releases 2b and 3 are out (2026-11-15): report, register (R-1380, R-1395, R-1050 closed; R-1397 filed), status, golden 0.353.0 record, evidence
gates / gates (push) Successful in 2m9s
gates / gates (push) Successful in 2m9s
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0159rPz1ZhFKsS53msqPYxtS
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## 2026-11-15 — releases 2b and 3: R-1380, R-1395, R-1050 closed (full text of the rows: `git show f561c85b:documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`)
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| Row | What | Closed | Evidence |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| **R-1380** | **Proxmox renews its own certificate and the agent's pin does not follow: from that day the agent cannot control or back up a guest (5 answers).** (P3) | CLOSED 2026-11-15 — agent 0.175.1 (vouched 11:07:35 CET), installer 1.37.0 (tagged and published), golden 0.353.0 (vouched). Tester 1, demo-hp and the N100 moved from the pinned certificate to the copy of their own root CA: each proved a working call with the copy first and cleared the fingerprint last. On demo-hp two forced new Proxmox certificates changed nothing for the agent: the same process, no restart, 14 and 40 calls answered 200 in Proxmox's own log, no alarm. A wrong CA copy was repaired at the agent's start. A fresh install ended with the copy and no fingerprint. A cut write of the agent's config is repaired at start (tests with a cut at four steps; NOT proven with a real power cut). What stays open is R-1396 gap 2 (a fully blind box) | `audits/release-2b-3-2026-11-15/` `part0/`, `part2/`; `documentation/tests/golden-0.353.0-2026-11-15/` |
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| **R-1395** | **A step of the host's clock makes the controller read a new boot: it then recreates every drive-backed app, once.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-11-15 — controller 0.353.0 (global floor 10:26:53 UTC) with agent 0.175.1. On Tester 1 the same 150 s clock step was staged twice: with the old controller it recreated one drive-backed app (three containers) at the step back and again at the step forward; with the new controller and agent it recreated nothing in either direction (the same container ids before and after). One real restart of Tester 1 after that was read as a new boot and the app was recreated, so the gate still works. On a box whose agent is older than 0.175.0 a clock step still recreates once | `audits/release-2b-3-2026-11-15/` `part2/t1-clock-A-*.txt`, `part3/t1-clock-B-*.txt`, `part3/t1-after-reboot.txt` |
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| **R-1050** | **Raise HSTS to one year on or after 2026-11-15, if no https trouble was reported.** (P4) | CLOSED 2026-11-15 — controller 0.353.0, on the operator's word in the release prompt (decision 249). Every public name of the three test boxes answers `strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000` and nothing more (26 names of 26; no includeSubDomains, no preload); the https-only check is green. The night's search found no https trouble since 2026-10-15. Not tested: a browser | `audits/release-2b-3-2026-11-15/` `part3/hsts-headers.txt`, `part3/https-only.txt` |
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**Reasoning kept (R-1380).** A set fingerprint wins over a CA file, so the move clears the fingerprint LAST and only after a working call with the copy. `agent.json` is written only through `config.ReplaceInPlace` (a journal of the old bytes first; the daemon repairs a cut write before it reads the config). Root files that are older than the agent are not a trust problem on a pinned box — but that quiet path is never taken after a failed call.
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**Reasoning kept (R-1395).** The boot token is the agent's; the controller only compares. A boot is the kernel's boot id, never a time computed from the wall clock.
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## 2026-11-14 — release 2a: R-1388, R-1301, R-1391 closed (full text of the rows: `git show a2173830:documentation/backlog/OPEN-ITEMS.md`)
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| Row | What | Closed | Evidence |
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@@ -268,7 +268,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-779** | Security & access | P4 | **[P3-LOW] Part A's "two outside addresses seen as two" is proven through the simulated tunnel only; on the REAL tunnel the second outside address (ep0, one request allowed) was refused by Cloudflare's edge with 403 and never reached the box.** Measured 2026-10-01 19:51 UTC (`audits/visitors-2026-10-01/A/L2-demo-hp-real-tunnel.txt`): no log line on demo-hp; demo-hp's box has no geo restriction in its settings, so a Cloudflare ZONE rule (country or bot, not read) refused a German datacenter address. DooPlex's own address on the real tunnel was seen as itself. **Needs:** one sign-in from a second Hungarian address (the operator's phone off wifi) while DooPlex is locked out — 2 minutes; and say which Cloudflare rule refused ep0. | **WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — rank P3-LOW; owner: operator (a phone), CC reads the logs** **Re-ranked 2026-10-03: P3→P4: a proof gap on the real tunnel; operator-only follow-up.** | — | — | CC + operator |
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| **R-904** | Security & access | P4 | **Cloudflare can read every household's app traffic; replacing it with our own relay is a later item.** Facts (reviewer discussion 2026-10-08; `01`): app traffic and the dashboard reach the box through the Cloudflare Tunnel (`01` §5 trust table, rows end-user ↔ apps and customer ↔ controller UI; §7), and the tunnel's public end is Cloudflare's edge, where TLS ends — so Cloudflare can technically read that traffic (the FAQ says so since 2026-10-08, R-900; „TLS ends at the edge" is not written in `01` — add it there). What Cloudflare gives today, free: inbound reach with no router setup, the CGNAT answer (`01` §4, §7); certificates (`01` §7, the free tier covers one level below a zone); the geo-WAF the hub enforces (`01` §5 last row, §7); flood protection (not in `01`). The alternative named: our own EU relay over WireGuard with TLS passthrough by SNI, certificates on the box, the geo-block on the relay. Its costs: one more machine the operator keeps up, and a single point of reach for every box; weaker flood protection; about a week of work after a spike. Operator ruling 2026-10-08 09:07 (`09` §3 decision 184): a later item. | **DEFERRED** — **2026-10-10: the asked sentence is in `01` §7** („TLS ends at Cloudflare's edge …”); the spike stays deferred. **DEFERRED — after the first customers (operator ruling 2026-10-08 09:07)** | — | A spike after the first customers (the relay's reach, cost and flood behaviour, measured) | operator |
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| **R-1040** | Security & access | P4 | **Until the household makes Sonarr's or Radarr's first admin, any container on the box can read the app's API key.** Measured on the bench 2026-10-14 with the R-1030 seed in place: `AuthenticationRequired=Enabled`, `AuthenticationMethod=None` — `/initialize.json` from another container answers 200 with `apiKey`. Outsiders are blocked by the box's setup gate in that window; a compromised other app is not. | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-14 | — | Seed the API key at install (`SONARR__AUTH__APIKEY`, measured to work) so the box knows it, and close the window by telling the household in the first steps; or seed a Forms user | CC |
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| **R-1050** | Security & access | P4 | **Raise HSTS to one year on or after 2026-11-15, if no https trouble was reported.** `09` §3 decision 249 (D2 = A, operator 2026-10-15): HSTS stays `max-age=86400` now; after a month with no https trouble it becomes one year (`31536000`); never preload, never `includeSubDomains`. The value is `HSTSMaxAgeSeconds` in `felhom-controller/controller/internal/infra/infra.go`, pinned by `TestRenderForwardedHeaders_HTTPSOnly`. „Trouble” = any report of a name that will not open, or a box answering http after the floor. | NARROWED — one year is in controller `main`, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** searched for https trouble since 2026-10-15: the open and closed registers (ASCII fragments; controls: a common word found, a nonsense word not found), the operator's mailbox (words for „does not open”, „not secure”, certificate, HSTS, the browser's error codes: one thread, a tester's install questions, no https trouble), the hub's log since its start today (0 lines). No name that does not open, no box answering http after the floor. Not searched: the hub's log before today's deploy (not kept), Tester 2 (off, R-1104). The release must be built on or after 2026-11-15. WATCHING — **2026-11-14: NOT in controller 0.352.1.** That release was built on 2026-11-14, one day before the ruled date, and the operator's words „one day early is OK” were not given. Check date moved to 2026-11-21 (one week: the next day a controller release is likely; a one-day move would only turn the nightly CI red with nothing to release). The search for https trouble since 2026-10-15 is NOT done yet. Earlier: **WATCHING** — filed 2026-10-15 | the date | On or after 2026-11-15: read the register and the operator's mail for https trouble since 2026-10-15; none → a controller release with one year (test updated), bake → vouch → floor | CC |
