due-checks gate (R-341), floor raise recorded (R-343), snapshot coverage (R-342)
gates / gates (push) Successful in 14s

PART 1+2 — dated checks stop being wishes. R-341 booked two measurements as
prose in a register row; nothing read those dates and nothing would have
objected when they passed. The dates now live in a DUE-CHECKS block INSIDE
OPEN-ITEMS.md (inside, so no sidecar can drift from it) and a new gate reads
them. Registered as #10 in repo_gates.py, --fast, so it runs in BOTH the
pre-push hook and CI.

  exit 0  nothing due (prints pending count + nearest date; empty block too)
  exit 1  a row is due/overdue (due <= today, UTC -- due TODAY counts), or a
          row names an item with no R-row
  exit 2  block absent/duplicated/unparseable -- INCONCLUSIVE, never 0

It REFUSES rather than warns, and its docstring states the limitation: it is
NOT a scheduler, it fires on the next push, not on the date.

37 tests. BOTH red-proofs run and reverted -- and the first one earned its
keep by catching a hollow assertion of MINE rather than confirming the gate:
flipping <= to < left a due-today row in neither bucket, min() raised on an
empty list, and the TRACEBACK exited 1, so "rc == 1" passed while the
boundary was wrong. An exit code cannot tell a verdict from a crash. The test
now asserts the conviction banner and the absence of a traceback, and the gate
returns 2 rather than crashing if that partition breaks again.

PART 3 — the floor raise, and the premise was WRONG. Read back from the store
(not the form): min_controller_version = 0.216.0 @ 12:36:58Z, zero
per-customer overrides, no "managed floor HELD" line. But read 5 shows the
raise was NOT a no-op: demo-felhom had been on 0.214.0 since 12 Aug and
auto-updated 0.214.0 -> 0.216.0 at 12:37:07Z -- NINE SECONDS after the save,
exactly the immediate action publish-train rule 2 documents. No error events
followed; it restarted clean.

R-343 is therefore filed OPEN, not CLOSED: the closing condition was all five
reads clean and no directive served. It went well, but a record calling it
inert when it moved a customer box is what misleads the next reader. The row
also states why the floor was behind -- rule 2 policy, not drift, earned by
the 2026-07-11 skew onto Peti's box -- and cites ResolveManagedFloor
(store.go:2068) plus the two build-felhom-iso.sh facts (build-time at :267,
fails open at :78-82) rather than asserting them.

Two boxes are below the floor and neither reports: drill-r50 (blocked,
powered off) and peti-felhom (host row deleted). peti-felhom was NOT
contacted -- its row records that a report from a deleted host 401s and is
not persisted, so the raise cannot reach it.

PART 4 — R-342 filed READY, quoting stop2-snapshot.txt verbatim: Hetzner
server snapshot 421440873 covers /dev/sda only; /mnt/pbs-datastore is a
separate Volume that snapshots exclude, so a rollback restores software state
and NOT the datastore. Fine for that upgrade; the safeguard for any future
procedure that could touch the datastore does not exist and is Viktor's call.

