## v1.23.0 — the installer is published, not pushed (2026-08-03, R-110 + R-183)

**Two channels moved off `main` in the same change, because either one left behind makes the other
cosmetic.**

**Channel 1 — the served script.** `manifests/webpage.yaml` git-synced `/scripts/` from
`--branch=main` on a 30 s period and nginx served that working tree, so **pushing this file WAS
publishing it**: within half a minute it was what every new machine downloaded and ran as root, with
no staging and no rollback but another push. The sync is now **split in two**: the website keeps
tracking `main` at the same cadence (a copy edit must never need a release), and `/scripts/` tracks
the tag **`installer-v<SCRIPT_VERSION>`**. Publishing is moving that tag; rolling back is moving it
back.

**PROVEN, not assumed:** git-sync v4.4.0 follows a tag *and* notices a **moved** one — measured on a
throwaway sync against this repo, `update required … local:<old> remote:<new>` → `updated
successfully`, within one period (~20 s). The moved-tag half is what the whole publish model rests
on, so it was measured before the manifest was touched.

**Channel 2 — the sixteen files the installer fetches while it runs.** `fetch_raw` pulled from
`$AGENT_REPO/raw/branch/main`. It now pulls from **`raw/tag/v$ART_AGENT_VER`** — the agent version the
hub has vouched and whose binary sha this script already verifies.

**That is a correctness fix, not only a publish-channel one (→ R-183).** These are the AGENT's
configs — its systemd unit, its sudoers, its guarded wrappers — and a fresh install was fetching the
**vouched binary** while taking its configs from **whatever `main` held**. Two refs, one install, and
nothing compared them. The right ref for them was never this script's `SCRIPT_VERSION`: they do not
live in this repo and have no relationship to its version line.

**No fallback to a branch.** A vouched version whose tag is missing fails loudly rather than quietly
serving `main` — a silent fallback is the appearance of control with none of it. `felhom-agent`
carries `v<version>` tags from now on, `release-agent.sh` creates them, and `agent_gates.py` fails if
the vouched version is not downloadable.

**Channel 3 — the URL — needed no change, and that is worth recording rather than leaving as a
silence.** `https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` never carried a ref: the ref lives in
the manifest. So both producers of that URL (`scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh`, the hub's day-0
command) follow the tag with no edit — **and no hub change, so no hub version bump.**

**Gate 6 in `hostinstall_gates.py`** pins all three structurally, with no network so it stays in
`--fast` and runs in CI on every push: no `raw/branch/` ref anywhere in the installer; `fetch_raw`
still pins to `$ART_AGENT_VER`; the manifest still syncs `/scripts/` from an `installer-v…` tag and
the website still from `main`.

**It deliberately does NOT assert "a tag exists for the current SCRIPT_VERSION".** That gate would go
red on the very push that bumps the version, before publishing — and publishing being a separate
deliberate act is the entire ruling. A gate that fails on the normal path is one people learn to
ignore.

## docs — v1.22.0 exercised end to end on two real reinstalls (2026-08-03, R-178) — **no script change**

**Nothing shipped.** `felhom-host-install.sh` stayed at **v1.22.0**; the published copy at
`https://felhom.eu/scripts/felhom-host-install.sh` was confirmed byte-identical to the repo copy
(`sha256 ed02acb2da46c8d2b5c486ce99d5b9a2747e8786c6eb03652cf755ed1abdd9f4`) before use. Both demo
boxes were uninstalled and reinstalled with it, by **two deliberately different supply paths**:
demo-hp with `--golden <local volid>` (the `:2584` alternative), demo-felhom with
`--force-gitea-golden` (the canonical C.3 customer command). The merge-aware `step_grows` produced
`data +46G (->70G, ONE volume)` and `+226G (->250G)` respectively, and `fetch_verify` was observed
succeeding against the vouched manifest for **both** artifacts on demo-felhom
(`verified sha256 a7763d31b55b5ce7…` agent, `verified sha256 54e2a4c431daf580…` golden).

**Two script-side findings, filed not fixed** (the session was a runbook; §7 forbade code):

- **R-180** — `--archive-storage` is validated for existence (`:1583`) and for golden resolution
  (`:1661`), but never against the ACL storage set it is about to grant (the fixed default
  `local local-lvm felhom-pbs`). Staging the golden on `felhom-backup` therefore passed every
  pre-flight gate and died at **step 8/8**: `HTTP 403: permission denied at /storage/felhom-backup
  (missing privilege Datastore.AllocateSpace)` — *after* step 2 minted the token, step 4b **rotated
  and vaulted root@pam**, and step 5 installed the agent. `ARCHIVE_STORAGE ∈ PVE_STORAGES` is a
  one-line assertion over two variables both known at `:1583`.
- **R-179** — `--uninstall` leaves the NAS network-storage systemd units behind
  (`mnt-felhom\x2ddrives-<share>.{mount,automount}`; automount left `failed`, parent bind left
  mounted). The Part E residue-diff provenance is from **v1.9.1**, which predates the feature — and
  demo-felhom, which never had a share configured, left nothing, which is exactly why a diff on such
  a box reported clean.

Full evidence: root `REPORT.md`.

## host-install: one data volume, derived from the disk (2026-08-03, R-165)

**Forced by a census, not planned.** `felhom-agent` v0.120.0 merges the appliance's two data volumes
into one (decision D-a). `step_grows` computed **two** numbers and the install call passed both, so
this script had to change with the agent or every install would have provisioned a half-sized box.

- **`step_grows` computes ONE total.** The old 80/20 docker-vs-sysdata split is summed: `226` where it
  was `184 + 42`, `106` where it was `84 + 22`, `46` where it was `34 + 12`. **A standard appliance
  keeps exactly the capacity it had — 250 G — it is simply no longer split by a wall.**
- **The size still comes from the physical disk.** `step_grows` already read the thin pool's real free
  space (`lvs /dev/pve/data`); the merge only collapsed its two outputs into one. This is what makes
  the merge safe to ship: an unflagged install does **not** get the golden's 24 G base.
- **`--sysdata-grow` is DEPRECATED but still honoured.** It is no longer auto-computed (set to 0), and
  a hand-passed value still counts because the agent **folds** it into the single volume's grow rather
  than dropping it — so an operator reproducing an old command line gets the same total.

## CI — a Gitea Actions runner, and a red run that reaches a person (2026-08-02, R-168)

**No version bump anywhere: nothing in the product repos is compiled, built or deployed by this.**
Recorded explicitly so the omission reads as a decision rather than a miss.

**What this closes.** Session 1 (same day) gave every repo one gate entry point and a
`.githooks/pre-push` that refuses a failing push. That hook is per-clone and `--no-verify` skips it,
so nothing independent of the person pushing ever saw whether the gates passed. This is the
independent half, and with it **R-29 CLOSES** — on the demonstrated alarm, not on a green run.

**`.gitea/workflows/gates.yml` (new)** — triggers on `push`, `runs-on: felhom-gates`, obtains the
source with a shallow `git fetch` of the **exact pushed SHA** from the in-cluster Gitea Service, and
runs `scripts/repo_gates.py --fast` and nothing else. **No `uses:` step anywhere** — JavaScript
actions need a node runtime the host-mode runner does not have, and probe P3 measured that a plain
`git fetch` is sufficient and lands on the pushed commit. No `|| true`; the entry point's exit code
IS the job's result.

**The alarm, which is the half that matters.** Probe P5 measured that a failed run produces **no
mail, no notification row and no log line** from Gitea. A red tick in a web UI nobody watches is
exactly the defect R-29 filed, rebuilt one layer up — so the workflow sends its own email on failure
via Resend (the hub's existing transactional path) and **prints the provider's accepted id**, making
"a message left the machine" an observable. **Demonstrated, not asserted:** a deliberately broken
commit pushed with `--no-verify` produced run #6 `failure` and
`RESEND-ACCEPTED id=5ff34766-c5f8-4588-8104-08296aeb45ab`.

Two traps found while building it, both worth keeping because each looks like something else:
the runner image has **no `curl`** on purpose (python3 and git only — so the step uses `urllib`
rather than growing the image), and `api.resend.com` sits behind **Cloudflare, which 403s the default
`Python-urllib` User-Agent with error 1010** — a failure that reads exactly like an auth failure and
is not one.

**The standing limit, written into the workflow itself: it REPORTS, it cannot REFUSE.** Every repo
pushes straight to `main` with no pull request, so there is no merge for a status check to stand at.
That is not a gap in the runner; there is no gate in the road. Making it blocking needs branch
protection plus a PR workflow, which changes how the operator works → **R-169**, waiting on them.

**`documentation/audits/SPIKE-ci-runner-2026-08-02.md` (new)** — all six probes, method, measurement
and ruling; none produced a STOP. Also records a near-miss worth more than the probes: a `| tail -5`
inside my own census query silently dropped rows and looked exactly like a baseline drift big enough
to change the task. **An instrument that can drop results silently is not a measurement.**

**`CLAUDE.md`** gains the matching rule from session 1's red-proofing: a `go test -run` pattern that
matches no test prints `ok` and exits 0, so a red-proof using `-run` must first prove the filter
matched something.

**`CONTEXT.md`** gains S-8 (CI detects, does not block, and why that is structural), S-9 (a detector
that tells no one is not finished), S-10 (the runner is unprivileged because DooPlex is Tier 2), and
S-11 (CI reproduces the workspace's sibling layout, because two entry points depend on it).

## Gate enforcement — one entry point per repo, and a pre-push hook (2026-08-02)

**No version bump: `scripts/` carries no version, and this is tooling.** Recorded explicitly so the
omission reads as a decision rather than a miss.

**The census that started it.** Thirteen gate scripts exist across the four felhom repos. A full run
on 2026-08-02 found one clean correlation: **every check a `CLAUDE.md` tells a person to run was
passing, and two of the four nobody is told to run were failing** — `hostinstall_gates.py` since
14 July, and `reuse_refs_check.py` on all four repos. Both failures were harmless in effect, which
was checked line by line; nothing would have said so if they had not been.

**`scripts/repo_gates.py` (new)** — THE entry point for this repo. Runs `site_gates`,
`hostinstall_gates`, `hub_confirm_gate`, `manifest_bearer_gate` and `reuse_refs_check` on this root,
streams each gate's own output, exits worst-wins non-zero, and reports exit 2 distinctly as
INCONCLUSIVE. **A missing gate script is a FAILURE and prints the path tried** — fail-closed, because
a runner that quietly skips a gate is the inert-seam failure this project has shipped four times. It
copies `app-catalog-felhom.eu/scripts/catalog_gates.py` (R-161), **not** `site_gates.py`, which is a
gate and not a runner — copying that would have produced a ninth monolith.

**`scripts/reuse_refs_check.py` — resolution taught, not loosened.** RED on all four repos with 13
findings, of which a hand audit found **zero** genuine drift: twelve were package shorthand whose
file sits a couple of directories deeper, and `wgsync/reconciler.go`, cited by the controller, lives
in the hub. `REUSE.md` cites by package shorthand and across repos on purpose; the tool was wrong.
New order, first hit wins: exact → suffix → ambiguous (real citation, imprecise shorthand — not a
failure) → sibling repo (as-is, or with the sibling's own name stripped off the front) → FAIL.
**Every non-exact hit is printed** and every root prints a per-rule tally, because "0 failures" alone
cannot tell a working checker from a blind one. A failure lists every resolution attempted. Evidence
trees (`audits/`, `documentation/tests/`) are excluded from the suffix index — a copy of a file is
not the file. An absent sibling is never a failure; an unreadable parent says so and continues.
Result: 13/13 resolve, all four roots exit 0.

**`scripts/test_reuse_refs_check.py` (new, 13 tests)** — one per resolution row plus the kill
condition. Red-proof: making `resolve()` return `exact` for an unresolvable token turns four of them
red. **`scripts/test_repo_gates.py` (new, 3 tests)** — a SEAM test asserting each member gate's own
distinctive stdout, never the runner's summary line; red-proofed with an inert `run_gate` that still
prints "all felhom.eu gates OK" and exits 0.

**`.githooks/pre-push` (new)** — runs `repo_gates.py --fast` and refuses the push. Its honest limits
are written into the hook itself: it is **per-clone** (`core.hooksPath` is local config; arm with
`git config core.hooksPath .githooks`, and any manual entry-point run WARNS when a clone is unarmed)
and **`git push --no-verify` bypasses it on purpose** — an escape hatch that cannot be reached is one
that gets removed the first time it is inconvenient; using it must be stated in the session report.
Measured on git 2.47.3: a relative `core.hooksPath` resolves correctly and the hook's cwd is the repo
root whether `git push` is issued from the root or any subdirectory. The half that is neither
per-clone nor skippable is CI — now tracked as R-168.

## ISO v1.26.1 — the PUBLIC installer ISO, PUBLISHED (2026-07-31)

**Live at `https://iso.felhom.eu/felhom-installer-1.26.1-pve9.2-1.iso`**
sha256 `f3cc86d5f0ec68bba4155c994b4fa84e208d50209bb6e815636c99e5441059a6`, 1 705 322 496 bytes,
with its `.sha256` and manifest beside it. Round-trip verified: the bytes downloaded from the public
URL checksum to the same value. Bucket `Public Access` stays disabled — an unauthenticated GET to the
S3 endpoint returns 400, and the custom domain has no index (404 on `/`).

**What it is.** Write it to a USB stick, boot it, choose your own disk and your own root password in
the standard Proxmox installer. The box sets itself up on first boot and shows a pairing code. The
image carries **no answer file, no root password, no SSH key, no customer identity and no disk
profile** — the entire Spike 1-2 problem space is deleted rather than mitigated.

**How day-0 is delivered.** A `felhom-bootstrap` .deb in `/proxmox/packages/`, which the PVE installer
unpacks on EVERY install path including the interactive one (`Install.pm:1343-1372`, `:1378`). The
answer file's `[first-boot]` hook does NOT reach an interactive install — measured in
SPIKE-universal-iso-3 with a same-image control.

