seconds later — the stack read `degraded`** where it read `running` for 18 hours on 2026-07-20. `10:51:11Z` **exactly ONE** `app_start_failed (warn) — Telepített alkalmazás nem fut: Immich` (single-fire verified by count, not by eye). Dashboard rendered the banner *Telepített alkalmazás nem fut: Immich (degraded)* plus the new „Részlegesen leállt" state label. `docker start` at 12:51:37 → `running` by 12:51:52 and the banner **self-cleared** (state-based, as designed). Note the banner appends the raw state in English — `(degraded)` — which is pre-existing behaviour, not introduced here, but now more visible |
| R-52 | **Boot desired-state reconciliation — a `deployed: true` app should be running after boot.** The controller *reports* deployed-but-stopped apps (30 s `deadapp-check`) but never starts them, so an app that misses its boot start stays down until a human notices. | M | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 — controller v0.156.0** | Origin: `AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` (F5). Observed live: the pre-transport shutdown left `immich-server` and `calibre-web` `Exited`; **10 sibling containers came back and those two did not**, and they were still down ~18 h later. **Includes root-causing why `restart: unless-stopped` did not resurrect them** — both were stopped ~25 s before power-off, so Docker most likely recorded them as user-stopped; that hypothesis is untested because the guest journal is volatile and the controller's own logs were rotated by the container recreate. Direction: a bounded start-once reconciliation (N attempts, reusing the existing boot grace), never a restart loop. Pairs with R-51 — that one is the *alarm*, this one is the *recovery* | **SHIPPED 2026-07-21 (controller v0.156.0), `internal/bootrecon`.** One bounded start-once sweep at controller startup: every deployed, non-protected, not-mid-deploy stack that still HAS containers and is down gets `StartStack`, at most **2 attempts 30 s apart**, then it stops and the alarm owns the problem. Never a restart loop. The whole sweep (5 s settle + one 30 s gap) fits inside the existing 90 s `deadAppBootGrace`, so a successful recovery never alerts and a failed one alerts honestly — asserted by a test rather than left to a comment. **The safety argument is the container gate:** the UI's Stop is `compose down`, which REMOVES the containers, while an interrupted boot leaves them behind as `Exited` — so "deployed, has containers, and they are down" is exactly the boot-orphan signature, and a zero-container stack is never touched. Red-proof: dropping that gate makes the user-stopped app get started, which is the one thing this must never do. **P1 (the `unless-stopped` root-cause probe) is deliberately NOT what this shipped on** — the reconciliation is correct whether or not Docker recorded those two containers as user-stopped, and the probe is recorded as an open question rather than a blocker. Live leg (STOP-1) pending. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21) **PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-21 (STOP-1, operator-present), and it answered P1 for free.** Fixture on 9201: `docker stop` on bookstack (2 containers, left in place) + calibre-web, and a UI Stop on immich (`compose down` → 0 containers); then `pct reboot 9201`. Result: `10:53:22Z [bootrecon] Boot reconciliation: 1 boot-orphaned app(s) found: [bookstack] — up to 2 attempt(s)` → `10:53:28Z attempt 1/2: started "bookstack" (took 6.0s)` → `complete: 1 app(s) recovered in 1 attempt(s)`, and **ZERO `app_start_failed`** — a successful recovery inside the boot grace is silent, exactly as designed. **P1 IS NOW ANSWERED, and the F5 hypothesis is CONFIRMED:** bookstack carries `restart=unless-stopped`, the Docker daemon came up at ~10:53:15Z, and the container's `StartedAt` is **`10:53:28.05Z` — the exact moment `bootrecon`'s `StartStack` returned**. Docker's own restart policy did NOT resurrect it; a container stopped before shutdown is recorded user-stopped and stays down. Only R-52 brought it back. **BUT the end-to-end "a deliberate Stop survives a reboot" property is NOT true today, for a reason outside R-52 — see R-55.** R-52's own gate is correct and was observed to be: immich (0 containers) was never a candidate |
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@
| R-15 | Multi-user dashboard accounts (household members, roles) | L | idea | Single password is a stated alpha limitation (R-11). **Launcher coupling — REVISED (controller v0.165.0):** the "share the launcher outside the household" need is now met WITHOUT member accounts — the **Indítópult megosztása** capability-URL guest link (`/s/<token>`, information-only, no account) shipped in v0.165.0. What remains for this arc is member-specific: **per-member tile visibility** (each member sees only their apps) and the launcher-as-member-landing-page — both live inside this SSO/members arc; the guest-link ruling explicitly SUPERSEDES the earlier "members are how you share the launcher" framing |
