# 00 — Felhom Capability Map

> **What this is:** the single cross-component truth table of what the Felhom platform can do
> **today**, at what confidence level, with verifiable evidence. Rows are *scenarios* (user- or
> operator-visible outcomes), not modules — a scenario spans agent + controller + hub + catalog,
> and this is the only doc that shows that view.
>
> **What this is NOT:** a roadmap. Planned work lives in `documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md` and is
> referenced from gap rows by ID (`→ R-n`). A row here never claims future behavior.
>
> **Status enum (strict):**
> | Status | Meaning |
> |--------|---------|
> | **PROVEN-LIVE** | Exercised end-to-end on real infrastructure; MUST cite a campaign/drill/validation doc in `documentation/audits/` or `documentation/tests/`. No citation → not PROVEN-LIVE. |
> | **IMPLEMENTED** | Shipped + unit/red-proof tested, but the real flow has not been exercised live (or not on the surface that matters — noted per row). |
> | **PARTIAL** | Some legs live, some missing/unvalidated — the note says which. |
> | **MISSING** | Does not exist. Present-tense fact; if planned, the row points at a roadmap ID. |
>
> **Update rule (end-of-session checklist item):** if a task changed any capability's status,
> update the row in the same session — with the new evidence citation. A PROVEN-LIVE claim is
> subject to the cardinal rule like any other claim.
>
> *Verified 2026-07-16 against evidence corpus @ felhom.eu tip `4b18cc5` by CC (capability-map audit);
> see REPORT.md for the per-row verdict table.*

---

## A. Provisioning & day-0

| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Appliance day-0 install: golden image → first boot → auto-confirm (zero clicks) → claimable box | installer, agent, hub, golden | **PROVEN-LIVE** (nested VM) | `DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12`, `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` | First firing on real customer hardware pending → R-1 |
| BYO install: `--mode byo`, mandatory caps, host-mutation disclosure, coexistence guards | installer v1.15+, agent | **PARTIAL** | `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` (demo box); GL-8 coexistence fixes | Peti clean-slate reinstall on proxmox2 is the first real BYO run of the current path → R-1 |
| **The installer is PUBLISHED, not pushed — the artifact that runs as root on a virgin box is served from a version-controlled ref, and rolling back is one act** | scripts **v1.23.0** + `manifests/webpage.yaml` (R-110, operator ruling option (b)) | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | `scripts/CHANGELOG.md` v1.23.0 + `REPORT.md`. **Proven by HTTP against the real URL, not from a pod's filesystem.** *Scenario A:* a real push to `main` without moving the tag left the served script **byte-identical** (`sha256 2f859555…`), and a marker comment planted in that very commit was **absent** from the served bytes, while the website tree advanced to the new commit in the same observation — both halves of the split in one measurement. *Scenario B:* moving the tag published in **~40 s** (`sha → ea2b4aa9…`, marker present) and moving it back restored **exactly** the pre-publish sha. `https://felhom.eu/` returned 200 throughout. *P-A, measured BEFORE the manifest was touched because the model rests on it:* git-sync v4.4.0 follows a tag **and notices a moved one** (`update required … local:<old> remote:<new>` → `updated successfully`) | **Two syncs, deliberately: the WEBSITE still tracks `main`.** Pinning both would turn every copy edit into a release, which makes the release meaningless and the site slow to fix. **Publish** = cut `installer-v<SCRIPT_VERSION>` + bump the manifest `--ref` + sync; **roll back** = move the tag back, which needs **no ArgoCD sync and no deploy**. Continuity is structural rather than lucky: both trees are seeded by init containers so a fresh pod is not Ready until the tag is checked out, and `maxUnavailable` rounds to 0 on one replica, so a failed scripts-init leaves the OLD pod serving — the failure direction is *no update*, never *no `/scripts/`*. **The URL never carried a ref**, so the bootstrap script and the hub's day-0 command follow the tag with no edit and **no hub change**. The installer's own sixteen run-time fetches are a separate channel pinned to the AGENT's version (**R-183**), because they are the agent's configs and not this repo's — leaving them on `main` would have made the whole change cosmetic |
| Bare-metal Felhom ISO (blank hardware → zero-touch auto-install → first-boot `host-install`); selectable UEFI loader; **universal secret-free / operator-bind** mode | scripts v1.19.0 (`scripts/iso/`) + hub v0.62.0 + assistant container | **PROVEN-LIVE on TWO different boards** (N100 2026-07-18; HP t740 2026-07-21) | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — the full chain on real metal in a single pass:** the generic reusable pairing ISO (v1.20.0, `--loader mkimage`, SB off) booted the cheap AMI board that F1 had blocked, installed unattended, and the box **self-registered as an unclaimed appliance at 16:17:14 — the same second it first booted** (`appliance_registrations` id=3), then bound → credential-delivered → day-0 SUCCESS 16:32:32 → floor-lifted to current. **F1 is closed on physical hardware.** Prior nested legs: slice A `SPIKE-baremetal-iso-2026-07-16` (build gate, disk-filter fail-safe, stub→host-install fetch); slice B RUNBOOK-B (shim boots+installs OVMF SB-enforcing + SeaBIOS; `--loader mkimage` boots+installs SB-off; mkimage SB-enforcing **FAILS** `Access Denied`; surgery byte-identical); **slice C (2026-07-17): the GENERIC secret-free ISO** — box self-registers as an unclaimed appliance (`POST /api/v1/appliance/register`, one-shot poll delivery, 404-no-oracle — all live-verified through the public ingress), operator binds on the Hosts page, hub delivers credentials once; bootstrap harness proves direct(zero-appliance-calls)/pairing/delivery; artifact proven secret-free (baked env = hub URL only) | **F1 loader caveat:** `--loader mkimage` fixes cheap AMI firmware that can't USB-boot the stock GRUB — UNSIGNED → **Secure Boot must be OFF**; default `shim` keeps SB. **Slice C bind is operator-password-gated** (CC stages, Viktor binds) → the live boot→register→bind→day-0 composition + physical N100 boot fold into the supervised rehearsal (R-1). Customer-facing **self-bind page = R-27 slice 1 SHIPPED (hub v0.66.0, 2026-07-17)** — see the dedicated self-bind row | **Second board, 2026-07-21 (demo-hp, HP t740 / Ryzen V1756B / AMI M42):** the whole chain ran on virgin hardware in one pass — armed install → self-registration as an unclaimed appliance → operator bind → day-0 → running guest 9201 + agent 0.92.1 as `demo-hp-bb76ea`. **The shim loader booted with Secure Boot ENABLED**, which retires the assumption that Felhom installs need SB off — that was an N100-firmware workaround. The exact-serial disk filter took the system SSD and left the box's 1TB NVMe untouched/unenrolled on hardware it had never seen. Two failures filed rather than smoothed over: **R-59** (no DHCP → the installer baked a static fallback instead of aborting) and **R-61** (baked root password unknowable → no console access).
| Box survives a wrong-NIC install: hub-unreachable first boot → legible Hungarian console screen (NIC table + remedy) + NIC sweep self-heal (bounded DHCP + hub probe per NIC, success-only persist), and the baked root password is operator-knowable (`<iso>.rootpw.txt`) | scripts v1.24.0 (`scripts/iso/felhom-bootstrap.sh` `network_gate`/`sweep_nics`, `build-felhom-iso.sh` rootpw emission) | **PROVEN-LIVE (nested drill — nested ≠ metal: metal proof rides the next real multi-NIC install)** | `audits/SPIKE-firstboot-nic-sweep-2026-07-22.md` — dead-NIC install from the virgin v1.24.0 ISO baked the 192.168.100.2 fallback (WITH a dead default gateway), the R-59 screen painted on the console (screendump captured), and after the cable move the box swept to the working NIC, re-leased and **self-registered at the hub unaided in under a minute**; the drill also caught + fixed the stale-fallback-route trap (flush before the bounded dhclient) and verified the emitted rootpw against the installed box's shadow hash | R-59 ships as a first-boot gate, not an install-time abort (recorded deviation — the fallback is the auto-installer's own, initrd hook out of scope); sweep is structurally first-boot-only (`state.json` gate + unit done-flag condition); a box past install-start gets the screen but its interfaces are never touched |
| Customer claim: one-time emailed code → customer sets own password (bcrypt, operator never sees it) | controller v0.122, hub v0.50 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM) | `DRILL-day0-vm-2026-07-12` §10/F-4 (gate ON via real edge; claimed, code consumed) | Never executed by a non-Viktor human → R-3. **Deliverability (R-4), gmail half DONE 2026-07-18:** the rehearsal's claim email was the first sent under the tightened DMARC `p=quarantine` and **landed in the gmail Inbox, not spam** (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`). **freemail.hu remains Viktor's open half.** (Dropped mis-cited `CAMPAIGN-4` F-C — that is the escrow-claim 502, not password claim) |
| Customer binds their own appliance (self-service): operator-sent 7-day tokenized capability link → public two-factor `/bind/<token>` (console pairing code + retrieval passphrase) → hub stages the bind, no operator | hub v0.66.0 + ISO scripts v1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (real customer-zero bind on metal, 2026-07-18) | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`:** operator minted + emailed the link 16:28:55 (7-day TTL, expiry 2026-07-25 recorded); **the customer bound their own box at 16:29:55 with `attempts=0`, `locked=0`** — `appliance_bound` carries source **`customer_selfbind`**, and the credential was delivered **26 s later** with no operator action. Hub-side lifecycle in `hub-state.txt` (`selfbind_tokens` mint→email→consume). Prior unit evidence: hub v0.66.0 (`web/selfbind.go`, `store/selfbind.go`; Scenarios A–F + F1/F2; 4 red-proofs verified red — THE TRAP `/bind/` exemption, no-oracle, lockout, single-active); GC verdict §3 (no appliance GC → TTL stands alone) | R-27 **slice 1**. No appliance list ever rendered; wrong code == wrong passphrase (one generic failure); 5-attempt lockout → call support; expiry falls back to operator-bind. **Live first-run DONE 2026-07-18** (rehearsal; the console banner rendered on the real ISO). **R-27b** (controller second-box dismissable prompt) deferred; **multi-box-per-link** = repeated operator sends |
| Escrow ceremony: customer-facing wizard, one-shot R claim, operator zero-knowledge | controller v0.127, agent v0.88/0.89 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (drill VM, endpoint-exact) | agent v0.88.0 REPORT (ceremony ~4s, one-shot claim 200→410, R absent from every payload); `SPIKE-controller-escrow-2026-07-13` | **Customer-facing browser wizard FIRST LIVE FIRING 2026-07-18** (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`, S6): customer zero drove the wizard on the reborn box — ceremony started 16:56:29, recovery code claimed one-shot 16:56:39 (absent from logs by design), hub-verified and `EscrowState` auto-confirmed 16:56:41, **offsite runs enabled 12 s after the ceremony began**; the v0.138.0 „megerősítésre vár, legfeljebb 15 perc" awaiting card rendered and flipped on the ACK (operator screenshots: Viktor's set). Honest caveat: at a 12-second confirm the awaiting window is so short that catching *both* states on screen is luck, not procedure. Prior: endpoints driven on the drill VM. **agent v0.89.0:** `/escrow/preflight` `pbs_storage_id` row now live-reloads (reads current agent.json) — a pbsdr convergence that seeds the id flips it green with NO service restart. **hub v0.60.0 (data-first retention) — ⚠ the claim as written was FALSE for the offsite tier for two months; **FIXED in hub v0.93.0 (2026-08-04), and the row below states what ships TODAY:** a re-escrow with a DIFFERENT sealed passphrase no longer destroys the old blob — the hub RETAINS it (`host_escrow_superseded`) — and **since v0.93.0 the retained row carries `identity_blob` as well as the K-escrow blob**, so a previous passphrase does now stay recoverable with the recovery code that sealed it. **What was wrong until v0.93.0, recorded because it is the ninth entry in `CLAUDE.md`'s comment-vs-code table and the first that was also customer-facing copy:** `host_escrow_superseded` had no `identity_blob` column and `demoteCurrentEscrowTx` did not copy one, so what survived a supersession was the **PBS datastore key only** — never the restic repository password, which lives in `identity_blob`. The destroying act was the **escrow ceremony** a rebuilt box asks its customer to run. Measured live 2026-08-04, before the fix: both current rows held `blob`=383 B **and** `identity_blob`=572 B; both retained rows held `blob`=383 B only. → **R-198** (SHIPPED), evidence `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §7. **THREE SCOPE LIMITS THIS ROW MUST NOT BE READ PAST.** (1) **Nothing was backfilled and nothing could be** — rows superseded before v0.93.0 were written without the blob and their source rows are already overwritten; both demo boxes' pre-2026-08-04 repository passwords are gone permanently. (2) **A retained key is not a restore — but as of 2026-08-04 evening it IS a recovered key.** See the row below. (3) The customer-facing orphan card still promises recoverability unconditionally (R-202, gate hit, card untouched). Guided-recovery flow = R-26. Red-proof `TestSaveHostEscrow_RetainsSuperseded`. **hub v0.60.1 — custody survives the host lifecycle:** host deletion (with the escrow ack) DEMOTES the current blob to retained custody (moved into `host_escrow_superseded`, never destroyed; existing superseded rows spared); the customer Danger-zone Delete is the one true purge point (cascades both escrow tables incl. already-deleted hosts). No operator path through host lifecycle can lose a blob. Red-proofs `TestDeleteHost_DemotesEscrowNeverDestroys` + `TestDeleteCustomer_PurgesEscrowCustody`. **agent v0.93.0 (2026-07-21) — recovery codes can no longer contain a hyphenated word.** The EFF large list holds exactly four entries containing the hyphen the words are joined with (`drop-down`, `felt-tip`, `t-shirt`, `yo-yo`); drawing one produced a code that reads as 11 words instead of 10 — ambiguous to transcribe in exactly the situation R exists for. They are now excluded **from GENERATION only**: the draw space goes 7776 → 7772 and a 10-word code 129.248 → 129.241 bits, still well clear of the 128-bit floor. **Every code already issued remains valid** — R is verified as a whole passphrase by the PBS scrypt KDF and is never re-split, so no customer needs to re-run a ceremony. This also retired the long-standing ~1/5 `TestGenerateRecoveryCode_EntropyAndFormat` flake, which was this defect and not a flaky test |