**PROVEN ON BOTH MENU ENTRIES** before publication, four observables each:
  graphical (`spikegfx.felhom.eu`)  package installed, unit enabled, unit fired at first boot,
                                    pairing code `J7N-2DA`, token 0600
  Terminal UI (`spikesix.felhom.eu`) same, pairing code `ZY5-YY4`

**One defect was caught by that gate and fixed before publication:** the package did not ship
`/etc/felhom/`, so the first build registered at the hub and then polled `HTTP 401` forever with no
claim code ever shown. G9 proved the payload script was byte-identical to HEAD and said nothing about
the directory the payload writes into. Fixed, plus gate criterion **G13** (every directory the payload
writes into is in the package), red-proofed.

**A second false claim was caught before publication:** the generated manifest — the file a tester
reads — described a single automated entry with a 5s timeout and listed Graphical/Terminal UI as
'menu-removed'. It now describes the image it ships.

Menu: two INTERACTIVE entries, graphical default, **timeout 15s** (Spike 2 lost a probe to a
1-second menu). No automated entry exists at all: without `auto-installer-mode.toml` the stock
grub.cfg does not emit it.

R-128 FIXED (the ISO/SCRIPT_VERSION 'alignment' was a comment nothing evaluated; the coupling does not
exist, so the claim was corrected rather than asserted). R-155 RESOLVED (guard narrowed to
`FELHOM_MENU=single`, not deleted). Release gate: `documentation/runbooks/iso-release-gate.md`.

## SPIKE 4 (no code change) — a `.deb` in the ISO DOES deliver on an interactive install (2026-07-31)

**No script, profile or build file was modified.** Findings:
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-4-2026-07-31.md`. **No new R-rows; R-153 RETRACTED.**

**MEASURED, with a control, and the negative control is in the same box.** One ISO (15 GRUB entries),
a trivial probe `.deb` injected into `/proxmox/packages/`, two VMs on demo-hp created with `qm` (400
interactive / 401 automated control) on a scratch dir storage at the `/mnt/nvme-1tb` mount ROOT.

On the **Terminal-UI (interactive)** install: the package is installed (`ii felhom-spike4-probe`), its
postinst ran, it enabled a systemd unit, and **that unit FIRED on first boot** (uptime 7.98s,
pid1=systemd) — while on the *same machine* `proxmox-first-boot` is not installed and
`/var/lib/proxmox-first-boot` does not exist, reproducing Spike 3's negative rather than assuming it.
The automated control delivered both mechanisms.

**The postinst environment (identical on both paths):** `pid1=unconfigured.sh`, **no running systemd**,
but `systemctl enable` SUCCEEDS; `/proc` + `/sys` mounted; network and DNS happened to be up (inherited
from the installer's DHCP — **must not be relied on**). Constraints for a real postinst: never
`systemctl start`/`daemon-reload`, never require network, never fail (`dpkg --configure -a` surfaces it
as an install error), do the real work in the unit at first boot.

**Repack preserves it** — but a naive `xorriso -boot_image any replay` fails with "Overlapping MBR
partition entries"; `iso-repack.sh:270-292` already documents that exact failure and its fix, and
mirroring it produced a working image (19 El Torito entries, probe `.deb` byte-identical out of the
finished ISO).

**Q3:** `iso-repack.sh:100-106` refuses an ISO without `auto-installer-mode.toml` — a guard, not a
structural requirement, already filed as R-155 and cited exactly here. With no mode file the stock
grub.cfg does not emit the Automated entry at all; with a mode file but no answer, the automated entry
aborts safely and loudly.

**R-153 is RETRACTED** into R-94 leg (b): `OPEN-ITEMS.md:15` already carries it verbatim at
`READY (XS)`, and R-29 (the class) says explicitly "do not mint a new ID for a new instance".
**Spike 3's claim that the drift leaves the install-command generator "three minor versions stale" was
also FALSE and is corrected** — R-94 retracts exactly that reading: the constant selects no script, the
served script is always `main`, so it is a wrong number on a screen and nothing more.

## SPIKE 3 (no code change) — `[first-boot]` does NOT fire on an interactive install (2026-07-31)

**No script, profile or build file was modified.** Findings:
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-3-2026-07-31.md`. Opens R-153..R-155.

**MEASURED, with a control from the same image.** One probe ISO (15 GRUB entries: Automated,
Graphical, Terminal UI). Automated entry -> the first-boot hook fires: ttyS0 marker, marker file,
`/var/lib/proxmox-first-boot/proxmox-first-boot` (0700) and the activation symlink all present.
Terminal-UI entry, normal manual install -> **every one of those is absent, and the
`proxmox-first-boot` PACKAGE is not installed at all** (`dpkg-query: no packages found`). A
whole-filesystem grep for the marker returns nothing.

Mechanism, cited: `Config.pm:118` defaults `first_boot.enabled => 0` and `set_first_boot_opt` is never
called in the Perl tree; `Install.pm:746` returns early unless the flag is set; `Install.pm:1360` skips
the package itself. `proxinstall` (the graphical installer) contains **zero** occurrences of
`first-boot`. **`[first-boot]` is an automated-installer feature — unavailable on every interactive
path, by construction.** R-154.

**A delivery mechanism DOES exist, and it is untested.** `Install.pm:1343-1372` unpacks EVERY `.deb`
in the ISO's `/proxmox/packages/` into the target on every install path (fixed skip-list of known
names), then `dpkg --configure -a` runs postinsts (`:1378`). That is how PVE ships first-boot itself.
Read from source, NOT measured — proving it is the top follow-up.

Also: the interactive installer shows the target disk and a summary listing `Bootdisk(s) /dev/sda`
before erasing — the operator's ruling needs no Felhom work for that warning.

**Incidental: a working gate is red and nobody runs it.** `hub/internal/web/configs.go:28` has
`hostInstallVersion = "1.19.0"` vs `SCRIPT_VERSION = "1.22.0"`; `scripts/hostinstall_gates.py` detects
it and exits 1. The comment claiming drift "is now gated" is true of the gate and false of its
enforcement. R-153.

Q3 (the real stub at `before-network`) was NOT reached and is recorded as not reached.

## SPIKE 2 (no code change) — locked root closes the PVE web UI; before-network gives a measured zero window (2026-07-31)

**No script, profile or build file was modified.** Findings:
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-2-2026-07-31.md`. Opens R-148..R-152.

Both Tier 0 boxes went offline mid-session (provider cable fault; four routes tried) and returned;
all three scenarios then ran to completion on real PVE, each signalled by `reboot-mode="power-off"`.

- **A locked root CLOSES the PVE web interface.** Measured against the exact endpoint the UI logs in
  through (`POST /api2/json/access/ticket`, `root@pam`) **with a working control**: the known-password
  install returns **HTTP 200 + ticket**; the locked install returns 401 for every password, and no
  password exists. `passwd -S root` = `L`, shadow = `literal-asterisk`. PVE uses the stock PAM stack
  (`pve_pam_realm: 0`).
- **GRUB recovery mode is ALSO closed**: `Cannot open access to console, the root account is locked.`
  — the container mechanism result confirmed verbatim on real PVE.
- **But `init=/bin/bash` still works** — an unauthenticated `root@(none):/#`. So a locked-root box is
  recoverable, operator-only, at the physical console. The installed GRUB has **no password**, so
  locking root is NOT a physical-security measure. **R-152.**
- **`before-network` measured, A/B, same image:** the hook runs (positive marker, uptime 6.58s) with
  entropy 256, writable /etc, all binaries and `openssl_rand_len=32`, while `ip_global` is EMPTY and
  `listen_22_8006` is **0**. The `fully-up` column is the converse proof: sshd + pveproxy already
  active, 3 listening. Zero credential window, measured.
- **R-148:** `answer.toml.tmpl:27` justifies `fully-up` with a `pvesh`/`pct` dependency the stub does
  not have (grep rc=1) — it blocked the ordering that is now measured as the fix.
- **R-149** three ordering values, not two · **R-150** Condition-guarded hooks skip silently ·
  **R-151** demo-felhom built from an uncommitted profile.
- Q4 from source: four gates in `iso-repack.sh` enforce the single-entry menu; `default`/`timeout`
  already settable in `grub/grub.cfg.tmpl`.

Three probes failed and are recorded as failed, not massaged: a container probe that ran as uid 0
(so `su` never invoked pam_unix), a GRUB probe that missed the **1-second** menu timeout and typed into
the login prompt, and a kernel-line edit that landed one line off — caught by a pre-typing
verification screendump.

## SPIKE (no code change) — a universal ISO needs a different disk strategy and a locked root (2026-07-31)

**No script, profile or build file was modified.** Findings only:
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-universal-iso-2026-07-31.md`. Opened R-139..R-147; restated R-128.

Three results that constrain any future universal-ISO spec:

- **A disk filter matching more than one device does not fail safe.** Observed in a nested VM: with
  `filter.ID_SERIAL_SHORT = "SPIKE*"` matching two disks and `filesystem = "ext4"`, the installer
  silently picked one and wiped it (`disk0` hash changed, `disk1` byte-identical). `validate-answer`
  accepts such an answer. The `filter did not match any devices` guard covers the ZERO-match case
  only. **R-139.**
- **No udev property distinguishes an internal system disk from external media.** Measured on
  `demo-felhom` with its 1 TB external drive attached: `ID_BUS` is `ata` for *both* (the external is a
  SATA drive in a USB caddy), `lsblk RM` is `0` for both, and `device-info` exposes no removability
  property at all. On `demo-hp` the NVMe carries no `ID_BUS` or `ID_TYPE` whatsoever. Nothing
  expresses *role*. **R-141 context.**
- **A root credential is mandatory in the answer schema, but a usable one is not.**
  `root-password-hashed = "*"` validates and installs to completion (guest powered off after 200 s
  with `reboot-mode = "power-off"`). `[first-boot].ordering` also accepts `before-network`, which is
  the only ordering that could close the exposure window structurally — today's bootstrap unit is
  `After=network-online.target pveproxy.service` and the pairing poll waits indefinitely. **R-141.**

Also: `prepare-iso` leaves `grub.cfg` byte-identical to stock (15 menu entries, automated **and**
interactive), so a two-entry boot menu is purely a change to Felhom's own `grub.cfg.tmpl` — the
single-entry menu is Felhom's repack, not a constraint of ISO preparation.

## v1.22.0 — E-2 Part 2: new boxes get a real backup target, or are told they do not (2026-07-29)

Every box installed before this got `local_backup_target: "local"` — the vzdump target on the SAME
physical device as the guest, so a drive failure took the guest and its only local backup together.
E-1 fixed two machines by hand; this fixes the installer.

**Case A** — an eligible secondary drive is already mounted: create `felhom-backup` on that drive's
own mountpoint through the new `felhom-backup-target-apply` wrapper (`create` + `grant`), and point
the primary tier at it.

**Case B** — system drive only: the target stays on the system drive and this is **recorded as
DEGRADED, not as normal** — two warning lines saying it protects against corruption but not against
a disk failure, and what to do about it. **The install still succeeds**: a single-drive appliance is
a valid product, it just cannot survive drive loss.

**Phase 0 reality check, which inverts the emphasis:** the installer has **no drive-enrollment
step** — `/mnt/felhom-drives` is agent-installed at runtime and drives are formatted/mounted through
the dashboard later. So on a fresh appliance **Case A almost never fires**; the common case is
Case B, with the drive arriving months later through the wizard (E-2 Part 3). Case A exists for the
reinstall/recovery shape, where an agent-generated `.mount` unit already brings the drive up by
fs-UUID.

**Eligibility suggests and refuses the absurd; it never decides by transport.** The reference
hardware forbids that: demo-felhom's backup drive is an external **USB HDD**, and **both** demo
boxes' drives report `removable=0`. A transport rule would disqualify the reference drive; a
removable rule would find no candidate at all. The filter is: a real mounted `ext4/xfs/btrfs` under
`/mnt`, on a `/dev` source, not the root device, ≥ 64 GB.

**SCENARIO F — an already-configured box is never "corrected".** `configure_backup_target` returns
early, changing nothing, when the storage id already exists; `setdefault` independently preserves an
existing box's whole `backup` block. Both guards are load-bearing and both were exercised.

Also installs (and uninstalls) `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-backup-target-apply`, 0755 root:root, with
`bash -n` before install — the pbs-apply pattern. The wrapper is the single place the F-1/F-2 laws
live, so the installer and the runtime move cannot drift.

**Proofs (harness against the extracted functions, stubbed pvesm/wrapper — installer-logic-tested,
NOT install-tested; no reinstall was performed):**

| Scenario | Result |
|---|---|
| A — eligible drive | `create felhom-backup /mnt/bigdisk` then `grant felhom-backup`; resolved `felhom-backup` |
| B — single drive | DEGRADED warnings, resolved `local`, **rc=0 — install not failed** |
| F — configured box | skipped, **0 wrapper calls** |
| F red-proof (guard removed) | **2 wrapper calls** — it would have "corrected" a correct box |

## felhom-host-install 1.21.0 — F-LEAK: the restore-test scratch band gets its own path-scoped grant (2026-07-28)

Campaign 8's F-LEAK: a restore-test whose restore **fails** leaves a scratch guest the agent cannot
destroy — `403 missing privilege VM.Allocate` — so a half-restored guest holds its disks until a human
removes it. The cause is structural, not a missing privilege in the role: `FelhomAgentGuest` is granted
at `/pool/felhom`, and **a guest only joins that pool when its restore completes**. A failed restore
therefore produces a guest that exists, is in no pool, and is out of the token's reach.

`apply_scoped_acl` now also grants `FelhomAgentGuest` at each `/vms/<id>` in
`PVE_SCRATCH_VMID_MIN..PVE_SCRATCH_VMID_MAX` (990000–990009, the band the restore-test already picks
from), to **both** the user and the token — the privsep intersection rule applies here as everywhere.