Also: CLAUDE.md's gate list named 6 of 10 registered gates -- completed
rather than appending a 7th to a wrong list (124 -> 128 effective, ceiling
200). Capability map deliberately unchanged; no row cites a floor or golden
version. repo_gates.py fully green, 10/10.
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@@ -640,3 +640,18 @@ class (an image `VOLUME` at an unmounted path) is still live — `immich-server`
| **R-337** | **`/backup/status` lagged a completed backup by minutes on one box and not the other — and it RESOLVED ITSELF, which is why this is WATCHING and not a defect.** During the R-336 recovery on 2026-08-18, `demo-hp`'s snapshot landed on ep0 at **03:58:43Z** (complete manifest; the host's own task index says `OK`) — yet `GET /backup/status` was **still serving the superseded 03:27:00Z failure at ~04:03Z**, four-plus minutes later. `demo-felhom` showed its new result within ~40 s of completion. **The lag cleared on its own:** demo-hp's 04:07:35Z host report carries `felhom-pbs success=true, 4.29 GB`, and the hub is green for both boxes. **The first draft of this row claimed the success was "still reported as failed" — that was written before the next report arrived and it was wrong; the corrected claim is a several-minute skew between the two boxes, not a stuck value.** It is recorded because a status field that can trail its own artifact by minutes will, during an incident, be read as a second failure — this session nearly did — and because the asymmetry between the two boxes is unexplained | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-18** | another observation, ideally during an incident rather than constructed | **Do not open a fix on this as written.** First establish the intended refresh path for `/backup/status` after an out-of-schedule run; only if the skew is not simply collection cadence is there anything to pin. If it is cadence, close this row and say so | CC |
| **R-338** | **`demo-hp` is not on the R-50 island at all, and `operations/nodes.md` states that it is.** The page records both fleet boxes as island-migrated 2026-07-25. True of `felhom-pve`; **false of `demo-hp`**, whose `agent.json` has `listen_addr: 192.168.0.87:8443` — the customer LAN address — and **no `island_bridge`/`island_guest_addr` keys at all**, whose guest 9201 has `net0` only (no `eth1`), and whose `vmbr9` exists with **zero members**. The controller's `controller.yaml` points at the LAN address, so the box works; this is inventory drift, not breakage. **Two costs.** A session trusting the page addresses the wrong endpoint — that happened on 2026-08-18 and the resulting timeout was briefly read as a fault. And the agent's local API is **bound to the customer LAN on this box** rather than to a point-to-point island, which is the exposure R-50 was built to remove — so a documented security property is claimed for a box that does not have it | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-18** | — | Decide which is true: migrate `demo-hp` to the island, or correct `nodes.md`. Leaving both is the one option that keeps the doc lying | Viktor decides; CC executes |
| **R-341** | **Does the fd slope change after the PBS 4.2.5 upgrade? — two dated checks, and the answer is expected to be NO.** ep0 was upgraded 4.2.2-1 → 4.2.5-1 on 2026-08-18 09:51Z on the operator's ruling, **for rehearsal value, not as a fix**: the full changelog range was read (128 lines, all three entries) and swept for connection-handling vocabulary, and it contains **no mechanism** by which descriptor reaping would change — the single keyword hit was `S3 … honor the node's proxy settings`, HTTP-proxy config for S3, not the PBS proxy daemon. **The 32-minute post-upgrade window is indistinguishable from the before window** (+5 fd/1919 s = 225/day vs +4 fd/1885 s = 183/day; the two differ by ONE descriptor and Poisson uncertainty on such counts is ±2, so both are consistent with one unchanged rate — the higher after-figure is noise, not a regression). **Thirty minutes cannot settle it in either direction and this row exists so nobody pretends it did.** New `t0` = **fd 17 at 2026-08-18 09:51:22Z, proxy PID 551655**; before-rate to beat = **183–200/day**. **Interpretation fixed in advance** (`evidence-ep0-pbs-upgrade-2026-08-18/stop1-ruling.txt`, written before any numbers existed): unchanged = EXPECTED, not a failed upgrade; changed = a SURPRISE needing explanation, not a confirmation | **WATCHING — NEW 2026-08-18** | elapsed time only | **Two dated checks, both CC:** **+24 h — 2026-08-19 ~10:00Z** and **+7 d — 2026-08-25 ~10:00Z**. Command (the incident's own positive observable): `ssh root@<ep0> 'PID=$(systemctl show proxmox-backup-proxy -p MainPID --value); ls /proc/$PID/fd \| wc -l; ss -lnt "( sport = :8007 )"; ss -tn state all "( sport = :8007 )" \| awk "NR>1{print \$1}" \| sort \| uniq -c'`. **Record the ESTAB/CLOSE-WAIT split, not just the total** — the split is what says which leak it is. If PID ≠ 551655 the window is void: something restarted the proxy and the count began again | CC on both dates |