| **The offsite repository password can be RECOVERED from the sealed escrow with the customer's recovery code** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.195.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04)** | On demo-felhom, through the real endpoints end to end: the box fetched its own sealed blob from the hub with its own per-host credential (hub log: *escrow blob SERVED … 572 opaque bytes, self_scope=true*), the agent unsealed it with the customer's recovery code, and the extracted repository password's sha256 was **byte-identical** to the one on disk — `c60c8bc737a6…`, which is ALSO the hash the hub had independently stored, so three sources agree. Five minutes earlier the same path with a WRONG code failed closed at age's KDF with nothing written, which proves links 6 and 7 ran independently of the success. R was searched for afterwards and found in 0 log lines and 0 files, with a positive control confirming the search would have found it. Evidence: per-repo CHANGELOGs; `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3 links 6–8 | **WHAT THIS ROW DOES NOT CLAIM, stated because the previous over-claim here was struck out four hours earlier.** It covers the KEY, not the DATA. **R-199 BACK-POINTER (omitted when this row was written): the recovery chain's link inventory and the per-link status live in `audits/RECON-offsite-dr-chain-2026-08-04.md` §3; links 1–8 are walked, 9–11 are not.** **Re-confirmed 2026-08-04 evening by an attempt to prove the DATA half:** the R-201 drill was prepared on demo-hp and **halted before the wipe** — the sentinel file was not in the off-site snapshot (R-203), so the wipe would have destroyed it and proven nothing. **No file has still ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (`audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md`). The install half of the chain (controller v0.196.0 `--recover-offsite-install`, R-200) is likewise unit-proven only — it has never run against a live recovery. A recovered password has never been **installed** (the diagnostic compares and refuses to write, by design), no existing repository has ever been **reopened** under one, and **no file has ever been restored** from an off-site history via a recovered key. Links 9–11 of the chain are open (R-200's remaining half, R-201). The proof also used a box whose local key still exists — the rebuilt-box case, where there is nothing to compare against, is exactly what the drill covers and it has not run || DR tier by default: PBS + WireGuard base infra on every install, hub-controlled activation | installer v1.15, agent v0.86, hub v0.51 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21) | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` §2 (WG enabled both modes, PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned ~1s after WG registration, zero operator steps); ships installer v1.15/agent v0.86/hub v0.51 | Live only on demo/drill fleet. (Cited spike was slice-0 mechanics — shipped nothing; corrected.) **⚠ The candidate upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE is WITHDRAWN — the 2026-07-18 rehearsal produced a live counter-example (R-39).** On the reborn N100 the descriptor auto-provisioned and the agent reported `converged state=applied` (16:45:53), yet **the storage is dead**: `pvesm status` → `felhom-pbs: error fetching datastores - 401 Unauthorized` / `inactive`, and a direct probe with the stored credential returns **401 on every endpoint including `/version`** while the WG transport is healthy (handshake 9 s, 27.9 ms RTT) — i.e. authentication failure, not ACL scope. Root cause in the evidence: **the hub minted a SECOND token secret at 16:47:52, two minutes after the agent had applied the first, and `consumed_at` is still NULL**; the converged state machine will not re-apply, and the agent's 15-minute verify loop **cannot even read the credential to notice** (`open /etc/pve/priv/storage/felhom-pbs.pw: permission denied` — non-root agent reading a file it writes through a root wrapper). A tier that reports `applied` while silently unable to authenticate is exactly the shape that must not carry a PROVEN-LIVE badge. See `tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` F2 and `pbs-dr-state.txt`. **agent v0.89.0 closes the F4 non-default-storage-id gap (R-22) — PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-17:** the reconcile self-grants the ACL through the root wrapper on a pre-check 403 instead of dead-locking. Reproduced F4 on the demo (marker moved aside = reinstall fresh-state + felhom-offsite ACLs revoked) → next reconcile tick `pbsdr: pre-check 403 … self-granting … (R-22)` → `converged state=adopted` in ~3 s, ACLs self-restored, `pvesm status felhom-offsite`=active, zero operator action. No more one-shot `pveum` grant  **2026-07-21 — the R-39 fleet fix SHIPPED (hub v0.68.0 + agent v0.91.2), closing the self-heal chain end to end.** The three defects that let a box be `applied` and dead simultaneously are each addressed: the hub stamps a monotonic `secret_generation` into the descriptor so a credential re-key finally MOVES the content hash the agent re-applies on; the wrapper gains a narrow `read` verb so the non-root agent can read the credential it writes (it never could — `/etc/pve/priv` is 0700 root:www-data, which made the verify loop blind by construction); and `pbs.ProbeAuth` turns a 401 into a loud `auth_failed` that the existing `pbsdrheal` damper escalates to a fresh mint. Plus a consumed_at honesty gauge for the disagreement no single tier can see (box says `applied`, hub's staged secret never consumed). Proven live on felhom-pve: the agent read its credential through the wrapper (`rc=0`) and probed successfully (`credential probe OK storage=felhom-pbs`). **STOP-2 RAN 2026-07-21 AND THE CHAIN CLOSED — 13 SECONDS, operator click to converged.** The operator pressed **Re-issue PBS credentials**; the identical click on 2026-07-18 did nothing at all. Full chain (hub UTC / host CEST = UTC+2): `08:39:31Z` hub mints a fresh secret, **generation 0 → 1**, and the descriptor gains `"secret_generation": 1` — with `token_id` and `fingerprint` **byte-identical**, i.e. exactly the re-key shape that used to be invisible → `10:39:34` the agent READS its credential through the wrapper (leg b — the read that was impossible until v0.91.0) → `10:39:38` **`ERROR pbsdr: the DR endpoint REJECTED this box's credential — the tier is applied and DEAD` `previous_state=applied`** (leg c: the exact R-39 failure state, detected out loud for the first time ever) → `10:39:45` **`one-time token secret consumed`** `secret_len=36` (leg a: **NO short-circuit** — this is the line that never appeared on 2026-07-18) → `10:39:45` `felhom-pbs-apply reconcile` (the set-only wrapper, no `--server`) → `10:39:47` **`pbsdr: converged state=applied`**. Corroboration: the agent marker hash moved to `afbb3b41…` (it was byte-identical to the pre-reissue marker in the failure); `consumed_at` stamped `08:39:45Z`; the on-disk secret's mtime moved `2026-07-18 20:28:52` → `2026-07-21 10:39:45`; a live probe with the NEW credential returns **200**; three consecutive hub reports trace the whole state machine `applied → auth_failed → applied`; and **zero** `pbsdr_selfheal` escalations fired — the box healed through the descriptor path before the damper was ever needed, with exactly ONE mint and ONE consume and no `consumed-failed.json`. **Row upgraded to PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-21).** Evidence: `felhom-agent/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21). |