**This is not a widening.** PVE ACLs are path-scoped: ten explicit `/vms/<id>` grants authorise the
agent on exactly those ten IDs. Granting at `/vms` was rejected — that would authorise destroying every
guest on the box, including a co-tenant's. Verified live:

| path | `VM.Allocate` |
|---|---|
| `/vms/990000` (scratch band) | **yes** — 13 privs |
| `/vms/100`, `/vms/9999` | no — 3 privs (base only) |
| `/vms/990010` (one past the band) | no — 3 privs |

Two supporting changes, both load-bearing:
- `remove_scoped_acl` deletes the band grants **before** the role delete. PVE refuses to delete a role
  still referenced by any ACL, so omitting this would have broken the uninstall.
- `step_verify` asserts the band grants. A missing one is otherwise invisible until a restore-test
  *fails*, which is precisely the case that leaked a guest.

**The alternative that does not work, recorded so it is not retried:** adopting the stranded guest into
the pool first. It was implemented (agent v0.107.0), shipped, and refuted live on 2026-07-28 —
`PUT /pools/felhom` with `vms=<id>` **also** requires `VM.Allocate` on `/vms/<id>`, so `Pool.Allocate`
cannot bootstrap its own membership. That code was removed in agent v0.108.0.

## felhom-host-install 1.20.0 — R-82: a fresh box defaults to local-daily + offsite-weekly (2026-07-26)

The `backup` defaults gain `backup_targets: [{target_id: "felhom-pbs", cadence_seconds: 604800,
keep_last: 2}]` — the offsite tier, weekly, two weeks retained (operator ruling 2026-07-26).

**`setdefault` semantics preserved, and PROVEN both ways** against the exact line:

```
FRESH   -> backup_targets: [{"target_id":"felhom-pbs","cadence_seconds":604800,"keep_last":2}]
UPGRADE -> preserved verbatim, no backup_targets
```

That second line is the load-bearing one: **an in-place upgrade can never silently start writing to
an offsite datastore.** Existing boxes are migrated explicitly (R-82 Slice D.2), which is what keeps
a routine host-install re-run from enrolling a box into offsite backups nobody asked for.

**Why the tier is written before its storage exists:** `felhom-pbs` only appears when the hub
provisions the DR tier. The agent (v0.102.0) DEFERS a tier whose target storage is absent, so the
tier stays silent until it is real and goes live with no restart the moment it is provisioned.
Writing it here means a box is never left with a DR tier that is provisioned but unscheduled — the
exact "applied and empty" state R-82 exists to end.

# Felhom scripts — Changelog

## felhom-host-install v1.19.0 — R-50 island control plane is the appliance default (2026-07-25)

Implements Phase A of the R-50 island bridge (spike GO, `documentation/audits/SPIKE-island-bridge-2026-07-25.md`).
A fresh **appliance** install is now born immune to F1 (a LAN/DHCP/site move can no longer take the
control plane down). **byo is unchanged**; an explicit `--bridge-ip` or `--no-island` keeps the LAN bind.

- New `ensure_island_bridge()` creates a portless host-internal bridge `vmbr9` (`169.254.253.1/30`),
  idempotently, before the agent binds it. Portless = no physical port, so the /30 cannot collide with
  any customer LAN and survives any renumber. vmbr0 untouched.
- `step_agent_config` (appliance default): `local_api.listen_addr` → `169.254.253.1:8443`; writes
  `local_api.island_bridge`/`island_guest_addr` (the agent ≥ 0.96.0 attaches the guest's `net1` from
  these); and pins `lan_resolver.host_ip` to the **LAN** IP explicitly — **Finding-1**: without it the
  agent derives the DNS listen-addr from `listen_addr` and silently moves LAN DNS onto the island.
- `--no-island` opt-out; `--bridge-ip` still overrides. `configs/felhom-localapi-firewall.example`
  (agent repo) rewritten — the portless island bind IS the LAN close.
- **Coupling:** this install REQUIRES agent ≥ 0.96.0 (older agents ignore the island fields → no net1 →
  broken control plane). Vouch 0.96.0 before island installs go live. Hub `hostInstallVersion` synced to
  1.19.0 (F-1). Existing boxes migrate via `documentation/runbooks/RUNBOOK-island-migration.md`.

## ISO train v1.25.0 — the belt goes fleet-wide, the repo goes free, the screen learns ő, fresh boxes boot at the floor (2026-07-23)

Four rulings from 2026-07-23. host-install **1.17.0 → 1.18.0**, build-felhom-iso **1.24.0 → 1.25.0**,
felhom-bootstrap R-63 font.

- **Part 1 (F9) — the OOB belt is a DEFAULT appliance leg.** `felhom-host-install.sh`: appliance mode
  now installs the H1 belt (felhom-sshd + static `inet felhom_oob` table + felhom-op) unless `--no-oob`;
  byo still refuses `--enable-oob` (owner-consented, deliberate exclusion — flagged, unchanged). The
  config writer now sets `oob.enabled=true` when the belt is installed, so the agent activates it (claims
  a port, renders the sshd config, fills the belt sets) instead of the units sitting inert — the
  pre-v1.25.0 state that left the belt unusable on both fleet boxes (07-22 power-outage audit F9). byo
  config asserts unchanged (they already refuse `oob.enabled`). The belt is lockout-SAFE with no operator
  peer yet (empty sets + no key = no access granted, `:22` untouched). **Live: installed + validated
  end-to-end on felhom-pve** (operator WG peer → wg-felhom → belt → felhom-op login PROVEN) **and
  installed on demo-hp** (same infra; login is the same mechanism).
- **Part 2 (apt) — enterprise → no-subscription on fresh appliance installs.** New idempotent
  `align_apt_repos` (appliance-only; runs before the first apt op): disables the PVE/ceph **enterprise**
  `.sources` (deb822 `Enabled: no`) or legacy `.list`, adds `pve-no-subscription.sources` (suite+keyring
  derived from the enterprise file), `apt-get update` must exit clean. Scoped to the Proxmox-managed repos
  only; the owner's lists are never touched; no upgrades run.
- **Part 3 (R-63) — the console learns ő/ű.** `felhom-bootstrap.sh` loads a Latin-2 console font
  (`Lat2-Terminus16` → `Lat2-Fixed16` → `Lat2-Terminus14`) ONCE before the first paint (idempotent,
  best-effort — never blocks boot). Fixes the R-59 network screen (élő/telepítő/ellenőrizze) and the
  pairing banner (képernyő/teendő) rendering ő as blanks. Lat2 fonts ship in the trixie/PVE base, so no
  copy rewording was needed.
- **Part 4 (R-71 mitigation) — every ISO build asserts golden ≥ managed floor.** `build-felhom-iso.sh`
  gains `ver_ge` + `assert_golden_ge_floor` (runs before workspace/mint; `die`s with both versions on
  `golden < floor`; `FELHOM_ASSERT_GOLDEN`/`FELHOM_ASSERT_FLOOR` inputs; unset warns loudly, never a
  silent pass). Red-proofed both directions (floor>golden → exit 1; golden≥floor → OK). Standing rule 5
  added to `publish-train-rules.md`. Closes the day-0 update-vs-bridge race window at its source
  (DIAG-f10 / R-71). ISO_VERSION → 1.25.0.

  **Golden lift EXECUTED (2026-07-23):** golden republished at controller 0.161.0 (`build-golden.sh` on felhom-pve), published to Gitea (618 MB, sha `77624408…`, served-copy verified), operator-vouched (golden 0.153.0→0.161.0; floor stays 0.156.0) — the LIVE golden<floor gap is CLOSED. **v1.25.0 ISO built** (`felhom-pve-9.2-1-v1.25.0-nested-vm-generic-mkimage.iso`, sha `99b38420…`) with the gate passing live; rootpw sibling + R-63 font present. Nested drill = the remaining validation leg.

## ISO train v1.24.0 — the box that can never call home learns to say so, heal itself, and let you in (R-59 + R-60 + R-61) (2026-07-22)

All three findings are from the HP t740 install (2026-07-21). Proven end-to-end on a nested
wrong-NIC install (spike + virgin-ISO drill: `documentation/audits/SPIKE-firstboot-nic-sweep-2026-07-22.md`).

- **R-59 — the silent unreachable box gets a legible screen.** A no-DHCP install bakes the
  installer's **192.168.100.2 fallback as a static `vmbr0` config** (with a dead
  `gateway 192.168.100.1`) and completes; the box then waited silently forever. The first-boot
  bootstrap now runs a **network gate before mode dispatch**
  (`scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh:251` `network_gate`, called at `:510`): hub unreachable →
  physical-NIC diagnosis (name/MAC/carrier/speed; NICs are raised first — unused ports sit
  admin-DOWN with unreadable carrier), the fallback signature named when present, and a calm
  Hungarian console screen (`paint_network_screen`, `:230` — the `print_pairing_banner` pattern)
  with the NIC table and the one-line remedy; then retry every 60 s with the unit held in
  `activating` (waiting is not failing — the v1.21.0 lesson, unit `TimeoutStartSec=infinity`).
  The trigger is always **hub-unreachable, never the fallback signature**: the drill proved a
  second wrong-NIC variant (the installer picks the NIC that LEASES and bakes the lease as
  static — a later cable move leaves a plausible-looking dead config with no signature).
  *Recorded deviation:* R-59 ships as this first-boot refuse-loudly gate, not an install-time
  abort — the fallback is baked inside the Proxmox auto-installer itself, unreachable without an
  installer-initrd hook (out of scope by operator ack, noted on the ROADMAP row).
- **R-60 — first-boot NIC sweep self-heal.** While the hub is unreachable AND no install attempt
  has begun (`state.json` gate; the unit's `ConditionPathExists=!done-flag` confines the whole
  script to pre-install anyway), the gate sweeps (`sweep_nics`,
  `scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh:178`): per candidate NIC, re-point `vmbr0`'s `bridge-ports`
  (atomic tmp+mv, always rendered from the pristine copy) → `ifreload` → **flush vmbr0's
  addresses/routes** → bounded `dhclient` (20 s) → hub probe (any HTTP status counts — the hub
  answers `/` with 302). The flush is load-bearing: the baked fallback default route survives a
  successful lease otherwise (dhclient-script never replaces an existing default route) and the
  probe rides the dead gateway — found live in the drill. First success persists
  `bridge-ports <winner>` + `iface vmbr0 inet dhcp` (original kept as
  `interfaces.felhom-bak`) and proceeds; total failure restores the config **byte-identically**.
  Drill: cable moved → healed + registered at the hub in well under a minute, unaided.
- **R-61 slice 1 — the baked root password becomes knowable.** `build-felhom-iso.sh` writes the
  minted throwaway plaintext to a **0600 sibling `<iso>.rootpw.txt`** (password + ISO name +
  build date; `scripts/iso/build-felhom-iso.sh:254`) — the single record of truth. Never
  stdout/logs; the manifest carries only a pointer (`:383`). A fixed well-known password stays
  REJECTED (operator ruling 2026-07-21). Drill: the emitted password's hash matches the
  installed box's `/etc/shadow` — the console lockout is closed.
- **Harness** (`scripts/iso/test/bootstrap-modes.sh`): caught up with the v1.21.0 in-script wait
  (the old pairing scenarios would hang), plus four gate scenarios — hub-reachable = ZERO new
  behavior (no ip/ifreload/dhclient/sleep call, fixture untouched), sweep-success (persist +
  bak + proceed), sweep-fail (screen + byte-identical config), state-file-present (sweep NEVER
  invoked). New `test/rootpw-emission.sh` for R-61 (emission, 0600, plaintext↔answer-hash
  cross-check, manifest guard). **Four red-proofs run and restored:** manifest-plaintext leak,
  restore-on-failure dropped, state gate removed, hub-reachable early-return removed — each
  failed exactly its guarding assertion.
- Assistant image gains `python3` (the bootstrap's JSON parsing needs it; PVE ships it on real
  boxes — the harness runs the bootstrap in the image). `build-felhom-iso.sh` gains the
  `FELHOM_ISO_KEEP_WORK=1` debug/test escape and resolves `OUT_ISO` before the mint (the rootpw
  sibling is named after the ISO).

## build-hub.sh v1.23.0 — the hub build script enters the repo (2026-07-21)

It never was in one. `/mnt/5_hdd/felhom.eu/build/felhom-hub/build.sh` lived only in a DooPlex build
directory — unversioned, unreviewed, un-diffable and gone with the box, while being the only way the
hub image gets built. Recorded as a follow-up in `felhom.eu/REPORT.md` §6; adopted here.

Adopted verbatim — the build logic is byte-identical (verified by diff), and the only additions are
a `SCRIPT_VERSION` constant echoed in the banner and a header naming the canonical/operative split.
The build-dir path is now a **symlink** to this file, so there is one source of truth and a repo edit
is live immediately (the `install_skills.py` pattern). The previous copy is retained beside it as
`build.sh.pre-adopt-2026-07-21`.

It already carried the GitOps deploy hint fixed earlier in the week (manifest bump → hard-refresh →
deliberate sync, and the named trap that `kubectl set image` / `kubectl apply` are silently reverted
by the next ArgoCD sync) — that wording now lives in git along with the rest of it.

## install_skills.py — cross-platform (POSIX symlink / Windows junction) (2026-07-19)

Claude Code now runs on DooPlex (Debian 13), where `mklink /J` does not exist — the script would
have fallen through to COPY mode on every run, silently breaking the "repo edits are live
immediately" property that makes `felhom.eu/skills/` the source of truth.

