diff --git a/documentation/tests/walk5-r201-2026-08-07/journal.md b/documentation/tests/walk5-r201-2026-08-07/journal.md index 4cfbea9..63219ec 100644 --- a/documentation/tests/walk5-r201-2026-08-07/journal.md +++ b/documentation/tests/walk5-r201-2026-08-07/journal.md @@ -411,3 +411,297 @@ DR Recipe: present · Key Escrow: present **Phase A gate: PASSED.** All seven records taken; the three sentinels listed **by name**. --- + +## Phase B — the journey (§7) + +**The rule: no command line inside the guest, at any point.** After the destruction the only things +that reach the guest are HTTP requests a browser could have made, issued **from the appliance** (the +only machine with an L2 path to it). **Instrumentation reads are counted separately and named**: the +`w5watch.log` sampler, `pct exec … docker logs`, the restic listing and the hub-DB queries are guest +or operator command lines. **None of them changed state and none was needed to progress the journey** — +that distinction is the whole point, and conflating the two is how a walk claims a property it does +not have. + +### B1 — the destruction (14:19:26Z) + +Guarded **four ways** before anything ran, because `demo-hp` also carries a guest 9201: + +``` +hostname == walk5 ✓ +pct config 9201 → hostname: walk5 ✓ +mountpoint -q /mnt/adatok ✓ +mountpoint -q /mnt/mentes ✓ +``` + +``` +14:19:18Z pct stop 9201 +14:19:26Z pct destroy 9201 --purge + → "Logical volume vm-9201-disk-0 successfully removed" + → "Logical volume vm-9201-disk-1 successfully removed" + → pct list EMPTY · lvs | grep 9201 → NONE +14:19:27Z /mnt/adatok and /mnt/mentes wiped 13M/1.2G → 4.0K each, + MOUNTS LEFT IN PLACE — deliberately: the surviving raw mount IS the R-220 condition +``` + +### B2 — the rebuild (14:24:09Z, 3 m 31 s) + +`felhom-host-install.sh` fetched **live** from `felhom.eu/scripts/` — `v1.25.0`, +sha256 `cb4d02059f126f8bfdddfe98607e87a3cb45dd2592c6b40b43c9659e2b687534`. The retrieval passphrase +was passed as `--passphrase-file` (a `0600` file), never on the command line. + +``` +[OK] Day-0 provision SUCCESS — vmid=9201 host_id=walk5-4bada5 customer=walk5 + golden=local:backup/vzdump-lxc-9100-2026_08_07-16_21_39.tar.zst +[OK] controller: Up 19 seconds (healthy) +[INFO] controller image: gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-controller:0.206.0 +[OK] authz signers: 2 (operator-signed self-update armed) +[INFO] root@pam was rotated + vaulted at step 4b +``` + +**What the rebuild landed on:** + +| | before | after | +|---|---|---| +| agent | 0.127.0 | **0.127.0** — no downgrade, no hand upgrade | +| controller | 0.206.0 | **0.206.0** — same, and it is the vouched build | + +**No hand upgrade, either time.** R-216 part 4's reinstall-downgrade did not recur. + +Guest re-provisioned at **192.168.0.83** (it was .149 before — a fresh DHCP lease, not a fault). + +### B3 — §5's observation window: THE MOMENT THAT MATTERS + +**T0 — 14:24:31Z, 22 seconds after provision, nobody has logged in:** + +``` +offbox directory ABSENT ("No such file or directory") +repository key NONE +settings.offbox null +settings.hub_escrow_identity_present TRUE ← the box already knows a package is held for it +settings.hub_escrow_key_sha256 eabf427c7274…144f ← and already knows WHICH key it seals +settings.claimed null (pristine, unclaimed) +``` + +**The scheduler is alive — the positive control, because an absent line is not evidence.** In the +first five minutes the controller logged `agent-channel-health` ×5 (1 m cadence), `stack-scan` ×2, +`system-health`, `backup-cache` and `offsite-credential-retry`. So "no key was written" is a +measurement, not a silence. + +**The window, minute by minute — nobody logged in at any point during it:** + +| time (UTC) | event | source | +|---|---|---| +| 14:24:09 | Day-0 provision SUCCESS; rebuilt guest, controller **0.206.0** | installer | +| 14:24:31 | **T0** — no offbox dir, no key, `offbox: null`, but `hub_escrow_identity_present` already **true** and the sealed key's hash already learned | box, **measured** | +| 14:24:53 | hub: `offsite_delivery_stuck` (warning) + operator `notification_log` row — **REFUSED**, "regressed-apply shape … a guest rebuild does, R-193" | hub, **measured** | +| 14:23:54 | first post-rebuild report carries **no** `offsite` object — it predates the ACK that set the flag | hub `reports`, **measured** | +| **14:38:49** | **first declaration**: `offsite={"enabled":false,"state":"needs_credential"}` | hub `reports`, **measured** | +| 14:38:53 | the checker **hands off**: *"the box DECLARES offsite.state=needs_credential; internal/offsiteheal owns this remediation"* | hub, **measured** | +| 14:53:49 | second declaration, same shape | hub `reports`, **measured** | +| **14:56:34** | `offsiteheal: re-staged the stored one-time offsite secret … (declared needs_credential across 2 reports) … no provider credential was minted` | hub, **measured** | +| **14:58:52** | **the box collects it and applies the tier — AND REFUSES TO MINT** | box log, **measured** | + +### THE LINE THIS WALK EXISTED TO SEE + +``` +14:58:52 [WARN] [offbox] NOT minting a repository password: the hub holds a sealed recovery package + for this box, and a fresh key would orphan the history that package protects (R-241). + The transport is configured; the tier stays down until the customer's recovery code places + the escrowed key. +14:58:52 [INFO] [offbox] apply-offsite: transport configured for u629488-sub4@…:/home/felhom-repo, + tier HELD awaiting the escrowed key (the hub holds a sealed package; no key was minted — R-241) +14:58:52 [INFO] [offsite-apply] credential retry: the staged credential was collected and the tier applied +``` + +**At the equivalent moment the previous walk minted `9b4a9a9d…` over a package sealing `30ef574f…`, +and lost the journey silently at 03:18 in the morning. This build did not.** + +### §5's four items, answered + +**1. Does the box declare a need, and when is it staged and collected?** **Yes** — declared +`needs_credential` at **14:38:49Z** and **14:53:49Z**, staged by the hub unaided at **14:56:34Z**, +collected and applied at **14:58:52Z**. **Zero human actions**; the whole chain ran on a box that had +not even been claimed. + +**2. Is any repository key written?** **NO.** Sampled every ~20 s from 14:24:52Z onward: +`repo_password_sha=NONE` at every single sample. At 15:00:24Z the directory holds exactly: + +``` +-rw------- applied_marker 64 +-rw-r--r-- known_hosts 290 +-rw------- ssh_key 400 + repo_password: ABSENT +``` + +**The transport is present and the key is not** — which is the guard's designed shape, not a partial +failure: `ApplyOffsiteTarget` deliberately keeps the transport so the recovery screen can bring the +tier up the instant the key arrives (R-219). + +**3. What state does it report instead?** `offbox.enabled = true`, `escrow_state = pending`, +`repo_state` absent — and `OffboxAwaitingRecoveryKey()` is therefore **true** (target exists, target +enabled, no password), so the box declares the new **`awaiting_recovery_key`** holding state rather +than coming up under a fresh key. + +**4. The two fingerprints, before anyone logged in (15:00:24Z):** + +``` +the escrowed key (hub's package, ACK-cached) eabf427c72749fdad355d8cbcadedd8430c8398999b6385cfb1960899167144f +whatever the box holds NONE — there is no repository key on this box +``` + +> **HONEST NOTE ON WHICH SHAPE FIRES, because it changes what has been proven.** With the mint guard +> holding, the box has **no local key at all**, so `OffsiteRecoveryOffer` returns true on **shape (a)** +> — the pristine-rebuild shape — not on shape (c). **Shape (c) was measured in Phase A, in its +> negative half**: equal hashes, correctly silent. So this walk proves the mint guard **positively** +> and the discriminator **negatively**; a positive shape-(c) firing needs a box holding a *different* +> key, which v0.206.0 now prevents from arising by itself. That is the intended end state (the fix +> removes the state its own second half was written to describe), but it should not be reported as +> "shape (c) proven". + +### B4 — the journey, step by step (§7) + +| # | step | result | +|---|---|---| +| 