docs: offsite continuity Part B REPORT/CONTEXT; DIAGNOSE incident→fix pointer; capability map (offsite reinstall-continuity + escrow retention); ROADMAP R-25 (TOCTOU hardening) + R-26 (guided old-history recovery)
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| Appliance day-0 install: golden image → first boot → auto-confirm (zero clicks) → claimable box | installer, agent, hub, golden | **PROVEN-LIVE** (nested VM) | `DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12`, `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` | First firing on real customer hardware pending → R-1 |
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| BYO install: `--mode byo`, mandatory caps, host-mutation disclosure, coexistence guards | installer v1.15+, agent | **PARTIAL** | `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` (demo box); GL-8 coexistence fixes | Peti clean-slate reinstall on proxmox2 is the first real BYO run of the current path → R-1 |
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| Customer claim: one-time emailed code → customer sets own password (bcrypt, operator never sees it) | controller v0.122, hub v0.50 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM) | `DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12` §10/F-4 (gate ON via real edge; claimed, code consumed) | Never executed by a non-Viktor human → R-3. (Dropped mis-cited `CAMPAIGN-4` F-C — that is the escrow-claim 502, not password claim) |
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| Escrow ceremony: customer-facing wizard, one-shot R claim, operator zero-knowledge | controller v0.127, agent v0.88/0.89 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM, endpoint-exact) | agent v0.88.0 REPORT (ceremony ~4s, one-shot claim 200→410, R absent from every payload); `SPIKE-controller-escrow-2026-07-13` | Endpoints driven on the drill VM; customer-facing **browser wizard** leg not yet live-validated. First supervised ceremony with a real customer pending → R-1. **agent v0.89.0:** `/escrow/preflight` `pbs_storage_id` row now live-reloads (reads current agent.json) — a pbsdr convergence that seeds the id flips it green with NO service restart |
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| Escrow ceremony: customer-facing wizard, one-shot R claim, operator zero-knowledge | controller v0.127, agent v0.88/0.89 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM, endpoint-exact) | agent v0.88.0 REPORT (ceremony ~4s, one-shot claim 200→410, R absent from every payload); `SPIKE-controller-escrow-2026-07-13` | Endpoints driven on the drill VM; customer-facing **browser wizard** leg not yet live-validated. First supervised ceremony with a real customer pending → R-1. **agent v0.89.0:** `/escrow/preflight` `pbs_storage_id` row now live-reloads (reads current agent.json) — a pbsdr convergence that seeds the id flips it green with NO service restart. **hub v0.60.0 (data-first retention):** a re-escrow with a DIFFERENT sealed passphrase no longer destroys the old blob — the hub RETAINS it (`host_escrow_superseded`), so a previous passphrase stays recoverable with its recovery code (turns the reinstall-orphan incident from "history destroyed" into "history recoverable"). Guided-recovery flow = R-26. Red-proof `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded` |
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| DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | **IMPLEMENTED** | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 | Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected. Candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE — see REPORT.) **agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17:** the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick `pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, `pvesm status felhom-offsite`=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot `pveum` grant |
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| Uninstall: KEPT-vs-WIPED statement, secret purge, enrolled-drive handling | installer | **PARTIAL** | `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` Phase 1/5 (KEPT-vs-WIPED printed verbatim; drive data intact ×3); GL-4 code | Secret purge (GL6-F1 `.bak` residue) fixed v1.12.0; enrolled-drive `mnt-*.mount` units survive (GL6-F2, open); cluster-aware `felhom_guests` guard + saferemove cost warning missing → R-9 |
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| Nightly DB dumps (postgres/mariadb autodiscovery), atomic writes | controller v0.118 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-BAK-FULL (pg+mariadb autodiscovered); atomicity `CAMPAIGN-6B` P4 + `CAMPAIGN-6E` B1/B2 (SIGKILL mid-write → only `.tar.tmp` touched, last-good byte-unchanged); DB restore `CAMPAIGN-6D` P-FAB | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-3` F7 is the *finding* of non-atomic writes, and T-RST-DB was auth-hollow — corrected to the 6B/6E fix-proofs.) T-6E-1 dir-fsync asymmetry (LOW) → R-10 |
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| Tier-2 secondary-drive copy: class-driven legs, v2 relpath layout, NAS-target exclusion, safe-remove boundary | controller v0.135 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6E-2026-07-15` (P-TIER2 deep-4 PASS), `CAMPAIGN-6C` | |