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| **R-1054** | Security & access | P3 | **The hub's operator/global API key is still one bearer that can do everything on `/api/v1`, including reading every box's break-glass root password (`GET /admin/hosts/{id}/recovery-credential`).** Hub v0.152.0 gave the web surface scoped tokens (`05` §17) but tokens are refused on `/api/v1` by design. Who uses the global key today is not listed in one place. Fix: list its consumers; move each operator use to a scoped token on the web side (or a token class on the API), and keep the global key only where a box path needs it — or retire it. | OPEN — filed 2026-10-15 by the token build | — | List the global key's consumers (pod env, scripts, runbooks) | CC |
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| **R-1194** | Security & access | P3 | **On a fresh box the operator's break-glass SSH door was broken from the first minute: `oob_degraded` „felhom-sshd config invalid (sshd -t fails)".** Rehearsal 2026-10-20, Tester4-816e21, mail at 12:03 UTC (one minute after the host record was created): details `active:false, config_invalid:true, felhom_sshd_port:0, operator_key_configured:false, operator_key_reported:true, reachable:false`. Possibly the shape of a customer with no operator key set (Tester4 is a test customer) — then the alarm is a false one on every such box; or a real config defect. Not diagnosed (no shell). Checked the same day: the only `oob_degraded` in the operator mailbox in 30 days, and no recovery mail followed; the report says port 0. Two candidate mechanisms in the agent (`internal/felhomsshd/health.go:63-66`): `sshd -t -f <conf>` run by the NON-root agent fails on unreadable host keys, or a config rendered before the desired state arrived (port 0). **CAUSE FOUND AND FIXED 2026-10-21 night** (`audits/night-2026-10-21/P5-checks/`): reproduced on a fresh box from the public ISO — `oob_degraded` mailed 20:34 CEST while felhom-sshd was applied 0.4 s after the check and is healthy (port 8822 listening, `sshd -t` passes as the agent's user through its sudo grant — so the non-root theory is FALSE; without sudo it fails on the host key, which the agent never does). The first host report runs before the felhom-sshd loop's first pass and reads a config never rendered. Fix: agent `0da792e` — no OOB stanza until the first pass has run (the hub does not evaluate a missing one; a failed pass counts). `TestR1194_NoOOBStanzaBeforeTheFirstPass` red-proved. | WATCHING — released in agent v0.162.0 (2026-10-22, operator yes; on the 3 test boxes); the false alarm comes only on a FRESH box's first report | the next fresh install with agent ≥ 0.162.0 | At the next fresh install read the hub's events for `oob_degraded` in the first hour (none expected); then close | CC |
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| **R-1237** | Security & access | P3 | **The nightly CC-secrets sweep found stored one-time codes in a session record dated 2026-10-23: 14 names in one file (bind tokens and setup codes of test boxes — NIGHT_2026_10_23_*, FIXES_2026_10_21_*, NIGHT_2026_10_21_*, REHEARSAL_2026_10_20_* — and R_DEMO_FELHOM in a file of 2026-10-20).** Mail „[DooPlex CC secrets] 2 secret name(s) found in old session records", 2026-10-23 01:57 UTC, read in the day session (names only). One file holding all of them suggests one command printed many stored values at once (a listing or a dump) in the night session. All but R_DEMO_FELHOM are one-time install codes of test boxes; NIGHT_2026_10_23_* die when Tester4-16fdef is deleted (the operator's do list). | **OPEN** — 2026-10-27 (operator yes): the dead names were REMOVED from the store with `sec rm` (46, one commit each; `audits/r1299-window-button-2026-10-27/sec-rm.txt`, names only): every one-time code this row names is gone; R_DEMO_FELHOM stays (unsure). Consequence: the nightly sweep no longer watches for the removed values — they open nothing (their boxes are destroyed). The session transcripts themselves are unchanged — that question stays here. **Earlier:** OPEN | — | CC: find the file and the command by the sweep's own report (names only), add a hook shape for that command if it is not one; R_DEMO_FELHOM (demo-felhom's recovery code) — the operator decides whether to rotate it | CC |
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| **R-78** | Box system & updates | P3 | **`local_api` authority ruling — auto-reconcile vs detect-only** **MIGRATED FROM `ROADMAP.md` 2026-08-22 (R-369) — originally filed 2026-07-25, size M, roadmap state `idea (deferred OUT of R-77 on purpose)`.** Moved verbatim; nothing added or reinterpreted. The roadmap keeps its copy as history, marked moved. **An OWED OPERATOR DECISION, not a defect — moved because an owed ruling hidden among feature ideas is the shape this session exists to remove.** | **OPEN — migrated from ROADMAP 2026-08-22, rank unchanged** | — | R-77 ships detection because the fix is genuinely undecided, and **both directions can lose customer-visible function**. **Direction 1 (today):** `controller.yaml` wins and drift is silent → the 2026-07-25 island migration blinded the whole fleet's control plane for 17.5 h (drive gate, guest-reboot recovery, quiesce/backup all degrade). R-77 makes that loud but does not stop it recurring. **Direction 2 (`bootstrap.json` wins, auto-reconcile on boot):** a guest whose `controller.yaml` is CORRECT and whose `bootstrap.json` is stale — a half-completed re-provision, a hand-repaired guest, a setup-wizard box — gets a **working channel clobbered on the next restart**, fleet-wide and silently, during a routine deploy. That is not obviously better than the bug. Needs a spike: which writer is authoritative per field (endpoint vs fingerprint vs token — `mergeLocalAPI` replaces the whole block, so they cannot be reconciled independently today), whether the agent side should stamp a generation/mtime so 'newer wins' is even expressible, and whether reconcile should require an operator ack. Until then the drift alert plus a manual edit is the supported path. | CC |
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| **R-468** | Box system & updates | P3 | **[P3-LOW] THE GOLDEN WAIVER — goldens on a cadence, not per release (operator ruling 2026-09-13).** 25 goldens in 26 days in August, almost one per release, because `golden_currency_gate.py` trips on every release by design and the only honest ways past it were a bake or a declared `--no-verify` (thirteen by 2026-09-01, R-404/R-417). **The ruling: bake WEEKLY, and always before any drill or fresh install.** Every release still raises the FLOOR, so both demo boxes keep getting each release in ~20 s; only the golden — which protects a fresh install and nothing else — moves to a cadence. **The mechanism (built 2026-09-13):** `documentation/tests/golden-waiver. **⚠ CORRECTED THE SAME DAY (R-472): between bakes the floor does NOT carry a release — the hub holds any floor above the vouched golden (publish-train rule 1), so releases between bakes reach the demo boxes only by hand-deploy.**yml`, four lines (`issued`, `expires`, `reason`, `register_row: R-468`), read by the gate. While valid, a golden BEHIND the record makes the gate print a loud ADVISORY and exit 0; when it expires the gate is red again until someone bakes or renews. **The 14-day cap is enforced by the gate, not the runbook** — a longer, undated, unparseable, reason-less or row-less waiver is INCONCLUSIVE (exit 2), never 0 and never silently ignored. **It never covers a golden that is UNRECORDED (R-385)** — that is not a cadence choice. **A dated waiver cannot be forgotten; it just expires** — the difference from R-242's original rule, which recurred the day after it was written. Tests: `scripts/test_golden_currency_gate.py` cases 5–15 (E/F/G/H, a 15-day, absent, unparseable, bad-row and empty-reason waiver each 2; the R-421 decoy — a file saying only `expires` — 2). **This is a PRE-CUSTOMER arrangement: the first external install retires it** (delete the file in that commit). Cadence written into `RUNBOOK-manual-build.md` §4.2 and the `felhom.eu` end-of-session checklist. **Does NOT touch R-242's open half (nothing gates the VOUCH).** **2026-10-15 (`09` §3 decision 250, operator):** the cadence is now the RULE, not a waiver — a controller release needs no golden (the floor carries it), the golden is baked every Sunday night when the floor is above it (`runbooks/nightly-rotation.md`), and `golden_currency_gate.py` convicts only a golden MORE THAN 7 DAYS old while a release is ahead (CASE 18–21, red-proved). The waiver file stays as a dated exception for a missed Sunday. **2026-11-11:** the End-dates list leans on this row (`documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md` DB21); the newest golden passed its 7-day limit on 2026-11-10 and no waiver is in force, so the gate refuses code pushes to `felhom.eu`. **2026-11-11: golden 0.352.0 baked and published; one fresh box installed from it (`documentation/tests/golden-0.352.0-2026-11-11/README.md`); the gate is green (`python3 scripts/golden_currency_gate.py`, rc 0). The operator vouched it on 2026-11-11 at 14:48:11 CET.** | WATCHING — **2026-11-14: golden 0.352.1 baked (sha256 `4f411cbe…346d`), one fresh install proven on a nested VM on demo-hp, vouched by the operator 10:25:43 UTC (`documentation/tests/golden-0.352.1-2026-11-14/`). The gate judges the bake's age: the next bake is due by 2026-11-21.** Earlier: **WATCHING** — the weekly bake is a night-routine step; the first external install still retires the waiver arrangement **2026-11-03: the Sunday 2026-11-01 bake was missed (it was in no brief): golden 0.344.0 is 8 days old, the floor 0.349.0; a CODE push to felhom.eu is refused until a bake and the vouch or a dated waiver. The night's close-out was documents only, which the gate exempts; no waiver written. First on the morning list.** | — | — | CC |