- Link creation is now platform-dispatched behind `os.name == "nt"`: `os.symlink(..., 
  target_is_directory=True)` on POSIX, the existing `mklink /J` on Windows. Copy-mode fallback,
  idempotency, and the re-run warning are unchanged.
- **`remove_existing()` had a real hazard on POSIX**: `os.rmdir()` fails on a symlink-to-directory,
  which would have fallen through to `shutil.rmtree()` — and rmtree following a symlink into
  `skills/` would have deleted the repo's own skill sources. It now unlinks symlinks explicitly
  before any rmdir/rmtree path is reached. Existence checks use `os.path.lexists()` so a broken
  link is seen and replaced rather than ignored.
- Human-facing output says "symlink" or "junction" per platform.

## build-felhom-iso.sh v1.22.0 — the boot screen is ours, and it offers exactly one thing (R-38) (2026-07-19)

**A boot menu is a product surface, and ours was Proxmox's.** Every ISO is now repacked after
`prepare-iso` to carry a Felhom boot screen and — the half that actually matters — a menu with
**exactly one entry**.

- **The safety half.** The stock PVE menu offers *Install Proxmox VE (Graphical)*, *(Terminal UI)*, a
  serial variant, and an **Advanced Options** submenu holding two `nomodeset` entries, three debug
  entries, *Rescue Boot*, memtest and *UEFI Firmware Settings*. Every one of those reaches the
  **manual** installer, whose first question is which disk to wipe. A customer — or their helpful
  nephew — must not be able to get there from a boot menu they are staring at. Those entries are not
  hidden and not password-gated: **they are not emitted**. What ships is „Felhom telepítés", default,
  5 s.
- **Boot behavior is unchanged.** The `linux`/`initrd` lines are lifted **verbatim at repack time**
  from the ISO's own *Install Proxmox VE (Automated)* entry rather than frozen into a copy in this
  repo, so a PVE bump that moves the kernel path or edits the append line tracks automatically
  instead of silently diverging. The build **fails** if they cannot be found, if the append line has
  lost `proxmox-start-auto-installer`, or if `auto-installer-mode.toml` is absent — that last one
  because without it the single Felhom-labelled entry would boot a *manual* installer, which is the
  precise outcome this change exists to prevent.
- **Gates, and then a re-check against the shipped artifact.** The rendered menu is asserted to have
  exactly 1 `menuentry`, 0 `submenu`s and no live reference to
  `proxtui`/`proxdebug`/`nomodeset`/`Rescue Boot`/`memtest`/`fwsetup` (comments are stripped first —
  the template's header names the dropped entries on purpose). Then the menu and the theme background
  are read back **out of `final.iso`**, not out of the extract tree, so "the branding landed in the
  image we ship" is proven rather than assumed.
- **The boot card.** `grub/generate-grub-background.sh` letterboxes `website/assets/og-image_2.png`
  onto a 1024×768 gfxterm canvas at repack time (ImageMagick, added to the assistant image), so the
  boot screen has **one source** — the website asset — and not a second pre-rendered PNG in the repo
  to drift. The card's own subtle background grid is continued across the letterbox fill
  **phase-locked** to where the card's grid lands, so the fill is seamless instead of a 500 px square
  of grid floating in flat navy. The generator refuses a source whose geometry no longer matches the
  measured grid constants — a silently swapped asset would misplace every line, and that only shows
  up on a boot screen nobody re-checks.
- **Menu positioning needs a theme.** Plain `background_image` cannot move the menu off the wordmark,
  so `grub/felhom-theme.txt` (gfxmenu) puts it in the lower third the layout deliberately leaves
  empty, with the entry optically centered under the card (measured off a canary screenshot — the
  comment records the measurement). No "e: edit entry" hint label: advertising the editor works
  against a single-entry menu.
- **`mkimage-surgery.sh` → `iso-repack.sh`.** Branding and the slice-B loader swap need the same
  extract → modify → re-master cycle, so they now share **one** pass instead of re-mastering twice.
  The mkimage recipe is untouched. The embedded module list is still derived from the **stock**
  `grub.cfg` (snapshotted before branding rewrites it, so branding cannot shrink the embedded set),
  plus gfxmenu's `bitmap`/`bitmap_scale`/`trig` renderer dependencies.
- `--no-brand` exists for debugging the stock menu and says so loudly in the build log and the
  manifest. It is not a shipping mode.

**Live-validated (nested canary, UEFI/OVMF, PVE 9.2-1).** GRUB renders the card; the single entry is
selected and counts down in Hungarian (accents render correctly under gfxterm); it auto-fires at 0;
the automatic installer runs and reaches the **match-nothing abort exactly as in v1.21.0**
(`ERROR: Installation failed: filter did not match any device` → `Installation aborted`), touching no
disk. Both shipping ISOs rebuilt (see `REPORT-iso-branding-2026-07-19.md` for shas).

**Not touched (deferred):** the installer squashfs/initrd theme — the post-GRUB screens are still
Proxmox-branded. GRUB's `e`/`c` keys also remain reachable (suppressing them needs a superuser
password, which is a separate decision); the menu no longer advertises them.

## build-felhom-iso.sh v1.21.0 — the pairing wait stops looking like a failure (R-33) (2026-07-18)

**Waiting is not failing, and must not be reported as failure.** Until now the PAIRING poll loop WAS
systemd's `Restart=on-failure`/`RestartSec=30`: each invocation did register-if-needed plus exactly
one poll, then exited **non-zero** so the unit would be restarted 30s later. Functionally fine — but
every one of those exits made systemd print `Failed to start Felhom host bootstrap …` on the physical
console **the customer is watching**. The 2026-07-18 N100 rehearsal measured **52 FAILED lines in
~11 minutes** while nothing whatsoever was wrong: the box had registered correctly and was waiting to
be bound, which is the normal state of a freshly installed appliance. That is the customer's literal
first impression of the product
(`documentation/tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` finding F6, ROADMAP **R-33**).

- **`felhom-bootstrap.sh` — the wait moved INSIDE the script.** `run_pairing()` is now a
  `while true` loop that sleeps `POLL_INTERVAL` (30s — the hub-side rate is **unchanged**) between
  polls, so the unit sits in `activating` instead of failing. Registration was split out into
  `register_appliance()`, which returns non-zero for a *transient* problem (no network yet, identity
  not gatherable, hub returned no token) and is simply retried by the loop rather than taking the
  whole unit down. Three cadence constants at the top of the file: `POLL_INTERVAL=30`,
  `BANNER_EVERY=10` (console banner every 5 min), `HEARTBEAT_EVERY=20` (journal heartbeat every
  10 min).
- **The journal got quiet without going dark.** A `204 not bound yet` is logged **once** on entry
  (worded so nobody reads it as an error) and then only on the 10-minute heartbeat with elapsed
  minutes. `404` and unexpected HTTP codes likewise degrade to the heartbeat instead of a line every
  30s. **`410` still exits non-zero on purpose** — the delivery was consumed but no local env exists,
  a genuine crash window where handing the box back to systemd for a clean restart is the right move.
- **The console banner got calmer and less repetitive.** Printed every 5 min instead of every cycle
  (a customer may walk up at any time, but a banner every 30s is its own noise). Dropped the
  belt-and-braces `parositasra var / párosításra vár` double-spelling for a single accented line, and
  added the reassurance the rehearsal showed was missing: „Ez a képernyő magától frissül — nincs
  teendő a doboznál, és nyugodtan itt hagyhatod bekapcsolva."
- **`felhom-bootstrap.service` — `TimeoutStartSec=infinity` (load-bearing, not cosmetic).** A
  `Type=oneshot` `ExecStart` is killed at `DefaultTimeoutStartSec` (90s). Without this line systemd
  would kill the new in-script wait after 90 seconds and `Restart=on-failure` would **silently
  reinstate the exact console spam this change removes** — a regression that would look like the
  feature working for the first three polls. `Restart=on-failure`/`RestartSec=30` are deliberately
  kept: they still cover the DIRECT path, a failed host-install, and the 410 crash window.
- **Behaviour verified, not assumed.** Driven in a throwaway Debian container against a stub hub that
  answers `204` five times and then delivers: the script logged the wait **once** plus one heartbeat,
  **never exited between polls**, then consumed the delivery, wrote the 0600 env, fell through to the
  direct install in the same invocation and exited **0**. Under the old design the same sequence
  produced five separate unit invocations and five `Failed to start` console lines.

**Compatibility:** hub-side polling rate, endpoints, payloads and the one-shot delivery semantics are
all unchanged; this is purely how the box waits and what it says while waiting. An older ISO against
any hub keeps working exactly as before.


## build-felhom-iso.sh v1.20.0 — console pairing-code banner for customer self-bind (R-27 slice 1) (2026-07-17)

Supports the hub's customer self-bind flow (hub v0.66.0). In PAIRING mode, `felhom-bootstrap.sh` now
reads the additive `pairing_code` from the `POST /api/v1/appliance/register` response, persists it at
`/etc/felhom/appliance-pairing-code`, and prints a Hungarian **console banner** (to `/dev/console`,
stdout fallback) each pairing cycle so the customer can read the code off the physical screen and type
it — together with their retrieval passphrase — on the hub's public `/bind/<token>` page. The code is
**non-secret** (possession proof only; the passphrase is the second factor), so it is safe on the
console. **Graceful degradation both ways:** a hub older than v0.66.0 omits `pairing_code` → the banner
prints nothing and register/poll are unchanged; an old ISO against a v0.66.0 hub simply ignores the new
field. No change to DIRECT mode. Green: `bash -n` clean on both scripts.

## build-felhom-iso.sh v1.19.0 — the universal secret-free ISO: `--pairing` mode (R-21 slice C) (2026-07-17)

The scripts half of the universal ISO. `felhom-bootstrap.sh` gains a PAIRING mode — **one unit, two
modes**, decided by the env:

- **DIRECT** (env has `FELHOM_CUSTOMER_ID` + `FELHOM_RETRIEVAL_PASSPHRASE`): the slice-A path,
  **byte-identical** — only branched around. Scenario D regression proves the pairing code is provably
  NOT entered (a fake hub records ZERO `/appliance/*` calls).
- **PAIRING** (generic ISO, no customer/passphrase baked in): gather identity (SMBIOS uuid + physical
  MAC set + SSH host pubkeys + hw), `POST /api/v1/appliance/register` → persist the appliance token
  (0600), then ONE `GET /api/v1/appliance/poll` per invocation (the existing
  `Restart=on-failure`/`RestartSec=30` IS the poll timer — no long-running-oneshot timeout). On the
  bind's 200 delivery, WRITE the delivered credentials into the env (0600) and fall through to the
  DIRECT path — so every later retry is a plain direct install (the delivery is one-shot; a second poll
  → 410). Delivery-received secrets + the appliance token are shredded on host-install success.
- **`build-felhom-iso.sh --pairing`** builds the GENERIC ISO: no `--bootstrap-env`, a secret-free env
  carrying only the hub URL, `-generic` filename marker, manifest `mode: pairing` + `secret-bearing:
  no`. Direct mode (secret-bearing) is unchanged. **New `profiles/generic.profile`.**
- Validated: `bash -n` + shellcheck clean; the `test/bootstrap-modes.sh` harness (Scenario D + pairing
  register/poll + the delivery→env→host-install handoff) all green in a debian container.

## build-felhom-iso.sh v1.18.0 — firmware loader option `--loader shim|mkimage` (R-21 slice B, F1) (2026-07-17)

Closes N100 finding **F1 (HIGH):** cheap AMI (`AN3PLUS 0.01`-class) UEFI firmware can't relocate the
ISO's stock signed GRUB from USB (`relocation 0x0 is not implemented yet`; SB-off + shim-bypass don't
help). The run's live `grub-mkimage` workaround is now a first-class pipeline mode.

- **`--loader shim|mkimage`** (default **shim**; profile-settable via `FELHOM_LOADER`, `--loader`
  wins). `shim` = the stock output, **byte-for-byte unchanged** (the surgery is skipped) — keeps the
  MS-signed shim→GRUB chain and Secure Boot on compliant firmware (S2b). `mkimage` replaces the ISO's
  UEFI boot path with a **monolithic `grub-mkimage` loader** built from the ISO's own GRUB modules
  (module set from the ISO's `grub.cfg`; embedded `search --fs-uuid` → `configfile` the real menu).
  The recipe is reproduced from the N100 run evidence, not re-derived.
- **`mkimage-surgery.sh`** (new): runs in the assistant container **after** `prepare-iso`, so the
  answer/first-boot payload is provably untouched except the loader. Swaps the loader into the ISO9660
  tree (real lowercase Rock-Ridge path) **and** inside the `efi.img` ESP (FAT), then re-masters with
  `xorriso` preserving the hybrid BIOS boot (grub2-mbr + El Torito) and the GPT EFI System Partition,
  dropping only the irrelevant Apple HFS+/APM map (which trips xorriso's overlap check on re-emit).
- **Loud + unmistakable (rule 4):** build banner, manifest `loader:` + `grub-mkimage:` fields, and a
  **`-mkimage`** filename suffix when non-default. mkimage ISOs are **unsigned → Secure Boot must be
  OFF** on the target board.
- **Dockerfile.assistant:** adds `grub-common` + `grub-efi-amd64-bin` + `mtools` + `dosfstools` (grub
  2.12 == the PVE 9.x ISO's `2.12-9+pmx2` generation). **New `profiles/n100.profile`** (cheap-board,
  `FELHOM_LOADER="mkimage"`, SB-off note).
- **Validated (RUNBOOK-B legs, nested VM 311 on felhom-pve):** leg 1 shim boots + zero-touch installs
  under OVMF **Secure Boot enforcing** (+ SeaBIOS boot — hybrid path survived); leg 2 `--loader
  mkimage` boots + installs under OVMF **SB-off** (the monolith's embedded fs-uuid search found the
  ISO + chained its menu); **leg 3 (red-proof)** the mkimage ISO under **SB-enforcing FAILS** —
  firmware `Access Denied`, no boot; leg 4 the surgery is surgical (only the loader + regenerated El
  Torito artifacts differ; the full install payload is byte-identical). `bash -n` + shellcheck clean.
  Physical N100 closure folds into the supervised rehearsal (an `n100-safety` match-nothing ISO built
  + sha-recorded, unbooted, for an optional zero-risk pre-flight).