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| Offsite (restic → Hetzner Storage Box): mandatory class only, raw-data quota, enlargement gate, retention regrouping | controller v0.134, agent, hub | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D-2026-07-15` (mandatory-only P-IMMICH; enlargement gate fired at real 50GiB quota P3-DELIVERY); `VALIDATION-offbox-storagebox-2026-07-09` (byte-perfect round-trip) | Raw-data quota (SP-1) + retention regrouping (SP-2) are `SPIKE-restic-snapshot-shape` **dry-run** verdicts — mechanism validated, not fired in a live product run; only the enlargement gate is live-fired |
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| Offsite (restic → Hetzner Storage Box): mandatory class only, raw-data quota, enlargement gate, retention regrouping | controller v0.134, agent, hub | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D-2026-07-15` (mandatory-only P-IMMICH; enlargement gate fired at real 50GiB quota P3-DELIVERY); `VALIDATION-offbox-storagebox-2026-07-09` (byte-perfect round-trip) | Raw-data quota (SP-1) + retention regrouping (SP-2) are `SPIKE-restic-snapshot-shape` **dry-run** verdicts — mechanism validated, not fired in a live product run; only the enlargement gate is live-fired. **Reinstall-continuity (controller v0.142.0, 2026-07-17):** a recreated data volume that orphaned the repo (new passphrase can't open the old keys) is now CLASSIFIED (`wrong password or no key found`) → explicit ORPHANED card + event (not nightly-spam) + a move-aside (never-delete) reset (unclaimed auto / claimed confirm), instead of a raw nightly restic error. Fake-based scenarios + red-proofs; live leg staged for the delete/re-create rehearsal (a scratch-target swap disturbs the live escrow state). `DIAGNOSE-offbox-repo-orphaned-2026-07-17` |
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| Offsite restore: local-preferred scratch, unit-only default, full two-step, missing-only place-to-live | controller v0.134/134.1/135 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D` accept legs (immich end-to-end from offsite alone) | |
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| Manual `.fab` export/import: class-scoped capture, browser up/download, tunnel-proof chunking | controller v0.125/128/130/136 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D` P-FAB / Accept #1 (1.7 GB full circle, byte-identical, app boots); chunking `CAMPAIGN-6B` P2 (100 MiB via real CF edge, 120 MiB→413) | Chunking proven at the real CF edge via `curl --resolve`; the **rendered browser file-picker** upload leg is still Viktor's open full-circle test (6C ran it NOT-RUN). C6B-F1 was the 6B *finding*; fix verified in 6D |
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| Guest-loss DR: PBS restore with full-fidelity layout from archive, restore-test verification | agent v0.75/0.76, PBS | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-P9-DESTROY-RESTORE (whole-guest `pct restore` of 9201 → running+healthy) + T-PBS-VERIFY (`verify_state: ok`, 13 snapshots); `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` Phase 0d (restore-test `mount_parity: ok`) | (Cited `VALIDATION-newbox-restore` is offbox **restic** file-restore, wrong tier — corrected.) Real **offsite** guest-loss round-trip still R1-blocked → S5 DR drill |
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# DIAGNOSE — offsite restic repo orphaned by a controller-data volume recreate (2026-07-17)
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**Status: FIXED** — controller **v0.142.0** (Parts A + C) + hub **v0.60.0** (Part B), 2026-07-17.
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Original diagnosis: session `236a92d4`; this note is the incident→fix pointer.
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## Incident
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Demo 9201 offbox backup failed nightly: `[offbox] backup <app> failed: exit status 1: Fatal: wrong
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password or no key found`.
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**Root cause.** The `felhom-controller-data` Docker volume was recreated 2026-07-16 (fresh
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`encryption.key`, re-provisioned `settings.json`). The offsite repo password is **generate-once**
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(`offbox.go` writes it only on `os.IsNotExist`), so with the file gone the offsite re-apply minted a
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NEW random passphrase `P_new`. Two destructive facts then compounded:
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1. **Controller:** `ensureOffboxRepo` swallowed the wrong-password `cat config` failure (its `init`
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fallback saw "config file already exists" → treated as success), so the failure surfaced only as a
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raw nightly restic error at the backup step — no state, no operator-actionable signal.
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2. **Hub:** `SaveHostEscrow`'s `ON CONFLICT(host_id) DO UPDATE` OVERWROTE the `P_old` escrow blob with
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the `P_new` one (`host_escrow.host_id` is the PRIMARY KEY, one row per host). `P_old` was then gone
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from the box, the controller, AND escrow → 18 snapshots (Jul 9–16) cryptographically unrecoverable.
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**Manual fix (Viktor GO, 2026-07-17):** `mv felhom-repo felhom-repo.orphaned-20260717` on the box +
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`restic init` fresh under `P_new`. Local + Tier-2 backups were never affected (offsite = DR tier only).