| R-72 | Curate `brand_color` for the top catalog apps | XS | idea | Parked follow-up to the v0.163.0 launcher. `.felhom.yml` `brand_color` (`#rgb`/`#rrggbb`) overrides the deterministic slug-hash tile color; no catalog app sets it yet. Pick brand-accurate colors for the most-installed apps so their launcher tiles match their real brand. Catalog-only change (`app-catalog-felhom.eu`), `brand_color` is already `omitempty` and consumed by the controller |
| R-73 | **SMART history / trending (hub-side)** | M | idea (parked) | Parked follow-up to the v0.169.0 disk-health card + degradation alert (agent v0.94.0 serializes SMART into `/disks`; controller renders „Lemezek állapota" + fires `disk_health_degraded` on a degradation). Today the verdict is point-in-time and the baseline is in-memory (a controller restart re-baselines silently). Hub-side would let the operator SEE a disk's SMART counters trend over time (reallocated/pending sectors climbing, NVMe wear %), catch slow degradation the 6h transition check can miss between reboots, and persist the baseline across restarts. Needs a hub ingest surface for periodic SMART snapshots + a small time-series store + an operator trend view. **No demo hardware exposes real SMART** (virtualized), so this only earns evidence on a real box |
| R-74 | **Island control plane on a CLUSTER (Peti's 2 nodes)** — bring R-50's island bridge to a multi-node PVE cluster. | M | idea (Phase C of R-50, parked) | R-50 shipped the island for the ONE-host fleet (demo-hp, demo-felhom). A cluster needs **bridge parity on every node**: either per-node identical `/etc/network/interfaces` `vmbr9` stanzas (simplest, drift-prone) or — preferred at ≥2 nodes — a Proxmox **SDN zone/vnet** defined cluster-wide (one definition, auto-applied per node). The guest island IP is per-guest + node-independent; the **agent-follows-guest** rule holds (each node's agent binds its own `vmbr9` `169.254.253.1`). Migration order per the spike: drill-proven → demo (done) → **Peti (this row)**. Its own supervised runbook, coordinated with Peti (a live customer). Completes the capability-map "site/network change" row for clustered installs. Source: `audits/SPIKE-island-bridge-2026-07-25.md` (cluster-parity finding) + `RUNBOOK-island-migration.md` (single-host procedure to generalise) |
| R-21 | **Bare-metal Felhom ISO** — per-PVE-release auto-install ISO for blank customer hardware → first-boot wrapper (invokes `felhom-host-install.sh`) → universal secret-free / operator-bind (option C) | XL | **SHIPPED + PHYSICALLY CLOSED (slices A+B+C; rehearsal executed 2026-07-18)** | **PHYSICAL CLOSURE 2026-07-18** (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`): the generic pairing ISO v1.20.0 (`--loader mkimage`, SB off) **booted the very AMI board that F1 blocked**, installed unattended, and the box self-registered as an unclaimed appliance the same second it first booted (16:17:14) → self-bind → credential → day-0 SUCCESS 16:32:32 → floor-lifted to current. **F1 is closed on physical hardware and the rehearsal dependency on this item is discharged.** Two residual notes stay open, neither blocking: PXE/network-boot is still unbuilt (the third F1 option, for boards where even USB-mkimage fails), and mkimage remains unsigned → **SB must be OFF**. The installer's GRUB menu still offers interactive installers → new item **R-38**. — Prior: **PHYSICAL RUN 2026-07-16 (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-baremetal-2026-07-16.md`):** demo N100 reinstalled clean-slate from a pipeline ISO → chain reached **rc-0 first try on real hardware** (closes slice A's operator-gated boundary), serial-filter safety proven on metal, PBS-DR reconciler self-healed on the reused peer, DMI verdict = key on MAC+UUID. **F1 (HIGH, slice-B input):** this cheap AMI `AN3PLUS 0.01` firmware won't UEFI-boot the ISO's GRUB from USB (`relocation 0x0`) — SB-off/shim-bypass don't help; worked around live with a `grub-mkimage` loader built from the box's own GRUB. Pipeline must ship a firmware-compatible loader / PXE path. Reused-customer edges (F2 claim re-issue, F3 offsite re-issue, F4 non-default-storage-id ACL 403) feed R-1/Peti. UX: F6 drive-init doesn't mount+attach, F5 guest-RAM not configurable, F7 back-route. — **Slice A (build pipeline + first-boot bootstrap) DONE + validated on VM 310:** build gate/red-proof, disk-filter fail-safe, stub→retry-unit→real public-channel host-install fetch+invoke→retry, resume-decision, exactly-once, no-net retry+recovery all GREEN. Operator-gated remainder: host-install rc-0 terminal success (drill customer needs the password-gated create-UI). **Slice B — SHIPPED (scripts v1.18.0, 2026-07-17):** the F1 firmware fix is now a first-class pipeline mode `build-felhom-iso.sh --loader shim|mkimage` (default shim; `mkimage` = monolithic grub-mkimage loader from