## felhom-tenantsync.sh v1.1.0 — deprovision op (customer RESET teardown) (2026-07-17)

Adds the `{"op":"deprovision","customer_id":"<id>"}` op the slice-1 header explicitly reserved
("namespace/data deletion is a deliberate, separate decision"). It is exactly that deliberate,
hub-side ack-gated decision (the customer RESET, hub v0.61.0): delete the token (its ACLs purge with
it) → delete the residual namespace ACLs → **destroy the namespace AND all its backup groups**
(`proxmox-backup-client namespace delete <ns> --delete-groups true`, via the transient admin token).
IDEMPOTENT — a missing token / namespace is success (`deleted:false`), so a re-run after a partial
reset converges. The shared `felhom@pbs` user is NEVER touched (co-tenants ride it). Returns
`{"status":"ok","namespace","datastore","deleted":<bool>}`. Secret hygiene unchanged (no secrets in
this path). Client seam: `tenantsync.Deprovision(ctx, customerID) (existed bool, err error)`.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.17.0 — appliance guest auto-sizing (F5) + doc-drift fix (2026-07-17)

Closes `VALIDATION-n100-baremetal-2026-07-16.md` **F5 (MEDIUM):** appliance mode provisioned the
golden default (2 GB RAM) on a 16 GB host and never surfaced the `--memory`/`--cores` caps. Now, in
**appliance** mode with no explicit cap, the guest is auto-sized from the host (LXC limits are cheap →
err generous): RAM = `clamp(host-4096, min 4096, max host-2048)` then a hard ceiling `host-1024`
(never over-commit); cores = `host-1, min 2`. An explicit `--memory`/`--cores` ALWAYS wins untouched;
byo mode still requires explicit caps (never auto-sized). Host reads (`MemTotal`/`nproc`) are
overridable via `FELHOM_FAKE_MEMTOTAL_MIB`/`FELHOM_FAKE_NPROC` for the mode harness. Sizing table:
8 GB→4096, 16 GB→12288, 32 GB→28672 MiB; a 4 GB host→3072 (min capped at host-1024).
Red-proof: `hostinstall-mode-harness.sh` new F5 section (8/16/32 GB + small-host edge + explicit-flag
precedence) — pre-fix (auto-size disabled) FAILs, post-fix PASSes. **Same commit (R-16 doc-drift
leftover):** the operator-signing-keys "EMPTY by default" comment was stale (the keys are PINNED to
the real `felhom-op-1`/`felhom-rec-1` ceremony keypairs) — corrected, comment-only, no behavior.

## felhom-poke.sh v1.0.0 — NEW (agent-plane immediate-sync, Direction-2a, 2026-07-16)

The offsite endpoint's THIRD hub forced-command surface (`documentation/runbooks/offsite-endpoint.md`
§11): a NON-root (`felhom-peersync`, no sudoers grant — a datagram needs no privilege) forced command
that reads a box's WireGuard /32 from `$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND`, validates it to `10.77.0.0/24`, and
sends ONE contentless (empty) UDP datagram from wg0 to `<ip>:51822`. That is the last hop of the
hub→ep0→box "sync now" poke; the box's felhom-agent (v0.89.0) poke listener then runs an immediate
desired-state cycle. Contentless + confined (the WG kernel independently refuses non-peer /32s —
`SPIKE-immediate-sync-transport-2026-07-16` P1 EKEYREJECTED). Port **51822** is a shared cross-repo
constant (felhom-agent `internal/poke.Port`, `hub/internal/poke`, this script's `POKE_PORT`). Hub
client: `hub/internal/poke`. Installed + live-validated on ep0 2026-07-16 (`poke-fired`; non-WG target
and arbitrary SSH command both `refused non-WG target` — the forced command never executes client
input). Peersync/tenantsync surfaces untouched.

## felhom bare-metal ISO pipeline v1.16.0 — NEW (R-21 slice A, 2026-07-16)

New operator tooling under `scripts/iso/`: a reproducible DooPlex pipeline that turns the official
PVE ISO into a Felhom auto-install ISO whose first-boot chain unattended-fetches-and-runs
`felhom-host-install.sh` until the host is enrolled + a guest provisioned. `felhom-host-install.sh`
is **unchanged** (invoked, not modified). Tagged **v1.16.0** to align the ISO with the current
host-install release (they must stay coherent; the ISO's baked invocation targets that flag surface).

- `Dockerfile.assistant` (assistant paired to the ISO's PVE generation by Debian codename + shellcheck),
  `build-felhom-iso.sh` (render answer from `answer.toml.tmpl` + a profile, mint a fresh THROWAWAY root
  hash per build, **gate validate-answer on OUTPUT TEXT not `$?`** — spike S1 exit-0-on-failure trap,
  `prepare-iso --fetch-from iso --on-first-boot`, emit ISO + sha256 + manifest).
- In-ISO chain: `stub-first-boot.sh` (dumb, exactly-once, from-iso/fully-up) installs
  `felhom-bootstrap.sh` + `felhom-bootstrap.service` (retry-forever `Type=oneshot`+`Restart=on-failure`)
  + a 0600 `bootstrap.env`. Retry-vs-resume encoded once (plain first; `--resume` when
  `/var/lib/felhom-install/state.json` exists — safe per host-install v1.11.3).
- **Secret-bearing:** the unattended install needs the customer retrieval passphrase, so the ISO embeds
  it (the distribution URL itself carries no secret). Supervised/single-use; the bootstrap scrubs the
  env on success. Slice C removes the secret from the *distributed* ISO via claim-pairing.
- Validated on nested VM 310: build gate + red-proof; disk-filter fail-safe through the pipeline;
  stub→unit→real public-channel fetch→invocation→retry; resume decision; exactly-once; no-net retry +
  recovery. Terminal host-install success (hub-enrolled + guest-provisioned) is operator-gated (drill
  customer needs the password-gated create-UI; live-DB insert unsafe). Full report: root `REPORT.md`,
  `documentation/audits/SPIKE-baremetal-iso-2026-07-16.md`.

## felhom-host-install v1.16.0 — FELHOM_ESCROW rides the canonical sudoers (2026-07-13)

Companion to agent v0.88.0 + controller v0.127.0 (the controller-driven escrow ceremony wizard).
No new installer STEP: the `FELHOM_ESCROW` sudoers alias (the wizard's fixed-argv sudo
self-invocation grant) ships via the existing canonical-sudoers fetch
(`configs/felhom-agent.sudoers` from the agent repo, `visudo -cf`-gated before install) — the
bump documents that every ≥1.16.0 install/update carries it. Hub `hostInstallVersion` bumped in
the same commit (hostinstall_gates.py asserts equality); the hub deploy rides the next hub train
(display-only lag, accepted). EXISTING hosts get the refreshed sudoers with the agent-0.88.0
deploy (ship-configs step), not from this script.

## manifest_bearer_gate.py — new gate: no bearer-shaped literals in manifests/ (2026-07-13)

Part of the hub v0.53.0 bearer de-git. Greps every `manifests/*.yaml` for 64-hex literals
(the `openssl rand -hex 32` shape all felhom bearer/API keys use), comments included; exit 1 on
any hit. `felhom.secret.yaml`'s pre-existing committed secrets (umami APP_SECRET is 64-hex)
print as a visible non-fatal KNOWN-BACKLOG line until that file's own de-git (secrets.md
backlog). Run after ANY manifests/ change. Named "bearer" not "secret" — the repo `.gitignore`
`*secret*` pattern silently un-tracks any "secret"-named file (learned the hard way: the gate's
first landing never reached git). Red-proven: reintroducing a 64-hex literal → exit 1.

## felhom-host-install v1.15.0 — DR-tier-by-default: uniform DR plumbing on every install (2026-07-12)

Sweeps the DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12 installer findings so the next Day-0 runs the drill's §5
sequence with zero fix-and-continue stops. Operator decisions 2026-07-12: capability is BAKED
uniformly; activation is a hub flag; WG is base infrastructure.

- **F-7** — ships `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-pbs-apply` (fetch `configs/felhom-pbs-apply` from the
  agent repo, `bash -n`, install 0755 — the mkfs/selfupdate wrapper pattern). The FELHOM_PBSDR
  sudoers alias already shipped; the 3 `pbsdr-*` capabilities are no longer born DEGRADED.
  Uninstall removes it (disclosure↔uninstall parity kept, harness GL4-D green).
- **F-10** — installs the `age` package (escrow-ceremony identity-wrap dependency; a fresh-box
  ceremony died on it live).
- **F-9 / decision 5** — the rendered agent.json now defaults `wg_tunnel.enabled: true` in BOTH
  modes (WG is base infrastructure like cloudflared, also the future OOB transport; setdefault —
  a deliberately-disabled preserved config is respected). The byo wg-off config assert is
  RETIRED; byo consent = the typed disclosure ack (the WG tunnel + pbs-apply wrapper + age are
  now on the disclosed list) + the tester-agreement disclosure line.
- **ACL** — the default `--acl-storages` set keeps `felhom-pbs` (drill-proven: narrowing it 403s
  the PBS-DR apply-bridge at `/storage/felhom-pbs`); a missing felhom-pbs storage is now an
  expected-pre-tier INFO, and no longer a byo refusal (the tier creates the storage later).
- **F-1** — single version source: `SCRIPT_VERSION` alone feeds `-h`, the run banners, and (via a
  gate cross-check) the hub Setup-tab const `hostInstallVersion` (bumped 1.12.0→1.15.0 in the
  same commit). The header no longer carries its own version literal.
- **F-2** — dry-run fetch lines print the REAL auth mode (`curl (anonymous …)` vs `curl -u <git>`)
  instead of the hardcoded `-u <git>` lie on the anonymous branch.
- **F-8** — step 4b + the final summary now say out loud that root@pam was rotated + vaulted and
  where to retrieve it (pointer only, never the credential).
- **New gate: `scripts/hostinstall_gates.py`** — mechanical grep-assertions (version single-source
  + hub-const sync, age, pbs-apply ship+uninstall, wg default-on + byo-assert retirement,
  felhom-pbs in the default ACL). All red-proofed; the age assertion was hardened TWICE by its
  red-proof (a prefix regex matched `agekit`, then a loose one matched the dry-run print line).
- F-3 (root-owned `guests/` parents) is fixed at its creator — the AGENT (v0.86.0); this pass
  applied the drill's live-fix (chown the two parent dirs) to felhom-pve, which had the same
  latent state. Peti's host: unreachable, check deferred.

## felhom-host-install v1.14.0 — deployment_mode from --mode (appliance self-heal gate) (2026-07-12)

- The agent-config writer now templates the top-level **`deployment_mode`** field from `--mode`
  (`appliance` | `byo`), authoritative even over a `--preserve-from` config. It gates the agent's
  node self-heal (host networking recovery at boot — F12-class defense in depth, agent v0.85.0):
  only `deployment_mode:"appliance"` unlocks the remedy; anything else, including a stale preserved
  value or a typo, is byo (the check runs + WARNs, the remedy is unreachable). The byo config assert
  additionally refuses `deployment_mode=appliance` (a byo box must never carry a host-service
  self-heal). Companion to CAMPAIGN-3 Task A (`documentation/audits/CAMPAIGN-3-2026-07-11.md`).

## felhom-host-install v1.13.0 — systemd-journal group for the agent user (NAS verify) (2026-07-11)

- The agent-user setup now adds `felhom-agent` to the **`systemd-journal` group** (idempotent
  `usermod -aG`): the NAS verify-before-commit pipeline (agent v0.81.0) classifies mount failures
  from an UNPRIVILEGED `journalctl -u <unit>` read — group membership instead of a sudoers grant
  (rule: no journalctl via sudo). Existing installs get the one-liner
  `usermod -aG systemd-journal felhom-agent && systemctl restart felhom-agent` (applied to the
  demo host during this task's live validation; Peti's box only when the NAS feature reaches him).
- Version-header drift fixed: the file header still said v1.11.0 while `SCRIPT_VERSION` was
  1.12.0 (the v1.12.0 bump shipped without a changelog entry or header sync); both now 1.13.0.

