diff --git a/documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md b/documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md index 91cedd0..339b142 100644 --- a/documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md +++ b/documentation/tests/campaign10-evidence-2026-07-31/r157-bootrecon-start-once-race.md @@ -107,3 +107,51 @@ mechanism, per the workspace rule about invariants needing a test that fails whe `R-52` is the feature; grep found **no existing item covering its timing**. `R-156` is this campaign's papra finding. **R-157 is free and is claimed here.** + +--- + +## Second mechanism, observed 2026-08-02 ~05:25 (run 2b cycle 34) — the zero-container case + +The 4th hard-reset failure had a **different signature**, and it matters because it is not a race at +all. Verified rather than assumed (the two preceding non-R-157 violations in this campaign turned out +to be harness artifacts, so each occurrence is now checked): + + all of rallly healthy this time; papra MISSING ENTIRELY + papra: state=stopped deployed=True containers=0 + bootrecon 03:14:34: "no boot-orphaned apps" (refresh 7 → 6 → 7 after it, same churn) + +`containers=0` is precisely the state bootrecon **deliberately never touches** — its documented safety +rule is *"a stack with ZERO containers is deliberately never touched"*, because the UI's Stop is +`docker compose down`, which removes containers. But a hard reset landing **during** a compose +operation produces the identical zero-container state. **The signature the safety rule relies on +cannot distinguish "the customer stopped this" from "an interruption caught it between containers".** + +### And in this state the app is SILENT, not merely unrecovered + + [deadapp] check alive: 20 scans since boot, 5 deployed app(s) evaluated, 0 currently down + +`papra` was `deployed=True` and not running, and the deadapp check counted **0 down**. No +`app_start_failed`, no banner. This is the workspace's own false-invariant #4 recurring — +*"`StateStopped` means deliberately stopped by the user"* (F-CRIT-1), reached here through a hard +reset rather than through quiesce. **Not filed as new**: `CLAUDE.md` already records it. Confirmed +live, on controller 0.188.0, via a new path. + +That makes the zero-container case **worse than the Exited case** this document opens with: the Exited +one at least alarmed (`app_start_failed`, `1 currently down`); this one is invisible on every channel. + +### Recovery in this instance + +`papra` did come back roughly 15 minutes after the reset — later than the harness's 10-minute window, +which is why the violation fired. **So this instance was slow, not permanent**, and the document does +not claim otherwise. What is not established is *what* restarted it: the campaign's own later atoms +are a candidate, and nothing in the logs attributes the recovery to a product mechanism. + +## Summary — two mechanisms, one root + +| | signature | bootrecon's view | alarmed? | observed | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| **A** | container `Exited (255)`, `state=degraded` | missed — snapshot taken before settle | yes (`app_start_failed`, `1 down`) | 3× | +| **B** | **zero containers**, `state=stopped` | deliberately skipped — matches a user Stop | **no — `0 currently down`** | 1× | + +Both leave a `deployed: true` app not running after an interrupted boot, which is the exact condition +R-52 exists to eliminate. A fix that only adds a settle condition closes **A** and leaves **B** open.