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| **R-1358** | Box system & updates | P3 | **cloudflared 2026.10.4 misses two dependency fixes (VULN-183456 chi, 2026.10.5; VULN-184686 go-jose, 2026.10.6; the newest is 2026.10.7).** No public text on reach. Not pinned tonight: the tunnel is a box's only door, and 9202 has none to prove it on. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 | — | raise `CloudflaredImage` on the next controller release with a tunnel proof on Tester 1 | CC |
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| **R-1380** | Box system & updates | P3 | **Proxmox renews its own certificate and the agent's pin does not follow: from that day the agent cannot control or back up a guest (5 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the End-dates list, class T2, `documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md` DB02-3 to DB02-7). MEASURED: the agent trusts one exact Proxmox certificate (a pin), and the certificate on the three test boxes ends about two years after install — the N100's about 2028-07-16, then demo-hp and Tester 1 within three months. Proxmox makes a new certificate by itself about 14 days before the old one ends (so about 2028-07-02 on the N100). No code path gives the agent the new fingerprint, no alarm names the cause, no runbook holds the hand step, and nobody has tried it. Every box installed in the same season fails in the same fortnight. P3 only because the first date is in 2028; it is certain, not a risk. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes (`09` §3 decision 297). Not built.** **2026-11-11 (afternoon): tried on demo-hp (`documentation/audits/certpin-spike-2026-11-11/README.md`).** A forced new certificate (`pvecm updatecerts --force`, then a reload of the web service; Proxmox's own renewal does that reload by itself) blinds the agent at once: `TLS pin mismatch`, no reconcile, no host report to the hub, 502 to the controller; guests and apps stay up. One operator mail names a symptom (`agent_channel_unknown`), none names the cause; the hub's Hosts page still read ONLINE eleven minutes after the last report (when it turns offline was not measured). The hand repair works and is written down (`documentation/runbooks/RUNBOOK-agent-proxmox-pin-repair.md`, 2.1 s from restart to a working call). **A CA file in place of the fingerprint works with no agent code:** with `proxmox.tls.ca_file` on a readable copy of the box's root CA and the fingerprint empty, the agent went through a second new certificate with no hand step; a wrong CA file was refused. Two facts for the fix: the agent's user cannot read Proxmox's certificate files, and a set fingerprint wins over the CA file. The design with both ways is `03-host-agent.md` §12a; CC's pick differs from the ruled shape, so it is decision D80. | READY — **2026-11-14 night, after an independent review (agent `ec7e699`, `54ac2c2`):** one lock for every writer of `agent.json`; the trust run is serialised and ends after 90 s; the root step keeps the previous root only during a changeover and compares exactly. **One low item stays open:** the move writes `agent.json` in place and nothing restores `agent.json.pre-pve-trust` by itself after a cut write (`03` §12a says so) — to weigh at the box proof. Earlier: READY — **2026-11-14 night: BUILT, not released** (felhom-agent `386a0c4` + `a9ab47e`; the installer on felhom.eu `main`, not tagged). The root step keeps the copy; the agent moves a pinned box in the order copy → proof → config, clears the fingerprint last, and a pinned box whose certificate changed heals at the first failed call; the installer gives a new box the copy and no fingerprint; the cause of a trust failure is named. `03` §12a is `[FACT — built, not released]`. **LEFT: the proof on a box** (demo-hp, a forced new certificate, twice; then the release with both signed jobs and the installer tag). What the hub does not tell yet: R-1396. Earlier: READY — **2026-11-14 09:55 — RULED (D80, `09` §3 decision 303): the root CA copy.** Built in release 2 (the host release). OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (end-dates list) | — | the operator rules D80 (CA file, or follow the fingerprint); then the design's open parts in `03-host-agent.md` §12a (the root step that refreshes the copy; an alarm that names the cause), then build, then prove on a scratch host with a forced renewal | CC |
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| **R-1382** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A box that was off past an end date: nobody knows if it comes back by itself (5 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the End-dates list, class T4, `documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; read in source and documents, never tried). After months without power: the web certificate has ended (DB01-6: does Traefik renew at the first start, and what does the household see until then), Debian's package keys may be too old to verify an update (DB16-6), the tunnel client may be below what Cloudflare accepts (DB19-6), a 30-day restore copy is past its date (DB24-6), and the 14-day countdown after a stopped off-site copy ran out while the box was off (DB04-6). Tester 2 has been off since 2026-10-04 and is the natural test. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (end-dates list) | — | When Tester 2 comes back (or with a scratch host and a moved clock on Tier 0, as a task): record what renews by itself and what needs a hand; put the hand steps in a runbook. | CC |
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| **R-1384** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A verdict or an „already ran” check trusts a clock that can be wrong (30 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the Clock list, class W2, `documentation/audits/clock-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`). MEASURED: the N100's host is 32.6 s behind and its time service does not run (R-1301); the other two boxes are in step. Nothing checks a box's clock except one hub alarm for a tunnel handshake stamped in the future. The hub takes the box's own time for backup age, off-site age and proof age (CH02-6, CH07-6, CH07-8, CH08-6); a box with a wrong clock refuses every signed job (CA09-6); a stamp from the future blocks the OS-update leg, the trim and the line test until the clock passes it (CA02-6, CA02-8, CA11-6, CA11-8, CA12-6); the crash guard reads the clock at early boot (CA04-6, CA04-8); a hub clock jump moves its own daily jobs (CH03-6, CH04-6, CH06-6, CH09-6, CH16-6, CH18-6, CH20-6, CH24-6). The others: CA05-6, CA05-8, CA06-6, CA07-6, CA10-6, CA20-6, CC04-6, CC05-6, CC14-6, CC18-6. Known parts stay in their rows: R-1189, R-1206, R-1260. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes (`09` §3 decision 300). Not built.** **2026-11-11 (afternoon): why the N100's clock is wrong is known (R-1301, `documentation/audits/n100-clock-2026-11-11/README.md`).** Numbers from source: a host clock more than 120 s behind refuses every signed job (`felhom-agent/internal/authz/verifier.go:21`, `:153-162`); at about 1.25 s a day the N100 gets there in about 70 days (mid-January 2027, an estimate from one measurement). | NARROWED — the hub's check is built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the agent stamps its clock at the moment of sending (`sent_at`) and the hub alarms the operator when it is more than one minute from the hub's clock, in either direction, and says so when it is back (`08-alarm-ladder.md`, `box_clock_wrong`). A report that waited on the box raises nothing (tested). Not released, not seen on a box. LEFT after the release: the 30 answers themselves still trust the clock; the alarm only makes a wrong clock known. OPEN — **2026-11-14: the one box whose clock was wrong (the N100, 32.6 s) is right again (R-1301 closed); this row's check is still not built.** Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (clock list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): the hub compares the time in each report with its own, alarms the operator above one minute, and does not take a time from the future as „fresh”. | CC |