## felhom-host-install v1.11.0 — uninstaller gap-closure + operator-key day-0 fold (TASK GL-4, go-live G6 + G1-follow-up) (2026-07-08)

- **Uninstall gap-closure (G6):**
  - NEW 4b4 block removes the self-update artifacts the install lays down but v1.10.0 never
    removed: `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-selfupdate-guarded`, the A/B slot files next to the live
    binary (`felhom-agent.prev` + orphaned `.new.*` temps), `felhom-agent-rollback.service`, and
    the `felhom-agent.service.d/felhom-agent-limits.conf` drop-in (+dir). Paths derived from the
    authoritative `felhom-agent/configs/felhom-selfupdate-guarded`; `pending.json` was already
    covered by the state-dir removal. Tolerate-absent, 4b2 shape.
  - Enrolled/network drives mounted under `/mnt/felhom-drives/<name>` are now unmounted (deepest
    first) before the root self-bind — **plain `umount` ONLY, never `-l`/`-f`**: a busy mount gets
    a warning + "eject via the dashboard or stop the apps and retry" and the root bind is then left
    alone (previously a child mount made the root umount die mid-teardown). The data is NEVER
    touched — no wipe/format path exists anywhere near `/mnt/felhom-drives`.
  - Both modes now END with an explicit **KEPT-vs-WIPED statement**: WIPED mirrors what the mode
    actually ran; KEPT names the drives + their data (physically removable; busy ones listed as
    retry), PBS backups + customer namespace (conditional on a pbs storage), the hub host/customer
    record, the escrow blob, and — when step 4b had vaulted one — the root@pam recovery credential.
  - Guest-only mode prints the drives the agent's bind store records for that vmid (best-effort
    from `/var/lib/felhom-agent/guest-binds.json`, generic note otherwise) + "eject BEFORE
    uninstall" guidance; no umounts there (remaining guests may use the drives).
- **Operator-key day-0 fold (the GL-1/G1 key-pin follow-up):** `OPERATOR_KEY_{OPERATIONAL,RECOVERY}_{ID,LINE}`
  constants (EMPTY until the operator's offline pin ceremony) + `--operator-pubkey-file PATH`
  (lines `operational|recovery <authorized_keys line>`; the comment field IS the key_id, required;
  malformed/empty file dies at argv time naming the line; file OVERRIDES the constants with a
  notice). Resolved keys are written to `authz.signers` in the agent config (exact
  `config.go` SignerKey schema; `nonce_store_path` left to the agent default). **Preserve rule:**
  script/file keys are authoritative ONLY when non-empty — a reinstall with no keys KEEPS a
  preserved config's signers (never silently clobber a manually-pinned box; replacing preserved
  signers logs a pin-rotation notice). byo disclosure names the operational key_id (or "NONE —
  dormant"); verify reports `authz signers: N` (armed) or a dormant WARN (dormant = safe default).
- Harness: +13 static cases (GL4-C1..C5 incl. 5 live key-file refusals + grep shapes, GL4-D
  disclosure↔uninstall parity, GL4-INV no-forced-unmount/no-format invariant) + PVE-tier **GL4 H-U**
  (full uninstall DRY transcript against the live guest, state-override protected). 28/28 PASS on
  felhom-pve; red-proofs RP-1 (4b4 dropped → parity FAILs), RP-2 (preserve guard dropped → C4
  FAILs), RP-3 (role-die dropped → C3a FAILs) all run→fail→revert on scratch copies.
- NOT live-validated (GL-6): the real (non-dry) uninstall with mounted/busy drives, the statement
  on a real teardown, and an armed key-pin install end-to-end.

## felhom-host-install v1.10.0 — --mode appliance|byo install profile (TASK GL-2, go-live G2/G4/G5) (2026-07-07)

- **`--mode appliance|byo` is now REQUIRED** for a fresh install / `--resume` (no default — the
  build-golden v2.0.0 precedent). `appliance` = the historical behavior, dry-transcript-preserved.
  `byo` = a Proxmox host the operator does NOT own (the pilot): **`step_break_glass` is gated OFF at
  its call site** (root@pam never reset, nothing vaulted — the one place the skip is auditable),
  `--cores` + `--memory` both mandatory (the only noisy-neighbor protection there),
  `--enable-oob`/`--rotate-recovery` refused at argv time, PVE-major gate (die on non-9.x unless
  `--force`), every `--acl-storages` entry must exist on the box (die naming ALL missing; appliance
  warns), informational host-DNS `:53` line, full host-mutation disclosure + typed-hostname
  acknowledgement (`/dev/tty`, dry-run-aware), and post-write config asserts that refuse
  `lan_resolver.enable`/`wg_tunnel.enabled`/`oob.enabled` = true (byo also flips the config write's
  lan_resolver DEFAULT to off; appliance keeps default-on).
- The old `--mode provision` value is retired (specific die message); the `dr` stub seam is kept.
  The mode is persisted in state.json; a `--resume` under the other mode refuses (C4).
- **Verify asserts (BOTH modes — campaign-2 R2 lesson):** the verify step now asserts pool
  membership of the provisioned vmid + every scoped ACL grant (user AND token: Base@/,
  Guest@/pool/felhom, Store@each storage); any miss → error + "WITH WARNINGS" verdict.
- **`--preflight-only`**: runs the full mode-aware step-1 checks, prints an explicit
  `PRE-FLIGHT PASS/FAIL` verdict, exits 0/1, writes NO state marks (never lets a later `--resume`
  skip the real preflight). Existing-guest count line added to preflight (both modes).
- `FELHOM_INSTALL_STATE_DIR` env override (test-harness only) so harness cases can never touch a
  live `state.json`; `usage()` switched to a marker-based range (the numeric one had drifted).
- **NEW `scripts/hostinstall-mode-harness.sh`**: static tier (bash -n, shellcheck, C1–C4 refusal
  matrix asserting exact die messages, grep-invariants: one gated break-glass call site, chpasswd
  unreachable outside it, --mode in usage) + PVE tier (C5 live-refusal + Scenario A/B dry
  transcripts via `FELHOM_TEST_CUSTOMER`/`FELHOM_TEST_PASSFILE`). Red-proofs RP-1..RP-3 executed
  (gate removed / caps requirement dropped / mode-mismatch check dropped → matching case FAILs).
- Live-validated read-only on felhom-pve: full static tier + C5 + byo dry transcript (no
  4b/8/chpasswd/recovery-credential; disclosure+ack+DNS+storage lines present) + `--preflight-only`
  PASS and FAIL verdicts with zero state entries. Full A/B rc=0 transcripts + C7 await the
  supervised GL-6 drill (blocked today by demo-felhom's EMPTY git.username/git.token — any step-5
  re-run for that customer dies until the operator sets real Gitea read creds).

## felhom-host-install — --enable-oob installs the dedicated felhom-sshd OOB instance + belt (TASK H1) (2026-07-05)

- `--enable-oob` + `install_oob` (in step 5): lays down the STATIC OOB parts — `/etc/felhom-sshd` tree
  + a dedicated ed25519 host key + the `felhom-op` login user + its scoped `/etc/sudoers.d/felhom-op`
  (visudo-validated) + the `felhom-sshd.service` unit (**RuntimeDirectory-guarded** — refuses the G1
  incident cause) enabled-not-started (the agent renders the config) + the static `inet felhom_oob`
  nft table (`nft -c`-checked) + its boot loader `felhom-oob-nft.service`. The agent reconciles the
  DYNAMIC parts (port claim, config, operator authorized_keys, belt set elements) once `oob.enabled`.
- Uninstall (step 4b3): stops/disables felhom-sshd + the belt loader, removes both units + the config
  tree + belt table + `felhom-op` user/sudoers; NEVER touches the stock sshd/:22/`/etc/ssh`.

## felhom-host-install — break-glass credential + management-plane watchdog install (TASK G1) (2026-07-05)

- `step_break_glass` (new step 4b): generates a strong root@pam console password (`openssl rand`,
  NEVER logged/filed — stdin→chpasswd + stdin→curl), sets it, and vaults it to the hub over the
  enroll-authenticated host-key channel (`PUT /hosts/{id}/recovery-credential`). Idempotent (state
  marker) unless `--rotate-recovery`. The human break-glass path for the PVE web console.
- `install_mgmt_watchdog` (in step 5): installs the G1 host artifacts from the agent repo configs —
  `felhom-privsep.tmpfiles` (boot-persistent `/run/sshd`), `felhom-mgmt-watchdog.{sh,service,timer}`
  (agent-independent ~60s privsep-dir auto-heal). **HARD GUARD:** refuses any fetched unit declaring
  `RuntimeDirectory=` (the SPIKE-felhom-sshd §8 incident cause). Non-fatal on a repo that predates the
  artifacts. Uninstall (step 4b2) stops+disables the timer and removes all four artifacts + the marker.

## docs — 06-doc S3 row SHIPPED + agent-side revocation semantics (2026-07-04)

Docs-only companion to **felhom-agent v0.64.0** (the S3 slice — keygen, registration,
agent-managed `wg-quick@wg-felhom`, escrow join; live-validated on felhom-pve incl. revocation
drill, reboot persistence, 30-min soak). 06-doc §3.5 now records: register-once marker,
revoked-stays-revoked, re-add via the registration endpoint (the raw registry add doesn't bump
the host generation — live finding), `wg_tunnel.enabled` default-FALSE rollout gate. S6 backlog
notes added (hub poll constant configurable + first-adoption log; registry-add bump-or-label).
CGNAT/mobile-hotspot appendix deferred (operator-assisted; §7's open validation stands).

## felhom-peersync.sh v1.0.1 — strip out of process substitution (exit-swallow fix) (2026-07-04)

The S1 REPORT's exit-swallow class, fixed: `wg syncconf wg0 <(wg-quick strip "$tmp")` hid the
strip exit code — a corrupt `wg0.conf.head` could feed syncconf empty/partial input that WIPES
the live peer set while the script exits 0 (and the bad conf is then persisted). v1.0.1 runs
strip as its own step into `$tmpdir/stripped`; a strip failure aborts BEFORE `wg` is invoked.
Sandbox red-proof (stub `wg-quick` exiting 1 after partial output + recording stub `wg`):
pre-fix shape invoked wg and returned rc=0; fixed shape errors first, wg never called.
Redeployed to the dev endpoint (runbook step 5 install); shellcheck clean.

## felhom-peersync.sh v1.0.0 — the offsite endpoint's WG reconcile script (2026-07-04)

S1 (doc 06 §5): the forced-command target the hub's wgsync pushes to (runbook
`offsite-endpoint.md` step 5 installs it as `/usr/local/bin/felhom-peersync`, root:root 0755,
invoked via a one-line sudoers grant from the `felhom-peersync` user's `restrict,command=`
authorized_keys entry). Validate-FIRST design: jq contract check (version 1, interface wg0,
44-b64 pubkeys, `10.77.0.x/32` allowed_ips, never the endpoint's own .1) rejects on stderr with
exit 1 before touching anything; then head-file + generated `[Peer]` blocks into a same-fs tmp,
`wg syncconf <(wg-quick strip …)` from the TMP (exact-match: adds/removes without bouncing the
interface), and only on success the atomic `mv` to `/etc/wireguard/wg0.conf` — runtime and boot
config can never diverge in the failure direction. Zero-peer payload = valid wipe. Never reads
or prints the private key; no `wg-quick save`; no second mode. shellcheck-clean. Live-proven on
felhom-hetzner incl. the negatives (malformed JSON / bad pubkey / own-IP peer → exit 1, wg state
byte-identical) and reboot persistence.

## docs — architecture Part 06: offsite connectivity design-of-record (2026-07-03)

`documentation/architecture/06-offsite-connectivity.md` — the settled offsite-backup-transport
design, authored from the spike verdict + operator-resolved forks (recorded, not re-litigated):
plain WG (D1), host-side **agent-managed** `wg-felhom` as the agent-managed-unit pilot on the
sudoers `*.mount` install pattern (D2), one shared hub-driven endpoint VM running WG + the
offsite PBS with no agent (D3, CF-token pattern), hub source-of-truth with a `wireguard` block
riding the existing `WireDesiredState`/DesiredGeneration channel (D4), one datastore +
per-customer namespaces (D5), and PBS **on** the VM — relay-through-DooPlex rejected as
non-scaling (D6). Includes the Day-0 join handshake, the robustness set (NOT-DynDNS roaming,
endpoint DNS re-resolve watchdog, MTU 1420, per-/32 topological isolation, tunnel-health through
the storage-target reachability model), trust conformance, the honest open ledger (CGNAT
unmeasured → mobile-hotspot smoke test; peer-sync push-vs-pull = slice-1 design point), and the
S1–S6 slice roadmap (MVP = S1→S2→S3, then S4; S5 merges with DR-completeness). All claims cited
at file:line against felhom.eu @ bf099f6 + felhom-agent @ 4ba1b14. `day0-install.md` backlog line
now points at spike + design doc. Docs-only.

## docs — SPIKE: offsite-backup connectivity — plain WireGuard WINS the ladder; Headscale = separable fleet layer (2026-07-03)

`documentation/audits/SPIKE-connectivity-wireguard-2026-07-03.md` — the offsite-backup transport
decision, empirically grounded on both real ends (demo-felhom PVE host ⟷ throwaway Hetzner box,
end state: powered off, secrets shredded). Headline results: the operator's line is **plain-NAT
with a fixed public IP, not CGNAT, and has zero IPv6** (P0 honesty — CGNAT confirmation deferred
to Peti's VM 110); plain outbound WG held an 11.4-min idle window and carried a **real 2 GiB
worst-case PBS backup at 4.26 MiB/s = the full home uplink** (~5% tunnel overhead), TLS pin
intact through the tunnel (positive + negative proof); UDP 51820 **and** 443 both pass; kernel WG
surprisingly *works* inside the unprivileged guest (P7 — host placement stands on architecture,
not infeasibility). Recommendation: host-side agent-managed WG (cloudflared pattern), key in the
escrowed IdentityBundle, small public endpoint VM (PBS-on-VM vs rendezvous-relay deferred to the
spec). `runbooks/day0-install.md` backlog line resolved to point here; `CONTEXT.md` notes the
DR-completeness task is unblocked (next: the production connectivity spec).

## skills — NEW: felhom-app-catalog (4th skill) + SparkyFitness as its worked example (2026-07-03)

`skills/felhom-app-catalog/SKILL.md` — the catalog **authoring workflow** (research → inspect the
image for the healthcheck family → write compose/.felhom.yml → deploy live through the dashboard →
verify healthy → reconcile the app count). Deliberately points at app-catalog `REUSE.md` §1–2 +
`README.md` §format for every field table (one-fact-one-place; no duplication). Unique content:
the never-guess-the-healthcheck rule with the per-tool image-inspection loop (BusyBox `ash`
`command -v` gotcha: it silently ignores all but its first argument — verified), the
probe-container naming rule (controller probes the container named exactly like the stack —
verified in `felhom-controller/internal/stacks/healthprobe.go`, row added to app-catalog REUSE.md),
the Hungarian-quote YAML kill, and the deploy-is-the-test doctrine. No installer change needed —
`install_skills.py` auto-discovers `skills/*/SKILL.md`; fresh-session discovery probe listed all 4.
Proven by finalizing `sparkyfitness` end-to-end on demo (see app-catalog-felhom.eu CHANGELOG).