| **A customer's file survives a machine rebuild and comes back — the whole off-site story, end to end** | hub v0.94.0, agent v0.125.0, controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04 night drill)** | demo-hp's controller data volume was destroyed and the sentinel deleted from disk. The customer's recovery code then produced `8a9e33aa4da6…` — **byte-identical** to the pre-wipe on-disk key and to the hub's independent record — and installed cleanly on the bare box. `identity_blob` was unchanged across the wipe (572 B, `updated_at` still 11:11:37). Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-night-run-2026-08-04.md` §2 | **WHAT IT DOES AND DOES NOT CLAIM.** PROVEN: after a real rebuild the key recovers byte-identical, the EXISTING repository opens (3 snapshots, 42 026 B — the pre-wipe size; not a fresh history), and the customer restore flow returns the file byte-identical. **ALL FOUR MANUAL INTERVENTIONS ARE CLOSED, AND THE CUSTOMER IS NOW OFFERED THE RECOVERY (2026-08-05). ONE QUALIFIER REMAINS AND IT IS NOT THE OLD ONE — state it precisely.** The 2026-08-04 drill needed four interventions between "the key is recoverable" and "the file is back", none of them in any design document (R-204). **Items 1–3 closed in controller v0.198.0 + hub v0.95.0** (the reset code works first time; a Re-issue no longer marks a healthy escrow stale; a unit restore states it returned the app's definition and database and NOT the customer's files). **Item 4 closed in controller v0.199.0 + hub v0.96.0** (a rebuilt box DECLARES `offsite.state=needs_credential` and `internal/offsiteheal` re-arms the stored credential before minting). **AND THE "needs someone who knows to look" HALF IS NOW GONE TOO (controller v0.200.0, R-193):** a full-page recovery screen takes over the landing pages while the hub holds a sealed package this box cannot open, explains that nobody can replace a lost recovery code, takes the code, opens the repository and lists what is in it — proven live on demo-felhom, which is genuinely in that state (`/launcher` → 302 `/recovery`; a wrong code refused with nothing written, three times, no lockout; the code found in no file, no container log and no debug ring, with a planted-copy positive control that first exposed a mis-aimed sweep). **WHAT THE QUALIFIER IS NOW, and it is narrower:** (1) **the final unlock has never been driven with a CORRECT code through the page** — no recovery code was kept for demo-felhom's orphaned history and demo-hp's is operator-held out of band, so the live run exercised the whole chain (handler → agent → hub fetch → age KDF) and stopped at the unseal; the install and listing rest on tests. (2) **putting files back in place is deliberately NOT part of this** — restore stays per-app, and the step after the listing is R-213. (3) **the journey has still not been re-walked end to end since these fixes** — the closures are proven individually, not as one uninterrupted run. That re-walk is one more drill and it is what is owed. Scope: `demo-hp`, a controller-data-volume rebuild — **NOT** a total host loss, and **NOT** a guest reprovision. **⚠ THE RE-WALK RAN ON 2026-08-05 (CAMPAIGN-11) AND IT FAILED. THIS ROW STAYS AS IT IS — it records a key recovering and a file returning, which remains true — but the JOURNEY row below is the honest verdict and this row must not be read as covering it.** The campaign built a throwaway appliance from the published ISO, destroyed it, and walked the customer's route: **the data half PASSED** (three sentinels byte-identical, including a 12 MB binary and a non-ASCII Hungarian filename, out of the pre-wipe snapshot in 16 s) and **the journey half FAILED** — four operator interventions, three needing root on the appliance, and the first of them was the machine telling the customer their perfectly correct recovery code was wrong (R-216). **R-198's retention is NO LONGER unit-proven — it was PROVEN IN PRODUCTION on 2026-08-05** (CAMPAIGN-11 Phase 3): the first supersession since the fix retained `identity_blob` at **572 B, byte-length exact**, carrying the OLD key `626e424670248db3` while the current row moved to the newly minted `e11a6c542b73477a`; `offsite_repo_key_changed` and `escrow_superseded` both fired at the instant of supersession, and the next off-site run REFUSED as `orphaned` rather than starting a fresh history. Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` |
| **The customer's own UNAIDED recovery journey, end to end** | controller v0.206.0, hub v0.98.0, agent v0.127.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-07, the fifth walk) — an unaided customer journey on a real installation, SCOPED: see what it does not claim** | A throwaway appliance was built from the published ISO on demo-hp, claimed, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, then destroyed — guest purged and both enrolled drives wiped. The rebuild and the customer's route were then walked with **no command line inside the guest**. **Data: PASS.** All three sentinels byte-identical (`beb9175d…`, `7c8cb0ad…`, `e012e76f…`), including a 12 MB binary and `C11-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` — the Hungarian filename survived disk → restic → SFTP → Storage Box → restore → disk intact. Restored in **16 s** out of the pre-wipe snapshot `f3d9cd67`, non-destructively. **Journey: FAIL.** Four interventions, three of them root on the appliance: R-216 (a correct code called wrong), R-218 (the store never opened; the box stopped asking), R-219 (the promised listing structurally could not render), R-220 (the app could not be redeployed — its drives were unenrollable). Evidence: `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal.md` | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM, and what the v0.201.0/v0.97.1 fixes do and do not change.** Six of the nine findings are fixed and each is red-proofed (R-216, R-218, R-219, R-217, R-222, R-215) — but **fixes are not a journey.** This row goes green only when the walk is repeated end to end and completes with no operator intervention. **Three findings are deliberately still open and each is a live blocker for some flow:** **R-214** (the console never stops showing a stale pairing code), **R-220** (after a rebuild the customer's drives cannot be re-enrolled — the deploy refuses and the wizard's list is empty, so no app can be redeployed onto its own data drive), **R-221** (a rebuilt box cannot run the escrow ceremony at all, because the pbsdr convergence marker survives on the host while the seeded `escrow.pbs_storage_id` is rewritten out of `agent.json`). **And R-216's fix does not by itself make a NEW box work:** with the hub guard corrected but the Day-0 manifest still vouching agent 0.120.0, a new box is **HELD, not served** — it stops being lied to, which is better, but the feature does not work for it until agent 0.125.0 is vouched.  **⚠ CAMPAIGN-11 PHASES 2 + 4 RAN OVERNIGHT 2026-08-05/06 AND THIS ROW STAYS **FAIL**.** **What they add:** eleven injected faults against the recovery journey, each with a positive control, and a full unattended scheduled cycle. **The backup promise strengthened** — the off-site tier ran itself at 04:15 on a box rebuilt twice and set aside hours earlier (`snapshot_count` 1 → 2), all five daily jobs fired exactly once, and nothing on the must-not list fired. **R-217's and R-215's fixes were proven live under exactly their faults**, the set-aside proved it does not delete (12 535 KB byte-exact at the far end), and a wrong code was refused three times with nothing written and no lockout. **What they do NOT add: any progress on the JOURNEY.** These faults are **not a re-walk** — no customer route was walked end to end — and four new findings say the journey got no better where it matters: **R-224** (a hub outage and a stopped agent are BOTH reported to the customer as a bad recovery code, in 0.056 s and 0.030 s — no unseal attempted; the agent's own `err` distinguishes them and it is discarded at the HTTP boundary, and R-216's gate answers `source=version` so it cannot see reachability — **Phase 1's headline defect relocated from the version channel to the transport**), **R-226** (M1, the only message telling a customer to check their typing, is unreachable on any box that has re-escrowed), **R-225** (an unread store renders `0 pillanatkép · 0 GB` above a card saying it holds backups — 1 snapshot and 12 535 KB were really there), **R-228** (the set-aside history is recorded in `orphaned_renamed_to` and shown by nobody — `OrphanedRenamedTo` has zero references in any template or handler). **§4.1 is now MEASURED rather than deduced** — the floor IS served, from the box's own rendered `GetFloor()` and a cold-started controller's settle-gate line. **§4.2's positive half is still NOT measured** and needs a rebuild. Evidence: `audits/CAMPAIGN-11-recovery-journey-2026-08-05.md`, `tests/campaign11-evidence-2026-08-05/journal-phase24.md`  **2026-08-06 — THE FIVE PHASE-2 FINDINGS ARE FIXED AND THIS ROW STILL SAYS FAIL.** controller **v0.202.0** + agent **v0.126.0** close R-224, R-226, R-225, R-227, R-228. **What changed:** the unlock path now classifies WHY it failed, from the value and never the text, and the message that mentions typing is reachable from exactly one class — a real refusal — with **unknown defaulting to neutral**. Proven live on the venue with the same wrong code and only the hub's reachability changed: `400 → 502 → 400`. **What it does NOT change: this row.** Fixes are not a journey; nothing here walked a customer end to end, and three of the blockers that made Phase 1 fail are still open (**R-220** in particular is worked around BY HAND on the venue — without that unmount no app can be deployed on a rebuilt box). **What still needs proving:** a re-walk with no operator intervention, and specifically the customer-facing messages end-to-end — they were NOT re-driven, because `/recovery` correctly retires itself once the old data is set aside and restoring that state would be the reconfiguration the fix task forbade. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md`  **⚠ THE RE-WALK RAN 2026-08-06 (R-201, attended) AND THIS ROW STAYS FAIL — but it is a nearer no.** A brand-new appliance was built from the published ISO, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, destroyed (guest purged AND both drives wiped), reinstalled and walked. **THE DATA: PASS** — all three sentinels byte-identical, including a 12 MB binary and an accented Hungarian filename **whose NAME BYTES are also identical**, restored in **23 s** out of the pre-destruction snapshot through the customer's own flow. **THE JOURNEY: FAIL — TWO dead ends against Phase 1's four.** (1) **R-218's CONSUME half**: the hub re-staged the credential and said "the box re-consumes on its next cycle"; a full cycle ran (positive control) and it did not — no customer-reachable action fetches it, and the only lever is a command line INSIDE THE GUEST. (2) **R-220**: the drives are still unenrollable after a rebuild, needing a Proxmox-host unmount, without which no app can be redeployed and the restore page stays empty. **The unaided RTO is therefore STILL UNDEFINED**; the attended figure was 30 m 13 s and must not be quoted as the customer number. **What passed and is new:** the recovery screen appeared WITHOUT being sought, answered all three of its questions with a seal date matching the hub exactly, the emailed reset code worked first try, and the unlock was a real 1.528 s unseal that placed the key. **⚠ AND IT DOES NOT CLAIM DELIVERY:** the fresh install landed on controller 0.201.0 / agent 0.125.0 — the vouched versions, neither carrying the fixes — which were installed BY HAND. Fleet delivery needs a golden carrying the fixed controller and a vouched agent, and nothing was vouched. Evidence: `tests/rewalk-r201-2026-08-06/journal.md`   **⚠ 2026-08-06 (later the same day) — THE TWO DEAD ENDS ARE CLOSED AND VOUCHED, AND THIS ROW STILL SAYS FAIL.** controller **v0.203.0** + agent **v0.127.0** close **R-218's consume half** and **R-220**, and golden **0.203.0** / agent **0.127.0** / `min_agent` **0.127.0** are now VOUCHED — so the delivery gap the re-walk recorded (“the fresh install landed on versions neither carrying the fixes”) is gone. **Both were then proven live on a genuinely rebuilt box** (Part 4 venue, VM 323): the reinstall landed on agent 0.127.0 with **no downgrade and no hand upgrade** (the previous re-walk's reinstall downgraded 0.126.0→0.125.0), `/disks/candidates` returned **both drives** after the guest was purged with the raw mounts still on the surviving host — before the fix, two empty lists — and both **re-attached through the customer endpoint**; the off-site credential was re-staged by `offsiteheal` at 13:24:57Z and **collected by the box on a tick, unaided**. **Why the row is still FAIL:** the walk did not finish. It stopped at the restore surface — **R-237**, the list was keyed on apps that are currently INSTALLED and currently TOGGLED ON for future backups, so a rebuilt box was shown nothing to restore while the repository held its snapshots. Fixed in **controller v0.204.0** (the store is now the source of the list) and proven live on that same venue with the toggle switched OFF, but **no sentinel was restored in that walk**, so the data half is unproven in EITHER direction for this venue. **R-238 was RECLASSIFIED, not fixed as filed:** `mode=full` without `confirm=1` is step 1 of a deliberate two-step that starts no job by design; the endpoint driver did not carry `?full_prep=` forward. The operator drove the same restore to completion in a browser. Its real residue — that step logging nothing at all, including when the headroom gate refuses — is fixed. **R-236 was WITHDRAWN: not a defect.** **This row goes green only when a walk completes end to end with no operator intervention, restoring a byte-identical sentinel.** Evidence: `tests/part4-rewalk-2026-08-06/journal.md`, `tests/teardown-2026-08-06.md`, `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` **⚠ THE FINAL WALK RAN OVERNIGHT 2026-08-06/07 AND THIS ROW STAYS FAIL — the data half passed again, the journey half failed further from the line than before.** A brand-new appliance was built from the published ISO, fixtured, soaked through a real scheduled cycle, destroyed and rebuilt. **THE DATA: PASS** — all three sentinels byte-identical out of snapshot `f5c53b03`, including a 12 MB binary and an accented Hungarian filename **whose name BYTES are identical too**. **THE JOURNEY: FAIL, and this time the customer has NO route at all** — `/` lands on the launcher with no recovery pointer, `/recovery` **302s away**, and the remote-backup page offers to **CREATE a new recovery code**, which would orphan the very history the customer's code protects. **There is no field anywhere to enter the code they hold**, and the operator's documented remedy refuses too. Cause (**R-241**): the credential self-heal — proven working unaided in the same walk, six hours earlier, as its best result — writes a FRESH repository password, which moves the box out of `OffsiteRecoveryOffer()`'s (a) pristine case while (b) orphan-detected is unreachable because runs are blocked by `escrow_state: pending`. **R-218's shape one level up.** **What DID pass, and is new:** the whole credential chain ran end to end with zero human action on an unclaimed box — declare, `offsiteheal` re-stages after two reports, the box's 5-minute retry collects it, tier applied — the **first live sighting** of that success line, settling R-218's consume half and R-236's withdrawal. Also new: **R-239** — a fresh install lands on controller **0.203.0** while 0.205.0 is released, so R-234 and R-237 are written but **not delivered**, proven from the customer's side (T2, T3). **This row goes green only when a walk completes with no operator intervention AND a byte-identical sentinel.** Evidence: `tests/finalwalk-r201-2026-08-07/journal.md` **⚠ 2026-08-07 — R-241 WAS DIAGNOSED BY A READ-ONLY SPIKE ON THE STANDING VENUE, AND THE DIAGNOSIS REVERSES THE FIX. This row is unchanged: still FAIL, and no code was written.** The question was whether R-241 is a screen-predicate defect or a minting defect. **It is a MINTING defect.** The screen was telling the truth — there genuinely was nothing recoverable under the key the box held, because the box minted that key itself over the top of a sealed package it already knew the hub was holding. **Three measurements, from the venue rather than from the earlier report:** (1) `WriteOffboxSecrets` (`offbox.go:411`) mints on ONE input — does the file exist — while `OffsiteRecoveryOffer()` and `needsOffsiteCredential()`, both in the same file, consult `GetHubEscrowIdentityPresent()`; the same fact is available on three paths and used on two. (2) That flag was the **precondition of the chain that reached the minting**: the retry job logs only when the declaration is live, and the venue logged `credential retry: … (the box still declares a need; retrying)` at **02:48:03Z** — thirty minutes and six ticks before the mint at 03:18:06Z. (3) **The box computed the answer and discarded it**: at **03:28:03Z**, thirty-five minutes before the customer looked, `EscrowAutoConfirmer.Reconcile` (`escrow_confirm.go:154`) logged `the hub's escrow blob does not cover the CURRENT repo password (hub hash 30ef574fe492… != local 9b4a9a9dcec7…)`. It is recomputed every report cycle and never persisted. **And the hub explicitly disclaims doing this** — `offsiteheal`'s package doc: *"credential automatic, key customer-present — the ruling this session implements and must not quietly widen."* **Shape (b) is structurally unreachable on this box** (the escrow gate at `offbox.go:743` sits upstream of `ensureOffboxRepo`, the only producer of `RepoState="orphaned"`; positive control: the scheduler was alive, 241 `agent-channel-health` ticks, and `offbox-backup` is a `sched.Daily` leg whose slot fell before the destruction). **Two by-products:** **R-243** — a box in this state silently stops backing up off-site and **no alarm fires** (`isStale` requires `escrowed`, `offsite_delivery_stuck` skips the `applied` shape, `backup_failed` needs a run that never happens); and the trap in the obvious fix — `ResetOrphanedRepo` clears the orphan flag without a ceremony, so a hash-mismatch discriminator alone would re-offer the screen forever to a customer who declined the old data. **Q7:** the „Helyreállítási kód létrehozása" button does NOT destroy the data — R-198's retention copies the `identity_blob` — but it converts a self-service recovery into one needing an unbuilt read path (R-199), and it re-enables the screen while invalidating the code that screen accepts. Evidence: `audits/SPIKE-r241-recovery-offer-2026-08-07.md` **⚠ 2026-08-07 (later) — R-241 IS FIXED (controller v0.206.0 + hub v0.98.0) AND THIS ROW STILL SAYS FAIL.