Golden 0.289.1 recorded (baked, round-trip, vouched; floor 0.289.1 served), STATUS, session REPORT, runbook pveam note

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
2026-10-03 21:29:59 +02:00
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+# REPORT — off-site backups a box cannot delete: built and live (decisions 68–70) — 2026-10-03 (evening)
+
+Architecture read: `07-backup-architecture.md` (custody, threat rows 9–12, §D), `06-offsite-connectivity.md` §3/§5,
+`09` §3. Baselines (re-verified): controller `09453325d1b2` (0.288.0), agent `d766666ff8cf` (0.138.0), felhom.eu
+`9268d9933b8f` (hub 0.126.0 deployed), catalog `917a779cca67`. Register 327 rows, highest R-822. Rulings recorded
+first as decisions 68–70 (`5188dbd`). Evidence: `documentation/audits/offsite-lock-build-2026-10-03/`.
+
+## The Part table
+
+| Part | Result | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| A — migration spike | **done, passed** | An sftp-written repo is listed, extended, restored from (bytes identical), `check`ed and `check --read-data`ed through the pinned `rclone:` key with restic 0.14.0; a delete is refused (403). The same measurements also settled several facts: one key on two lines → the **first** line wins (so the window = prepend a deleting line); an absolute pinned path works; a probe signal (exit 0 + rclone output = pinned; exit 8 = unpinned); the restricted shell's `dd`/`mv`/`cat` (no `test`). |
+| B — hub registrar + sealed password | **done** — hub v0.127.0 deployed | `internal/offsitekeys`; `consume-password` → 410; password AES-256-GCM at rest (4 live rows sealed, read back as `enc:v1:`); daily key check 07:10 + on demand. 3 red-proofs. |
+| C — box on the locked key | **done** — controller v0.289.0, then **v0.289.1** | registrar client, pinned probe, `rclone:` transport (hub tier only — the household NAS stays sftp), all four deleting features off the box, window client + fake-snapshot guard. 4 red-proofs. **v0.289.1 fixes a defect v0.289.0 put live (below).** |
+| D — live, both demo boxes | **done** | demo-felhom 11→13, demo-hp 91→100 (history kept); a delete from each box refused (403), count unchanged; one-file restore and `check` through the pinned key on each; the old endpoint answers 410 to demo-hp's own key. The hand-run key check is clean for both. **Changed:** the "unprefixed test line on a demo sub-account" decoy ran on tester-1's account instead, which already held 3 unpinned lines. The demo passwords are now sealed in the hub, and the hub DB is the only route to them. |
+| — stop point | **passed** | |
+| E — window + guard | **mechanics done; a real prune NOT done** | Window 1 on demo-hp ran live: the hub opened it (deleting line first), the guard refused, the window closed in 3 s, the operator was mailed, and the key file read back clean. The refusal is a **design defect** (R-824): any manual run makes the plan remove a same-day snapshot younger than 8 days. Weekly windows stay OFF. |
+| F — ep0 → DooPlex copy | **done** | ep0: one read-only token (the only change there). DooPlex: an SSH forward (`felhom-ep0-pbs-tunnel.service` — **operator ruling in-session**, because ep0's PBS listens on `wg0` only), PBS remote, datastore `ep0-copy`, nightly pull 05:00 with `remove-vanished false`, Saturday verify, failures to admin@ via Resend (the test mail arrived). First pull: 201 s, 12 GB, 4 of 4 snapshots, matching ep0. Runbook: `runbooks/ep0-datastore-copy.md`. |
+| Golden + floor | **done** | Golden 0.289.1 baked (subagent, runbook §4.1, token-leak grep 0 with a positive control), round-trip sha matches, vouched (agent 0.138.0, min_agent 0.131.0), floor 0.289.1 SERVED to both boxes. |
+
+## Claims in the brief that turned out wrong
+
+1. **"An sftp-written repo reads through rclone"** — confirmed: it was expected, and now it is measured.
+2. **"The box stores no password today"** — true on disk (it was only in an env var during install), but the box could fetch the password at will; that route is closed now.