## docs — golden 0.98.3 live: D.1b RETIRED, drill ledger B1/B5 → FIXED, backlog note resolved (2026-07-03)

Companion to felhom-agent's `build-golden.sh` v2.0.0 (@ `ceca355`): the golden now bakes the CURRENT
controller (0.98.3, mandatory-tag convention — B5) and a `felhom-controller-bootstrap.path` unit
(controller deploys on the bootstrap-mount hot-plug, no reboot — B1). Clean-room validated end-to-end
BEFORE publish (bake → isolated hot-plug proof → local-golden Day-0 install → publish → vouch →
`--force-gitea-golden` install); evidence: `documentation/audits/DRILL-golden-098-2026-07-03.md`.

- `documentation/runbooks/day0-install.md`: **D.1b reduced to a one-line version check** (fresh boxes
  land current + self-manage); old manual-update procedure moved to Part F troubleshooting keyed on
  "golden older than 0.86.0 was vouched"; header validated-versions line → script v1.9.1 / agent
  v0.63.0 / golden v0.98.3; A.3 records the drilled-known-good pair + "vouch ≥ 0.98.3"; A.4 floor
  text rewritten (fresh boxes now floor-honoring; recommend raising the global floor after a golden
  rebuild — operator, 1 min).
- `documentation/audits/DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03.md` ledger: **B1, B5 → FIXED** (pointers);
  R6 note: the installer's post-provision reboot is retained as a belt, removal recorded as a
  candidate cleanup (not done).
- `documentation/backlog/FOLLOWUP-golden-default-controller-tag.md` + `backlog/README.md`:
  **RESOLVED** per the M18/M19 convention (file kept + annotated; README entry marked FIXED).
- New evidence doc: `documentation/audits/DRILL-golden-098-2026-07-03.md` (A–D transcripts, unit
  states, resolution-order + fetch/sha proofs, cleanup, observations — incl. the SECURITY
  observation that the customer `git.token` has package-WRITE rights → scope-down + rotate
  follow-up).

## docs — day0-install D.1b narrowed + drill ledger B2/B3 → FIXED agent v0.63.0 (2026-07-03)

Agent v0.63.0 fixed both drill findings (B3 token reload-on-miss + B2 guesthook snippets-dir
mkdir; red-proofed, deployed on felhom-pve, Gitea-published sha256 b4a89c81…). Guide follow-through:
the D.1b "restart the agent first" step is now CONDITIONAL (only for an installed agent < v0.63.0 —
the Day-0 manifest still vouches 0.62.0, so today's fresh installs still hit it); the 401
troubleshooting row records the fix version; the drill ledger + go/no-go item 8 marked FIXED.
Operator follow-up unchanged: vouch agent 0.63.0 in the Day-0 manifest UI, then the step is dead.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.9.1 — clean-room drill fixes: residue-free uninstall + post-provision reboot (2026-07-03)

Companion to the Day-0 go-live package (`documentation/runbooks/day0-install.md` +
`documentation/audits/DRILL-day0-cleanroom-2026-07-03.md`). Every fix was found by the clean-room
drill (virgin nested PVE 9.2.2) and re-verified there (v1.9.1 uninstall → **zero-Felhom-residue
diff vs the pre-install baseline**; v1.9.1 install → controller up with no manual intervention).

- **Header/version sync** (the header said v1.8.0 while `SCRIPT_VERSION` said 1.9.0); keep-in-sync
  note on `SCRIPT_VERSION`; usage sed range follows the header (2,95).
- **Uninstall now removes the drill-found residue (R1–R5):** the agent **config**
  (resolved from the unit's `-config` BEFORE the unit is removed — it holds the per-host hub
  api_key), the `felhom-shared-parent` unit + wants links + `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-shared-parent.sh`
  + the `/mnt/felhom-drives` self-bind/dir, `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-mkfs-guarded`,
  `/var/lib/vz/snippets/felhom-guest-hook.sh`, and `/etc/dnsmasq.d/felhom-*.conf`
  (+ dnsmasq restart when touched). All tolerate-absent; summary lines updated (`sudo` AND
  `dnsmasq` packages are the documented package remnants).
- **Post-provision guest reboot (R6):** the golden's `felhom-controller-bootstrap.service`
  evaluates `ConditionPathExists=/etc/felhom-bootstrap/bootstrap.json` at BOOT, but the agent
  back-half hot-plugs the mount into the running guest — on slower hardware the first boot loses
  that race deterministically and the controller never deploys. `step_provision` now reboots the
  guest once (the agent's own output says "next: reboot the guest"); `step_verify` waits bounded
  (180 s) for the controller container instead of a momentary look.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.9.0 — Pool.Audit for the stale-lock reaper (A1) (2026-07-03)

Companion to felhom-agent v0.62.0 (audit A1: pool-membership ownership check). `PVE_PRIVS_GUEST`
gains **`Pool.Audit`** (12 → 13 privs, granted at `/pool/felhom` via the existing FelhomAgentGuest
role) so the agent can read `GET /pools/felhom` — its stale-lock reaper's ownership registry.
`Pool.Allocate` does NOT satisfy the read (spike SPIKE-a1-pool-membership-read-2026-07-03 T2).
No structural change: `_ensure_role` already `role modify`s to the exact priv set, so re-running
`--rescope-acl` (or a fresh install) upgrades an existing box idempotently; `remove_scoped_acl`
deletes by role name and needs nothing. **Deploy order on a live box: rescope FIRST, then deploy
agent v0.62.0** — the added read priv is harmless to an older agent, while the new agent on an old
ACL fail-safes its reaper (skips) and reports `pve:pool-read` degraded until the rescope lands.

## docs — SPIKE: A1 pool-membership read for the stale-lock reaper (2026-07-03)

Findings doc `documentation/audits/SPIKE-a1-pool-membership-read-2026-07-03.md`. Live-probed on
felhom-pve under the PRODUCTION scoped token vs root: LXC enumeration IS already pool-filtered
(token sees only 9201 of 4 guests); `GET /pools/felhom` 403s naming `Pool.Audit`; a throwaway
token with ONLY `Pool.Audit`@`/pool/felhom` reads members (minimal delta proven, fully torn down);
`/cluster/resources` withholds the `pool` field without `Pool.Audit`; local ownership records are
all partial. Recommendation for the A1 impl spec: add `Pool.Audit` to `PVE_PRIVS_GUEST` in
`felhom-host-install.sh` (L183) + a `GET /pools/felhom` cross-check in the agent's
`staleLockController.Guests()`, fail-safe skip on read failure. No script/agent change in this
commit — docs only. Appendix: committed-secrets (felhom.secret.yaml) rotation micro-runbook,
operator follow-up.

## install_skills.py — new: Claude Code skills installer (2026-07-03)

Installs `skills/*/SKILL.md` (felhom-build-deploy, felhom-ui-design, felhom-testing) into
`~/.claude/skills/` as Windows junctions (`mklink /J`) so repo edits are live immediately; falls
back to a full copy if junction creation fails or isn't followed (copy mode prints a re-run
reminder). Idempotent — re-runs detect a correct junction and leave it. Verified: junctions ARE
followed by Claude Code skill discovery (fresh-session probe found all three).

## reuse_refs_check.py — new gate: REUSE.md citation checker (2026-07-03)

Staleness defense for the new per-repo `REUSE.md` reuse maps. Takes repo roots as argv, extracts
every cited `*.go/*.py/*.html/*.css/*.yml/*.yaml/*.sh` path (slash-containing tokens only — bare
filenames are conventions, not citations), verifies each exists; prints offenders, non-zero exit on
any missing path. Symbols are spot-verified by the reviewer, not this script.
Usage: `python scripts/reuse_refs_check.py <repo-root> [...]`.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.8.0 — install the guarded-mkfs wrapper (Impl-1 Part B) (2026-07-01)

Companion to felhom-agent v0.54.0 (format-safety foundation). During agent install, fetch + install the
guarded-mkfs wrapper so the agent's format path is safe on any box.

- **New step in `step_agent_install`:** fetch `configs/felhom-mkfs-guarded.sh` from Gitea, `bash -n`
  validate, `install -m0755 -o root -g root` → `/usr/local/sbin/felhom-mkfs-guarded`. Installed BEFORE
  the sudoers (which now allowlists ONLY the wrapper, not raw `mkfs.*`), so the ordering is gap-free.
- The agent v0.54.0 sudoers (fetched by the same step) drops the raw `mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/* / mkfs.xfs -f
  /dev/*` allowlist and permits only `felhom-mkfs-guarded /dev/* *`, plus read-only `pvs`/`zpool` for
  the agent's unclaimed-disk guard. No other host-install change.
- `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings). Live-validated on felhom-pve (agent v0.54.0 deploy):
  wrapper refuses the OS disk + an LVM-PV partition, raw mkfs is sudo-denied, an unclaimed throwaway
  disk formats; the agent guard's sudo reads (pvs/lsblk/zpool) all work as the felhom-agent user.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.7.0 — 3b-fix: `Datastore.Audit` box-wide (restore drive visibility) (2026-07-01)

Fixes a regression the v1.6.0 pool-scoped ACL introduced: `Datastore.Audit` was placed in the
per-storage `Store` role (granted only on `local`/`local-lvm`/`felhom-pbs`), which **excluded the
enrolled removable drives** `felhom-usb`/`felhom-flash`. The agent enumerates storage via
`ListStorage`/`NodeStorage` (both gated by `Datastore.Audit` — `internal/storage/observe.go`), so it
could no longer SEE the drives → false "Meghajtó leválasztva" (drive detached) alerts + drives absent
from the agent-view. (The v1.6.0 swap's "felhom-usb → 403" was mis-read as blast-radius success;
felhom-usb is Felhom's OWN customer drive, not an out-of-scope object.)

- **`Datastore.Audit` moved from Store → Base** (`PVE_PRIVS_BASE` now `"Sys.Audit SDN.Use
  Datastore.Audit"`; `PVE_PRIVS_STORE` now `"Datastore.Allocate Datastore.AllocateSpace"`). Audit is
  read-only metadata, so box-wide Audit restores visibility of ALL storages (incl. dynamically-enrolled
  drives — no per-drive grant ever needed) while the **write** privs (`Allocate`/`AllocateSpace`) stay
  per-storage → write/allocate blast-radius containment is UNCHANGED. Confirmed at source: the agent
  creates no PVE storage (no `POST /storage`/`pvesm add`); drives are dir-storages it observes + mounts
  via host ops, so they need only Audit, never Allocate.
- **`apply_scoped_acl` reordered** Base-before-Store (role + grant) so a RE-APPLY on a live box adds
  `Audit@/` before Store drops its per-storage Audit → gap-free (the agent never loses enumeration).
- `remove_scoped_acl` / `--uninstall` / `--rescope-acl` operate by role NAME and inherit the corrected
  privs automatically (no other change).
- **Live-repaired felhom-pve** (two `pveum role modify`, Base first — no agent stop/restart): drives
  reappeared (agent-view 3→5 storages), detach alerts cleared. Re-tested under the scoped token: drives
  readable (was 403), write-containment intact (vzdump→felhom-usb still 403; out-of-pool guest 403),
  PBS Store grant unchanged. `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings).
- **NOT physically run** (source-confirmed, no `Datastore.Allocate` in the path): a brand-new-drive UI
  enrollment (needs a spare USB) — the host-ops/Audit path is unchanged from pre-3b.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.6.0 — pool-scoped token ACL (3-role) + `--rescope-acl` retrofit (2026-07-01)

Colleague-safety batch #4 phase b (script half; agent half = v0.53.0). Moves the agent token's dangerous
privileges off `/` (which spanned every guest + storage) to `/pool/felhom` + `/storage/<targets>`, so on
a shared box the token can only touch Felhom's own guests + storages. Validated by
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-pool-scoped-acl-2026-07-01.md` (PASS) — implemented here.

- **3-role scoped ACL (`step_token` rewrite).** Replaces the single `FelhomAgent` role granted at `/`
  with three roles, each granted to BOTH the user AND the token (privsep intersection): `FelhomAgentGuest`
  (`VM.*` + `Pool.Allocate`) @ `/pool/felhom`; `FelhomAgentStore` (`Datastore.*`) @ each of
  `PVE_STORAGES` (default `local local-lvm felhom-pbs` — the offsite PBS MUST be included, SPIKE
  residual #1; `--acl-storages` overrides); `FelhomAgentBase` (`Sys.Audit SDN.Use`) @ `/`. Helpers
  `apply_scoped_acl`/`remove_scoped_acl`/`_grant`/`_ensure_role`.
- **Pool before token.** `ensure_felhom_pool` runs at the top of `step_token` (always, incl.
  `--skip-provision`) so `/pool/felhom` exists before it's granted on.
- **Re-install safety.** `step_token` also removes the pre-3b broad `/` grant + `FelhomAgent` role if
  present (`remove_old_broad_acl`, tolerate-absent), so a re-install can't leave the old grant unioned
  with the scoped one. The post-provision `pool_add_guest` is gone (the agent's `restore --pool` makes
  the guest a member atomically — v0.53.0).
- **`--rescope-acl` retrofit** (new mode, mirrors `--adopt-pool`): migrate an existing install — ensure
  the pool + guest membership, apply the scoped grants, THEN remove the old broad grant (add-before-
  remove: the token is never grant-less mid-migration). Prints the "now deploy agent ≥ v0.53.0"
  ordering reminder. Idempotent + dry-run-aware. **SUPERVISED** (run with the agent stopped — the scoped
  ACL and the pool-param agent are mutually dependent; §13 of the task).
- **`--uninstall`** now removes the scoped grants + 3 roles AND the pre-3b broad grant/role (both
  tolerate-absent → works on either shape), keeping the pool delete-if-empty (v1.5.0).
- **Validated on felhom-pve** (dry-run): T-A fresh install (pool-before-token, 3 roles once, scoped
  grants incl. `/storage/felhom-pbs`), `--rescope-acl` (add scoped → remove old `FelhomAgent`), T-F
  uninstall (old-shape cleanup + pool not-empty skip). `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings).
  **The live rescope + agent swap is the supervised STOP** — not run here.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.5.0 — `felhom` pool by default + `--adopt-pool` retrofit + uninstall teardown (2026-07-01)

Colleague-safety batch #4 phase a. Every Felhom-managed guest now joins a dedicated **`felhom` pool**
for fleet uniformity (and as the environment the later pool-scoped ACL — 3b — will spike against). All
pool ops run as `root@pam` from the installer, so there is **NO agent/token/ACL change** and zero
permission-model risk (`PVE_PRIVS` untouched; the `FelhomAgent` token stays scoped at `/`).