the ISO's own GRUB, recipe from the run evidence). RUNBOOK-B legs on nested VM 311 proved it: shim boots+installs under OVMF SB-enforcing + SeaBIOS; mkimage boots+installs under OVMF SB-off; mkimage under SB-enforcing FAILS `Access Denied` (unsigned → **SB must be OFF**, documented); surgery byte-identical payload. **Physical N100 boot on the real board still pending** → folds into the supervised rehearsal (R-1; an `n100-safety` match-nothing ISO is built + sha-recorded for a zero-risk pre-flight). **PXE/network-boot** (the third F1 option, for boards where even USB-mkimage fails) stays a deferred note under this item — not built. **Slice C — SHIPPED (hub v0.62.0 + scripts v1.19.0, 2026-07-17):** the GENERIC secret-free universal ISO (`build-felhom-iso.sh --pairing`). The box self-registers as an unclaimed appliance (keyed by SMBIOS-uuid + MAC set — the DMI-verdict tiebreaker), the operator BINDS it to a customer on the Hosts page, and the hub delivers customer-id + retrieval passphrase ONCE (`/api/v1/appliance/register` + one-shot poll, 404-no-oracle — all live-verified through the public ingress); the bootstrap then falls through to the slice-A direct path. **One unit, two modes** (direct = byte-identical, regression-proven zero-appliance-calls). Artifact proven secret-free (baked env = hub URL only; manifest `secret-bearing: no`). The **bind is operator-password-gated** → the live boot→register→bind→day-0 composition (with a Viktor-created drill customer) + the physical N100 boot fold into the supervised rehearsal — **which now runs the COMPLETE final product flow in one pass: RESET the demo → boot the generic ISO → bind → day-0**. SSH-host-key pinning: stored + fingerprints displayed (attaching to the host on bind = future, no clean hand-off surface today). **Customer-facing self-bind page = R-27 (future).** Origin spike `audits/SPIKE-baremetal-iso-2026-07-16.md`: every mechanism GREEN on nested virt (VM 310 on felhom-pve). Zero-touch install BIOS **and** UEFI incl. **Secure Boot enforcing** (no MOK/keypress); first-boot hook `fully-up` = root + working pvesh/pct, exactly-once via `pending-first-boot-setup` flag; post-install **webhook** carries SMBIOS-UUID + management-MAC + host SSH keys → the unclaimed-appliance record; disk-filter installs only the target (canary byte-identical) and **fails-safe** on match-nothing / bad disk; `from-url` + `cert-fingerprint` **fails CLOSED**. OPEN (needLine truncated
| R-29 | **The design-v2 green gates are not enforced anywhere — one has been RED for 16 releases.** `controller/scripts/docker_run_volume_path_gate.py` has failed continuously since **2026-07-14 (v0.129.0)** and nobody noticed until R-7b's close-out ran it by hand at v0.145.0. Two separable parts. **(a) The finding itself is benign and the fix is 3 lines.** The flagged call is `internal/appexport/estimate.go:179` `docker run --rm -v <volumeName>:/vol:ro alpine du` — a **NAMED-VOLUME** mount, i.e. daemon-side with no host path, which is the *safe* shape and byte-for-byte the same pattern as three entries already on the gate's ALLOWLIST (`export.go` `volName+":/vol"`, `backup.go` `volName+":/vol:ro"`, `restore.go` `volName+":/vol"`). It is NOT the v0.124.0 path-strand class the gate exists to catch — the author of the v0.129.0 F-A fix explicitly avoided that class (see the function's own comment) and simply never added the allowlist entry. So the fix is an ALLOWLIST addition WITH ITS WHY, **not** a docker-cp rewrite; anyone who 'fixes' this by rewriting the call has misread the gate. **(b) The systemic half is the real item:** the gates run only when a human remembers to run them, so a gate can sit red across 16 releases while every REPORT says 'green'. This is the SECOND instance of the class — cf. the v0.123.0 note *'Windows green gate silently red (read-only fsync)'*. Decide where they run (pre-push hook, `build.sh` step, or a CI job) and make a red gate block the train the way the Go green gate does. | S (a) / M (b) | idea | Origin: R-7b close-out, `felhom-controller` REPORT §4(f) — CC correctly left it alone as out-of-scope and pre-existing, and verified by stashing that it fails identically on the unmodified tree. Flips no capability-map row (engineering hygiene, no customer-visible behaviour). Affected gates to audit for the same rot: controller `template_id_gate` / `emoji_gate` / `native_confirm_gate` / `offbox_rename_gate` / `mojibake_gate` / `app_row_dedup_gate` / `docker_run_volume_path_gate`, hub `hub_confirm_gate`, manifests `manifest_bearer_gate`, website `site_gates`. **Do not bundle (a) into an unrelated feature commit** — it is a one-line behavioural claim about a mount's safety and deserves its own reviewed diff. **2026-07-18 rehearsal note:** the run's finding list independently re-raised "assign the pre-existing `docker_run_volume_path_gate` failure its ID so red stops normalizing" — **that is this item; no second ID was minted.** |