** Three changes, following the spike's ruling rather than the obvious reading: the box **no longer mints a repository key while the hub holds a sealed package** (a conjunction, so a first-time box is untouched; the refusal is a HOLDING state that still writes the transport, declared as `offsite.state=awaiting_recovery_key` and shown inert to every existing hub reader); the **hub-vs-local key comparison that was computed every cycle and discarded is now persisted** and drives the offer as **shape (c)**; and **abandoning starts a 14-day countdown** whose terminal step removes the set-aside store and the sealed package **together**, so the offer ends because the state is right rather than because a flag suppresses it. Surface: the full page appears **once per ENTRY into the offered state**, three dismissal levers with three scopes, and **none removes the entry point**. Q7's trap is closed — „Helyreállítási kód létrehozása" is **unavailable** while a recovery is outstanding. **WHY THE ROW STAYS FAIL: these are fixes, not a walk.** Nothing here walked a customer end to end, and this row goes green only when one completes with **no operator intervention AND a byte-identical sentinel**. Two of Phase 1's blockers are also still open (**R-214**, **R-202**), and **R-240** is untouched. Evidence: `felhom-controller/CHANGELOG.md` v0.206.0, `hub/CHANGELOG.md` v0.98.0. **DELIVERY, separately: R-239 is CLOSED 2026-08-07** — golden **0.205.0** baked, published, round-trip verified (`./etc/felhom-controller-image` read OUT of the downloaded archive) and **VOUCHED**, so a fresh install now lands on 0.205.0 carrying R-234 and R-237. In the event it was a ONE-field change: `agent_version` and `min_agent` both stayed 0.127.0. Evidence: `tests/golden-0.205.0-2026-08-07/`. **The row still says FAIL** — delivery is not a journey, and R-241 is diagnosed, not fixed. **✅ 2026-08-07 — THE FIFTH WALK PASSED, BOTH HALVES, AND THIS ROW TURNS.** A brand-new appliance (VM **325**, customer `walk5`) was installed from the published ISO on `demo-hp`, claimed, given three sentinels, escrowed, backed up off-site, then **destroyed on purpose** — guest purged, both data drives wiped — and rebuilt through the documented day-0 path. **THE DATA: PASS** — all three sentinels byte-identical out of snapshot `5b0f20f7` (`11eb7fb2…`, `6b504d1e…`, `0baaf402…`), including a 12 MB binary and `WALK5-őrszem-ékezetes-árvíztűrő.txt` **whose name BYTES are identical too**, read back with `os.listdir` on a bytes path so no decode round trip could launder a `U+FFFD`. **THE JOURNEY: PASS — ZERO guest command lines were needed to progress**, against three on the previous walk. **RTO 71.7 s** from login to an open store (12.44 s of it the unseal; ~22 s a harness retry). The recovery screen **appeared without being sought** (`/` → `/launcher` → `/recovery`), answered all three of its questions, and its sealed-at timestamp matched `host_escrow.created_at` exactly. **WHAT MADE THE DIFFERENCE — R-241's mint guard, exercised live for the first time:** at **14:58:52Z**, unaided and before anyone logged in, the rebuilt box collected its re-staged credential, configured the transport and **refused to mint a repository password** over the sealed package — `NOT minting a repository password: the hub holds a sealed recovery package for this box`. Sampled every 20 s from T0: **no key at any moment**, with the scheduler proven alive throughout. At the equivalent moment the previous walk minted one and lost the journey silently. **AND DELIVERY IS PART OF THE PASS:** the fresh install landed on **controller 0.206.0 + agent 0.127.0 — the vouched set, no hand upgrade**, both times, so the box under test is the box a customer receives. **WHAT THIS ROW STILL DOES NOT CLAIM.** (1) **Putting files back in place is built and worked here** — `reconstitute` placed 6 files — but **only after two obstacles the customer must guess past**: **R-252** (the restore refuses with „nincs elérhető adatmeghajtó" because a rebuild loses the drive *registration*, and nothing on the recovery path says to re-attach) and **R-253** (the restore refuses because the app is not installed, on a page that says three lines above that the restore reinstalls it). Both were cleared **from the dashboard with no shell** — which is why the journey passes — but neither is signposted, so *unaided* here means *possible without a shell*, not *obvious*. (2) **Shape (c) did NOT fire positively.** With the mint guard holding there is no local key, so the offer comes from **shape (a)**; shape (c) was measured in Phase A in its **negative** half (hub hash == local hash, correctly silent). The mint guard is proven positively; the discriminator only negatively. (3) **R-214, R-202 and R-240 are untouched.** (4) The venue is **torn down** (2026-08-08) — full-schema census 168 rows → 67, of which 37 are audit-by-design and **30 are R-244**, predicted before the run rather than found after; every layer verified absent against a surviving positive control, and **16.64 GiB** returned. `tests/walk5-r201-2026-08-07/teardown-walk5-2026-08-08.md`. Evidence: `tests/walk5-r201-2026-08-07/journal.md` |
| **Off-site app-data capture covers the paths an app declares MANDATORY — on BOTH drive layouts** | controller v0.197.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-04) — and this row was OPTIMISTIC before it** | On demo-hp, an app on the **system-data fallback** bound `/mnt/sys_drive/userdata/media/books` while the capture set looked in `/mnt/sys_drive/felhom-data/userdata/media/books`: the declared-mandatory directory was in **no** snapshot and the run reported `ok` (R-203). After v0.197.0 the capture log reads `1 mandatory path(s)` and the file is **listed inside the snapshot** — `restic ls -l latest --tag calibre-web` → `-rw-r--r-- 1000 1000 181 … /DRILL-SENTINEL.txt`. Evidence: `audits/DRILL-r201-offsite-recovery-2026-08-04.md` §2 and the v0.197.0 CHANGELOG | **WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM.** It covers CAPTURE, not RESTORE: **no file has ever been restored from an off-site backup after a wipe** (R-201, ready to resume). It also does not claim the enrolled-drive layout was ever wrong — it was not, which is precisely why this survived. And a run that still misses a mandatory directory now reports **`incomplete`** rather than `ok`, so this row's guarantee is one the status can express. **Widened 2026-08-06 (controller v0.205.0, R-234):** the same verdict now also covers an app skipped ENTIRELY — until then a missing declared FOLDER made the run incomplete while an app with no recovery unit at all still reported `ok`, so the smaller gap moved the verdict and the bigger one did not. **This row still claims CAPTURE, not that a newly-selected app is protected by the next run** — for a DEPLOYED app it is (the run's own pre-dump phase writes the unit, measured 2026-08-06), and for an undeployed one it is not and the card now says so || **Recurring offsite (PBS) whole-guest backups actually LAND, and RESTORE** — local daily + offsite weekly as scheduled work | agent v0.97–0.103, controller v0.174/0.175, hub v0.76.0, host-install 1.20.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-26)** | `audits/SPIKE-r82-phase0-2026-07-26.md`; per-repo CHANGELOGs/REPORTs. **Restore round-trip on demo-hp:** `--selftest=restore-test` against `felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-26T15:42:42Z` → `pass:true`, `verified:"boot+running"`, **`mount_parity:"ok"`** (`mp0=/var/lib/docker 50G`, `mp1=/mnt/sys_drive 20G`, mp8/mp9 throwaway stand-ins for the archived binds), `source_tier:"pbs"`, 4m5s restore+boot+verify+teardown, scratch band clean afterwards and the live guest untouched. | **This row is distinct from the DR-tier row above, which proves ACTIVATION, not ARRIVAL.** That tier was PROVEN-LIVE as `applied` since 2026-07-21 while demo-felhom held ONE snapshot (a healing artifact) and demo-hp held **zero, ever** — "applied and empty", the R-39 shape one level quieter. **What earns PROVEN-LIVE here:** (a) demo-hp's FIRST EVER offsite backup landed (4.25 GB into a verifiably empty namespace); (b) it **restores into a bootable, mount-complete guest** — `mount_parity` is the non-hollow half, since a boot-only verify cannot see a missing data volume; (c) **the multi-tier quiesce ran through the real UI endpoint** (`POST /api/guest-backup/trigger`, authed+CSRF) and produced **exactly ONE stop/start pair with BOTH backups inside it** — `quiescing 1 stack(s)` 17:01:39 → local done 17:02:56 *"next tier may start (app still quiesced)"* → felhom-pbs snapshotted 17:03:06 → `unquiescing` 17:03:06. **App downtime 1m27s for both tiers**, and the app came back healthy. **Known gaps, recorded not hidden:** the SCHEDULED restore-test still only selects the PRIMARY tier, so the offsite tier is never AUTOMATICALLY restore-tested (the manual/selftest path is proven, the unattended one is not); the hub infers "PBS ⇒ weekly" from storage TYPE rather than a reported cadence; the installer-default fleet flip awaits a full weekly cycle. → **R-82** |
| **Restore-proof is UNATTENDED — the scheduler covers EVERY tier, follows the BACKUP rather than the clock, and a failure is heard** | agent v0.104.0 → **v0.121.0**, hub v0.77.0 → **v0.91.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | per-repo CHANGELOGs; `backlog/SPEC-r85-phase4-5-2026-07-26.md`. Unit red-proofs for tier rotation, restart-survival, the one-heavy-op gate, failure-emits-an-event, and newborn silence. | **The row above is earned by a MANUAL `--selftest=restore-test`; this one is about the SCHEDULED path, and the distinction is the whole point.** Before R-85 the scheduler could only ever see `cfg.Backup.BackupTarget()`, so the offsite tier was never a candidate — and a failed restore-test was a `[WARN]` line with no event at all, which was true for the LOCAL tier that WAS being tested. Now: oldest-first rotation across every configured tier (operator ruling 2026-07-26), persisted so it survives a restart; a restore-test joins the host-wide one-heavy-operation gate so it never contends with a backup over the same tunnel; and the hub raises two DISTINCT operator-tier signals — `restore_test_failed` (broken now) and `restore_test_stale` (unverified, not known-broken), anchored on R-81 so a newborn box never alarms. **Why this was NOT PROVEN-LIVE until now:** rotation had not been observed selecting both tiers across consecutive UNATTENDED cadences — at a 24h cadence a multi-day window — and a single passing run proves the code path, not the schedule. → **R-85**. **R-86 (agent v0.121.0 + hub v0.91.0, 2026-08-03) replaced the schedule and the observation became possible in one afternoon**, because what has to be observed is no longer a multi-day rotation but a RULE: a tier is due when its newest archive that has settled ~24 h has not been proven. **UPGRADE EVIDENCE — a real unattended run on demo-felhom (2026-08-03), triggered by DUE-NESS, not by a timer.** The scheduler's own log: `15:14:38 restore-test tier is DUE … target=felhom-pbs archive=felhom-pbs:backup/ct/9201/2026-07-28T04:49:43Z … reason="newest settled archive … has not been proven"` → `proxmox-backup-client restore --crypt-mode=encrypt` under the agent's own token → `15:25:08 gate decision class=guest_destroy guest=990000 allowed=true` → `15:25:14 scratch guest torn down` → **`15:25:14 backup: scheduled restore-test passed archive=felhom-pbs:… duration_s=635.1`**. A **14.5 GB encrypted offsite archive pulled from ep0 over the WAN**, restored, booted, verified and destroyed in 635 s, unattended. **The three things a timer could not show**, all verified after it: the state names THAT archive (`{"felhom-pbs":{"archive":"…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z","proven_at":"2026-08-03T13:25:14Z"}}`); a second evaluation reports `due=false … is already proven` and runs nothing; and **an agent restart runs nothing**, which is the defect a person actually noticed — every deploy used to restart the timer. Teardown verified at all three layers: guest absent from `pct list`, **zero** `990000` volumes in `lvs`, and the hub-side `restore_tests[]` entry deliberately RETAINED (it IS the proof the staleness check reads). **R-189 (agent v0.122.0, 2026-08-03) closed the reporting half of this row, and it was a REAL gap in the evidence path:** the proof above reached the hub only because no restart intervened — `restore_tests[]` came solely from an in-memory store, so the 15:25:14 PASS was in fact LOST when the agent restarted 2 m 43 s later for a deploy (`0 restore-tests` on the next two host-reports). Under per-archive due-ness the box would not have repeated the work for a week. The persisted per-tier proof (with the archive, and now the tier) is merged into the report, so a proof survives a restart — one entry per tier, newest wins, and a record that cannot be described honestly is not emitted. **THE HOST TIER'S HALF OF THIS ROW WAS OPTIMISTIC UNTIL 2026-08-03, and it is worth saying plainly.** Every live restore-test cited here is on the OFFSITE tier. The HOST tier was not merely unproven on demo-felhom — it was **unprovable**, and on demo-hp equally: the agent's token had no ACL on `/storage/felhom-backup`, the storage both boxes configure as `local_backup_target`, so the content API answered `{"data":[]}` through the token while root listed three archives. The scheduler skipped it as *"no settled archive yet"* — which is exactly what a brand-new tier reports — so nothing ever said so (**R-185**). **CLOSED 2026-08-03 — agent v0.123.0 + installer 1.24.0.** The grant is applied on both demo boxes (the token now lists 3 and 4 archives), the installer's reuse arm grants on a pre-existing target, and the agent now **asks whether it may read each tier it depends on** instead of inferring it from an empty list: a critical degraded capability naming the storage and the missing role, which the hub alerted and emailed on **while the box was still blind**. **THE HOST TIER IS NOW PROVEN-LIVE, UNATTENDED, ON BOTH DEMO BOXES (2026-08-04) — this row's optimistic half is cashed.** Four SCHEDULED runs, nothing triggered by hand: **demo-felhom** host tier `…2026_08_02-04_42_14.tar.zst` **passed in 83.8 s** at 00:55, offsite `…2026-07-28T04:49:43Z` **passed in 540.4 s** at 06:55; **demo-hp** host tier `…2026_08_02-04_49_29.tar.zst` **passed in 109.3 s** at 02:05, offsite `…2026-07-28T19:19:45Z` **passed in 300.1 s** at 08:05. Each restored into a scratch guest, booted, verified and destroyed itself; `pct list` and `lvs` show zero `990000` afterwards on both, and both boxes' `local-lvm` returned to their pre-run figures (1.95 % and 30.83 %). **Both boxes had BOTH tiers due at once and the ordering was observed live for the first time under R-86's rule:** never-proven sorted first, so each box took its HOST tier, deferred the offsite one, and picked it up on the following evaluation six hours later — one heavy operation at a time, per box, without anyone sequencing it. **The proofs reached the hub**, which is R-189 carrying a host-tier entry for the first time: demo-felhom's report holds **two** entries, one per tier, and the `local` one can only have come from the persisted state because the in-memory store held only that morning's offsite run. **SCOPE, stated because one box proving something does not make it a fleet property:** this covers `demo-felhom` and `demo-hp`. The tester's box is untested and untouched. Evidence: `felhom-agent/REPORT.md`, `felhom.eu/REPORT.md` |
| Customer RESET (middle lifecycle tier: host delete < RESET < customer Delete): one operator action → pre-first-install; all operational state destroyed, identity + basic config survive | hub v0.61.0, felhom-tenantsync v1.1.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE (external teardown, incl. two real firings)** | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` — two live firings, both host-delete-first, on two different customers** (`demo-vm-felhom` 15:49:57, `demo-felhom` 16:08:51): every leg `ok` (`claim`, `db_purge`, `descriptor`, `hetzner`, `pbs`), escrow acked separately, each completing in 8–9 s (`hub-state.txt` `customer_resets`). The **Hetzner sub-account destruction is now verified against the live pool box** — and produced the run's sharpest lesson: **a sub-account is an access-control object, not a data object.** Deleting it left its `/home` intact, so re-enabling offsite recreated an account over the previous lifecycle's ciphertext under a key this same RESET had destroyed — which is why the orphan guard fired at 16:58:14 (**a finding by S7's own criterion**) and why RESET now needs a base-dir purge → **R-32**. Prior: hub v0.61.0 REPORT; **ep0 live drill 2026-07-17** (throwaway `drill-reset-01` with a real backup: deprovision `deleted:true` destroyed the namespace + backup group + token, idempotent re-run `deleted:false`, all 3 real tenants + shared user survived); red-proofs (ack-gate, partial-failure resumability) + orchestration/store/offsite/render tests | External teardown FIRST, DB purge LAST, every leg idempotent; refuses while any host row exists; separate escrow-custody ack; clears claim (fresh code next onboarding); keeps the offsite tier CHOICE, drops provisioned fields. **Live-clicked 2026-07-18** (twice, by Viktor) — this supersedes the earlier "not live-clicked / Hetzner delete unit-tested only" note. **R-25b CLOSED (hub v0.69.0, 2026-07-21):** the Danger-zone DELETE is now the guided full-teardown cascade that runs this very sequence as its middle leg — see the row below |
| **Customer DELETE cascade** (top lifecycle tier): one guided operator action → `hosts → RESET → residue → purge`; host rows deleted (custody DEMOTED), full external teardown (Hetzner repo destroyed, PBS namespace/token revoked, tunnel + zone removed), then the customer record and ALL escrow ciphertext purged | hub v0.69.0 | **UNIT-PROVEN; live leg PENDING** | `hub/internal/web/customer_delete_test.go` — leg ORDER observed from inside leg 2 (hosts already gone, customer row still present, custody still retained); 9 fail-closed gate cases each asserting zero mutations + zero external calls + no journal row; resume-after-external-failure converges; `purgeEscrow` custody semantics; preview leaks no secret. **5 red-proofs** (ack gate, stale-preview gate, ONLINE-host gate, leg order inverted, `purgeEscrow=true`) | Three acknowledgements + typed customer-id + stale-preview check + ONLINE-host refusal, ALL before any write. Ruling-3 preserved BY CONSTRUCTION (leg 2 never sees a host row); custody purged EXACTLY ONCE, in leg 3. **Coupling:** hub-only — no agent/controller/catalog change; the cascade calls the same service paths as manual host-delete and standalone RESET, so their rules move together. **v0.70.0 (2026-07-21):** added the **residue** leg — `GetCustomers()` is REPORT-derived, so before it a fully deleted customer stayed on the Customers list and its report stream kept the staleness/offsite checkers alerting (live: `demo-vm-felhom` deleted 07-18, still emailing `offsite_stale` on 07-21). The leg also purges the credential-bearing `appliance_registrations` + `selfbind_tokens`. **Ghost customers (config row already gone) are now deletable** — 404 means "nothing here", not "no config row"; the Hetzner/descriptor legs record `skipped_no_config`. **Gap:** the end-to-end live leg on a scratch customer (external Hetzner teardown observed from outside) is not yet run |
| Uninstall: KEPT-vs-WIPED statement, secret purge, enrolled-drive handling | installer | **PARTIAL** | `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` Phase 1/5 (KEPT-vs-WIPED printed verbatim; drive data intact ×3); GL-4 code | Secret purge (GL6-F1 `.bak` residue) fixed v1.12.0; enrolled-drive `mnt-*.mount` units survive (GL6-F2, open); cluster-aware `felhom_guests` guard + saferemove cost warning missing → R-9 |