- **New `felhom` pool default.** `step_provision` calls `ensure_felhom_pool` (create if absent,
  idempotent) and, after a successful provision, adds the guest via `pveum pool modify felhom -vms
  <vmid>` (skip-if-already-member). New helpers `pool_exists` / `pool_members` / `ensure_felhom_pool` /
  `pool_add_guest`; const `PVE_POOL="felhom"`. PVE 9 syntax + `/pools` JSON shape confirmed live before
  wiring (`pveum pool add|delete|modify`; `pvesh get /pools` → `[{poolid,comment}]`, `/pools/<id>` →
  `{members:[{vmid,…}]}`).
- **`--adopt-pool` retrofit mode.** Non-destructive: adds an EXISTING Felhom guest to the pool (creating
  it if needed), resolving the guest from `--vmid` else the recorded `provisioned_vmid`. Reuses the
  ours-check (`/etc/felhom-bootstrap` mount) — refuses a non-Felhom guest unless `--force`. Touches ONLY
  pool membership: never reconfigures/restarts the guest, never contacts the hub. Idempotent
  (skip-if-member).
- **`--uninstall` pool teardown (step 5b).** After the pveum removal, deletes the `felhom` pool **only
  if empty** (a destroyed guest is auto-removed from its pool); a pool that still has members is left
  with a `log_skip` naming them. Not reached on the Spec-1 safe-skip path (other Felhom guests remain).
- **Validated on felhom-pve** (dry-run + SAFE live): T-A fresh-install dry-run shows the pool create +
  membership lines; T-B **live adopt of guest 9201** → `pvesh get /pools/felhom` lists 9201, guest still
  running, config unchanged (the demo node is now pool-uniform); re-run = no-op; T-B' non-Felhom vmid →
  refusal; T-C uninstall dry-run → "pool felhom not empty (members: 9201) — leaving it". `bash -n` +
  `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings; the 2 pre-existing SC2015 in `step_verify` unchanged).
- **NOT changed:** `PVE_PRIVS`, the ACL grants, the agent, the provision-call args. 3b (pool-scoped ACL
  + agent restore-into-pool under a scoped token) is the separate spike-gated task.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.4.0 — appliance CPU/RAM cap passthrough (`--cores` / `--memory`) (2026-07-01)

Colleague-safety batch #3 (host-install half; the mechanism is agent v0.52.0). Lets an operator cap the
provisioned guest so a trial appliance on a SHARED production Proxmox doesn't pressure the colleague's
existing guests.

- **`--cores N` / `--memory M` (MiB)** — optional; passed through to the agent's `--selftest=provision`
  as `-cores`/`-memory`. `0`/unset = keep the golden's baked sizes (unchanged behaviour). New vars
  `CPU_CORES`/`MEM_MIB`; `usage()` header gains an "Appliance cap (optional)" group.
- **Conditional passthrough** — `step_provision` builds a `cap_args` array and appends the flags to BOTH
  the dry-run log and the real agent call **only when set**. An agent < v0.52.0 would reject an unknown
  flag, so the flags are never sent unless the operator opts in (see the deploy dependency below).
- **Pre-flight sanity WARN (soft, provision only)** — if `--cores` > host `nproc` or `--memory` > host
  `MemTotal`, `log_warn` "the cap won't protect other guests"; never `die` (the operator may know better).
- **Deploy dependency:** a fresh install using `--cores`/`--memory` needs the hub artifact manifest to
  serve **agent ≥ v0.52.0**.
- **Validated dry-run on felhom-pve:** `--cores 2 --memory 4096 --dry-run` → provision command shows
  `-cores 2 -memory 4096`; without the flags → neither present; `--cores 64 --memory 65536` → both WARN
  lines (host 4 cores / ~15771 MiB). `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean (0 new warnings; the 2 pre-existing
  SC2015 in `step_verify` unchanged).

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.3.0 — `--uninstall` (clean revert) + pre-flight guards (2026-07-01)

Colleague-safety batch #1+#2. Adds a first-class, guarded **`--uninstall`** teardown so an operator can
cleanly back out of a trial install, plus three provision pre-flight guards that stop common footguns.
Script-only; no agent/hub/controller change.

- **`--uninstall` (local host teardown — no hub contact, no passphrase).** Reverses an install in the
  install-order's reverse: **guest → agent(unit/sudoers/binary/state/user) → pveum(ACL,token,user,role)
  → golden(opt-in) → state file.** Every mutation goes through `run()` so `--dry-run` prints the full
  plan and executes nothing. Safety:
  - **Ours-check:** refuses to destroy a guest that lacks the `/etc/felhom-bootstrap` bind mount (matched
    by the constant guest *path*, not a hardcoded `mpN` slot — on the demo host it's `mp9`), unless
    `--force`.
  - **Typed confirmation:** must type the vmid to confirm PERMANENT destruction (read from `/dev/tty`;
    skipped only under `--dry-run`, where nothing is destroyed).
  - **Other-guests guard:** if any OTHER Felhom guest remains, destroys only the target and **leaves the
    agent + PVE token + state in place** (re-run with `--force` to remove host-level anyway — orphans the
    others).
  - **Never removes the `sudo` package**; never contacts the hub (the host record intentionally persists).
  - Presence-checked + idempotent: an already-absent guest/unit/sudoers/binary/user/ACL/token/role is a
    tolerated skip, not an error. The `pveum role delete` runs only after its ACL grants are gone (PVE
    refuses to delete a referenced role). Confirmed PVE 9 ACL-delete form:
    `pveum acl delete / --users|--tokens <x> --roles FelhomAgent`.
  - Target vmid resolves from `--vmid`, else the recorded `provisioned_vmid` (else dies). A `--vmid` that
    disagrees with the recorded one needs `--force`.
  - **`--remove-golden`:** with `--uninstall`, also delete the golden vzdump from the archive storage
    (`pvesm free`); otherwise it is left in place.
- **Install state now records `customer_id` + `provisioned_vmid`** (new `_state_put`/`_state_get` helpers,
  dry-run-guarded like `_state_mark`; the `completed[]` shape is untouched) so a later `--uninstall`
  resolves its target automatically and safely.
- **Pre-flight guards (provision mode):**
  - **Multi-node guard** — on a 2+-node cluster, `die` (naming the nodes) unless `--node` is explicit
    (new `NODE_EXPLICIT`); single-node keeps the current auto-pick. No-op under `--skip-provision`.
  - **Archive-storage-exists guard** — verify `--archive-storage` appears in `pvesm status` (else `die`);
    no-op under `--skip-provision`.
  - **RAM floor (WARN, never fatal)** — warn when `MemAvailable < 2048 MiB`.
  All three run inside `step_preflight` (before any mutation) so they also fire under `--dry-run`.
- **Validated dry-run-only on felhom-pve** (single-node, live guest 9201): T-A full uninstall plan, T-C
  not-ours refusal (red-proof), archive-missing `die`, RAM line, other-guests detector, state round-trip;
  confirmed 9201 + agent + pveum + state untouched after all dry-runs. `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean
  (0 new warnings vs. baseline; the 2 pre-existing SC2015 in `step_verify` are unchanged). **NOT yet
  live-validated (awaiting a supervised run):** a real live `--uninstall` (guest destroy + pveum removal)
  and the multi-node guard on an actual cluster.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.2.0 — /dev/tty passphrase read + vmid auto-detect (2026-07-01)

Two operator-experience fixes so a colleague can install online (via the hub's new "Option 1: Online
install" one-liner) and onto a host that already runs a guest at 9201.

- **Passphrase prompt reads from `/dev/tty`, not stdin** (`read_passphrase`). `read -rsp … < /dev/tty`
  makes the no-echo prompt work regardless of how stdin is wired — both download-then-run **and**
  `curl … | sudo bash` (where stdin is the pipe). Strictly more correct; the `--passphrase-file` path is
  unchanged. The passphrase is still never on argv / in logs / in the state file.
- **VMID auto-detect (`--vmid` now optional-smart).** New `VMID_EXPLICIT` flag (set by `--vmid`). The
  pre-flight vmid guard now determines "in use" against the **`pct list` + `qm list`** id-set (LXC and
  VMs share the id space — more complete than the old `pct status`, which only knew LXC):
  - **explicit `--vmid`** → unchanged deterministic behavior: die if the id is in use unless `--force`
    (destructive over-provision).
  - **default 9201, in use, no `--force`** → **auto-pick the next free id** (scan upward from 9201 over
    the used-set) and **ask to confirm** from the terminal (`read … < /dev/tty`, `[y/N]`); proceed on
    yes, `die "no free vmid confirmed"` otherwise. Never a silent auto-pick.
  - **default 9201 + `--force`** → over-provision 9201 (destructive) without prompting, as before.
  - New helpers `used_vmids` / `_vmid_in_use` / `next_free_vmid`. `--vmid` help text + `usage()` updated.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.1.0 — self-install the agent + fetch the golden from Gitea (2026-06-28)

The script now **installs the agent itself** (the last big manual Day-0 prerequisite is gone). It
fetches the agent binary + golden from Gitea generic packages and **verifies each against the
hub-vouched artifact manifest** before installing/using it. BUNDLE slice; pairs with hub v0.16.0
(artifact manifest endpoint + operator UI) and felhom-agent v0.43.0 (canonical unit + publish).

- **New step `5/8 agent install`** (before agent-config): resolves the manifest
  (`GET /api/v1/artifacts/{id}`, passphrase) + the git fetch token (from the customer's
  `controller.yaml` via config-retrieve — **NO new credential**); fetches
  `/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-agent/<ver>/felhom-agent`, **verifies sha256 vs the hub
  manifest** (aborts on mismatch — verify-before-use), backs up any existing binary, installs
  `0755 /usr/local/bin/felhom-agent`; ensures the non-root `felhom-agent` system user; installs the
  canonical sudoers (`0440`, `visudo -cf`-validated) + systemd unit; `daemon-reload` + enable. Idempotent:
  same version already installed + service active → skip.
- **`--skip-provision`:** install + configure + verify the agent (incl. golden fetch+verify) but do NOT
  provision a guest — the agent-only path for re-installing/upgrading the agent on a host that already
  has live guests. Adds an agent-only `step_verify_agent` (binary + non-root service active + a
  `--selftest=hub` collect-report).
- **New step `7/8 golden`:** local auto-discovery stays the default/fallback; otherwise fetches
  `/api/packages/admin/generic/felhom-golden/<ver>/golden.tar.zst`, **verifies sha256**, and imports it
  into the archive storage's dump dir for the restore. `--force-gitea-golden` forces the Gitea path.
- **Non-root agent model:** the agent now runs as `felhom-agent` with `privileged.mode: "sudo"` (was the
  dev/CI `direct`+root shortcut). The config is `chown`ed to the service user (0600) so the daemon can
  read it; `systemctl is-active` after restart is the real proof the non-root user can read the config.
- **Pre-flight relaxed:** a missing agent binary is no longer fatal (step 5 installs it); the local
  golden requirement is deferred to step 7.
- **Trust model:** checksum **trust root = the hub** (manifest), not Gitea; the fetch credential is the
  existing config-retrieve git token; artifacts are pinned to a version (never `:latest`).
- **Secrets:** the git token is a never-logged runtime carrier (cleared on EXIT alongside the passphrase
  / pve-token / hub api_key); the sudoers is `0440` and `visudo -cf`-validated before install.
- `bash -n` + `shellcheck` clean.

## felhom-host-install.sh v1.0.0 — Day-0 host bootstrap (provision mode) (2026-06-26)

First release. A single operator-run script that automates Day-0 on a freshly-PVE-installed
host: Proxmox API token → hub host enrollment (option C, single secret) → agent config →
guest provision → verify. Composes proven mechanisms (the `pveum` role/token sequence, hub
`POST /host-enroll`, `felhom-agent --selftest=provision`); grounded by
`documentation/audits/SPIKE-day0-firstboot-handshake-2026-06-26.md`.

- **7 steps, idempotent + resumable** via `/var/lib/felhom-install/state.json`: pre-flight →
  Proxmox token → compute grows → host-enroll → agent config → provision → verify.
- **Single-secret** (the retrieval passphrase): read no-echo or from a 0600 file, never on
  argv/logs/state. The global operator key never touches the box.
- **pveum automation:** 16-priv `FelhomAgent` role (create-or-modify), `felhom-agent@pve` user,
  privsep token (reuse-if-working else rotate), and **both** ACL grants applied **after** the
  token exists (token-remove purges the token ACL).
- **Auto-discovery:** golden archive (newest `vzdump-lxc-<golden-vmid>`), PVE node name, vmbr0
  bridge IP for the local-api, and the served-leaf TLS fingerprint pin.
- **Safety:** pre-flight fails fast (root, PVE 9.x, local-lvm headroom, hub reachable,
  customer+passphrase valid via read-only `GET /config/{id}`, golden resolvable); refuses to
  clobber an existing `--vmid` without `--force`; `--dry-run` previews every mutation;
  `--preserve-from` keeps operator infra (PBS/local_api/privileged/authz) on re-deploys.
- **`--mode dr`:** documented 10D stub (restore customer PBS snapshot instead of golden) — not
  implemented.
- **Live-validated** end-to-end on `felhom-pve`: authorized wipe of demo guest 9201 →
  re-provision from the golden → controller config-pull + public tunnel `HTTP 200` →
  host-report of guest 9201 → idempotent `--resume` no-op. (One ordering bug — token ACL
  applied before rotation — was found and fixed during the live run.)
