docs: R-43 + R-44 shipped in controller v0.148.0 (live acceptance still pending)

ROADMAP R-43/R-44 → SHIPPED with what actually landed:
  - R-43: ReconstituteFromOffsite — safety dump → stop → files overwritten to
    the snapshot version → start → the snapshot's own dump replayed from the
    SCRATCH unit (the live unit is still never overwritten). Invariants:
    nothing is ever deleted, and the undo is verified on disk before the act.
  - R-44: every run, manual AND nightly, refreshes dumps + units BEFORE the
    capture, so each snapshot is a coherent {DB@T, files@T} pair stamped with
    offsite_run_id + dumps_at. Nightly ordering is now structural rather than a
    coincidence of two scheduler entries at 02:30 and 04:15.

DIAG doc gains a "fixed in v0.148.0" header pointing at both.

Capability map deliberately NOT flipped: the DB half now exists but is PARTIAL,
not PROVEN-LIVE — shipped and deployed with no live acceptance behind it. The
customer-restore row stays MISSING, now blocked only on the evidence run rather
than on missing capability, and R-3 stays DRAFT.

Still open: the 00-capability-map.md:61 ruling — did CAMPAIGN-6D's "immich
end-to-end from offsite alone" exercise the DB half, or only the file half?

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P9Nn14TWGzKoqAJAiVwC2s

documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md

@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@
 | R-40 | **[P2-HIGH] The update path cannot express a MULTI-HOP major upgrade.** A template pin is a single value; the customer's update button pulls whatever the catalog now says. For apps whose upstream forbids version skipping this produces a broken upgrade. Nextcloud is explicit: *"You cannot skip major releases. Please re-run the upgrade until you have reached the highest available release."* Campaign 7 moved its template **31 → 34** (a fresh deploy validates fine — 302, 3/3 healthy), so an existing 31 customer pressing update would attempt a jump Nextcloud refuses. | M | idea | Origin: CAMPAIGN 7 (`audits/CAMPAIGN-7-catalog-sweep-2026-07-19.md` §7 F7). Not nextcloud-only — any app with sequential-major rules (gitea, tandoor, outline…) has the same shape. Directions: a per-app `upgrade_path:`/`max_hop:` in `.felhom.yml` that the update button walks in stages; or refuse-and-explain when the installed major is >1 behind; or pin an intermediate "stepping-stone" tag. **Until this exists, a >1-major catalog bump is safe for NEW deploys and unsafe for the update button** — which is exactly the asymmetry the campaign's MAJOR flag was meant to record but cannot enforce |
 | R-41 | **[P2-HIGH] The catalog has no standing "does every template still deploy?" check.** Campaign 7 was the first thing that ever tried to deploy all 53 apps, and found **5 that had NEVER been deployable**: papra (missing required `AUTH_SECRET`), zipline (v4 renamed `CORE_DATABASE_URL` → `DATABASE_URL`), wishlist (Docker Hub image gone; upstream moved to ghcr.io), homebox (upstream dropped the `v` tag prefix + new required env), glance (needs a seeded `glance.yml` the template never provides — PROVEN pre-existing: the pre-campaign v0.7.4 pin fails identically). Plus **7 broken healthchecks** and 2 apps whose images no longer resolve at all (plant-it, wanderer). | M | idea | Origin: CAMPAIGN 7 (§7 F5/F6). The repo already has the right pattern in `scripts/check-image-pins.py` — a mechanical gate run on every change. Cheap first slice: a **resolvability gate** (`docker manifest inspect` every pin) would alone have caught plant-it, wanderer, wishlist and homebox, and needs no box. Full slice: a periodic deploy-all sweep on the demo box reusing the campaign's engine. **Silent rot is the real risk** — an app can die upstream and nobody learns until a customer clicks Telepítés |
 | R-42 | **Ruling needed: do DB/cache sidecar majors follow the app, or the newest tag?** Campaign 7 deliberately did NOT bump sidecar majors (postgres 16→18, redis 7→8, mariadb 11.6→12.3, postgis 16→17) while bumping ~40 app images to current. | S | **decision pending (Viktor)** | Origin: CAMPAIGN 7 §4. The case for not bumping: a DB major is a **data-plane decision the application owns** — immich proves it, upstream pins one specific tested `postgres:14-vectorchord…` build — and `postgres:16-alpine`/`redis:7-alpine` already track the newest patch inside their major, so they are not stale. The case for bumping: EOL majors eventually stop getting security patches, and "we never bump" silently becomes "we ship EOL databases". Suggested shape: per-app sidecar pin follows **upstream's own compose** where upstream publishes one, else stay within the current major and revisit at that major's EOL date |