## B. Apps & catalog

| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deploy an app from the catalog (env config, memory guard, health-aware progress) | controller, catalog (~52 apps, images pinned) | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-DEPLOY-SET (7 apps, env config, health-aware); `RERUN-p1p3` (×4 PASS) | Memory-guard FIRING is not live-shown (T-RES-MEMGUARD never fired: ample RAM / auth-walled) — implemented + unit-level only |
| App lifecycle: start/stop/restart/update/logs/remove/redeploy | controller | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-LIFECYCLE (stop/start/restart/update/logs); remove live in `CAMPAIGN-3` | Redeploy-after-remove edge remains open (T-REMOVE-REDEPLOY never cleanly passed — stale dryrun journal); non-pilot-critical |
| Protected infra stacks can't be stopped/removed from UI | controller | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-nomercy` + `RERUN-p1p3` T-SEC-PROTECTED (refuse stop/remove, stay Up) | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-2` T-SEC-PROTECTED was a stale-dryrun FAIL — corrected to the runs with a real server-side refusal) |
| Catalog sync (git, 15 min) + orphan lifecycle + validation choke point (bad `backup:` block degrades to legacy, loudly) | controller v0.132, catalog | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-SYNC-IDEMPOTENT; v0.132 LoadMetadata red-proofs | |
| Lemez-egészség felügyelet: per-disk SMART kártya („Lemezek állapota") + degradáció-riasztás (Rendben/Figyelmeztetés/Hiba/Nincs adat) | agent v0.94.0→**v0.95.0**, controller v0.169.0→**v0.171.0**, hub v0.73.1 | **PROVEN-LIVE (healthy path + delivery)** | **2026-07-25 (v0.95.0 + v0.171.0 — the SMART-coverage fix):** the card on guest 9201 now shows BOTH real disks with **real verdicts + human model labels** — **„AirDisk 512GB SSD" → Rendben (34°C)** (the system SSD, via LVM/dm resolution) and **„TOSHIBA MQ04ABF100" → Rendben (30°C)** (the USB, via union-path SMART). `/disks` carries `smart.health=PASSED` + `model_name` for both. This reverses the 2026-07-24 „Nincs adat on a raw UUID" state (`SPIKE-smart-coverage-2026-07-25.md` had proven both disks answer `smartctl -a -j` PASSED but the agent never asked). Prior: verdict table (+≥90 red-proof); check first-run/degradation/recovery/UNKNOWN tests; hub allowlist test. **Notification pipeline PROVEN-LIVE 2026-07-24** — a `disk_health_degraded` POST (the exact `notify.PushEvent` wire call) was **400-rejected by hub v0.73.0** and **200-accepted + „Operator email sent" by hub v0.73.1** | No new smartctl load; feature-detect by payload presence → **MinAgent floor unchanged**; no sudoers/`-d sat` change. **No global banner** (deliberate). Agent v0.95.0 fixes: union-path SMART (Fix B) + LVM/dm whole-disk resolution incl. the builtin `local` on the LVM root (Fix A, SMART-only — never touches backing/durable_id) + `model_name` capture. **A live FAILING/Figyelmeztetés verdict still needs a genuinely degrading disk** (the demo disks are healthy) — that arm stays unit+red-proof covered. **SMART history/trending (hub-side) PARKED** (ROADMAP R-73) |
| App crashes → customer notified (one event per transition, no flapping spam) | controller v0.120, hub v0.48 | **IMPLEMENTED** | controller v0.120.0 (dead-app alerting, `app_start_failed`, one-event-per-transition red-proofs); `CAMPAIGN-3` F11 surfaced the gap | End-to-end crash→customer-email delivery never live-confirmed (6B deferred / 6C inconclusive: clean stop ≠ crash); anti-spam unit-proven |
| Post-deploy optional config (API keys etc.) with restart | controller, catalog `.felhom.yml` | **IMPLEMENTED** | feature long-standing; config page renders (`CAMPAIGN-2` T-PAGE-ALL is GET-only) | The config-save+restart flow is exercised in no campaign (CAMPAIGN-3 explicitly skipped interactive app config). Demoted: T-PAGE-ALL is a page-render smoke test, not this flow |
| Backup classification: 13 bind-bearing apps carry mandatory/optional/excluded classes | catalog, controller v0.132–133 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `SPIKE-backup-classification-2026-07-14`, `CAMPAIGN-6D/6E` | Remaining ~39 apps are legacy-class by design (unit-only offsite) |

## C. Protection & recovery (the product promise)

> **Coupling (2026-07-28, S-1).** The **failure → recovery matrix** in
> `07-backup-architecture.md` §8 is authoritative for *which failure has which recovery route, who
> can invoke it, and what its measured RTO is*. This section stays authoritative for *per-capability
> status*. **Neither restates the other** — rows below carry a `→ 07 §8 row n` pointer instead of
> repeating the route. Where a row's status and the matrix's status differ in wording, the matrix is
> about the **failure** and the row is about the **mechanism**; that is not a contradiction, and both
> cite the same evidence.
>
> The matrix's blank RTO/RPO cells are deliberate: no number is estimated anywhere. Two counts of
> Tier-2 app coverage disagree (9/43/1 vs 7/45/1) and are **both** recorded there, unresolved —
> do not adopt either from this page.

| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Whole-guest backup lands OFF the guest's own physical device; a single-drive box is recorded **DEGRADED** rather than silently normal (installer Case A/B) | agent v0.113, host-install v1.22.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `E2D-fresh-vm-2026-07-29` C1 (real 1.22.0 install, rc=0, `Day-0 provision SUCCESS`) + C2 (both DEGRADED lines verbatim, `local_backup_target=local`, install did not abort) | Case A (a second drive already present at install) has never fired naturally — only Case B has |
| Nightly DB dumps (postgres/mariadb autodiscovery), atomic writes | controller v0.118 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-BAK-FULL (pg+mariadb autodiscovered); atomicity `CAMPAIGN-6B` P4 + `CAMPAIGN-6E` B1/B2 (SIGKILL mid-write → only `.tar.tmp` touched, last-good byte-unchanged); DB restore `CAMPAIGN-6D` P-FAB | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-3` F7 is the *finding* of non-atomic writes, and T-RST-DB was auth-hollow — corrected to the 6B/6E fix-proofs.) T-6E-1 dir-fsync asymmetry (LOW) → R-10 **DB replay route → `07-backup-architecture.md` §8 row 3** |
| Tier-2 secondary-drive copy: class-driven legs, v2 relpath layout, NAS-target exclusion, safe-remove boundary | controller v0.135 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6E-2026-07-15` (P-TIER2 deep-4 PASS), `CAMPAIGN-6C` | **Route + RTO → `07-backup-architecture.md` §8 rows 1, 2, 4, 5.** The matrix records that the copy's `recovery-unit/` mirror is read by no path (→ R-102) |
| Offsite (restic → Hetzner Storage Box): mandatory class only, raw-data quota, enlargement gate, retention regrouping | controller v0.134, agent, hub | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D-2026-07-15` (mandatory-only P-IMMICH; enlargement gate fired at real 50GiB quota P3-DELIVERY); `VALIDATION-offbox-storagebox-2026-07-09` (byte-perfect round-trip) | Raw-data quota (SP-1) + retention regrouping (SP-2) are `SPIKE-restic-snapshot-shape` **dry-run** verdicts — mechanism validated, not fired in a live product run; only the enlargement gate is live-fired. **Reinstall-continuity (controller v0.142.0, 2026-07-17):** a recreated data volume that orphaned the repo (new passphrase can't open the old keys) is now CLASSIFIED (`wrong password or no key found`) → explicit ORPHANED card + event (not nightly-spam) + a move-aside (never-delete) reset (unclaimed auto / claimed confirm), instead of a raw nightly restic error. Fake-based scenarios + red-proofs. **The live leg FIRED on its own during the 2026-07-18 rehearsal** (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`, S7): after a RESET + re-enable, the first offsite run hit the previous lifecycle's ciphertext and the guard **classified it, pushed `offbox_repo_orphaned`, skipped the run and showed the card (16:58:14)** rather than nightly-spamming a raw restic error; the operator-confirmed reset then **moved the repo aside (never deleted) to `.orphaned-20260718` and re-initialised (16:59:26→16:59:32)**, and the next run produced 2 snapshots / 48.717 MiB. The guard behaved exactly as designed — **the finding is that it had to fire at all** (R-32: RESET destroys custody, so the ciphertext it leaves behind is dead by design and should be purged, while the move-aside guard stays correct for reinstall-WITHOUT-RESET). `DIAGNOSE-offbox-repo-orphaned-2026-07-17` **Route + RTO → `07-backup-architecture.md` §8 rows 4, 10, 12, 15** (incl. the R-95 delete exposure and the R-104 stale-lock defect). **2026-08-04 (R-193/R-197, `audits/SPIKE-offsite-credential-recovery-2026-08-04.md`) — the row is NOT overclaiming and the guard is not the gap; the CADENCE is.** This row already recorded that a recreated data volume orphans the repo, and the spike confirms the mechanism at source: `WriteOffboxSecrets` (`offbox.go:392`) mints a fresh 256-bit repo password whenever `<DataDir>/offbox/repo_password` is absent, and **no automatic path ever consults the escrowed one** — `InjectOffboxPassword` has exactly one caller, a web form a human pastes into. What was NOT recorded is that this now fires on an **ordinary, planned, unattended guest rebuild**, on every box: measured on BOTH demo boxes 2026-08-03/04 by comparing `host_escrow.restic_pw_sha256` against `host_escrow_superseded.restic_pw_sha256` (demo-hp `8e03eddf…`→`8a9e33aa…`, demo-felhom `48741892…`→`c60c8bc7…`), orphaning **15 snapshots / 40.9 MB** and **36 snapshots / 1.14 GB** respectively. **demo-felhom is the important half:** it kept its DELIVERY (a stale staged secret restored the target in 76 s) and lost its REPOSITORY anyway, with **nothing marking the escrow stale for 13 h** — `escrow_stale` is wired to `ReissueCredentials`, the one path that does NOT change the repo password (**R-196**), and absent from the rebuild path that does. Status unchanged: the classify-and-move-aside guard remains PROVEN-LIVE and correct, and is predicted (not yet measured) to refuse the 2026-08-05 run on both boxes rather than start a silent fresh history |
| Offsite restore: local-preferred scratch, unit-only default, full two-step, missing-only place-to-live | controller v0.134/134.1/135 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-20) | `CAMPAIGN-6D` accept legs (immich end-to-end from offsite alone) | **2026-07-19:** `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md` finds **no offsite path loads a DB dump** — all three buttons are file-only (R-43). The mechanics in this row's title are each proven; the phrase "**immich end-to-end from offsite alone**" is what is contested, since a DB-indexed app cannot be reconstituted by any offsite action. **RULED 2026-07-19 (Viktor): 6D's destruction hit the FILE TREE ONLY — the database survived in its named volume** (`immich_postgres_data` is a named volume in both the v2 and v3 template eras), so "immich end-to-end from offsite alone" **overclaimed scope**: the file half was proven, the DB half was never destroyed and therefore never restored. Row downgraded PROVEN-LIVE → **PARTIAL**, scope-corrected. Evidence: `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md` (no offsite path could replay a DB at all) + the P-FAB destructive re-import (the proven-replay evidence, on the LOCAL path). **2026-07-19, controller v0.148.0:** the DB half now exists in code (R-43 + R-44) and its replay reached a live box — but **round 2 found it aborts against a running app** (`audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md`, H4: the replay races immich's own schema repair; `clip_index` recreated by the app 2 s before the dump's CREATE INDEX). **2026-07-20, controller v0.153.0: H4 IS CLOSED (R-47)** — both restore paths now replay into a DB-ONLY window (`StartStackServices` brings up the database service alone; the app starts only after the replay exits 0), with a fail-closed refusal when a dump has no identifiable DB service. *(The earlier note here said "closes in v0.149" — that was wrong: v0.149.0 was the F3 dashboard `BackupStatus` fix. R-47 shipped in v0.153.0.)* **2026-07-20: the clean run HAPPENED** — endpoint-level supervised reconstitute of immich from snapshot `49e7cb46` (the very snapshot that aborted in round 2): stop → DB-service-only start → replay rc-0 → full start, no `already exists`, operation reported SUCCESS, immich's own DatabaseService logged `No schema drift detected` twice, 11 assets `active`, 4/4 containers healthy, 231 `public` indexes. **Operator confirmed the immich timeline renders correctly after the reconstitute** (screenshot held, 2026-07-20). Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` §4b. **2026-07-20, LATER THE SAME DAY — the destructive drill RAN and the row now earns PROVEN-LIVE.** The operator deleted the photos in immich own UI **and emptied the trash** (the step whose absence makes a drill prove nothing — the round-1 lesson), then restored through the customer-facing UI. **`40 file(s) placed`** against the 6 of the earlier non-destructive run — the files were really gone and really came back — plus 1 DB dump replayed rc-0, 11 assets `active`, `No schema drift detected`, timeline confirmed by the operator. This is the destroy-then-recover proof the 6D downgrade asked for, and it was taken through the customer own buttons, not endpoint shortcuts. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` 4e **Route + RTO → `07-backup-architecture.md` §8 rows 3, 4** — the matrix also records that no offsite action unpacks the named-volume tars it captures (→ R-107) |
| Manual `.fab` export/import: class-scoped capture, browser up/download, tunnel-proof chunking | controller v0.125/128/130/136 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D` P-FAB / Accept #1 (1.7 GB full circle, byte-identical, app boots); chunking `CAMPAIGN-6B` P2 (100 MiB via real CF edge, 120 MiB→413) | Chunking proven at the real CF edge via `curl --resolve`; the **rendered browser file-picker** upload leg is still Viktor's open full-circle test (6C ran it NOT-RUN). C6B-F1 was the 6B *finding*; fix verified in 6D |
| Guest-loss DR: PBS restore with full-fidelity layout from archive, restore-test verification | agent v0.75/0.76, PBS | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-P9-DESTROY-RESTORE (whole-guest `pct restore` of 9201 → running+healthy) + T-PBS-VERIFY (`verify_state: ok`, 13 snapshots); `DRILL-GL6-2026-07-08` Phase 0d (restore-test `mount_parity: ok`) | (Cited `VALIDATION-newbox-restore` is offbox **restic** file-restore, wrong tier — corrected.) Real **offsite** guest-loss round-trip still R1-blocked → S5 DR drill **Route + RTO → `07-backup-architecture.md` §8 rows 6, 8, 9** — measured 84–112 s local / 1101 s PBS into a scratch guest; a restore to a DIFFERENT host is unmeasured |
| PBS-DR secret self-heal on reused-peer re-provision | hub v0.56 | **IMPLEMENTED** | hub v0.56.0 (`pbsdrheal/reconciler.go`, `RestageHostPBSSecret`, all §10 red-proofs); `SPIKE-pbsdr-selfheal-2026-07-15` (root cause) | Reconciler is **scoped to one host** (`PBSDRHEAL_ONLY_HOST`), not fleet-wide; already fired live hands-free on drill qm300 (07-15) — real-customer firing + fleet-wide widening pending |
| Box survives an **unattended app or guest-network failure** (a dead app member, a boot-orphaned app, a dead DHCP client) — it is noticed, and where safe it is repaired | controller v0.156.0→**v0.190.0**, agent v0.92.1 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21; boot-orphan leg rebuilt and re-proven 2026-08-02 — **6 of 6 hard resets**, repeat count cited per N.5) | All three legs exercised on the live demo box, operator-present, in one session — `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` + `felhom-agent/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21). **Dead primary:** `docker stop immich-server` 12:50:40 CEST → `degraded` 13 s later → **exactly one** `app_start_failed` + dashboard banner → restart → banner self-cleared (the 2026-07-20 shape that was silent for 18 h). **Boot orphan:** `pct reboot 9201` → `[bootrecon] 1 boot-orphaned app(s) found: [bookstack]` → started in 1 attempt of 2, **zero alerts** (success inside the boot grace is silent); `StartedAt` proves Docker's `unless-stopped` did NOT resurrect it — only the sweep did, which also answers P1 and confirms the F5 hypothesis. **Dead DHCP client:** deliberate replay of the incident — `kill -9` 12:43:18 → detected on process liveness 57 s later while the lease was still live → healed 12:45:18 with the incident's verbatim invocation; **the tunnel never dropped (`cloudflared Up 29 hours`)**, i.e. the outage was prevented rather than merely observed | **The gap this validation surfaced → R-55, now FIXED (controller v0.157.0, 2026-07-21).** For a *drive-backed* app a customer's deliberate Stop did NOT survive a reboot — the boot bind gate recreated and started every deployed drive-backed app unconditionally. Pre-existing, not introduced by R-52 (whose own gate was observed correct). The gate now also requires the app to still HAVE containers, which is R-52's own `existing-Exited vs absent` predicate: a UI Stop is `compose down` and removes them. So **"a stopped app stays stopped" now holds for drive-backed apps too — PROVEN LIVE 2026-07-21** (TASK-F Part 3, operator-present). immich was stopped through the real UI endpoint (`compose down` → 0 containers), calibre-web and bookstack left running, then `pct reboot 9201`: the gate recreated calibre-web and logged `1 drive-backed app(s) left stopped — zero containers means the customer stopped them on purpose`; immich came back **stopped**, where the identical fixture had brought it back running hours earlier. Zero alerts, ~15 s to steady state. The **static-guest** half of the network leg stays deliberately out of scope → **R-50**. **2026-08-02 — the boot-orphan leg now rests on a RECORDED signal, not an inference (R-166, controller v0.189.0).** Both the R-52 sweep and the R-55 gate above decided "the customer stopped this" from *zero containers*, which is also what a power cut mid-compose and an interrupted deploy leave behind — so two real faults were read as deliberate stops and stranded silently (R-157 mechanism B). The customer's intent is now written to `app.yaml` (`desired_state`) by their own action and read directly. **PROVEN-LIVE on 9201** in three flows: a UI Stop persisted `stopped` and survived a controller restart with the app still down and NOT listed as a candidate; an app recorded `running` whose containers were removed out-of-band was recovered by name (`[bootrecon] 1 boot-orphaned app(s) found: [calibre-web]` → started in 1 attempt) — **the case that was invisible before**; and a legacy `app.yaml` with no field was skipped exactly as before and was never inferred to be stopped. **Interrupted app-data operations are covered separately and are NOT proven-live** — `backup.AppStopGuard` restarts apps left stopped by a killed volume dump / offsite reconstitute / `.fab` export, and that leg is unit-proven + red-proofed only (killing the controller mid-backup on a live box was not exercised): **IMPLEMENTED, not PROVEN-LIVE.** **R-170 and R-171 closed the same day (controller v0.190.0).** **R-157 mechanism A** — the sweep observed ONCE at T+5 s, while docker was still restoring, and never re-checked (3 of 6 hard resets). It is now a settle-then-sweep window: sample every 5 s, settled after 3 identical samples, ONE sweep at the end, terminating on settled or a 50 s budget (sized so settle+budget+one retry stays inside the 90 s dead-app grace; a test rejected 60 s at 95 s). **Repeat count, per this map's own rule: 6 of 6 hard resets on the shipped build brought every app back, and an app the customer had stopped stayed down in all 6** (window settle times 10/40/10/10/15/15 s — i.e. it routinely waited 2–8× longer than the old fixed 5 s). A same-app before/after on one box is the sharpest evidence: the pre-fix window logged `no boot-orphaned apps` for calibre-web at 18:08:35; the fixed one found and recovered it at 18:18:50. **R-170** — `shouldRecreateOnBoot` now reads intent too, so the two boot gates agree; proven live in one reboot (calibre-web `running`+zero containers recreated, immich `stopped` left alone). **R-171 — a regression v0.189.0 introduced, found by reading the diff and CONFIRMED on hardware before any fix was written:** the sweep started an app whose drive was absent, burned both attempts and raised a false dead-app alarm. The *write* hazard was blocked only by an ACCIDENTAL filesystem permission (host-root-owned mountpoint + unprivileged guest) that no code owns and no test pinned — which is why it was fixed rather than noted. New fail-safe `bootrecon.StartGate` (cannot determine ⇒ do not start), also covering quiesce and in-flight app-data operations. **One defect in the fix itself, found by live validation and not by review:** the window sampled the Manager's 10 s-refreshed cache, so "settled" could mean "the cache did not update"; `sampleBootFleet` now refreshes first. Evidence: `audits/DIAG-bootrecon-drive-absent-2026-08-02.md`, `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` |
| Crash/power-loss mid-backup/mid-migration → self-heal on next run | controller, agent | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6D` P5-REST (SIGKILL mid-offbox → auto-restart ~15s, run marked failed not false-success, no stale lock); `CAMPAIGN-6E` B1-B3 | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-2` T-RBT-* legs were empty / auth-hollow — corrected.) Live mid-**migration** crash→self-heal is the weakest sub-claim (P5-REST is mid-backup) |
| An app can be **withdrawn from the catalog without orphaning the customers running it** (available / hidden / abandoned) | controller v0.158.1, catalog metadata | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21) | TASK-F Part 1. Verified on 9201 through the real endpoints: `lifecycle: abandoned` arrived via the normal catalog sync; plant-it renders 0 times on the Alkalmazások page (control app renders 10); a direct `POST /api/stacks/plant-it/deploy` → **HTTP 409 "Ez az alkalmazás jelenleg nem telepíthető."**; the app page carries the permanent notice and offers no Telepítés button. `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` (2026-07-21) | Deployed instances keep FULL function in every state — lifecycle governs what is offered, never what runs. Orphan detection deliberately never sees the field (red-proofed): a withdrawn template stays in the catalog tree, or every deployed instance would read `Elavult` and be offered deletion. Unknown values fail OPEN; the deploy gate fails CLOSED. R-57 |
| Box survives a **site/network change** (relocation, different subnet, DHCP re-lease) with the control plane intact | agent v0.96.0 (island NIC), host-install v1.19.0, controller (unchanged), bootstrap | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-07-25)** | **R-50 SHIPPED and deployed to the whole fleet.** The control plane now rides a host-internal, portless island bridge (`vmbr9`, `169.254.253.1/30`↔`.2/30`) with a fixed private address that no LAN/DHCP/site move can invalidate. Proven end-to-end: the spike's F1 replay (renumber the LAN → agent stays bound on the island, control plane HTTP 200; the LAN-literal contrast reproduces the original `bind: cannot assign requested address` daemon-death) + cold-reboot survival (`SPIKE-island-bridge-2026-07-25.md`), the migration runbook run verbatim (`RUNBOOK-island-migration.md`), a fresh provision auto-attaching the island `net1` (A4), and the live migration of **both demo boxes** (demo-hp + demo-felhom, 2026-07-25) — island `/storage` HTTP 200, LAN DNS pinned to the LAN IP (Finding-1), **apps served throughout (0 container restarts)**, hub reporting 0.96.0. **Origin:** `audits/AUDIT-vacation-remote-ops-2026-07-20.md` — the real relocation where the agent's LAN-literal bind took storage/PBS/quiesce/restore-test/DR down silently; that is now structurally impossible on a migrated box | **Fleet: DONE.** Remaining: **R-74** — bring the island to Peti's 2-node cluster (SDN vnet / bridge parity), its own supervised runbook. Related historical: R-51 (dead-primary alerting), R-52 (boot desired-state reconciliation), both shipped |
| **The customer is warned BEFORE a filesystem fills** — per filesystem, in Hungarian, naming the drive and the free space, edge-triggered | controller **v0.191.0/.1/.2**, hub **v0.89.0** (R-167, decision D-c) | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-02)** | `audits/SPIKE-r165-mp1-merge-2026-08-02.md` (context) + `felhom-controller/REPORT.md`. Exercised on guest 9201 against a REAL filesystem (`/mnt/sys_drive` filled with `fallocate`): **`disk_warning` at 90% used / 4.7 GB free** → hub `notification_log` `customer | disk_warning | sent` with the dynamic Hungarian rendered; grown to 1.7 GB free → **`disk_critical`** → `customer | sent`; file removed → `critical → ok … cleared silently, re-armed` and the persisted state emptied. **Exactly two events across three boots** — the boot in between produced none, which is the edge trigger holding | **Nothing warned before this.** The only prior signal was the healthcheck's generic `health_degraded` at 90%, for REGISTERED STORAGE PATHS ONLY — it never looked at the docker area or the system-data area, never gave a free-byte figure and never named a drive. **The two event types already existed with NO PRODUCER** (`disk_warning`/`disk_critical`: allowlisted, copy'd, in `DefaultEnabledEvents`, checkbox'd) — the **sixth** *built-but-never-wired* instance here; this ships their producer rather than a seventh near-duplicate type. **Two threshold terms, whichever trips first, and the live proof vindicated the design:** the critical crossing fired on the FREE-BYTE term (1.7 GB) at only **91%** used — a percentage-only rule would have missed it. The hub's generic `customerMessages` entries were REMOVED, because `FormatCustomerEmail` prefers the entry over the message and would discard the label and figures. **Known gap → R-177:** there is no operator-triggerable run-now path; the check is daily 03:30 + once at startup, so confirming a cleared warning on a support call needs a controller restart or a wait |
| **A failed per-app Tier-1 backup reaches the OPERATOR — EVERY failing app, in ONE mail per run, and every failure recorded whether or not it is mailed** | controller **v0.194.0**, hub **v0.90.1** (R-158 → R-167 → **R-182**) | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03)** | `felhom-controller/REPORT.md`. Two real capture failures on guest 9201 (`mkdir …/backups: permission denied`) → both accepted and stored by the hub, `operator | recovery_unit_capture_failed | sent`, and the positive observable **`customer | recovery_unit_capture_failed | skipped | operator_only`** read from the hub's `notification_log`. One event per app, loop continuing | **Before this the failure was a `[WARN]` line and nothing else** — the manager carried three notify seams and none for the unit capture, so `/backups/apps`, the page you open to ask whether ONE app is backed up, was the one page that never said. **Deliberately NOT `backup_failed`:** that type is customer-enabled by default and carries Hungarian copy, so reusing it — which R-158's own proposal said — would email the customer about a failure they cannot act on. **D-c routes it to the operator and overrides the proposal.** Operator-only is enforced by `notify.operatorOnlyEvents`, NOT by the absence of a `customerMessages` entry (the v0.78.0 defect); a red-proof removing the register entry shows the customer receiving it. **ROW REWRITTEN 2026-08-03 (R-182) — the 2026-08-02 claim was TRUE OF ONE APP AND FALSE OF THE REST, and it is worth saying which.** The signal existed and worked; what it did not do was scale past the first failing app. Measured: nine per-app events reached the hub in one day and **two** operator mails went out, because the cooldown key is `customerID:eventType(+tier)` and this type carries `app` but no `tier` — so the first refused app took the hour and the rest were dropped **before `LogNotification`**, leaving no row on any channel. The old row said "One event per app, loop continuing", which was true of what the CONTROLLER emitted and not of what the operator received. **Now:** the per-app event is the RECORD (hub `recordOnlyEvents`: stored + logged every time, never mailed) and `backup_run_failures` is the NOTIFICATION — one mail per run listing every failed app, its leg and its reason, with the counts and free space. A suppressed operator event of ANY type now leaves a `suppressed` row naming its key. **Proven live on demo-hp 2026-08-03** by a real 64.6 GiB fill (thin pool held 30.78 → 30.78): `notification_log` shows `recovery_unit_capture_failed | operator | recorded` ×2, `backup_run_failures | operator | sent` ×1 naming BOTH apps, and `backup_run_failures | customer | skipped | operator_only`. A second run in the same hour produced a second digest; after freeing space a run completed with 2 volume dumps and **no** digest. The suppression row proved itself on an unplanned event — `disk_critical | suppressed | key=demo-hp:disk_critical` — a collapse that yesterday would have left nothing at all. **The digest's silence is safe only because** the hub's deadline check raises `expected_backup_missed` from report freshness independently of any mail (`monitor/deadline.go:396,417`); that check is load-bearing for this row |
| **A local backup is bounded by the box's FREE SPACE, not by a partition set at build time** — the appliance ships ONE data volume, and a capture that would exhaust it is refused per app rather than allowed to stop the container runtime | golden `build-golden.sh` **v3.0.0**, agent **v0.120.0**, controller **v0.193.1** (R-165 / D-a / B2, completed by R-181) | **PROVEN-LIVE (2026-08-03) — BOTH halves** | `REPORT.md` (R-178 reinstalls) + `audits/SPIKE-r165-phase0-2026-08-03.md` (P1/P2/P3) + the bake transcript. **The golden bake is real evidence and is cited as such:** `build-golden.sh v3.0.0` produced `including mount point mp0 ('/var/lib/felhom')` with **no `mp1` line at all**, and its own guards printed `/var/lib/docker is a real mount`, `/mnt/sys_drive is a real mount` and `both paths are ONE filesystem`. Archive published (registry HTTP 200, sha `54e2a4c4…`). The B2 floor is unit-proven with 3 red-proofs and live on 9201 | **The row's FIRST clause is now PROVEN-LIVE; its SECOND is not, and they are separated deliberately.** **Proven (R-178, 2026-08-03):** *"a local backup is bounded by the box's FREE SPACE, not by a partition set at build time"* — both demo boxes reinstalled from this golden, by two different supply paths (demo-hp `--golden <local volid>`; demo-felhom the normal manifest route with **`verified sha256 54e2a4c431daf580… matches the hub manifest`**), each showing `mp0` at `/var/lib/felhom` with **no `mp1`**, both consumer paths real mounts on ONE filesystem (`stat -c %d` = `64519` on all three), 3/3 reboots each, and claim → deploy → backup → **restore** with a planted marker returning byte-identical. Space available to a recovery unit measured at **65 GiB / 233 GiB**, against the **19 GiB / 45 GiB** those boxes' `mp1` slices offered. **NOT proven — and measured FALSE in part:** *"a capture that would exhaust it is refused per app rather than allowed to stop the container runtime"*. The floor fired live for the first time (demo-hp 06:40:03) and does refuse per app, delete nothing, and alert — **but it is checked only in `captureAllRecoveryUnits`, while `runVolumeDumps` writes the bulk with no floor check at all**, so the leg that exhausts the volume is the unguarded one; and the refusal's claim that the previous unit is untouched was measured false (a 182,272 B dump replaced by 2,147,666,432 B under a manifest still dated 06:34:26). → **R-181, CLOSED THE SAME DAY (controller v0.193.0 + v0.193.1) and the second half is now PROVEN-LIVE TOO.** The reserve became a **per-app, per-run ADMISSION decision** taken before the app's FIRST write and covering all three legs (DB dump, volume dump, capture) — they write under one per-app root, which is what lets one verdict cover them honestly — and it gained a **size term**, so an app is no longer admitted at 96% and then allowed to write 2 GB. **Re-proven by filling demo-hp deliberately, once for EACH term, using the method that found the defect.** *Headroom @ 08:59:46* (906 MB free / 99%): both apps refused, **the whole `backups/primary` tree byte-identical — `TREE_SHA` 111d1760c18d3440f700634ab325f8b8 before and after**, opengist's tar still at its original 182,272 B; **no `Stopping <app> for safe volume dump` line at all**, which is the positive-by-absence observable that matters because that line IS present in the 08:58 baseline run; 0 volume dumps; one alert per app, HTTP 200. Space freed, re-run @ 09:01:33 → both captured normally. *Size @ 09:03:00*, reproducing the original sequence with a real 2 GiB file in opengist's volume (previous tar **2,147,666,432 B**, the exact figure the defect was measured at) and the filesystem at **91% used / 2.9 GB free — both headroom terms deliberately clear**: opengist refused `(size)` while **privatebin was ADMITTED and dumped normally**, proving the term is per-app rather than a global halt. **The refusal's wording was NOT weakened to fit** — the behaviour moved so the wording became true, and it is verified by tree fingerprint rather than by reading the log line, which is what lied. The `fallocate` instrument was re-proven on the rebuilt box before use (5 GiB step moved guest `df` while thin-pool `data_percent` held **36.83 → 36.83**), and teardown returned the pool to **29.43%**, below its own baseline. The golden **is now VOUCHED** (2026-08-03, hub `Artifact manifest set: … golden=0.192.0`), so fresh installs pick up the merged layout. Every box in the field that has not been reinstalled is still on the SPLIT layout and is unaffected: nothing assumes the merged shape at runtime, the controller's system_data_path is a path rather than a volume, and agent v0.120.0 FOLDS the retired `-sysdata-grow` into the single grow so an older `felhom-host-install.sh` still provisions the same total capacity |
| Soft-quota: usage bar, pre-push enlargement block, customer notification | controller v0.109/134, hub v0.41/55 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | 6D/6E; hub OffsiteChecker | |
| **A customer (not the operator) performs a restore via UI alone** | all | **MISSING** (as evidence) | — | Alpha will produce this; script it into R-3. **2026-07-19:** the C6 evidence attempt ran and found a **product gap instead of evidence** — `audits/DIAG-immich-restore-2026-07-19.md`. A customer-driven UI restore of a DB-indexed app cannot currently succeed (R-43 file-only restore, R-44 stale dump), so this row cannot flip until those close. Row stays MISSING **by finding, not by absence of attempt** — the rehearsal system working, not failing. **2026-07-19: the blocking product gaps are CLOSED in controller v0.148.0** (R-43 + R-44 shipped), so this row is now blocked only on the evidence run itself, not on missing capability. It flips the moment the §9 acceptance produces screenshots + the outcome flash + a snapshot ID. **2026-07-19 round 2 — PARTIAL EVIDENCE ONLY, row NOT flipped** (`audits/DIAG-immich-restore-round2-2026-07-19.md`): a deliberate run from snapshot `49e7cb46` did recover all 11 assets (`status=active`, files resolve), but the operation **reported failure** and left immich reporting schema drift, because the replay aborted against the running app (H4). Photos back ≠ clean acceptance. **2026-07-20: H4 closed in controller v0.153.0 (R-47) on BOTH paths, AND THE EVIDENCE RUN HAPPENED.** *(The "closing in v0.149" wording above was wrong — v0.149.0 was the F3 dashboard fix; R-47 shipped in v0.153.0.)* The C6 drill ran end-to-end **through the UI**: photos deleted, **trash emptied**, the full files+database restore pressed on `/backups/restore`, 40 files placed + 1 DB dump replayed rc-0, 11 assets back, no drift, timeline visually confirmed. The method note below is now DEMONSTRATED, not merely written down. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` 4e. **Residual: the run was performed by the OPERATOR, not by a customer** — for this row literal wording the alpha still owes one genuinely customer-driven pass, but no product gap blocks it. Method note for R-3's script: deleting in an app's own UI usually means *trash*, not deletion, so a drill written that way merges 0 files, flashes success and proves nothing — a real drill must empty the trash **and** verify the app's *content*, not the file count **Lane split → `07-backup-architecture.md` §3**: this row is Lane 1 (customer, unassisted). §8 rows 1–5 are the routes it would exercise |