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| **R-1384** | Box system & updates | P3 | **A verdict or an „already ran” check trusts a clock that can be wrong (30 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the Clock list, class W2, `documentation/audits/clock-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`). MEASURED: the N100's host is 32.6 s behind and its time service does not run (R-1301); the other two boxes are in step. Nothing checks a box's clock except one hub alarm for a tunnel handshake stamped in the future. The hub takes the box's own time for backup age, off-site age and proof age (CH02-6, CH07-6, CH07-8, CH08-6); a box with a wrong clock refuses every signed job (CA09-6); a stamp from the future blocks the OS-update leg, the trim and the line test until the clock passes it (CA02-6, CA02-8, CA11-6, CA11-8, CA12-6); the crash guard reads the clock at early boot (CA04-6, CA04-8); a hub clock jump moves its own daily jobs (CH03-6, CH04-6, CH06-6, CH09-6, CH16-6, CH18-6, CH20-6, CH24-6). The others: CA05-6, CA05-8, CA06-6, CA07-6, CA10-6, CA20-6, CC04-6, CC05-6, CC14-6, CC18-6. Known parts stay in their rows: R-1189, R-1206, R-1260. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes (`09` §3 decision 300). Not built.** **2026-11-11 (afternoon): why the N100's clock is wrong is known (R-1301, `documentation/audits/n100-clock-2026-11-11/README.md`).** Numbers from source: a host clock more than 120 s behind refuses every signed job (`felhom-agent/internal/authz/verifier.go:21`, `:153-162`); at about 1.25 s a day the N100 gets there in about 70 days (mid-January 2027, an estimate from one measurement). | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: LIVE and seen on a box** (hub 0.182.0, agent 0.175.1). Tester 1's clock was set 150 s back twice: the hub said „150 s behind”, one mail went to the operator only, a second alarm inside the hour sent no second mail, and the hub said „in step again” after the clock was put right (`audits/release-2b-3-2026-11-15/` `part2/`, `part3/`). LEFT, as before: the 30 answers themselves still trust the clock. Earlier: NARROWED — the hub's check is built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the agent stamps its clock at the moment of sending (`sent_at`) and the hub alarms the operator when it is more than one minute from the hub's clock, in either direction, and says so when it is back (`08-alarm-ladder.md`, `box_clock_wrong`). A report that waited on the box raises nothing (tested). Not released, not seen on a box. LEFT after the release: the 30 answers themselves still trust the clock; the alarm only makes a wrong clock known. OPEN — **2026-11-14: the one box whose clock was wrong (the N100, 32.6 s) is right again (R-1301 closed); this row's check is still not built.** Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (clock list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): the hub compares the time in each report with its own, alarms the operator above one minute, and does not take a time from the future as „fresh”. | CC |
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| **R-1004** | Box system & updates | P4 | **After an unclean stop every guest ext4 volume waits ~43 s in multi-mount protection before it mounts, so each restart after a power cut takes ~1.5 min longer.** Kernel: „EXT4-fs warning (device dm-6): ext4_multi_mount_protect: MMP interval 42 higher than expected, please wait" on dm-6/dm-7 and loop0/loop1, demo-hp and Tester 1, every round of `audits/night-power-2026-10-13/` (R1 `repairs.txt`). | **READY** — filed 2026-10-14 | — | CC: find where MMP is switched on for the guest volumes (Proxmox `pct` create, or our own mkfs), whether it protects anything on a one-host disk, and measure the restart without it on a scratch guest | CC |
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| **R-1013** | Box system & updates | P4 | **After a power cut the agent's start-up stale-lock pass logs an ERROR „pct unlock failed … no lock found" when Proxmox's own start-all removed the lock in the same second.** The outcome is the goal (no lock), so the line is a false alarm in the log. Seen on demo-hp 2026-10-14 12:07:44–45 UTC (`audits/power-cut-fixes-2026-10-14/E/after-boot.txt`; Proxmox: „removed left over backup lock from '9201'!"). Small, but the agent's release for this session is spent (v0.156.1). | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-14 | — | CC: treat „no lock found" from `pct unlock` as already clear (INFO), with a test; ride the next agent release | CC |
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| **R-1061** | Box system & updates | P4 | **A per-customer floor reached Tester 1 only at its next 15-minute report, not in seconds.** Set 2026-10-15 12:55:51 UTC for tester-1, demo-hp and demo-felhom together (hub 0.153.0, CC's token): demo-hp and demo-felhom ran 0.314.0 within 13 s (the hub's wake); Tester 1 moved at 13:09:35, its regular report (`audits/gate-restore-2026-10-15/release/03-boxes-move.txt`). It had restarted at 12:54:29 onto rc.1 and logged „hub wait channel active". Why the wake did not reach it is not read (the wake line is DEBUG). No harm: the floor arrived. | **OPEN** — filed 2026-10-15 | — | Read Tester 1's DEBUG ring at the next floor change; compare with the hub's bump log | CC |
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| **R-1285** | Box system & updates | P4 | **D43's removal of our SSH drop-in from a BYO host happens one bundle LATE: the bundle run that delivers agent 0.165.0 is planned by the box's OLD (0.164.0) wrapper, which writes the drop-in as before („same"), and only then replaces itself.** Measured 2026-10-25 on the BYO test host (VM 9371 on demo-hp, `Tester4-f967d4`; attended release run): 0.164.0 day-0 → signed `agent_update` + `agent_config_update` 0.165.0 → the planted drop-in still there; a second `agent_config_update` (same bundle) → `BUNDLE REMOVED … (ours, on a BYO host — D43)`, nothing written, `sshd -T` the owner's own `permitrootlogin yes` (`audits/release-2026-10-26/byo/byo-proof.txt`). No box is affected today (the fleet's only BYO host is this test host); a fresh BYO install on ≥ 0.165.0 runs the new wrapper from the start. | **VERIFY** — 2026-10-27: agent v0.167.0 RELEASED; in the NORMAL signed delivery the pass now runs right after the commit on all three boxes („running the bundle policy pass after the self-update commit (R-1285)” → `BUNDLE POLICY DONE install_mode=appliance removed=0`; `audits/release-2026-10-27/agent-0167-tester1-demofelhom.txt`). Not live: a BYO box coming FROM 0.164.0 (none in the fleet). **Earlier:** **VERIFY** — 2026-10-26: agent `b1bc63d` (unreleased) — the new agent runs the bundle-policy pass once right after its self-update commits (`selfupdate.SetOnCommitted`); test in the real order (commit, then one pass), red-proved. **Not live:** only a box coming FROM 0.164.0 discriminates (0.165.0's wrapper already applies D43), which needs a signed downgrade chain on a BYO box — the live proof rides the next agent release. **Earlier:** **OPEN** — 2026-10-26 (agent 0.166.0 released, attended run): the policy pass is wired, but in the normal delivery it does NOT run: the box gets `agent_update` and `agent_config_update` in ONE pass, and the bundle job runs in the OLD process (demo-hp: pid 1966780, agent 0.165.0, bundle 09:03:07–09:03:09 CET; the restart into 0.166.0 at 09:03:10) — no `bundle policy pass` line on any of the three boxes. So a BYO host coming from 0.164.0 still loses our drop-in one release late. The night proof (`audits/night-2026-10-25/rig/r1285-live.txt`) ran a bundle under an agent that was ALREADY 0.166.0-code, so it did not cover this order. No BYO host is in the fleet today. Fix options: the agent runs the pass once at start-up after `update committed`; or the release procedure sends the bundle job only after the commit. **Earlier state:** **VERIFY** — fixed on main 2026-10-25 night (agent `abcc1e6`), waits for the agent release + the vouch: the agent runs the wrapper's `bundle-policy` pass after every install (red-proved, `redproof-r1285.txt`). **Live on the rig in ONE signed run** (BYO host, staged as upgraded from 0.164.0: the new agent by hand, the old 0.164.0 wrapper on disk, our drop-in planted; one `agent_config_update` of a test bundle): the old wrapper installed the bundle and replaced itself, then „BUNDLE POLICY REMOVED … (ours, on a BYO host)", `sshd -T` the owner's own `permitrootlogin yes` (`rig/r1285-live.txt`); the test package deleted from the registry after. **Earlier state:** OPEN | — | either the wrapper plans again after it replaced itself (one agent change + a test that a 0.164.0→0.165.0 bundle on a BYO record removes our copy in ONE run, red first), or the release procedure sends a BYO box's config bundle twice; until then a BYO box upgraded from ≤ 0.164.0 keeps our drop-in until its next bundle | CC |
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| **R-1395** | Box system & updates | P4 | **A step of the host's clock makes the controller read a new boot: it then recreates every drive-backed app, once.** Found 2026-11-14 on the N100 (`audits/release-2a-2026-11-14/D/13b-n100-container-near-the-step.txt`): the time service came back and stepped the clock by +32.7 s; 9 seconds later the controller logged „[gate] boot 1794112550-…: recreating drive-backed app” for radarr, sonarr and qbittorrent (each down for 1 to 5 s; all healthy after). Cause, read on the box: the controller's boot identity carries `/proc/stat` `btime`, and the kernel computes `btime` from the wall clock, so it moved by the same 32 s (the crash guard's `last_boot_at` reads 04:35:18Z, `btime` now 04:35:50Z). The crash guard was NOT fooled: it reads the kernel's `boot_id`. A step this large needs a clock that was wrong for weeks, so a healthy box does not meet it; a fresh box with a wrong hardware clock can, at its first time sync. | NARROWED — built in the agent and the controller, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the boot token is the AGENT's (`guest_boot_id` in its `/disks` answer), not the controller's; the controller only compares it. The agent now also sends `guest_boot_key` (the kernel's `boot_id` in place of the boot time) and the controller's boot pass prefers it; the move to the key recreates nothing; an older agent or controller behaves as before. Tests with a moved boot time on both sides (`audits/night-build-2026-11-14/C/`). Needs BOTH releases to take effect. Not proven on a box (a clock step cannot be staged without changing a box). OPEN — filed 2026-11-14 | — | make the controller's boot identity the kernel's `boot_id` (as the crash guard's is), with a test that a moved `btime` is not a new boot | CC |
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## Monitoring & notifications — 29 rows (P2 3, P3 18, P4 8)
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@@ -331,9 +328,10 @@ stopping line that lies.