-| R-43 | **[P2-HIGH] No offsite restore path can restore a database — offsite restore cannot reconstitute a DB-indexed app.** All three offsite buttons are file-only. „Ellenőrző visszaállítás" and „Teljes visszaállítás" restore into a **scratch/verify folder** and never load a dump into postgres (`controller/internal/backup/offbox_restore.go:171-232`, `:130-164`); „Helyreállítás az élő adatok közé (csak a hiányzó fájlok)" is `rsync -a --ignore-existing` over **mandatory userdata paths only** — it never touches a DB and never stops/starts the stack (`offbox_restore.go:346-421`). The DB dump is faithfully carried *into* the snapshot and can never be replayed *out of* it by any offsite action; the only code that replays into a live DB is `RestoreFromRecoveryUnit` (`backup/restore_unit.go:74`), reachable solely from the **local** restore panel (`web/handlers.go:1108`). Compounding: the `live recovery unit present — not overwriting` guard (`offbox_restore.go:400-405`) skips the **entire** unit — compose, manifest **and db-dumps** — whenever a local `backups/primary/<app>` exists, which is true on any box whose local backup has run, so on a normal box the offsite dump is never even staged to disk. | M | idea | **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md` (live on demo-felhom).** Viktor deleted 11 immich photos to test offsite restore; both place runs merged **0 files** and flashed success. Root cause is two-layered — the UI delete only *trashed* the assets so nothing was missing to restore, **but a valid test would also have failed**: files return, the library stays empty, because immich's truth lives in postgres. **The customer-visible failure mode: correct bytes on disk and an app that cannot see them.** Severity case: this is the offsite tier — the one that survives losing the box — and most of the catalog is DB-indexed. Direction (needs a spec, do not improvise): either offsite gains a real DB-replay leg reusing `RestoreFromRecoveryUnit` behind a stop→restore→start sequence, or the offsite UI states plainly that it restores files only and routes the customer to the local recovery-unit flow for the DB. Pairs with R-44 (a replay leg is worthless while the dump is stale). Flips: the **customer-restore map row stays MISSING** and gains this as a note — the C6 evidence attempt found a product gap, which is the rehearsal system working |
-| R-44 | **[P2-HIGH] A manual offsite push ships an unrefreshed DB dump — "backed up now" is false for the DB half.** `offboxRunHandler` → `RunOffboxBackup` goes straight to the restic push and never calls `RunDBDumps` / `captureAllRecoveryUnits` (`controller/internal/web/offbox_handlers.go:203-227`, `backup/offbox.go:574-759`); the recovery unit merely **enumerates** existing dump filenames via `listFileNames`, never creates them (`backup/recovery_unit.go:105-106`). Dumps come only from the separate local `db-dump` daily at **02:30** (`cmd/controller/main.go:542`), with the scheduled offsite at 04:15 — so a *manual* run at any other hour ships a dump up to ~24 h old. **There is no freshness check and no RPO surface anywhere:** zero `RPO` hits across `controller/`; `offboxUnitTime` is only a two-drive tiebreak (`offbox.go:827-837`); the `DBValidationCache` exists (`backup.go:364-370`) but no offsite or restore path reads it. | S–M | idea | **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md`.** Today's unit dump `immich-postgres.sql` (51 954 452 B, mtime **02:30 CEST**) probed to **`asset: 0 rows`, `user: 0 rows`, `album: 0 rows`** — the 52 MB is entirely immich's shipped `geodata_places`/`naturalearth_countries` reference data. It predates both the admin user (created 07:56:25) and the photos (07:57). Same for the unit's `immich_immich_postgres_data.tar` (323 MB, also 02:30). **A dump that looks substantial by size can contain zero customer content** — size is not a health signal, and nothing in the product says otherwise. **Latent hazard:** had a full restore actually loaded that dump it would have written an empty DB over the live one, destroying the trashed rows that were the only surviving recovery path. Direction: dump-before-push on manual runs (the honest fix), **or** an explicit RPO line in the UI („adatbázis-állapot: <dump time>") so the operator/customer can see what they are actually shipping. Cheap interim: surface dump mtime + row-count sanity from the existing `DBValidationCache` on `/backups/restore` |