| **R-342** | **The ep0 snapshot covers less than it looks like it covers, and the next person will assume otherwise.** Quoting `audits/evidence-ep0-pbs-upgrade-2026-08-18/stop2-snapshot.txt` verbatim: *"covers — the 38 GB system disk /dev/sda (root), i.e. the PBS packages, unit files, /etc/systemd drop-ins, nftables and wg config. DOES NOT — /mnt/pbs-datastore. That is /dev/sdb, a separate 100 GB VOLUME, and Hetzner server snapshots do not include attached volumes. The backup data is therefore NOT protected by this snapshot."* Snapshot **421440873** (`felhom-hetzner-20260818`, 15.06 GB, Available) was taken as the rollback for the 4.2.2→4.2.5 PBS upgrade. **Rolling it back restores software state, not the datastore.** That was *acceptable for that change* — a package install writes no datastore content — and the file says so. **The problem is what happens next:** this fact lives in an evidence file nobody will open again, and a snapshot named as "the rollback" reads as protecting everything on the box. ep0 holds the only off-premises copy of a real customer's data | **READY (S) — NEW 2026-08-18** | — | **Decide the safeguard for any future ep0 procedure that could touch `/mnt/pbs-datastore` — it does not exist and has not been designed.** Candidates: a Hetzner **Volume** snapshot (a different object from the server snapshot), a PBS-level sync to a second location, or an explicit written acceptance that the datastore is unprotected for the duration. **Nothing may be added to a runbook implying a safeguard exists until one does** | **Viktor decides; CC executes** — a risk-to-customer-data question |
| **R-343** | **The managed controller floor was raised 0.214.0 → 0.216.0 — and it was NOT the no-op it was expected to be: it moved a live box nine seconds later.** Raised by the operator 2026-08-18 **12:36:58Z**, in a **separate save after** the artifact vouch. **Read back from the store, not the form** (`hub_settings.min_controller_version`, `GetGlobalMinControllerVersion` — `hub/internal/store/store.go:1751`): `min_controller_version = 0.216.0`, updated 12:36:58. **WHY IT HAD BEEN BEHIND — this was NOT drift, and describing it as "two releases behind" without this context reads as a defect it was not.** `publish-train-rules.md` rule 1 is *manifest before floor*, and rule 2 requires the floor field to be filled **LAST, in a separate save**, because the DB row overrides the env floor and **acts immediately on the next report cycle**. That rule was earned: on the 2026-07-11 publish train the floor was saved together with the manifest, acted at once, and pushed controller 0.113.0 onto Peti's box **~9 minutes ahead of agent 0.81.0** — the exact forbidden skew, benign only because that box had no NAS shares. R-120's row records the same deliberate choice (*"Floor untouched per publish-train rule 2"*). So the floor sitting at 0.214.0 was **policy being followed**, not neglect. **What it was functionally while it sat there:** not a live problem — every reporting box was at or above it — but a **safety net set two versions low**. The floor is what drags a box forward if it ever falls behind (restored from an old backup, reinstalled, long offline), and at 0.214.0 it would have pulled such a box only to two versions back, missing R-328's severity fix and R-335's follow-up. **THE MEASURED BLAST RADIUS — five reads, and the third and fifth are the findings.** **(1) Floor:** `0.216.0` @ 12:36:58Z, from the store. **(2) Per-customer overrides:** **zero** — all five `customer_configs` rows carry an empty `min_controller_version`, so nothing hides behind a lower override and the global applies to everyone. **(3) Every box's controller version:** `demo-felhom` **0.216.0**, `demo-hp` **0.216.0** — both AT the floor **now**; `drill-r50` **0.213.0** (status `blocked`, last report 2026-08-12, powered off/reverted) and `peti-felhom` **0.115.0** (host row DELETED) are **below** it but are **not reporting boxes**. **(4) Directives/holds:** no `managed floor HELD` line exists; the hub logged `[INFO] Global controller-version floor set to "0.216.0"`. **(5) THE FINDING — a controller DID auto-update after the raise.