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| **R-1363** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A household's mail ends with raw JSON: `Megjegyzés: {"avail_gb":5.192043304443359,"band":"warning",...}`.** Seen in the walks of 2026-11-02 (`audits/security-2026-11-02/part5/mail-fill-household.txt`, `mail-crash-household.txt`). `api/handler.go` adds the details as the „Megjegyzés" line; a golden pins it (`mail_golden_test.go`), so it was once wanted. The sentence itself is right and Hungarian. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-03 | — | drop the line from a household's mail, or render known fields in words; the operator's mail keeps it | CC |
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| **R-1365** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A security-watch source that stays down mails once and never again; after that only one line of the Monday summary says so.** An open advisory reminds every 7 days, a failed source does not (`08` §11 [DESIGN], „once per streak"). The cost was seen 2026-10-28 → 11-02: one mail, then a week of silence. With the seven pins that can never be read now a stated GAP (R-1334), a streak means a real outage. | WAITING-ON-OPERATOR — D66 | D66 | on yes: `plan()` mails a streak again every 7 days, with a test seen failing; `08` §11's line changes | operator (decision), CC (build) |
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| **R-1371** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **Seven places have no space alarm, and the host-disk alarm that does exist goes to the household.** Found 2026-11-10 (the space list, `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md`, question 6). (1) **The guest root disk has no watcher.** The controller watches `/` and the system data path, but inside its container both are the data volume (measured on all three boxes, `evidence/extra/controller-fs-view.txt`); the 32 GiB guest root disk, which holds `/opt/docker/stacks`, is not a target. Closed row R-521 says it is — true only before the two volumes were merged; capability-map row C13 („warned before a filesystem fills — per filesystem”) does not hold for this one filesystem (the map's status is not changed here). (2) **The same filesystem is two targets**, and warnings are de-duplicated by path, so two warnings for one full disk are expected (read from source, not proved live; the comment at `cmd/controller/main.go:2694-2707` says the opposite). (3) **`host_disk_critical` and `storage_fill_critical` are mailed to the household by default** (`hub/internal/claim/engine.go:229-243`), but only the operator can free a host disk; the seed list was chosen as „critical only” and the question „can this reader act on it” was not asked. No architecture document names the host-disk event (search S4; `08-alarm-ladder.md` names the thin-pool one). (4) Small places with no alarm: EFI partition, temp folders, guest system log, guest package cache. **Members (answers marked N):** H10-6, H15-6, G1-6, G13-6, G15-6, G16-6, G17-6. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (space list) **2026-11-10 12:22 — RULED (D68 = operator only; `09` §3 decision 287):** the household is not mailed about a host disk it cannot free. **2026-11-10 — parts (2) and (3) FIXED IN SOURCE, NOT RELEASED.** (2) felhom-controller `844f19f1`: one fill target per filesystem (`system.FilesystemKey`; the container's `/` is an overlay with its own device number, so the identity is taken from a Docker-kept file — `documentation/audits/space-list-2026-11-10/evidence/extra/fs-identity.txt`); `TestR1371_*`, red seen three times; not proven on a box. (3) hub source, no build: `host_disk_warning` / `host_disk_critical` are operator-only and the critical is not seeded; `storage_fill_*` reaches a household only for `usb`, `local-dir`, `nfs`, `cifs` (`notify.operatorOnlyFor`; `08-alarm-ladder.md`); `TestD68_*`, red seen three times. Parts (1) and (4) stay open: who watches the guest root disk is a design point in `16-storage-physical-identity.md`. **2026-11-10 (afternoon) — two design points added** (`16-storage-physical-identity.md` §14.4): a drive in the backup role reports as `usb` or `local-dir`, so the household gets the `storage_fill` mail for a drive it must not clean by hand; the hub's first list for a household still holds `storage_fill_critical` until the box sends its own list (not measured on the running hub). Also noted: the closed row R-521 and `felhom-controller/controller/cmd/controller/r521_f7_rootfs_test.go:29,36` call the watched path „the guest's root filesystem”; it is the container's `/`, an overlay on the data volume. The guest's real root disk is the one part (1) says nobody watches. **2026-11-10 (release run) — parts (2) and (3) RELEASED** (`documentation/audits/release-space-fixes-2026-11-10/`). (2) controller 0.352.0, global floor 15:31 UTC: on scratch guest 9202 one fill sent TWO warnings on the version before and ONE on the new one (so the double warning is now seen on a box, not only read from source); Tester 1, demo-hp and demo-felhom each check 2 filesystems where they checked 3. (3) hub 0.180.0 live since 15:12 UTC, Synced/Healthy; proof = the `TestD68_*` tests and the deployed commit. **Not proven on the running hub:** that a household which saved its own alarm list before no longer gets the host-disk type — the pages that show a household's list refuse a token (by design, `05` §17) and no test alarm was made (`16` §14.4). **Still open:** (1) the guest root disk has no watcher (design point); (4) the small places; a real fill on a household's box. | — | Controller: add the guest root disk as a fill-watch target, de-duplicate targets by filesystem, correct the comment; red-proof with two paths on one filesystem. Hub: after the pick, route the two host-disk events. Docs: name the host-disk alarm and its reader in `08-alarm-ladder.md`. | CC |
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| **R-1379** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **An end date exists and nobody is warned before it (18 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the End-dates list, class T1, `documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; dates measured read-only on three boxes and from public certificates). No alarm fires before any of these ends: the box's web certificate (DB01-5, DB01-7: Traefik renews by itself; a renewal that fails is silent until the day), the hub address certificate (DH20-5), the operator tokens with a 90-day life (DH22-5), a node's Tailscale key (DH30-5), Debian's package keys (DB16-5), the 30-day restore copy (DB24-5), the end of OS security support (DB17-5), app and tunnel-client images (DB18-5, DB19-5), the local-API certificate (DB03-5), and the outside accounts: mail key, domains, Cloudflare, Hetzner, GitHub and Gitea tokens (DH23-5, DH24-5, DH27-5, DH28-5, DH29-5, DH31-5, DH32-5). Decision D77 in `STATUS.md` asks if the product warns 14 days before. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes, D77 (`09` §3 decision 298). Not built.** | NARROWED — the two ruled warnings are built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the hub warns the operator 14 days before an operator token ends and 14 days before a box's web certificate ends (the box reads the date from its own store and sends it in its report) — `08-alarm-ladder.md` §12.1. The other sixteen are a design table there (§12.2): one is small and waits for a yes (the hub's own five public names), one is a design question (a household's Cloudflare token), the rest stay the operator's list. Not seen on a box or a deployed hub. OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (end-dates list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): the box reads its web certificate's date, the hub reads its tokens' dates, one operator alarm 14 days before. The outside accounts stay a list the operator reads (`documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/README.md`). | CC |
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| **R-1383** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A job on a timer does not run, gives up, or loses its state at a restart, and nobody is told (23 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the Clock list, class W1, `documentation/audits/clock-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; read in source, times measured read-only on three boxes). The four worst: the guest-power watchdog gives up with one journal line (CA07-7, CA07-8); a signed job that is refused or runs out stays silent, so an agent update never arrives (CA09-4, CA09-7); the hub's daily checks are skipped with no trace when the hub is down at their minute (CH02-4, CH02-8, CH11-4, CH16-4); an operator mail waiting for a retry is lost at a hub restart, and a household mail is never retried (CH04-4, CH04-7, CH04-8, CH03-7). The others: CA13-7, CC07-7, CC12-4, CC19-7, CC20-4, CH07-4, CH09-4, CH14-4, CH26-7, CH27-4, CH27-8. Beside R-1361 (a lost event) and R-1186 (the silent off-site skip); not the same gaps. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes (`09` §3 decision 299). Not built.** | NARROWED — **2026-11-14 (night build, second part):** the two things release 2a did not tell are built, not released: the System page has a cell for the kernel clean-up (removed, kept, space gained) and one for the security-profile refresh (the kernel, how many profiles changed, any failed service it restarted) — `11` §5.11.1, §5.12. On the way a display defect was fixed: a clean-up hid a kernel that fell back the night before in the „Kernel step” cell. NARROWED — the four worst cases are built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the operator is told when a hub daily check's slot passed while the hub was down, when an operator mail was never sent, when a box did not take a signed job in two hours, when a box refused a signed job (with the cause), and when the guest-power watchdog gave up (`05` §16.6, `08-alarm-ladder.md`). Tests only; not deployed, not seen on a box. LEFT: the other 15 answers of the class; a household mail is still never retried (R-1361); the kernel clean-up and profile-refresh detail (next part of release 3). OPEN — **2026-11-14 (release 2a), two more things the hub does not tell:** (1) a kernel clean-up that removed kernels shows only as „cleaned <time ago>” in the System page's „Kernel step” cell — what was removed, kept and gained is stored and shown nowhere; (2) the security-profile refresh sends nothing to the hub at all, also when it restarted a failed service (it did on the N100). Both for release 3. Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (clock list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): one hub alarm for the four worst cases (agent: watchdog give-up and refused job as events; hub: a start-up check „did my daily jobs run”, and the mail retry kept across a restart). | CC |