1 | **Destroy** — 14:19:26Z | guest 9201 purged (both LVs), both drives wiped 13M/1.2G → 4.0K. Host identity `walk5-4bada5` survived | +| 2 | **Reinstall** | `felhom-host-install.sh` **v1.25.0** fetched live; **Day-0 provision SUCCESS 14:24:09Z**, 3 m 31 s. **controller 0.206.0, agent 0.127.0 — no hand upgrade, no downgrade** | +| 3 | **§5's window** | **no key minted**; transport configured; `awaiting_recovery_key` — see B3 | +| 4 | **Claim back** | new code requested through the customer-facing „Új kód kérése" path (15:01:27Z), hub rotated to **generation 2** and emailed it; the operator relayed it; **worked FIRST TRY** — 302 in **0.151 s**, accents intact (`á`=`c3a1`, `í`=`c3ad`, sha256 identical source→appliance) | +| 5 | **Log in** | `/` → 302 `/launcher` → 302 **`/recovery`** — **the recovery screen appeared WITHOUT BEING SOUGHT** | +| 6 | **Read the screen** | all three questions answered — quoted below | +| 7 | **Enter R** | **HTTP 200 in 12.44 s** — a real unseal. `[web] recovery: the offsite repository key was recovered and placed (outcome=installed)` | +| 8 | **The listing** | **rendered** — `calibre-web · 2026-08-07 14:57 · 12.8 MB` | +| 9 | **Restore** | **all three sentinels byte-identical** — after two unsignposted obstacles, both cleared from the dashboard | + +### The recovery screen, as a customer reads it (§7.6) + +> **„Adatok visszaszerzése"** +> +> „Ezt a gépet újratelepítették. **A korábbi, házon kívüli mentéseid megvannak** — a Felhom központi +> rendszere őriz hozzájuk egy lezárt csomagot, amelyet **2026-08-07T12:51:02Z** zártunk le. A csomagot +> csak a **te helyreállítási kódoddal** lehet kinyitni. +> +> **A helyreállítási kódot senki nem tudja pótolni** — sem a Felhom, sem az ügyfélszolgálat, sem az +> üzemeltető. Ez szándékos: így a mentéseidet rajtad kívül senki nem tudja megnyitni. Ha a kód +> elveszett, a korábbi mentések nem nyithatók meg többé. +> +> Ha megadod a kódot, **feloldjuk a mentéseid zárolását és megmutatjuk, mi van bennük** — melyik +> alkalmazás, mikorról, mekkora. **Ebben a lépésben semmit nem állítunk vissza és semmi nem változik.**" + +**All three questions answered.** The sealed-at timestamp **`2026-08-07T12:51:02Z` matches the hub's +`host_escrow.created_at` exactly**. The field label reads „Helyreállítási kód (tíz szó)" and R is +indeed ten tokens. + +*(One copy wart, recorded not filed: the sealed-at is rendered as a raw ISO-8601 string on a +customer-facing Hungarian screen, where every other date on the box is formatted `2026-08-07 14:57`.)* + +### The listing, against Phase A's record (§7.8) + +| | Phase A recorded | the screen showed | +|---|---|---| +| app | `calibre-web` | **`calibre-web`** ✅ | +| when | snapshot `5b0f20f7` at 12:57:41Z | **`2026-08-07 14:57`** ✅ (12:57Z rendered in CEST) | +| size | `restic stats` 12.784 MiB | **`12.8 MB`** ✅ | + +*(A second row `felhom-offbox · 12.8 MB` also appears — the snapshot carries both tags and the screen +renders one row per tag. A customer sees an "app" they have never installed, and the same 12.8 MB +counted twice. Cosmetic; filed as R-251.)* + +### THE RTO (§7.7) + +``` +login 15:04:25.417Z +unlock returns 200 15:05:37.156Z +------------------------------------------ +wall clock, login → open store 71.7 s +``` + +**Of which 12.44 s was the unseal itself.** ~22 s of the remainder was **my own harness retry** — I +scraped the CSRF token from a `` tag the recovery page does not carry, got a 403, and re-read it +from the form (the controller logged `CSRF rejected … (token mismatch)` at 15:05:02). **A customer +clicking the button would have seen ≈50 s.