## D. Storage & devices

| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A second drive appearing is OFFERED as the backup target; accepting moves it; registration and the drive gate confer no role by themselves | controller v0.186.0, agent v0.113 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `SESSION-C-2026-07-29` C4: offer rendered with `data-path`, decline path proven (target stayed `local`, no `felhom-backup` storage, agent.json unchanged), `restart_required:true`, agent did NOT self-restart, wrapper created the storage at the drive's OWN mountpoint | Accept was driven through the endpoint the button POSTs, not a browser click — no browser automation exists on DooPlex |
| Drive wizard: scan/format/mount/enroll, incl. legacy-boot LVM-root hosts | controller, agent v0.87 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `DISPOSITION-ia-finding2-systemdisks-2026-07-13` (legacy EFI+LVM host, root not offered, byte-identical); enroll/format live in `storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15` (E10 re-enroll, data intact); agent fence self-test refuses `/dev/sda` | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-2` T-STG-ENROLL/SEC-FORMAT were auth-hollow CSRF-403.) **Fresh-USB wizard enroll+format through the customer UI PROVEN-LIVE (controller v0.141.0, 2026-07-17):** a 64 GB scratch USB driven through the real `/api/storage/init` endpoints (login+CSRF) → confirm → detached format (~27 s mkfs) → mount → register → mounted+registered at `/mnt/felhom-drives/scratch1`. **F6 (initialize-to-usable) now covered:** the wizard runs the chain as a detached, disconnect-safe, pollable job (3-step progress) with an agent format-status poll for a slow mkfs **2026-07-26 — a SILENT failure class on the channel every agent-backed capability depends on (this row, data migration, USB enrollment, guest RAM, quiesce/PBS) is now DETECTED (controller v0.173.0, R-77). No row status flips.** `controller.yaml` and `bootstrap.json` could disagree on `local_api.endpoint` indefinitely with no signal: the R-50 island migration rewrote the latter, the fleet kept dialling the former, and for 17.5 h the only alert was a generic "agent unreachable" that read as an infrastructure blip. Drift now raises its own event type (`local_api_endpoint_drift`) naming both values. It is DETECTION ONLY — the authority ruling is R-78 — so the class is now loud, not prevented. Evidence: `audits/DIAG-agent-channel-2026-07-26.md`. |
| Data migration between drives (all / per-app), crash-safe | controller | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6C` 4P-5 (scope=app round-trip, byte-identical); `storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15` (two migrate-all runs via dashboard UI, sha256 byte-identical) | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-2` T-STG-MIGRATE-* were auth-hollow.) "crash-safe" is design-level (copy→verify→remove) — no clean live crash-during-migration PASS |
| NAS (NFS/SMB-client) verify-before-commit, uid-1000 probe, categorized Hungarian errors, DSM-validated | controller v0.113–117, agent v0.81/84/85 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `SPIKE-nas-verify-2026-07-11`, `SPIKE-nas-dsm-2026-07-11`, `CAMPAIGN-3-2026-07-11` (boot/reassert fixes) | |
| **Network storage (NAS) is browse + bulk-media only — it may NOT host an app's data namespace** | controller v0.187.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-30) | `audits/R108-network-app-namespace-2026-07-30.md`. Same-box before/after on demo-felhom through the exact endpoint the UI invokes (`POST /api/storage/migrate-app`, authenticated + CSRF): **pre-fix v0.186.0** the target was never examined — both a NAS-shaped and an unregistered path passed straight into `MigrateApp` and failed only on the app name (409); **post-fix v0.187.0** both are refused 400 with a Hungarian reason, while a real local drive still reaches `MigrateApp` (409) proving the guard is not over-broad. On demo-hp (the box with a REGISTERED share) the network-specific refusal fires. Non-effect verified in the registry: no `migrated_to`, nothing decommissioned, app `HDD_PATH` unchanged, no `backups/` on the share | **Closes R-108 and UNBLOCKS D5** (`07-backup-architecture.md` §7.3, §10.1). The share-root `:rslave` FileBrowser bind is deliberately UNCHANGED — load-bearing for automount wake, and unscopable — verified byte-identical by diffing demo-hp's generated compose before/after. Fails closed: `/mnt/felhom-drives` holds both kinds, so an unregistered path under it is un-classifiable and refused. **Not exercised:** the deploy POST and decommission-migrate refusals are unit-tested (non-effect, nil `stackMgr`) but were NOT live-fired — only migrate-app was. `.fab`-export-onto-NAS remains open (→ R-126) |
| **A Tier-1/Tier-2 app restore works from the DRIVE ALONE — the recovery unit carries the app's secrets (D5)** | controller v0.188.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-30) | `audits/D5-drive-alone-restore-2026-07-30.md`, `07-backup-architecture.md` §7.4. On a scratch drill guest on felhom-pve, through the real endpoints (`POST /api/stacks/{app}/deploy` → `POST /api/backup/run` → `POST /backup/restore`): AdventureLog (`SECRET_KEY` **data_key** + `DB_PASSWORD`) restored with the guest's `app.yaml` **moved aside** → `secrets recovered=2/2`, **27.6 s**, `Restore-from-unit completed`. **The observable is the DATA, not the exit code:** the app itself then read the seeded customer row **over TCP with its own credential** (`connected_as=adventurelog over_TCP=True`), 51 Django tables intact, and the discriminator held — the pre-backup row returned while a row added AFTER the backup was gone, so the volume tar was genuinely restored. The unit held **no `.sql` dump**, so the DB came back from the volume tar, which is exactly the case a regenerated password would have broken. **The withheld half is proven too:** Grafana's `type: password` admin login was live in its container and `ENC:` in the guest, yet appeared in **0 files** anywhere under the backup namespace, and the unit's app.yaml header names it as withheld | **Ruling (operator, 2026-07-30): `type: secret` travels, `type: password` NEVER does, minus the `nonPortableSecrets` code register (`vaultwarden/ADMIN_TOKEN`).** Plaintext on the drive, like the data — defensible **only because** the internet-reachable class is withheld; the two are coupled and must not be relaxed independently. **The brief's own proposal (data_key-only) was tested and rejected:** the flag is unreliable (4 encryption keys the catalog itself labels as such are unflagged → **R-127**) and a DB password is not resettable in practice (`POSTGRES_PASSWORD` is ignored once PGDATA is non-empty). Precedence: **the unit wins** over the guest, because the unit's secrets match the data being restored. The fail-closed data-key gate is UNCHANGED. **Not exercised live:** the withheld-class O4 regeneration on restore, and Tier-2's own cross-drive copy of a secret-bearing unit (both unit-tested only). Venue was a **fixture-class scratch guest**, correct per `runbooks/target-selection.md` since D5's claim is about restore CODE, not the install path |
| USB drive enrollment + unplug detection + recommission | controller, agent | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15` E4 (yanked-while-running → agent auto-rebind) + E10 (re-enroll, data intact); `CAMPAIGN-4`/`6A` (3 USB re-establish across device-letter reshuffle) | (Cited `RUNBOOK-usb` could NOT complete a wizard enrollment; `CAMPAIGN-2` legs were auth-hollow.) Fresh-USB **wizard enrollment** specifically still unproven |
| Decommission (migrate-first and anyway-paths), eject | agent, controller | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15` E9 (decommission-anyway → bind detached, parent mp untouched, reboot-safe) + E12 (eject drive holding all apps) | (Cited `CAMPAIGN-2` T-STG-DECOM-* were auth-hollow; `SPIKE-decommission` was report-only, button still vestigial.) |
| Boot ordering: automount + networking survive reboot; appliance self-heal watchdog | agent v0.85 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-4-2026-07-13` (F12 fix HOLDS: demo-host reboot + 5-boot storm, 0 ordering cycles, caps 63/63, WG re-handshake) + `CAMPAIGN-6A-2026-07-14` 1D (re-arm reboot-survival across 9 guest + 1 host reboots) | (`CAMPAIGN-3` F10/F11/F12 were the CRITICAL/HIGH *failures*; fixes shipped in agent v0.85 and were re-validated live in 4/6A — cite the validation, not the finding.) Residual: `skip-active` on `pct reboot` carried by the heal path; a NAS outage spanning a guest reboot can strand the share until agent restart (6A) |

## E. Access, networking & household use

| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Remote access via Cloudflare Tunnel + Traefik (per-app subdomains) | cloudflared, traefik | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-2` T-FLT-CF | Per-customer zone-scoped CF tokens (blast-radius ruling) |
| LAN access when internet is down (lan_resolver) | agent | **IMPLEMENTED** | — | Never drilled as a customer experience ("net down — can I reach my photos?") → R-19 |
| Phone photo backup | immich (classified) | **PROVEN-LIVE** | 6D end-to-end restore proof | |
| Documents/OCR | paperless-ngx (classified) | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `CAMPAIGN-6C` 4P-1 (deploy paperless-ngx, ingest 3 docs via consume flow, OCR + PDF/A ~90s) + 4P-2/3/5 | Consume-folder ingestion awkward without SMB → R-7 |
| Files from Windows Explorer / Mac Finder (SMB **server**) | controller v0.145.0 + `felhom-samba:1.0.0` | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `felhom-controller` REPORT.md (v0.144.0) + `controller/sharing.md`; transport verdict `audits/SPIKE-lan-discovery-2026-07-18.md` | „Megosztás" page: enable + one household password + shares (new folder or picked existing, per-share read-only). Fourth protected infra stack (host-net, smbd+**nmbd**+wsdd). Live on demo: 445 reachable, NetBIOS `FELHOM` resolves, write/read byte-compare PASS, write to a read-only share REFUSED, SMB writes land as uid 1000. **Explorer leg PASSED 2026-07-18 (Viktor):** Network → FELHOM → both shares open; a real Explorer *save* into `dokumentumok` landed owned uid 1000, and a write into the read-only `filmek` was refused by Windows with the folder left untouched. Share data RIDES BOTH BACKUP TIERS (R-7b, controller v0.145.0, Model B′ sibling shares source): tier-2 cross-drive legs + an offsite `_shares` restic snapshot carrying the share definitions and the credential copy, with a „Megosztások" restore. **All four legs PROVEN-LIVE on demo 2026-07-18** — tier-2 tree md5-verified; offsite snapshots `e0b9d723` (Viktor 12:18:16Z) and `4e2b15ec` both carrying manifest + `passdb.tar`; restore round-trip returned a deleted probe file byte-identical and a deleted share DEFINITION with its original flags without overwriting live files; samba liveness → hub-accepted `health_critical`. Remaining human leg: SMB positive auth with the real household password |
| Media to TV via DLNA | — | **MISSING** | — | Jellyfin app exists; DLNA/SSDP unvalidated → R-6, R-8 |
| File access via browser | FileBrowser (infra app, auto-mount sync) | **IMPLEMENTED** | FileBrowser runs healthy + userdata-bound (`storage-lifecycle-acceptance-2026-06-15`, `CAMPAIGN-3`) | Actual browse/download **through FileBrowser** is exercised in no doc. (Cited `CAMPAIGN-2` T-PAGE-ALL renders only the controller dashboard pages, not FileBrowser.) Demoted. **2026-07-26, controller v0.172.0 (R-75) — status DELIBERATELY UNCHANGED.** The canonical drop-zone now has its own FileBrowser source („Beolvasás" → `/srv/beolvasas`, a separate bind of `<system namespace>/userdata/import`) and the app page carries a per-app deep link into it. Verified live on demo-hp: the source and bind are in the generated config, the app page renders `https://files.enkisfelhom.hu/files/Beolvas%C3%A1s/paperless`, and a file written through FileBrowser's OWN mount was consumed and deleted by paperless in ~30 s. **That is still not a browse.** Nothing in this arc drove the FileBrowser HTTP UI — no browser exists on DooPlex — so the row's standing caveat survives intact and the upgrade to PROVEN-LIVE remains unearned. What it would take: a human click-through, or an authenticated `/api/resources` round-trip against the live instance. See `controller/import-and-data-paths.md` |
| **Indítópult (app launcher) — one-tap grid of the household's openable apps** | controller v0.163.0 | **IMPLEMENTED** | New FIRST sidebar page `/launcher`: colored tiles (deterministic slug color or `.felhom.yml` `brand_color`) + white glyph/monogram, one per openable app (tile ⟺ „Megnyitás" — subdomain presence is the single criterion; controller excluded). Operational → `<a target=_blank>` to the public URL; stopped → greyed + state badge, no link. `/` stays the Vezérlőpult. Endpoint-level + render-test verified; `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` (2026-07-24) | Live operator click-through of a real tile → app pending (browser automation not available on DooPlex). Follow-up: curate `brand_color` for top catalog apps (R-72). Sharing the launcher outside the household is now the capability-URL guest link — see the row below |
| **Indítópult megosztás (vendég link)** — capability URL `/s/<token>` serves a standalone read-only guest launcher (no account, no admin session); optional per-share password; QR | controller v0.165.0 | **IMPLEMENTED** | 160-bit `crypto/rand` token, constant-time match (empty stored = disabled = byte-identical to the mux default 404); guest headers `noindex`/`no-referrer`/`no-store`; optional SEPARATE bcrypt share password + its own per-IP attempt map; signed cookie `HMAC(token`\|`passwordHash)` keyed with `session_secret` (rotate-token OR change-password invalidates all cookies); token redacted in logs (`/s/<redacted>`). Groups A–G (14 tests) + 3 red-proofs; **§13 endpoint-level live validation on 9201 all-pass** (`felhom-controller/REPORT.md` 2026-07-24). **Design ruling: member accounts SUPERSEDED by this capability-URL model; per-member tile visibility parked under the SSO arc (R-15).** | Full operator browser click-through + a validation doc pending → then PROVEN-LIVE. Accepted residuals: link-preview crawlers fetch once (noindex prevents indexing); reverse-proxy/CF access logs hold the path (ops-tier); the modal link carries the request Host (LAN-IP admin ⇒ LAN-IP link) |
| Forgot dashboard password → instant reset code | controller v0.123, hub | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `DRILL-day0-take2-2026-07-12` F-15 (live re-run of the exact failure path: hash applied 1s after request, code accepted first try) | |
| Multiple household users / per-person accounts | — | **MISSING** | — | Single dashboard password; acceptable for alpha → R-15 |
| WireGuard base infra always-on; OOB operator access (felhom-sshd, /32 peer) | agent v0.72, hub v0.35 | **IMPLEMENTED** | `SPIKE-oob-wg-operator-peer-2026-07-05`, `SPIKE-felhom-sshd-2026-07-05` | Mutual-repair desired-state arc not built → R-13. **CHECKED 2026-08-08 (R-260) and this row was NOT claiming something untrue** — it claims the capability is implemented, never that it is monitored, so no correction was owed. What WAS untrue is narrower and sat one layer down: **the hub's own OOB health check could not see whether the operator's key was installed.** `HostOOBRow` mirrored five of the agent's eight OOB fields, so `operator_key_configured` — emitted every heartbeat since agent v0.72.0, i.e. from this row's own vintage — was discarded by `encoding/json` on arrival, and `oobDegraded` returned `ok` for a box with felhom-sshd active, reachable, a valid config, a configured peer and **no operator key at all**. `operator_peer_configured`, which it did read, only says the peer IP is in desired-state — that OOB is MEANT to work, not that entry is possible. Fixed hub v0.99.0; the missing key now degrades and the alert NAMES it; a stanza too old to carry the field is reported distinctly and is never a silent ok. Pinned end-to-end from raw report JSON by `TestHostOOB_MissingOperatorKey_EndToEnd` and `TestHostOOB_NoKeyField_IsNotSilentlyOK_EndToEnd` |
| The operator can see WHERE a managed host is — its LAN address and its WireGuard address, on the host page | agent **v0.119.0**, hub **v0.85.0** | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-31) | `audits/host-addresses-visible-2026-07-31.md` | Before this the LAN IP was **not reportable at all** — `HostMetrics` carried no address of any kind — and the WG IP existed only in `/offsite`'s peer table keyed by pubkey (peer→host, never host→peer). New wire field `addresses[]`, one row per (interface, address); `IsGlobalUnicast()` is the whole filter, chosen by MEASURING both demo boxes, and it needs no veth/fwbr denylist because that plumbing carries no IP. Rendered live on both 0.119.0 hosts matching their `ip addr` ground truth exactly. **Two honesty properties carry the risk and are both red-proofed:** WireGuard shows the hub ALLOCATION and whether the box CONFIRMS holding it (allocation alone cannot tell a live tunnel from a peer never applied), and an agent below 0.119.0 renders **UNKNOWN, never "no addresses"** — proven live on `drill-r50-0a4f9a` (0.113.0). **Not covered:** a two-LAN-bridge box and a real WG drift, neither of which exists to observe |
| Break-glass management-plane recovery | agent v0.71, hub v0.84 | **IMPLEMENTED** | `runbooks/break-glass.md` | hub v0.84.0 adds an **operator-SESSION** retrieval path (host page → Console access → Reveal; `POST /hosts/{id}/reveal-recovery-credential`, CSRF-gated, writes a customer-visible `recovery_credential_revealed` event) beside the pre-existing **global-key** one (`GET /api/v1/admin/hosts/{id}/recovery-credential`), which is untouched and stays the route for when the hub UI itself is down. **The credential half is now PROVEN (2026-07-31):** the vaulted `demo-hp-bb76ea` password was verified against the box's own `/etc/shadow` hash AND minted a real PVE ticket — `POST /api2/json/access/ticket` → **HTTP 200, `root@pam`, 367-char ticket**, the exact API the login form submits to. Still IMPLEMENTED rather than PROVEN-LIVE overall, because the path has not been exercised on a REAL lockout (SSH was available throughout). Discovered during that check: the card's Copy button shipped `disabled` until a Reveal and silently no-opped, leaving ANOTHER host's password in the clipboard — fixed in hub v0.86.0. The vaulted secret is plaintext at rest → **R-133** |

