# REPORT — R-196 / R-204 item 2 (hub v0.95.0), 2026-08-05

**A re-issue no longer marks a healthy escrow stale.** One behaviour change, one register closed, and
the coverage claim proved rather than assumed. The controller's half of R-204 (items 1 and 3) is
`felhom-controller` v0.198.0.

## 1. Baselines, re-read on arrival

| Repo | Expected | Found |
|---|---|---|
| `felhom.eu` | `2a7ac03c4726` / hub v0.94.0 (deployed `felhom-hub:0.94.0`) | **exact match**, tree clean, `HEAD == origin/main` |

**§3.2's landmark had DRIFTED, and the drift changed the work.** The task described
`offsite.go:222-231` under a known-consequence comment saying the mark was made on a false premise.
That comment had already been rewritten by the R-196 comment-correction commit, and the version on
`main` gave a **non-false** ground for the mark: *"the box's re-apply may mint a fresh repository
password (it does exactly that whenever `<DataDir>/offbox/repo_password` is absent — the
guest-rebuild shape)"*. So the question was no longer "delete a comment's lie" but "is the shape it
guards actually covered elsewhere?" — which is Scenario D, and §8.2 says to stop and report if it is
not. It is; §3 below is the evidence.

## 2. What changed

`offsite.ReissueCredentials` no longer calls `MarkEscrowStale` and no longer emits the `escrow_stale`
event. **`offsite_reissued` is untouched** and still fires on every re-issue. The known-consequence
comment is rewritten to record what was done, when, and why — with the disagreement below stated in
it rather than absorbed.

**What the mark actually cost, established mechanically rather than asserted** (this is why it was a
blocker and not a nit):

1. `stale_at` set → `GetEscrowStatusForCustomer` **withholds** `restic_pw_sha256` from the report ACK.
2. With no hash, the controller's SLICE-3 auto-confirm returns early and cannot flip
   `pending → escrowed`.
3. `OffboxRunnable() = OffboxConfigured() && EscrowState == "escrowed"` → **every off-site backup
   refused**, indefinitely, on a box whose repository key was never in doubt.
4. The customer is told to re-run the recovery ceremony — which mints a new recovery code and
   supersedes the sealed blob. **During a recovery that is the one act that would have destroyed the
   key just recovered.**

## 3. Scenario D — the evidence that the removed marking is covered

The mark was precautionary and aimed at ONE shape: a re-issue followed by a box that mints a fresh
repository password (the guest-rebuild shape, where `offbox/repo_password` is absent). That shape is
measured in two independent places, and **the mark was blinding one of them**:

- **Continuous, box-side — the real coverage.** `report.EscrowAutoConfirmer.reconcileEscrowed`
  (controller) compares the ACK's sealed `restic_pw_sha256` against the box's CURRENT local repo
  password on **every report ACK**, raising the stale flag, the customer card and the
  „create a new recovery code" CTA on a mismatch. That is a **measurement**, not a guess, and it is
  continuous rather than edge-triggered. Pinned by the controller's
  `TestEscrowStale_MismatchWarnsOnceAndFlags` — re-run green this session.
  **And step 1 above was blinding it:** a stale flag empties the very hash that comparison needs, so
  the box could only reach the hash-LESS branch and report *"the hub's current blob carries NO
  password hash"* — which is false. Removing the mark restores the true signal.
- **Edge-triggered, hub-side.** R-197's `offsite_repo_key_changed` fires from
  `api.maybeEmitRepoKeyChanged` on a proven hash difference across a supersession and pages the
  operator. **Red-proved:** removing the `maybeEmitRepoKeyChanged` call from `handleHostEscrowPut`
  made `TestEscrowPut_ChangedRepoKey_RaisesSignal` fail with *"the repository key demonstrably changed
  and NO signal was raised"*, while the two silence tests stayed green.

**Disagreement recorded, per the R-96 standing rule.** Scenario D as written asks that a real key
change also *"mark the escrow stale"*. **It must not, and nothing was changed to make it.** The hub
learns of a real change at the instant a supersession **seals the new password** — i.e. when the
escrow is at its freshest. Marking it stale there would ask the customer for a ceremony to fix the
ceremony that just ran. The correct consequence at that instant is the operator alarm, which is
exactly what R-197 already does. This is recorded in the code comment, the CHANGELOG and OPEN-ITEMS,
not only here.

## 4. `MarkEscrowStale` is kept with no caller — deliberately

Per task §5 it was not to be modified, and it is not deleted either. The `stale_at` flag remains live
and correct — read by the ACK, the operator config card and the PBS-DR view — and the right way to
set it is a **future EVIDENTIAL caller** that has measured a key change rather than guessed at one.
Its doc comment now says so plainly instead of naming a caller that no longer exists, and
`TestEscrowStaleMechanism_StillWithholdsAndClears` keeps the mechanism from decaying to inert while
nothing writes it (the seam-built-but-never-wired shape, in reverse).

The schema comment and `EscrowStatus.Stale`'s comment were corrected the same way — each of the three
previously asserted a writer that is now gone.