** `demo-felhom` had been on **0.214.0** since 2026-08-12 16:44 and the hub recorded `controller_updated — Controller frissítve: 0.214.0 → 0.216.0` at **12:37:07Z**, then `controller_started (0.216.0)` at 12:37:12Z — **nine seconds after the raise**, exactly the immediate action rule 2 documents. `demo-hp` was already on 0.216.0 (hand-deployed 2026-08-14 08:31) and did not move. **No error, warning or critical event followed** — the update completed and the controller came back up. **So the change was real, not inert: "every reporting box is at or above the floor" is true BECAUSE of the raise, not independently of it.** **Why it is safe by construction**, cited rather than asserted: `ResolveManagedFloor` (`hub/internal/store/store.go:2068`) sets `Held` and clears the floor entirely when `Floor > GoldenVersion` (the R-216 shape) — floor 0.216.0 **equals** golden 0.216.0, so that guard does not trip — and holds per-box when the box's agent is below the manifest's `MinAgent`, or unknown, or unparseable; both boxes report agent 0.129.0 against `MinAgent` 0.129.0, so the floor was served rather than held. That second guard remains armed for any box reporting with an old agent. **No ISO rebuild is required:** the golden is fetched at first boot from the hub's manifest, which is 0.216.0 — at the floor, not below it — and rule 5's `assert_golden_ge_floor` is a **build-time** gate for *future* builds (`scripts/iso/build-felhom-iso.sh:77`, called at **:267**) which **fails open with a warning** when its inputs are absent (`:78-82`: `if [[ -z "$golden" \| \| -z "$floor" ]]` → `log_warn "… UNENFORCED …"` → `return 0`), both confirmed in the script. **`peti-felhom` was NOT contacted and needs no contact** — from the PETI row: its host row was deleted 2026-07-15 and *"a report from a deleted host 401s and is not persisted"*, so it cannot receive a floor directive at all and the raise cannot reach it | **OPEN — NEW 2026-08-18.** Deliberately NOT closed: the task's closing condition was *all five reads clean, no directive served*, and read 5 shows a live box updated. It went cleanly and is the floor working as designed — but a change recorded as a no-op when it moved a customer box is exactly the kind of record that misleads later | — | **Confirm the 0.216.0 update on `demo-felhom` is healthy in normal operation** (it reported and restarted clean, but it has not yet run a full bacLine truncated
<!-- DUE-CHECKS-BEGIN — machine-readable. Parsed by scripts/due_checks_gate.py.
One row per dated check. The R-number must have a row above. Dates are UTC.
Clearing a row means the check was DONE and its result recorded in that R-row —
or the date was deliberately moved, with the reason stated in the R-row.
This block is an INDEX, not the detail: the command and the preconditions live in
the R-row. Duplicating them here would create the second source this design avoids. -->
| item | due (UTC) | what to measure |
|---|---|---|
| R-341 | 2026-08-19 | ep0 proxy fd count + ESTAB/CLOSE-WAIT split; PID must still be 551655 |
| R-341 | 2026-08-25 | same, +7 d |
<!-- DUE-CHECKS-END -->
@@ -81,3 +81,11 @@ so the gate is enforced, not skipped (an unset input warns LOUDLY and does not s
fix for a tripped gate is never to lower the floor: **republish golden ≥ floor and vouch it**
(rule 1), then rebuild. This gate composes with rule 1 — the manifest still leads the floor; this
one stops an ISO from carrying a golden the floor has already outrun.
> **Dated note, 2026-08-18 — the current pair is golden `0.216.0` / floor `0.216.0`.** Equal, so the
> R-71 gate passes. Recorded so the next build has numbers to hand, and deliberately **not** as a
> replacement for the instruction above: **resolve both LIVE from the hub before a build.** A
> snapshot that looks authoritative is exactly how `build-golden.sh`'s hand-bumped `CONTROLLER_IMAGE`
> default rotted twice. Treat these as a sanity check on what you read, never as a substitute for
> reading it. (Floor raised to 0.216.0 by the operator on 2026-08-18 in a separate save after the
> vouch, per rule 2 — see R-343, which records that the raise moved `demo-felhom` nine seconds later.)