## F. Notifications & monitoring

| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| An ABSENT backup-target drive raises its OWN alarm, paired with a matching recovery | agent **v0.116.0**, controller v0.184.1+, hub v0.81.0 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-30) | `audits/R116-v0116-2026-07-30.md`. On a fresh box built through the **real day-0** on demo-hp, running the agent it installed **unaided from the vouched Day-0 manifest** (0.116.0), both drives enrolled through the real endpoints and device loss a real hot-detach — **the full four-event sequence, two matched pairs, correctly discriminated:** `07:20:04 backup_target_absent (error)` / `07:22:34 backup_target_restored (info)` for the TARGET, and `07:24:04 storage_disconnected (error)` / `07:25:34 storage_reconnected (info)` for a NON-target drive on the same box minutes apart. Gate fired in **3 s**. All four reached the hub — specific alarm, severity, Hungarian copy and hub routing now exercised end-to-end. **Discrimination is proven NON-trivially for the first time**: both prior runs had the target itself emit the generic event, so the mirror proved nothing. **Over-correction guard PASSES** with a positive observable — 0 ABSENT lines and 0 drive events over a 2m14s window with both drives present, target `degraded:false`, while 2 `RETURNED` lines prove the gate was ticking. | **The mechanism was isolated from the captured payload first** (`DIAG-r116-disks-payload-2026-07-30.md`), after two fixes aimed at shapes that do not occur. v0.116.0 joins the two records of one drive on the only identity that survives the device — the CONFIGURED path — so one row carries both the flag and the guest path the gate keys on. **Both smaller-looking fixes were rejected because they regress R-114** (`backup_target_offer.go:79` reads flag+mount_path as *healthy*). **Caveat worth reading: the drill box ran controller 0.185.1 from the golden, which PREDATES R-114** — so its absent-state banner showed the old false "backup is on the system disk" copy. That is the golden being a release behind, not a regression → **R-120** |
| Health-degradation email (edge-triggered, cooldowns, Hungarian) via hub → Resend | controller, hub | **IMPLEMENTED** | delivery pipeline live-proven for the **enlarge-block** trigger (`CAMPAIGN-6D` P3-DELIVERY, op+customer "Kedves Ügyfél!"); `NotifyHealthChange` ok→warn/fail edge-trigger implemented | The **health-degradation** trigger specifically has never fired an email live in any doc. Demoted (pipeline proven for a different event). Deliverability to HU freemail → R-4 |
| Event catalog: app_start_failed, dead-app, offbox_enlarge_blocked, claim/reset codes, critical severity | controller, hub v0.31/48/50/55 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | live-delivered: `CAMPAIGN-6D` P3-DELIVERY (enlarge-block, op+customer); `DRILL-day0-vm` F-4 (claim code); `DRILL-day0-take2` F-15 (reset code) | `app_start_failed`/`dead-app` delivery is unit-only (6C inconclusive) — the pipeline + 3 event families are live, those two are not |
| Prefs safety: empty-email wipe guard | controller v0.137 + hub v0.71.0 | **IMPLEMENTED** | controller leg red-proofed 07-15; hub-side no-clobber belt (`handleSavePreferences` preserves a stored non-empty address on an empty-email push) red-proofed 07-22 | Born from a live incident; controller 0.160.0 guards both its push legs, so the hub belt covers older/rogue boxes |
| Paired recovery notifications + prefs seeding at claim + priority headers (power-outage audit F11/F12/F14-light) | hub v0.71.0 | **IMPLEMENTED** (recovery leg **PARTIAL** until a live staleness cycle fires it) | `hub/CHANGELOG.md` v0.71.0; 17 tests + 4 red-proofs (`REPORT.md` 2026-07-22); Resend `headers` mechanism probed live (HTTP 200) pre-implementation; operator+customer `test` rows live-fired via the controller's own test endpoint | Recovery = explicit eventType branch, severity semantics frozen; customer gate = PAIRING (`notification_log` evidence), not `enabled_events`. Live legs pending: a natural `*_recovered` mail (next real staleness cycle or the reboot-drill arc — never fabricated by blocking reports) and seed-at-claim on a real claim (Peti Friday reinstall). F14-full (operator push channel, ntfy/Telegram) stays open → R-69 |
| System + container metrics (SQLite, Chart.js, 30-day downsampling) | controller | **IMPLEMENTED** | metrics collection + `/monitoring` render present (page 200) | The cited `CAMPAIGN-2` T-RES-CPU/T-SOAK-LOOP are H1/H2 harness artifacts (auth-302), not metrics tests; SQLite/Chart.js/30-day downsampling validated in no campaign. Demoted |
| Always-on debug rings + on-demand log-bundle pulls with TTL/custody | controller v0.116, agent v0.83, hub v0.46 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | debug rings live-exercised `CAMPAIGN-3` fix-6 (1000-cap ring, ~55min horizon under load) | The **log-bundle-pull TTL/custody** half is changelog-only (no dedicated observability audit doc); ring persistence across restart is a known gap |
| Operator alerting (Healthchecks → monitoring@felhom.eu) | k3s, Resend | **IMPLEMENTED** | operator infra, stated in production since 02-04; no corpus validation doc |
| Backup-deadline alerting (`expected_backup_missed`) is ANCHORED — absence of signal is UNKNOWN, not failure | hub v0.75.0 | **IMPLEMENTED** | `audits/DIAG-backup-missed-2026-07-26.md` + red-proofs A/B/C + replay of the real 2026-07-26 03:00 reports (all three silent) | **No row status flips** — this signal had a FALSE-POSITIVE class (three instances: hub v0.12.0, v0.73.0, R-81), now anchored at first contact and read across retained host-report history. Still unit-proven only, not live-fired at a real deadline. The *underlying* PBS/offsite-DR tier gap it exposed is → R-82. | Per the status enum, no citation → not PROVEN-LIVE. Demoted pending an operator-cited live alert (candidate re-upgrade — see REPORT) |

## G. Fleet & operator (hub)

| Scenario | Components | Status | Evidence | Gap / roadmap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Customer/host management: 8-tab detail, scoped auto-refresh, safe stale-host deletion, capability chips | hub v0.47–0.53 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | hub v0.53.0 dead-host roll-up live on the Peti cluster (proxmox1 down 23h); `CAMPAIGN-4-2026-07-13` (operator UI driven live); `DRILL-day0-take2` F-16 (offsite/freeze buttons live) | 8-tab render + capability chips are **render-test-validated** (hub UI is password-gated; CC cannot log in). (Cited "daily operator use" was a no-doc citation; `AUDIT-hub-gui-2026-06-30` predates these features at hub v0.25) |
| Config/state change round-trips in **seconds** (hub↔box immediacy; 15-min cycle stays the backbone): box→hub out-of-cycle report (Dir 1) + hub→box `GET /api/v1/wait` long-poll wake (Dir 2) | controller v0.139/140, hub v0.58/0.63 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (2026-07-21) | Transport proven live through the real DNS-only ingress: `SPIKE-immediate-sync-transport-2026-07-16` + hub v0.58.0 / controller v0.140.0 REPORTs — 240 s no-annotation hold (25 s heartbeat defeats nginx's 60 s `proxy_read_timeout`, no ingress change), 0.047 s wake-on-change, hub `rollout restart` = 1 WARN + 0-storm reconnect; Dir-1 2 s box→hub round-trip live in controller v0.139.0 | The operator-UI **save→apply** round-trip is not fired end-to-end live (hub UI password-gated; CC can't log in) → R-23; the wake transport and the ACK→config_version→`ConfigRefresher` delivery chain are each proven, only the UI-triggered bump leg is unexercised. Agent-plane (host-domain desired-state) poke **first slice PROVEN-LIVE** (Direction-2a, agent v0.89.0 + hub v0.59.0, 2026-07-17): contentless ep0-relayed UDP poke → agent immediate desired-state cycle, per `SPIKE-immediate-sync-transport-2026-07-16` P4. Full path live-proven: a real operator manifest save fired `poke: sync-poke delivered to 10.77.0.2`; the box (0.89.0) received it and logged `poke received → triggering an immediate desired-state cycle` → `out-of-band report triggered` — **~31 ms ep0→box, sub-ms to the report cycle** (WG-confined, from 10.77.0.1 to the 10.77.0.2-bound socket); save→tick ≈ ~0.45 s (SSH-dominated), well under ≤2–3 s. R-13 first slice (listener+sender only; the rest of the mutual-repair arc stays open). **System-initiated immediacy wired (hub v0.63.0, this REPORT):** the mutation sites that only OPERATOR actions used to notify now fire the correct plane's notifier when the hub itself mints state — agent-plane pokes at `PBSDRAutoProvision` (the observed slice-C lag), `ReissuePBSDR` (also the pbsdrheal escalation), `handlePBSDRReissue`, and the two admin desired-state api writers; controller-plane bump at `reissueOnReenroll`. Unit-tested + red-proofed, not yet fired on a real system event (folds into the rehearsal bind sequence). Still PARTIAL: the R-23 operator-UI save→apply leg and the agent **fast-tick-until-first-convergence** SECONDARY (the WG-registration leg a poke can't reach pre-tunnel) remain unfired live. **Fast-tick SHIPPED (agent v0.90.0, R-28):** while any desired-state item is unapplied — incl. the pre-tunnel window a poke can't reach — the agent pulses the out-of-band trigger every 30 s and self-disarms on convergence (state-based; four cached sources; LOUD states excluded). LIVE on both demo agents (the `fast-tick armed: 30s …` startup line verified). **REAL-ONBOARDING PROOF DONE — `tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` (ledger 8, S5):** on a genuine first onboarding on metal, **every post-bind leg landed seconds apart with no ~15-minute stall anywhere** — bind 16:29:55 → credential delivered 16:30:21 (26 s) → agent 0.90.0 up 16:30:49 → **WG registered + tunnel applied 16:30:51 (~2 s)** → poke listener 16:30:54 → controller 16:32:28 → floor-lifted and running current 16:32:39. **Bind → running-current = 2 min 44 s.** The PBS-DR descriptor auto-provisioned on the same cadence (agent `converged state=applied` 16:45:53) — though see the DR-tier row: the descriptor converged while the credential behind it was already stale (R-39). The pre-tunnel fast-tick window is therefore proven in its real setting; the remaining PARTIAL is the R-23 operator-UI save→apply leg alone  **2026-07-21 — THE LAST PARTIAL LEG IS CLOSED (R-23(a) restart leg).** The operator saved the global floor to a version the box did NOT run (0.153.0 → **v0.154.0**) and the managed self-update fired **exactly once**: `06:57:13Z` UpdateState pending (`initiated_by=auto-floor`) → `06:57:17Z` agent `controller swap requested` → `06:57:21Z` container restarted → `06:57:29Z` `new controller healthy`. **Save → healthy on the new version = 16 s.** Over a 39-minute window: swap requests **1**, agent-driven bootstrap restarts **1**, rollbacks **0**, container `RestartCount` **0**; `VerifyStartup` confirmed on the next boot and the following periodic check logged `Current version 0.154.0 is up to date` (the at/above-floor branch doing nothing, as designed). The 2026-07-20 attempt could not prove this because it targeted an already-running version. Evidence: `felhom-controller/REPORT.md` §6. |
| Customer right-sizes guest RAM from the controller (agent-enforced bounds, live cgroup apply, no reboot) | agent v0.90.0 + controller v0.143.0 (R-24) | **PROVEN-LIVE** (grow **and** shrink on metal, 2026-07-18) | **`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md` (ledger 9) — the apply is now proven in both directions on a normal-sized box:** customer zero **shrank 11675 → 8192 MB at 16:50:22** and **grew 8192 → 12288 MB at 17:02:17**, each a live cgroup apply with **no reboot** (`local-api: guest-memory resized` in the agent journal, `[web] memory resized` in the controller log), and the new total rippled into the deploy page's memory math at 17:05:15 (`total=12288MB`). F5 auto-sizing had landed the guest at 11675 MB. Controller-direct (R-24's hub-desired-state framing SUPERSEDED, Viktor 2026-07-17). Agent `GET`/`POST /guest/memory` enforces every bound FRESH (min 2048 / max host_total−2048 / shrink floor max(2048, usage+512)) + verify-after-apply; PVE `SetConfig` hot-applies (**Phase-0 PROVEN** on the nested box: maxmem moves with the guest running, /proc/meminfo ripples via lxcfs, no reboot). Controller "Szerver memória (RAM)" card + code→Hungarian map, gated on `FeatureGuestMemoryResize` (MinAgent 0.90.0). LIVE-validated end-to-end through the real endpoint on the demo (above_max + below_min refusals render the Hungarian, agent English never leaks; SupportYes via the version header) | Row complete as of the 2026-07-18 rehearsal — the refusals were proven on the nested demo, the **applies** on the N100. Cores stay observation |
| Publish train: MinAgent floors, gated auto-Reissue, version channels, floor-field-LAST rules | hub v0.45/0.53, agent | **PARTIAL** | `runbooks/publish-train-rules.md`; demo-fleet updates proven | **Box-side floor lift PROVEN-LIVE on a fresh install** (`tests/VALIDATION-n100-rehearsal-2026-07-18.md`): the day-0 golden deployed controller **0.143.0** at 16:32:28 and the managed floor lifted it to **0.145.0 by 16:32:34 — a 5-second, fully unattended update inside the first minute of controller life**, `update-state.json` recording `initiated_by: auto-floor` with `controller_updated` pushed to the hub. So the *mechanism* is no longer nested-only. **Still never proven on a real REMOTE customer** — parked trains `RUNBOOK-publish-0.79/0.81/0.85-*` await Peti → R-1. **Action before first invite: rebuild the golden to 0.145.x** now that this evidence is banked, so fresh boxes don't sit two versions stale | **Fresh-box floor lift proven 2026-07-21 (demo-hp):** a brand-new box came up on golden **0.153.0** and self-updated to the fleet floor **0.156.0** during day-0, unattended — the floor mechanism works on first contact, not only on boxes that have been in the fleet a while. That is the R-23(a) single-swap behaviour observed on a machine with no history at all.
| Agent self-update: A/B slots, crash-loop auto-rollback, operator-signed | agent v0.70+ | **PROVEN-LIVE** (demo) | `SPIKE-agent-selfupdate-2026-07-05` | Remote-customer proof pending → R-1 |
| Controller self-update: anonymous registry, no credentials in guest | controller v0.112 | **PROVEN-LIVE** (demo) | 07-10 arc | |
| Offsite provisioning: Hetzner API, sub-account per customer, host-key pinning, credential re-issue | hub v0.37–0.39 | **PROVEN-LIVE** | `VALIDATION-offsite-provisioning-e2e-2026-07-09`, `SPIKE-hetzner-api-provisioning-2026-07-09` | |
| Per-customer offsite fill + staleness + freeze lever | hub v0.41 | **IMPLEMENTED** | `OffsiteChecker` (`hub/internal/monitor/offsite.go`): fill 90/95% vs soft quota, staleness >48h | No live-fired leg: `CAMPAIGN-offsite-overnight-2026-07-10` recorded no quota/fill/staleness emails, and the freeze write-block was **inconclusive** (only the Hetzner `readonly:true` API op succeeded). Demoted |
| **Box-level Storage Box aggregate (total fill, Σ quotas, oversubscription alert)** | hub v0.64.0 (R-5) | **IMPLEMENTED** (data pipeline PROVEN-LIVE) | `monitor.OffsiteBoxChecker` — fetch-throttled Hetzner GET (1/15 min), fill (used/`storage_box_type.size`, 80/90%) + oversubscription (Σ shared+enabled ConfigJSON quotas / capacity, 2.0×), escalation-only operator alert on the customer-less `"pool-box"` scope; Offsite-tab panel + dashboard tile. **Phase-0-pinned** live shape (box 611714) + **live-computed in-cluster:** `0.2% full (2.6 GB of 1.00 TB), Σ shared quota 150 GB, oversub 0.15x`. Tests + 4 red-proofs; hub v0.64.0 REPORT | Two open legs: the **UI render** is unit-verified only (hub UI password-gated → no screenshot); the **alert emails** are unit + red-proof verified but NOT fired live (real pool nominal — a live-fire emails Viktor). Thresholds pending Viktor's ruling (named config keys). READ-ONLY (GET) |
| **Operator sees PBS DR datastore fill at a glance (Offsite "PBS DR" tab + dashboard gauge)** | hub v0.65.0 + tenantsync v1.2.0 (R-5) | **IMPLEMENTED** (data pipeline PROVEN-LIVE) | The PBS DR datastore (`felhom-offsite` on ep0) fill — NOT a Hetzner box. **Option A:** a read-only `usage` op on the `felhom-tenantsync` ep0 forced command (twin of `fingerprint`; `df` on the datastore path — no customer_id, no admin token, NO mutation), polled by `monitor.PBSDRBoxChecker` (OffsiteBoxChecker clone; 15-min throttle; states ok/unavailable/degraded; fill 80/90% on the `"pbsdr-box"` operator scope). `/offsite` split into Restic + PBS DR tabs; two dashboard gauges. **Graceful: hub deploy ⟂ ep0 update** (ep0 ≤ v1.1.0 → gauge "n/a" until updated). **Phase-0-pinned** (`df` on ep0 PBS 4.2.3) + **live-computed in-cluster** (ep0 updated to v1.2.0 this session): `19.1% full (7.1 GB of 37.2 GB)`. 10 Go tests + a bash harness + 3 red-proofs; hub v0.65.0 REPORT | Open legs: **UI render** unit-verified only (hub UI password-gated); the **fill alert email** is unit + red-proof verified, NOT fired live (datastore nominal at 19%). Separate PBS threshold keys (default 80/90); no oversubscription (namespaces, not quotas). READ-ONLY |
| Secrets hygiene: bearer in k8s Secret, no secrets in git, single-quote credential store | hub v0.53, conventions | **IMPLEMENTED** | 07-13 closing bundle | |
| Operator login password changeable from UI | hub v0.54 | **IMPLEMENTED** | 07-13 | |