+| R-43 | **[P2-HIGH] No offsite restore path can restore a database — offsite restore cannot reconstitute a DB-indexed app.** All three offsite buttons are file-only. „Ellenőrző visszaállítás" and „Teljes visszaállítás" restore into a **scratch/verify folder** and never load a dump into postgres (`controller/internal/backup/offbox_restore.go:171-232`, `:130-164`); „Helyreállítás az élő adatok közé (csak a hiányzó fájlok)" is `rsync -a --ignore-existing` over **mandatory userdata paths only** — it never touches a DB and never stops/starts the stack (`offbox_restore.go:346-421`). The DB dump is faithfully carried *into* the snapshot and can never be replayed *out of* it by any offsite action; the only code that replays into a live DB is `RestoreFromRecoveryUnit` (`backup/restore_unit.go:74`), reachable solely from the **local** restore panel (`web/handlers.go:1108`). Compounding: the `live recovery unit present — not overwriting` guard (`offbox_restore.go:400-405`) skips the **entire** unit — compose, manifest **and db-dumps** — whenever a local `backups/primary/<app>` exists, which is true on any box whose local backup has run, so on a normal box the offsite dump is never even staged to disk. | M | **SHIPPED controller v0.148.0 (2026-07-19) — live acceptance PENDING** | **SHIPPED:** new „Teljes visszaállítás (fájlok + adatbázis)" (`ReconstituteFromOffsite`, `/backup/offbox/reconstitute`): safety dump → stop → files overwritten to the snapshot version → start → the snapshot's own dump replayed (`reimportDBDumpsFrom`, reading the SCRATCH unit — the live unit is still never overwritten) → health wait. Two invariants, both red-proofed: **nothing is ever deleted** (`rsync -a`, no `--ignore-existing`, no `--delete`; post-snapshot files survive as extras) and **the undo exists before the act** (the `pre-restore-` dump is verified ON DISK before anything is stopped/overwritten/replayed; if it cannot be taken the operation refuses with zero changes). Outcome-shaped flash; the old missing-only button now states what it does NOT do. Deployed to demo guest 9201, healthy; page renders, button correctly gated behind a prepared full scratch. **STILL OPEN — the §9 live acceptance has NOT run** (upload → push → empty the trash for real → one button → photos back in the timeline). Until it does, no capability-map flip, the customer-restore row stays MISSING and R-3 stays DRAFT. — **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md` (live on demo-felhom).** Viktor deleted 11 immich photos to test offsite restore; both place runs merged **0 files** and flashed success. Root cause is two-layered — the UI delete only *trashed* the assets so nothing was missing to restore, **but a valid test would also have failed**: files return, the library stays empty, because immich's truth lives in postgres. **The customer-visible failure mode: correct bytes on disk and an app that cannot see them.** Severity case: this is the offsite tier — the one that survives losing the box — and most of the catalog is DB-indexed. Direction (needs a spec, do not improvise): either offsite gains a real DB-replay leg reusing `RestoreFromRecoveryUnit` behind a stop→restore→start sequence, or the offsite UI states plainly that it restores files only and routes the customer to the local recovery-unit flow for the DB. Pairs with R-44 (a replay leg is worthless while the dump is stale). Flips: the **customer-restore map row stays MISSING** and gains this as a note — the C6 evidence attempt found a product gap, which is the rehearsal system working |
+| R-44 | **[P2-HIGH] A manual offsite push ships an unrefreshed DB dump — "backed up now" is false for the DB half.** `offboxRunHandler` → `RunOffboxBackup` goes straight to the restic push and never calls `RunDBDumps` / `captureAllRecoveryUnits` (`controller/internal/web/offbox_handlers.go:203-227`, `backup/offbox.go:574-759`); the recovery unit merely **enumerates** existing dump filenames via `listFileNames`, never creates them (`backup/recovery_unit.go:105-106`). Dumps come only from the separate local `db-dump` daily at **02:30** (`cmd/controller/main.go:542`), with the scheduled offsite at 04:15 — so a *manual* run at any other hour ships a dump up to ~24 h old. **There is no freshness check and no RPO surface anywhere:** zero `RPO` hits across `controller/`; `offboxUnitTime` is only a two-drive tiebreak (`offbox.go:827-837`); the `DBValidationCache` exists (`backup.go:364-370`) but no offsite or restore path reads it. | S–M | **SHIPPED controller v0.148.0 (2026-07-19)** | **SHIPPED:** every offsite run — **manual AND nightly** — now refreshes the DB/volume dumps and recovery units (`offsitePreDump` → `runDBDumpsInternal`) BEFORE the restic