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| **R-1396** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **The agent now names WHY its trust in Proxmox is wrong, and the hub does not tell the operator yet.** Found 2026-11-14 night (release 2b, built). The agent's host report carries a `proxmox_trust` stanza (`mode`, `problem`, `detail`, the CA copy's end date; `03-host-agent.md` §12a). Two gaps: (1) the hub does not read the stanza — a box whose CA copy does not verify, ends within 30 days, or whose move failed is said only in the box's journal; (2) a box that is fully blind (neither the pinned certificate nor the CA copy works) sends NO host report, because the report starts with a call to Proxmox — that case reaches the operator only as „host stale” after 45 minutes, with no cause. With release 2b a pinned box heals itself at the first failed call, so (2) needs both ways to fail at once. | NARROWED — **2026-11-14 night: gap (1) is BUILT, not deployed** — the hub reads `proxmox_trust` and raises one operator-only `proxmox_trust_problem` per (box, cause), and `proxmox_trust_ok` at the recovery (hub `main` after v0.181.0; the wire-contract gate asked for the receiver in the same push as the sender). **LEFT: gap (2), the fully blind box.** Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-14 | — | hub: an operator-only event from `proxmox_trust.problem` (raise once per cause, clear when it is empty), and the mode on the System page; agent: send a report without the Proxmox part when the failure is one of trust (a design choice: what the hub does with a report that has no guests) | CC |
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| **R-1379** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **An end date exists and nobody is warned before it (18 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the End-dates list, class T1, `documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; dates measured read-only on three boxes and from public certificates). No alarm fires before any of these ends: the box's web certificate (DB01-5, DB01-7: Traefik renews by itself; a renewal that fails is silent until the day), the hub address certificate (DH20-5), the operator tokens with a 90-day life (DH22-5), a node's Tailscale key (DH30-5), Debian's package keys (DB16-5), the 30-day restore copy (DB24-5), the end of OS security support (DB17-5), app and tunnel-client images (DB18-5, DB19-5), the local-API certificate (DB03-5), and the outside accounts: mail key, domains, Cloudflare, Hetzner, GitHub and Gitea tokens (DH23-5, DH24-5, DH27-5, DH28-5, DH29-5, DH31-5, DH32-5). Decision D77 in `STATUS.md` asks if the product warns 14 days before. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes, D77 (`09` §3 decision 298). Not built.** | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: the two warnings are LIVE** (hub 0.182.0, controller 0.353.0). The three test boxes' reports carry their web certificate's end date and issuer (read from a copy of the live database: 2026-12-31, 2027-01-02, 2027-01-19); the hub's end-date check set its baseline at the start. **Not seen:** no real certificate or token 14 days from its end, so no warning was seen. The other sixteen stay a design table; D85 is not ruled. Earlier: NARROWED — the two ruled warnings are built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the hub warns the operator 14 days before an operator token ends and 14 days before a box's web certificate ends (the box reads the date from its own store and sends it in its report) — `08-alarm-ladder.md` §12.1. The other sixteen are a design table there (§12.2): one is small and waits for a yes (the hub's own five public names), one is a design question (a household's Cloudflare token), the rest stay the operator's list. Not seen on a box or a deployed hub. OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (end-dates list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): the box reads its web certificate's date, the hub reads its tokens' dates, one operator alarm 14 days before. The outside accounts stay a list the operator reads (`documentation/audits/end-dates-list-2026-11-11/README.md`). | CC |
|
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| **R-1383** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **A job on a timer does not run, gives up, or loses its state at a restart, and nobody is told (23 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the Clock list, class W1, `documentation/audits/clock-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; read in source, times measured read-only on three boxes). The four worst: the guest-power watchdog gives up with one journal line (CA07-7, CA07-8); a signed job that is refused or runs out stays silent, so an agent update never arrives (CA09-4, CA09-7); the hub's daily checks are skipped with no trace when the hub is down at their minute (CH02-4, CH02-8, CH11-4, CH16-4); an operator mail waiting for a retry is lost at a hub restart, and a household mail is never retried (CH04-4, CH04-7, CH04-8, CH03-7). The others: CA13-7, CC07-7, CC12-4, CC19-7, CC20-4, CH07-4, CH09-4, CH14-4, CH26-7, CH27-4, CH27-8. Beside R-1361 (a lost event) and R-1186 (the silent off-site skip); not the same gaps. **Ruled 2026-11-11 13:17: yes (`09` §3 decision 299). Not built.** | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: LIVE** (hub 0.182.0, agent 0.175.1 vouched). Seen on the running hub: the daily-check ledger has its first records, the lost-mail scan ran at the start („none”), the „Security profiles” cell is filled for the three test boxes, the „Kernel clean-up” cell shows the N100's night. **Tests only, not seen on a box:** a refused signed job told, a guest-power give-up told, a lost operator mail told, a skipped daily check told. Earlier: NARROWED — **2026-11-14 (night build, second part):** the two things release 2a did not tell are built, not released: the System page has a cell for the kernel clean-up (removed, kept, space gained) and one for the security-profile refresh (the kernel, how many profiles changed, any failed service it restarted) — `11` §5.11.1, §5.12. On the way a display defect was fixed: a clean-up hid a kernel that fell back the night before in the „Kernel step” cell. NARROWED — the four worst cases are built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the operator is told when a hub daily check's slot passed while the hub was down, when an operator mail was never sent, when a box did not take a signed job in two hours, when a box refused a signed job (with the cause), and when the guest-power watchdog gave up (`05` §16.6, `08-alarm-ladder.md`). Tests only; not deployed, not seen on a box. LEFT: the other 15 answers of the class; a household mail is still never retried (R-1361); the kernel clean-up and profile-refresh detail (next part of release 3). OPEN — **2026-11-14 (release 2a), two more things the hub does not tell:** (1) a kernel clean-up that removed kernels shows only as „cleaned <time ago>” in the System page's „Kernel step” cell — what was removed, kept and gained is stored and shown nowhere; (2) the security-profile refresh sends nothing to the hub at all, also when it restarted a failed service (it did on the N100). Both for release 3. Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (clock list) | — | Fix shape (ruled, not built): one hub alarm for the four worst cases (agent: watchdog give-up and refused job as events; hub: a start-up check „did my daily jobs run”, and the mail retry kept across a restart). | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1396** | Monitoring & notifications | P3 | **The agent now names WHY its trust in Proxmox is wrong, and the hub does not tell the operator yet.** Found 2026-11-14 night (release 2b, built). The agent's host report carries a `proxmox_trust` stanza (`mode`, `problem`, `detail`, the CA copy's end date; `03-host-agent.md` §12a). Two gaps: (1) the hub does not read the stanza — a box whose CA copy does not verify, ends within 30 days, or whose move failed is said only in the box's journal; (2) a box that is fully blind (neither the pinned certificate nor the CA copy works) sends NO host report, because the report starts with a call to Proxmox — that case reaches the operator only as „host stale” after 45 minutes, with no cause. With release 2b a pinned box heals itself at the first failed call, so (2) needs both ways to fail at once. | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: gap (1) is LIVE and was seen from a real event** (hub 0.182.0): Tester 1 reported `ca_copy_unavailable` for the minutes between its agent update and its root-files update; the hub mailed the operator only, named the cause, and said „no problem any more” at the next report. That alarm was FALSE (the pin worked) and agent 0.175.1 no longer raises it. **LEFT: gap (2), the fully blind box** — a box whose trust does not work sends no report, so a staged wrong CA copy can raise no alarm (it also repairs itself at the agent's start, seen on demo-hp). Earlier: NARROWED — **2026-11-14 night: gap (1) is BUILT, not deployed** — the hub reads `proxmox_trust` and raises one operator-only `proxmox_trust_problem` per (box, cause), and `proxmox_trust_ok` at the recovery (hub `main` after v0.181.0; the wire-contract gate asked for the receiver in the same push as the sender). **LEFT: gap (2), the fully blind box.** Earlier: OPEN — filed 2026-11-14 | — | hub: an operator-only event from `proxmox_trust.problem` (raise once per cause, clear when it is empty), and the mode on the System page; agent: send a report without the Proxmox part when the failure is one of trust (a design choice: what the hub does with a report that has no guests) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1397** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **One call of the agent to Proxmox is answered 500 during a fresh install, and the agent logs no ERROR line.** Seen 2026-11-15 on the fresh test box (golden 0.353.0, agent 0.175.1): Proxmox's own access log holds `PUT /api2/json/pools/felhom` → 500 at day-0, between 102 calls answered 200; the install ended „SUCCESS”, the guest is in the pool's box and one app installed; the agent's journal has 0 ERROR lines. Not read: which call it is in the agent, whether it is retried, and whether the same line was there on earlier installs (`documentation/tests/golden-0.353.0-2026-11-15/fresh-install/`). | OPEN — filed 2026-11-15 | — | read the pool call in the agent's day-0 path: is the 500 an expected „already a member” answer, and is it logged | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1377** | Monitoring & notifications | P4 | **Two endings tell nobody outside the page.** Found 2026-11-10 (the endings list, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` endings EC03, EC15; read in source). **Orphan delete** of an app sends the hub a fresh report and no 'app removed' event (`internal/api/router.go:1150-1178`); the normal remove sends one. **Wipe of a drive** sends no event to the hub (`internal/web/storage_handlers.go:911-1000`). Not a member: retiring a drive — the hub does not read that field by ruling (decision 130, closed R-888). **Members (answers marked N):** EC03-6, EC15-6. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (endings list) | — | Controller: send the 'app removed' event from orphan delete; decide in `08-alarm-ladder.md` whether a wipe is an operator event. | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