** Both numbers are stated because the 71.7 s is what was +actually measured. + +### The restore, and the two obstacles (§7.9) + +`POST /backup/offbox/restore` (mode=full) → **refused**: „nincs elérhető adatmeghajtó a +visszaállításhoz". Then, after that was cleared, `POST /backup/offbox/reconstitute` → **refused**: +„a(z) calibre-web nincs telepítve — előbb állítsd helyre az alkalmazást, utána az adatokat". + +Both were cleared **from the dashboard, with no guest shell**: + +1. **Re-attach the drives** — `GET /api/disks/candidates` offered both surviving disks + (`mountable: true`, `data_bearing: true`), and Tárhely → Meghajtók → „Meglévő meghajtó csatolása" + (`POST /api/storage/attach`) registered them: `/mnt/felhom-drives/adatok` and `…/mentes`. +2. **Redeploy the app** — `POST /api/stacks/calibre-web/deploy`, running in 1 m 30 s. + +Then prepare (12.8 MB) → confirm → reconstitute: + +``` +15:10:18 [offbox] restored calibre-web (5b0f20f7, full=true) → …/backups/offsite-restore/calibre-web +15:14:30 [offbox] reconstituted calibre-web from snapshot 5b0f20f7: 6 file(s) placed, + 0 DB dump(s) replayed, safety dump=., skewed=false +``` + +### THE THREE SENTINELS, read back as BYTES from the live path + +``` +MATCH [A] 11eb7fb2d1891f62a685e3d9a9fda44e0a342d437d4aebaa15fcb4c0fd79d539 61 + name_hex 57414c4b352d53454e54494e454c2d412e747874 +MATCH [B] 6b504d1e83bf4c673334d0b9e701f3e5f07311d954fdc4463a6b0a55b261ae32 66 + name_hex 57414c4b352d c591 72737a656d2d c3a9 6b657a657465732d c3a1 7276 c3ad 7a74 c5b1 72 c591 2e747874 +MATCH [C] 0baaf402733e6a85f3d9ce8c4c3a57b05692f5f6733da6a23da76d2cd7635210 12582912 + name_hex 57414c4b352d53454e54494e454c2d432d31324d422e62696e +all three present: True +``` + +**Identical to Phase A in every byte, including the accented filename.** Read with `os.listdir` on a +**bytes** path, so no decode/encode round trip could launder a `U+FFFD` into looking correct. + +### The end state — the loop closed + +``` +escrow_state escrowed (auto-confirmed: hub hash == local hash) +repo_password sha256 eabf427c7274…144f == the escrowed key, == Phase A's key +GET /launcher 200 (the recovery screen no longer interrupts) +GET /recovery 302 (correctly retired — shape (c) compares equal again) +``` + +--- + +# THE VERDICT — both halves, separately + +## THE DATA: **PASS** + +All three sentinels came back **byte-identical**, out of snapshot `5b0f20f7`, under the key recovered +from the sealed package with R — including the accented filename's **bytes**. Disk → restic → SFTP → +Storage Box → a destroyed machine → a rebuilt machine → disk, intact. + +## THE JOURNEY: **PASS — the first time in five walks** + +**No step needed a command line inside the guest.** Every step that *progressed* the journey — request +a code, claim, log in, read the screen, enter R, read the listing, re-attach the drives, redeploy the +app, prepare, confirm, restore — was an HTTP request a browser makes, issued from the appliance +because DooPlex has no L2 path to that LAN. + +**Guest command lines used, named per §3 so the claim is not read wider than it is:** the `w5watch.log` +sampler, `docker logs`, the settings reads, the restic listing and the final sentinel verification. +**Every one is instrumentation** — none changed state, none was needed to progress, and removing them +all would have changed nothing except my ability to describe what happened. The previous walk needed +**three** guest command lines to progress; this one needed **zero**. + +**The reset-code hatch was used ONCE, in Phase A**, where §3 permits it. It was **not** used in Phase B. + +### But the journey is not smooth, and two obstacles are new + +Neither is a dead end by §3's definition (neither needed a guest shell), and both were cleared from +the dashboard — **but a customer would not know to do either**, because the product does not say so +and, in the second case, says the opposite: + +1. **The restore refuses with „nincs elérhető adatmeghajtó" and nothing on the recovery path mentions + that the drives must be re-attached first.** → **R-252** +2. **„a(z) calibre-web nincs telepítve — előbb állítsd helyre az alkalmazást" — on a page that says, + three lines above, „Nincs telepítve — a visszaállítás előbb újratelepíti."** The product + contradicts itself in the customer's own language, at the last step of a recovery. → **R-253** + +**So: the machinery works end to end and the data is provably safe. The unaided journey now succeeds, +and it succeeds through two obstacles the customer must guess their way past.**