capture, so each snapshot is an internally coherent `{DB@T, files@T}` bundle and retention becomes a history of restorable points. Order is the mechanism and is red-proofed (moving the capture first yields `[capture dump]`): the gap can only ADD files the DB does not reference yet, never remove one it does. This also makes the nightly ordering **structural** rather than a coincidence of two scheduler entries at 02:30 and 04:15. Each unit manifest carries `offsite_run_id` + `dumps_at`, so a pair's coherence is verifiable at restore time instead of assumed; the periodic refresh carries a prior stamp forward and never invents one. A dump-leg failure is a loud WARN that does NOT abort the push (data-first: a degraded backup beats none). Honesty surfaces, all warn-level and none a gate: an unstamped pre-v0.148 pair reports its skew in the confirm, and `ValidateDump` gained an **exact-match** accounts-table sniff for customer-empty dumps (a substring match on "user" would flag `user_metadata`/`album_user`/`user_audit` on every healthy single-user box — red-proofed). — **Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md`.** Today's unit dump `immich-postgres.sql` (51 954 452 B, mtime **02:30 CEST**) probed to **`asset: 0 rows`, `user: 0 rows`, `album: 0 rows`** — the 52 MB is entirely immich's shipped `geodata_places`/`naturalearth_countries` reference data. It predates both the admin user (created 07:56:25) and the photos (07:57). Same for the unit's `immich_immich_postgres_data.tar` (323 MB, also 02:30). **A dump that looks substantial by size can contain zero customer content** — size is not a health signal, and nothing in the product says otherwise. **Latent hazard:** had a full restore actually loaded that dump it would have written an empty DB over the live one, destroying the trashed rows that were the only surviving recovery path. Direction: dump-before-push on manual runs (the honest fix), **or** an explicit RPO line in the UI („adatbázis-állapot: <dump time>") so the operator/customer can see what they are actually shipping. Cheap interim: surface dump mtime + row-count sanity from the existing `DBValidationCache` on `/backups/restore` |
 | R-45 | **[P2] Unified async-job feedback.** Every long operation invents its own progress surface, or none. Tonight produced three more one-off cards (v0.147.x: samba bring-up, offsite progress, restore result) on top of two existing patterns (deploy 3-step panel; storage-init/netstorage status poll). They agree on nothing: some use `{ok,data}` envelopes and some raw JSON, some poll 1 s / 1.5 s / 3 s, some are in-memory-only and lie after a restart, and each re-implements single-flight + snapshot + phase→Hungarian mapping. | M | idea | Origin: 2026-07-19 feedback slice 1 (controller v0.147.0). The cases to generalise from are all in-tree: `web/storage_init_job.go` (the best shape — acquire/release/set/snapshot), `web/netstorage_job.go`, `web/samba_ensure_job.go`, `backup/opstatus.go`, `backup/offbox_progress.go`. Shape: one job registry + one poll endpoint + one client-side renderer, phases declared per job. **Two lessons tonight that any framework must encode:** (1) a terminal state must be **probed, not inferred** — `compose up -d` exits 0 on a crash-loop; (2) a progress source that reports nothing is normal, not broken — restic reports 0 bytes for a whole incremental run, and a bar that sits at 0% is worse than no bar. Also fixes the restart hole: in-memory job state currently vanishes and the card silently disagrees with reality |
 | R-46 | **[P2] Verification copies need a customer-visible browse surface and an expiry.** v0.147.0 made them *visible* (listed with path/size/date, individually deletable) — but the customer still cannot LOOK INSIDE a verification restore to confirm the file they wanted is really there, which is the entire point of a verification restore, and nothing ever removes them. | S–M | idea | Origin: 2026-07-19 feedback slice 4a, registered as the explicit follow-up to it. Two gaps, deliberately designed together because they are the same object: (a) **the invisible-result gap** — a read-only browse of `backups/offsite-restore/<app>` (the FileBrowser infra stack already exists and already serves scoped roots, so this may be a mount rather than new code); (b) **the disk-lifecycle gap** — auto-expiry after N days with the count/size surfaced before it fires, so a drive is never quietly filled by verification restores nobody remembers taking. Pairs with R-43: a browse surface is also how a customer would discover that a DB-indexed app's files came back but the app still cannot see them |