+3. **"One authorized_keys can hold two lines for the same key"** — it can, but only the **first** line counts. That is what makes the window possible with a single key.
+4. **"The integrity check works through the forced key"** — confirmed (`check`, `check --read-data`, the exclusive lock).
+5. **"DooPlex has room and a PBS that can pull from ep0"** — it has the room (5.5 TB) and a PBS, but it **cannot reach** ep0's PBS (open on `wg0` only). An SSH forward was added on an operator ruling.
+6. **"Every deleting feature leaves the box"** — only on the hub tier. The same code serves the household's own SFTP NAS, which keeps box-side retention. A `Transport` flag separates the two.
+7. **"Abort when the plan exceeds a week's removal"** — that would never prune after the interim. The box takes the oldest snapshots up to the cap instead (disagreement recorded in the code and the CHANGELOG).
+8. **The guard as written is too strict** (R-824). It also cannot see past-dated poisoning (R-822, residual).
+
+## Found and fixed in-session
+
+- **R-825 (v0.289.1):** the provider's rclone prints a NOTICE line on every connection, and restic forwards it into the output. Every `--json` parse failed, so demo-felhom recorded **0 snapshots as measured**, and the hub mailed a **false** `offsite_snapshots_dropped` (11→0) at 17:17. The fix went live 15 min later. It strips the notice, and an unreadable count is never a measured zero. Red-proved.
+- A shadowed `newPath` in the NAS move-aside path was caught by the existing suite before release.
+- Stale **unpinned keys** sat in the sub-accounts: 4 on demo-felhom's and 5 on demo-hp's (every reinstall added one). The registrar removed them. tester-1's 3 remain, and the daily check alarms on them (R-826).
+
+## Deviations, stated
+
+- **Two controller releases**, against the one-release rule: v0.289.1 fixes a false zero that v0.289.0 put live.
+- The hub has a **test-only commit after the release** (window-sweep test + a test helper in the store). The deployed v0.127.0 image does not contain it; behaviour is unchanged.
+- I read tester-1's sealed-era password from the hub DB again for Part A (operator ruling from the morning session; the copy was deleted, the value never printed).
+- A Hetzner storage API token was printed into this session's transcript while I read `manifests/storagebox.secret.yaml` (a gitignored file; the redaction regex missed the quoted value). **Rotate `HETZNER_TOKEN`** — it is in Secret/storagebox.
+- The window's red-proofs ran in unit tests and on one live window. A live real prune did not happen (R-824).
+
+## Records
+
+- Closed: **R-820, R-821, R-342** (+ **R-825** opened and closed). Narrowed: **R-95, R-822**. Opened: **R-823, R-824, R-826, R-827, R-828, R-830**. Register **327 → 330**.
+- Decisions 68–70 in `09` §3, CONTEXT, `07`, `06`. `07` threat rows 9/10/12 and `06` §3.6 carry `[FACT]` lines.
+- Runbooks: `ep0-datastore-copy.md` (new), `secrets.md` (offsite key, DooPlex PBS secrets), `RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` (`pveam update`).
+
+## Teardown, three layers
+
+- **Machines:** helper scripts were removed from both demo guests, their containers and hosts (0 left). tester-1's sub-account is back to `.ssh`, `felhom-repo`, with `authorized_keys` byte-identical to the start (sha256 `795e7153…`). The scratch dirs `spike-r436`, `spike-migrate` and the rclone `.config` were removed. The drill VM is reverted to `virgin`, build guest 9100 destroyed, the bake token shredded.
+- **Host (DooPlex):** **kept on purpose:** `felhom-ep0-pbs-tunnel.service`, the PBS remote/datastore/jobs/notification target (Part F). The scratchpad secret files (sub4 password, ep0 token, Resend key copy) were shredded.
+- **Hub:** **kept:** v0.127.0, Secret/offsite-secret-key, floor 0.289.1, golden 0.289.1 vouched. Weekly windows OFF. The one-shot grant for demo-hp was consumed.