## 5. Files modified

| File | Change |
|---|---|
| `hub/internal/offsite/offsite.go` | the pessimistic `MarkEscrowStale` + `escrow_stale` event removed; comment rewritten to record the change, the coverage and the disagreement |
| `hub/internal/offsite/offsite_test.go` | `TestReissue_InvalidatesEscrow` **replaced in place by its exact inverse** `TestReissue_DoesNotMarkAHealthyEscrowStale`; new `TestEscrowStaleMechanism_StillWithholdsAndClears` |
| `hub/internal/store/store.go` | three comments corrected (`MarkEscrowStale`, the `stale_at` schema note, `EscrowStatus.Stale`) — each had named a writer that no longer exists |
| `manifests/hub.yaml` | image tag `0.94.0` → `0.95.0` |
| `hub/CHANGELOG.md`, `CONTEXT.md`, `STATUS.md`, `documentation/…` | v0.95.0 entry; ruling **S-32**; the register and architecture updates below |

**Commits on `main`:** `d1a8edb` (behaviour + tests + comments) · `5c7d671` (CHANGELOG) ·
`975a690` (manifest bump).

**Deploy:** built + pushed `felhom-hub:0.95.0`, bumped `manifests/hub.yaml`, pushed, then a
**deliberate ArgoCD hard-refresh + sync** (auto-sync stays off; no `kubectl set image` anywhere).
Result: app `felhom` **Synced / Healthy**, `deploy/hub` rolled out, running image
`gitea.dooplex.hu/admin/felhom-hub:0.95.0`, startup log clean (offsite provisioning, pool-box checker,
PBS-DR reconciler and all six host checkers initialised; `Listening on :8080`).

## 6. Tests and red-proofs

Green gate: `cd hub && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...` — **rc=0**.
`python3 scripts/repo_gates.py --fast` — **all five gates OK**.

| Test | Result | Red-proof — what was mutated | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| `TestReissue_DoesNotMarkAHealthyEscrowStale` (C) | PASS | restored the pessimistic `MarkEscrowStale` block in `ReissueCredentials`, exactly as it was | **FAILED** — *"a re-issue marked a HEALTHY escrow stale…"* |
| `TestEscrowStaleMechanism_StillWithholdsAndClears` | PASS | same mutation | **stayed GREEN** — correctly: the mutation restores a *caller*, not a break in the mechanism. That split is the evidence Scenario C's assertion is about the caller and not the flag. |
| `TestEscrowPut_ChangedRepoKey_RaisesSignal` (D) | PASS | removed the `maybeEmitRepoKeyChanged` call from `handleHostEscrowPut` | **FAILED** — *"the repository key demonstrably changed and NO signal was raised"* |
| `TestEscrowPut_UnchangedRepoKey_Silent`, `TestEscrowPut_HashlessSupersession_NoSignal` | PASS | same | stayed green — the detector's silence branches are independent |
| controller `TestEscrowStale_MismatchWarnsOnceAndFlags` | PASS | — (cited as the continuous-coverage pin) | — |

Scenario C asserts the **consequence** (the ACK still carries the hash, so auto-confirm can proceed)
rather than the mechanism (that a function was not called), because the hash is what the drill's
blockage actually turned on. It also asserts that `offsite_reissued` still fires — removing a false
alarm must not remove the true notice.

## 7. Live validation

**Per task §12 point 5, a live re-issue was NOT run, and must not have been on demo-hp** — it would
have been a credential rotation on the box holding the drill's evidence. Part 2 is proved by test and
by the deployment being live and healthy. The controller-side halves of R-204 were validated live and
are reported in `felhom-controller/REPORT.md`.

## 8. Register and documentation

- **`OPEN-ITEMS.md`** — **R-196 → CLOSED (hub v0.95.0)**; **R-204 → items 1–3 CLOSED, item 4 OPEN
  (→ R-193)** with its dependency named. The header block is updated and states explicitly that
  **R-202**, **the ~1.2 GB orphaned-ciphertext deletion** and **R-198's retention (still UNIT-PROVEN
  ONLY — the second deliberate wipe is the next item)** all **remain open**, so nothing is presumed
  closed by association. R-201 is recorded as PASSED. **R-204 is still the highest ID; nothing new
  was minted.**
- **`architecture/00-capability-map.md`** — the recovery row now says three of the four crutches are
  gone, names the fixes and their evidence, and states that **item 4 (R-193) is the one that remains**
  and is why the row **keeps its "with a person present" qualifier**. The **R-199 back-pointer was
  already present** on the adjacent key-recovery row (added when that row was last corrected), so it
  needed no further action — verified, not assumed.
- **`architecture/07-backup-architecture.md`** — **new §7.0, "What a customer can and cannot do
  ALONE"**: the four steps in a table with what each cost and its status, plus the honest current
  answer. This is the section a future reader will use to answer the question.
- **`documentation/backlog/ROADMAP.md`** — R-196 and R-204 collapsed per the coupling rule.
- **`CONTEXT.md`** — new standing ruling **S-32**, which supersedes S-31's steps 2–5 and carries the
  blinding mechanism, the fail-closed rule and the "no TTL" reasoning forward.
- **`STATUS.md`** — rewritten to **one screen** (191 → ~90 lines) per its own header. It also had a
  corrupted, half-overwritten "What we're working on" section left from the drill session, which is
  now gone. Next item stated as the retention drill.

**CI:** felhom.eu runs **154** (`5c7d671`, code) and **155** (`975a690`, manifest) — both success.
`--no-verify` was **not** used; the pre-push gate ran and passed on every push.

## 9. Observations — noticed, NOT acted on

- **`allowedEventTypes` still lists `escrow_stale`**, which after this change has **no producer** in
  either repo. It is inert rather than harmful; removing an allowlist entry is a behaviour change and
  is out of this session's scope.
- `MarkEscrowStale` is now dead code by call-graph. Kept on purpose (§4 above) — but if a future
  session's linter or cleanup pass proposes deleting it, the reason it exists is in its doc comment
  and in the test that exercises it.
- `/` on DooPlex is at **86%** used — under the 90% abort line, but worth watching before large builds.