## Hub & operator — 18 rows (P2 1, P3 5, P4 12)
|
||||
@@ -354,8 +352,8 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| **R-1293** | Hub & operator | P4 | **Once a year the hub's 02:00 database copy never reaches ep0, and the 20:00 copy is pushed twice instead.** Measured 2026-10-26 during R-1183's read (`audits/night-2026-10-25/r1183-measurement-2026-10-26.txt`): on 2026-10-25 (the clocks go back) 02:00–03:00 happens twice. The hub's `nextDailyRun` uses `time.Date`, which picks the SECOND 02:00 (CET, 01:00Z — measured with Go). DooPlex's `felhom-hub-db-backup.timer` fired at the FIRST 02:30 (CEST, 00:31Z) and pushed `hub-20261024T180000Z.db`, 391 min old — under the 7 h limit, so no refusal and no alarm; the 08:30 push took the 08:00 copy. Effect: for one morning a year ep0's newest hub copy is 12 h old, not 6 h; nothing is lost on the hub. The spring night (2027-03-28, 02:00–03:00 does not exist) is not measured. **2026-11-11:** the Clock list leans on this row (`documentation/audits/clock-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md` CH23-6). | OPEN | — | pick one: the push refuses (and says so) a newest snapshot older than the slot it serves, or the hub and the timer agree on one 02:00; then read the 2027-03-28 night (DUE-CHECKS) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1345** | Hub & operator | P4 | **An access token's scopes cannot be changed after it is made — widening or narrowing one means a new token (and a new secret).** The operator, 2026-10-29: to give CC `hosts:read` + `hosts:write` for the live proofs he had to make `CC_HOSTS` (now in `sec`) beside `cc-releases-2`. Wanted: edit a token's scopes in the session (an audit line per change), so a scope can also be taken away after a session without retiring the secret. | OPEN | — | design + build the scope edit (session only), red-first test that an unticked scope is refused at once | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1353** | Hub & operator | P4 | **Statements still over 1 s, named by the new slow-statement line (hub 0.178.0) in its first hour:** a background deadline/restore-test check reading days of full host-report JSON (`GetHostReportsSince`, `store.go`; 1.5–9.2 s cold, from `monitor/deadline.go` and `monitor/restoretest.go` — no page waits on it); the start-up prune of `events` and `app_log_issues` (1.1 s and 1.8 s; no index on `created_at` / `last_seen`); the customer page's newest-report read (`GetCustomer`, 1.3 s cold in the pod probe). With the 1 GiB limit most of this should come from the cache once warm. Evidence: the hub log 2026-10-30 09:22–10:05 UTC; `audits/release-2026-10-30/p2-r1346/`. | OPEN **2026-11-02 read (`audits/security-2026-11-02/part4/hub-slow-lines-2026-11-01-02.txt`; the log covers only the 31 h since DooPlex restarted on 2026-11-01 16:11 CET, the lines from 10-30 are gone with the old pod):** 35 lines, 15 statements. What repeats: `VACUUM INTO` 5× (avg 110 s, the 6-hourly snapshot, expected); `GetHostReportsSince` 9× (avg 7.9 s, max 26.6 s); `GetCustomer`'s newest report 3× (1.1 s). Once, at the cold start: the prune of `events` (10.4 s) and `app_log_issues` (21 s, again 04:30), the OS-release and host lists (2–22 s). No fix before the full week (11-06). **2026-11-10 read (the hub's start after a deploy, `audits/release-space-fixes-2026-11-10/hub/10-watch.txt`):** 11 slow lines in the first 2 minutes of the new pod, the longest 19.1 s (`GetHostReportsSince`), then the OS-report reads (3–4 s) and the two prunes (2.7 s, 4.2 s); none in the 28 minutes after. The 13:02 UTC snapshot's `VACUUM INTO` took 127.8 s. The same statements as the 11-02 read; no new one. | — | read a week of slow-statement lines; index or narrow what still repeats (the history read needs only a few fields, not the whole JSON) | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1375** | Hub & operator | P2 | **The outside part of three endings is done by hand or not at all — the worst: an off-site account can stay at the provider with no record in the hub.** Found 2026-11-10 (the endings list, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` endings EH06, EH01, EA21 and the ending "a tester ends"; read in source and documents; no account was called). (1) **Unticking the off-site tier** of a household takes nothing down and leaves no reminder (`hub/internal/web/configs.go:1737-1743`). A later RESET takes the account down only when the tier is ticked (`hub/internal/web/customer_reset.go:203-245`), so the sub-account and its data stay, are paid for, and the hub holds no record that they exist. (2) **Switching the second off-site tier off** takes nothing down: storage entry, token and copies stay; the source calls the teardown 'a deliberate future op' (agent `internal/pbsdr/manager.go:274`). (3) **A tester ends**: no handler and no runbook; done by hand once (2026-09-25); no list says what to collect. **Members (answers marked N):** EH06-4, EH01-4, EA21-4, and 'a tester ends' in the table's head. Related: R-810 (a household leaves), R-32. | NARROWED — part 1 (D71) is built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the hub keeps the record of an off-site account after the tier is unticked; RESET and delete take the account down when a record exists; an untick alone takes nothing down (pinned by a test); the config form says that the account still exists (`05` §14.1). The runbook „a household or a tester leaves” is written (D74, `runbooks/household-leaves.md`). **For the operator, once, after the release:** at the provider's page read each sub-account's label `felhom-customer=<id>`; for a household whose tier is unticked in the hub, tick it again and save — the account's record comes back. LEFT: part (2) has no fault (the second tier keeps its record, read in source and its test); part (3) is the runbook; a household mail at leaving stays R-810. OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (endings list) **2026-11-10 15:19 — RULED (D71 = yes, D74 = yes; `09` §3 decisions 291, 294).** Not built. | — | Hub (D71): keep the account record after an untick; RESET and delete take the account down, ticked or not. Docs (D74): the runbook 'a household or a tester leaves', from the five code doors, in a later documents-only session. Parts (2) and (3) of this row have no ruling of their own. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1376** | Hub & operator | P3 | **Records of a thing that is gone stay in six places.** Found 2026-11-10 (the endings list, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` endings EH00, EH02, EH21, EA00, EA11, EA27; read in source, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/evidence/hub-delete-statements.txt`; no hub database was read). (1) **Hub:** thirteen tables have no delete statement anywhere. Deleting a box leaves its update settings, its update reports and its kernel notices; deleting a household leaves its off-site key rows, off-site window rows and abandon requests. Most are small; the update reports of each box grow with time. (2) **Host uninstall** leaves the mount units and host mounts of household drives (said when R-179 closed; no open row carried it). (3) **A drive wiped by a signed job** keeps a record and a mount unit that name the old filesystem (agent `internal/signedjobs/wipe.go:61-110`). (4) **The token of a destroyed guest** stays valid until a new guest takes its number: the token store has no remove (agent `internal/localapi/tokenstore.go:127-210`). **Members (answers marked N):** EH00-4, EH02-4, EH21-4, EA00-4, EA11-4, EA27-4. | NARROWED — part 1 (the hub, D73) is built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** deleting a box removes its update settings, update reports, kernel notices and the hub's alarm marks that name it; deleting a household removes its off-site key, window and abandon rows; the operator's action log of a deleted household goes one year after the deletion with the other audit rows (decided by CC unattended — the operator may reverse); the delete journal stays; a daily sweep removes what earlier deletes left (`05` §14.2). The privacy sentence is proposed in the report, not published. LEFT: the agent part (a destroyed guest's token), parts (2) and (3), and an age limit for a LIVE box's update reports (needs a design: the kernel lane reads old reports). OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (endings list) **2026-11-10 15:19 — RULED (D73 = yes, with one exception; `09` §3 decision 293).** Not built. | — | Hub (D73): add the tables with no delete to the two purges and to the daily clean-up; the delete journal (`host_deletions`, `customer_resets`) stays on purpose, and the privacy text says so. Agent: remove a guest's token when the guest is destroyed. Parts (2) and (3) have no ruling of their own. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1375** | Hub & operator | P2 | **The outside part of three endings is done by hand or not at all — the worst: an off-site account can stay at the provider with no record in the hub.