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## The fix (this incident class is now closed)
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- **A (controller v0.142.0):** `ensureOffboxRepo` CLASSIFIES the `cat config` failure
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(`wrong password or no key found` → ORPHANED). An orphaned repo → explicit ORPHANED state + a calm
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Hungarian card + `offbox_repo_orphaned` event (once, not nightly spam); scheduled runs skip. Reset =
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move-aside (`.orphaned-<date>`, never delete) + init: UNCLAIMED auto, CLAIMED reveal-then-confirm.
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- **B (hub v0.60.0):** `SaveHostEscrow` RETAINS a superseded (different-sha) blob into
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`host_escrow_superseded` before overwriting — so `P_old` stays recoverable with its recovery code.
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This turns the incident class from "history destroyed" into "history recoverable with the recovery
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code" (the guided recovery flow itself is R-26).
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- **C (controller v0.142.0):** the remote-backup page auto-refreshes the run status.
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## Still open
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- **R-26** — guided old-history recovery via a retained superseded blob + the recovery code (Part B
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makes it possible; the flow is not built).
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- Product note: fresh-volume provisioning against a pre-existing offsite repo still does not *recover*
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the old password unattended (needs R) — it now cleanly SURFACES/RESETS instead of erroring nightly.
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| ID | Item | Size | Status | Notes |
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|----|------|------|--------|-------|
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| R-26 | **Guided old-history recovery via a retained superseded escrow + the recovery code.** Enabled by hub v0.60.0 (Part B) which now RETAINS superseded escrow blobs (`host_escrow_superseded`, `ListSupersededEscrow`). Build the flow that, given the customer's recovery code, unwraps a retained old blob → recovers the old repo passphrase → mounts/reads the moved-aside `.orphaned-<date>` repo for restore. | M | idea (enabled by v0.60.0) | Turns "history recoverable in principle" into a real customer-drivable path; pairs with the controller v0.142.0 orphaned-repo move-aside. Origin `DIAGNOSE-offbox-repo-orphaned-2026-07-17` |
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| R-25 | **Device-node TOCTOU hardening (drive init).** Graduate the controller v0.141.0 Observation: the `format → resolveEnrollUUID(path) → AssignDisk(uuid)` sequence has a narrow /dev-re-enumeration window (agent-guarded on the destructive format via anti-retarget durable-id; benign fs-UUID mount). Bind resolve+assign to the format's durable-id so the mount can't target a moved node. | S | idea | From the v0.141.0 F6 commit's security-review finding (`felhom-controller` REPORT). Low real risk (single-operator, agent-guarded), but cheap to close |
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| R-24 | **Guest resources as hub desired-state (live resize).** F5 (host-install v1.17.0) auto-sizes RAM/cores at INSTALL only. Make guest cores/RAM a per-host `pbs_dr`-sibling descriptor field the agent reconciles (`pct set -memory/-cores`), so the operator can right-size a running box from the hub — and land it in seconds via the agent-plane poke (R-13). | M | idea (F5 follow-on) | Follows F5 (`VALIDATION-n100` — appliance auto-size shipped); the live-resize path reuses the desired-state + poke machinery (agent v0.89 / hub v0.59). Would flip a new map row "operator right-sizes a running guest from the hub" |
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| R-12 | Cluster mode: agent-follows-guest, bind-mount reconciliation on HA migration | XL | idea | Scoped 07-15; interim = HA-group pin to one node. Driven by Peti's two-node cluster |
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| R-13 | OOB management arc: dual-use existing WireGuard + hub desired-state channel as mutual-repair | L | **first slice PROVEN-LIVE (poke channel)** | **FIRST SLICE PROVEN-LIVE — the agent-plane poke channel (Direction-2a), agent v0.89.0 + hub v0.59.0 (2026-07-17):** the ep0-relayed contentless poke (hub→ep0 `felhom-poke` forced-cmd→UDP→box WG /32:51822, peer-confined, zero ep0/box infra change) reaches the **agent** and fires an immediate desired-state cycle. Full path live: real operator manifest save → `sync-poke delivered to 10.77.0.2`; box → `poke received → immediate desired-state cycle` (~31 ms ep0→box, save→tick ≈ ~0.45 s). This is ONLY the listener+sender; the rest of the mutual-repair arc (self-heal actions over the channel) stays open. Per `SPIKE-immediate-sync-transport-2026-07-16` P4. The controller-plane Direction-2 wait channel (hub v0.58 / controller v0.140) shipped the config-puller leg separately |
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