** Found 2026-11-10 (the endings list, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` endings EH06, EH01, EA21 and the ending "a tester ends"; read in source and documents; no account was called). (1) **Unticking the off-site tier** of a household takes nothing down and leaves no reminder (`hub/internal/web/configs.go:1737-1743`). A later RESET takes the account down only when the tier is ticked (`hub/internal/web/customer_reset.go:203-245`), so the sub-account and its data stay, are paid for, and the hub holds no record that they exist. (2) **Switching the second off-site tier off** takes nothing down: storage entry, token and copies stay; the source calls the teardown 'a deliberate future op' (agent `internal/pbsdr/manager.go:274`). (3) **A tester ends**: no handler and no runbook; done by hand once (2026-09-25); no list says what to collect. **Members (answers marked N):** EH06-4, EH01-4, EA21-4, and 'a tester ends' in the table's head. Related: R-810 (a household leaves), R-32. | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: part 1 is LIVE** (hub 0.182.0). The record of an off-site account now outlives an untick. **Tests only:** the provider path (no call to the provider was made today; no household was unticked). The operator's one-time label check at the provider is still to do. Earlier: NARROWED — part 1 (D71) is built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** the hub keeps the record of an off-site account after the tier is unticked; RESET and delete take the account down when a record exists; an untick alone takes nothing down (pinned by a test); the config form says that the account still exists (`05` §14.1). The runbook „a household or a tester leaves” is written (D74, `runbooks/household-leaves.md`). **For the operator, once, after the release:** at the provider's page read each sub-account's label `felhom-customer=<id>`; for a household whose tier is unticked in the hub, tick it again and save — the account's record comes back. LEFT: part (2) has no fault (the second tier keeps its record, read in source and its test); part (3) is the runbook; a household mail at leaving stays R-810. OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (endings list) **2026-11-10 15:19 — RULED (D71 = yes, D74 = yes; `09` §3 decisions 291, 294).** Not built. | — | Hub (D71): keep the account record after an untick; RESET and delete take the account down, ticked or not. Docs (D74): the runbook 'a household or a tester leaves', from the five code doors, in a later documents-only session. Parts (2) and (3) of this row have no ruling of their own. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1376** | Hub & operator | P3 | **Records of a thing that is gone stay in six places.** Found 2026-11-10 (the endings list, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/TABLE.md` endings EH00, EH02, EH21, EA00, EA11, EA27; read in source, `documentation/audits/endings-list-2026-11-10/evidence/hub-delete-statements.txt`; no hub database was read). (1) **Hub:** thirteen tables have no delete statement anywhere. Deleting a box leaves its update settings, its update reports and its kernel notices; deleting a household leaves its off-site key rows, off-site window rows and abandon requests. Most are small; the update reports of each box grow with time. (2) **Host uninstall** leaves the mount units and host mounts of household drives (said when R-179 closed; no open row carried it). (3) **A drive wiped by a signed job** keeps a record and a mount unit that name the old filesystem (agent `internal/signedjobs/wipe.go:61-110`). (4) **The token of a destroyed guest** stays valid until a new guest takes its number: the token store has no remove (agent `internal/localapi/tokenstore.go:127-210`). **Members (answers marked N):** EH00-4, EH02-4, EH21-4, EA00-4, EA11-4, EA27-4. | NARROWED — **2026-11-15: part 1 is LIVE** (hub 0.182.0). The first sweep at the start deleted 26 rows (old update reports of 13 boxes deleted earlier), the same count as the preview on a copy; the ids are kept off git. A box delete by the operator at 11:29 ran with the new code. **One thing the sweep does not cover:** the hub's own alarm marks of a box deleted BEFORE the release (4 marks of one such box were read today) — a delete now removes them, the sweep of old ones does not. Small; to add to the sweep. Earlier: NARROWED — part 1 (the hub, D73) is built, not released. **2026-11-14 (night build):** deleting a box removes its update settings, update reports, kernel notices and the hub's alarm marks that name it; deleting a household removes its off-site key, window and abandon rows; the operator's action log of a deleted household goes one year after the deletion with the other audit rows (decided by CC unattended — the operator may reverse); the delete journal stays; a daily sweep removes what earlier deletes left (`05` §14.2). The privacy sentence is proposed in the report, not published. LEFT: the agent part (a destroyed guest's token), parts (2) and (3), and an age limit for a LIVE box's update reports (needs a design: the kernel lane reads old reports). OPEN — filed 2026-11-10 (endings list) **2026-11-10 15:19 — RULED (D73 = yes, with one exception; `09` §3 decision 293).** Not built. | — | Hub (D73): add the tables with no delete to the two purges and to the daily clean-up; the delete journal (`host_deletions`, `customer_resets`) stays on purpose, and the privacy text says so. Agent: remove a guest's token when the guest is destroyed. Parts (2) and (3) have no ruling of their own. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1386** | Hub & operator | P3 | **Timed jobs with no time limit and no measured duration (25 answers).** Found 2026-11-11 (the Clock list, class W4, `documentation/audits/clock-list-2026-11-11/TABLE.md`; read in source; the hub was not measured, by ruling). The hub's 60-second sweep runs its checks one after the other with no limit for each: one slow check delays all the others, the liveness check too (CH19-3, CH19-8, CH01-3, CH08-3, CH08-8, CH10-3, CH13-8, CH18-3, CH06-8, CH02-3); the 07:10 audit has 10 minutes, measured with three boxes only (CH11-3, CH11-8). On the box: the interval jobs have no limit of their own (CC11-3, CC12-3, CC13-3, CC14-3, CC15-3, CC16-3, CC20-3, CA06-3, CA10-3, CA10-8, CA13-8, CA15-3, CA19-3). Every measured duration is from a small test store. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-11 (clock list) | — | Hub: log each sweep step's duration and alarm when one sweep takes longer than its interval; then read a week of numbers and set limits. Box: the same for the controller's interval jobs. | CC |
|
||||
| **R-1393** | Hub & operator | P4 | **For about 8 minutes after a hub restart its database statements take 1 to 32 seconds; the System page took 12.7 s and a box's enrolment 11.4 s.** Measured 2026-11-14 at the 0.181.0 deploy (`audits/release-1-dates-2026-11-14/hub/05-watch.txt`): 24 `slow statement` lines from 09:58 to 10:06 UTC, none in the 20 minutes after. The database file is 678 MB; the slow ones read `host_reports`, `os_reports` and `events` (whole report JSON per row). One 32-second statement ran while CC copied the database out of the pod for a read (CC's own load). No report was lost that CC could see; not measured: whether a box's report timed out in that window. | OPEN — filed 2026-11-14 | — | measure a restart with no copy running; then decide: an index or a shorter keep on `host_reports`/`os_reports`, or accept | CC |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -423,7 +421,6 @@ stopping line that lies.
|
||||
| item | due (UTC) | what to measure |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| R-1293 | 2027-03-29 | the spring clock change: the hub's 02:00 snapshot and the 02:30 push on 2027-03-28 (02:00–03:00 does not exist) — which file each push took; detail in the R-1293 row |
|
||||
| R-1050 | 2026-11-21 | HSTS one year in the next controller release if no https trouble since 2026-10-15; detail in the R-1050 row |
|
||||
| R-1035 | 2026-11-18 | „felhő tárhely” + „saját felhő tárhely” impressions and average position, and the new page's own impressions/clicks/position, 4 weeks after publishing; operator supplies the read; detail in the R-1035 row |
|
||||
| R-528 | 2026-11-28 | no further failed oom_check after the one on 2026-11-11 (demo-felhom), no unexplained app_oom; detail in the R-528 row |
|
||||
| R-1035 | 2026-12-09 | the same three numbers 8 weeks after publishing, compared with the 4-week read; a null at 4 weeks is not a verdict, both reads are needed; detail in the R-1035 row |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ Moved here byte for byte on 2026-10-14 (night session), newest first, so that `S
|
||||
|
||||
**Updated 2026-10-13 (night): demo-hp, demo-felhom and Tester 1 run agent 0.155.0; demo-felhom runs controller 0.310.0, the other two 0.309.0 until the floor is raised. The open-items list is at 127. Reports: `REPORT-poweroff.md`, `REPORT-plugmeter.md`, `REPORT-usenet-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-newapps-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-disk-evening-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-answers-2026-10-12.md`, `REPORT-m3-2026-10-11.md`, `REPORT-redesign-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-testers-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-register-shrink-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-new-apps-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-release-2026-10-10.md`, `REPORT-break-the-circle-2026-10-09.md`, `REPORT-dooplex-survival-2026-10-09.md`, `REPORT-day4-2026-10-09.md`.**
|
||||
|
||||
## Moved from STATUS on 2026-11-15 (midday)
|
||||
|
||||
**Updated 2026-11-15 (morning).** The N100 removed 6 of its 8 old kernels by itself at night and is healthy: 1 of the 2 nights D82 asks for; demo-hp had nothing to remove (0 of 2). Releases 2b and 3 are built and tested in source; nothing is released (`REPORT-night-build-2026-11-14.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Moved from STATUS on 2026-11-15 (morning)
|
||||
|
||||
**Updated 2026-11-14 (afternoon).** Release 2a is out: agent 0.174.0, vouched. A ring-0 box now removes its old kernels at night, and a box reloads its security profiles after a kernel change. The N100 keeps time again; the product repaired it, with no hand step.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user